Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; September 13, 2016; Federal District Court
Kelley A. Rosenberg has initiated a lawsuit against Wells Fargo Bank and Nationstar Mortgage LLC, seeking a declaratory judgment to prevent Wells Fargo from using the statutory remedy under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 244, section 14. She asserts multiple claims: a violation of Massachusetts regulations (209 C.M.R. 18.21(A)(2) and 209 C.M.R. 18.22) and the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A) in Count II, and slander of title in Count III. Rosenberg is also requesting an order to stop foreclosure on her property located at 13 Ward Street, Southboro, Massachusetts, along with monetary and punitive damages.
The court is addressing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint due to failure to state a claim. Rosenberg obtained a $354,000 loan from Bank of America in March 2005 and executed a corresponding mortgage, which was recorded. The mortgage was later assigned to Wells Fargo on April 24, 2014, and this assignment was recorded on May 1, 2014. After the assignment, Nationstar informed Rosenberg’s counsel that Wells Fargo was the current owner of the note. Wells Fargo then issued a legal notice for a foreclosure sale scheduled for January 6, 2016. In response, Rosenberg filed a complaint and an emergency motion for a restraining order to halt the foreclosure, which was denied due to insufficient likelihood of success on the merits. The case was subsequently removed to federal court. The motion to dismiss Rosenberg's complaint has been granted.
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and grant the plaintiff all reasonable inferences. To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must present a claim that is plausible on its face, necessitating factual allegations that raise the right to relief above mere speculation. The plausibility standard does not require a probability of unlawful action but demands more than a bare possibility. If a plaintiff's allegations lack sufficient weight to warrant relief, dismissal is appropriate.
Rosenberg's allegations are deemed vague and unorganized, suggesting that the conveyance of a legal interest in the Mortgage to Wells Fargo violated the trust documents, thereby disputing Wells Fargo's ownership and statutory rights under Massachusetts law. She argues that the April 2014 Assignment from Bank of America to Wells Fargo is invalid due to non-compliance with the Trust’s Pooling and Servicing Agreement. However, her counsel contends that the claims are distinct from established case law that denies standing to challenge such assignments based on similar agreements.
The court notes that Rosenberg's unclear assertions and convoluted legal arguments likely do not differentiate her case from previous rulings, reinforcing the First Circuit’s position against rehashing previously settled legal matters. As a result, the court finds that Rosenberg lacks standing to challenge the Assignment and has failed to state a plausible claim in her complaint. Consequently, her claims under Chapter 93A and for slander of title are also dismissed.
The court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Rosenberg's complaint, rejecting her attempt to apply New York law regarding trustee actions without sufficient legal analysis. Most courts have concluded that, under New York law, trustee acts are voidable, not void, which would leave her without standing to challenge the Assignment, even if New York law were applicable.
