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Vann v. City of Southaven
Citations: 199 F. Supp. 3d 1129; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105607; 2016 WL 4224271Docket: NO. 3:15CV63-M
Court: District Court, N.D. Mississippi; August 10, 2016; Federal District Court
The court, presided over by Judge Michael P. Mills, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in a § 1983 action related to the police shooting of Jeremy Vann on May 28, 2014. The incident occurred during an undercover drug operation involving Vann and his passenger, Teon Katchens, who were attempting to sell marijuana to a confidential informant. The City of Southaven employed prior arrestees as confidential informants to facilitate minor drug sales and increase revenue from non-residents. Vann and Katchens, who did not possess any weapons, were approached by plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles. As Vann attempted to flee, Officer Jeff Logan stepped in front of the vehicle, resulting in Vann being shot by both Logan and Lt. Jordan Jones after he struck Logan with his car in an attempt to escape. Following the incident, an investigation by the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation (MBI) concluded that the officers' use of deadly force was justified due to an immediate threat posed by Vann, who had committed felonious actions by striking police vehicles. The MBI's findings were supported by subsequent commendations for the officers' actions. The plaintiff acknowledges the favorable MBI report and the agreement that Logan and Jones were responsible for the fatal shots. Logan testified that he identified himself as a police officer before Vann attempted to escape by ramming his vehicle into police cars. Logan clarified that he did not aim his weapon at Vann until Vann's vehicle collided with him. During his deposition, Logan recounted jumping out of his vehicle, yelling his identity, with his badge visible and gun held in a "low ready" position, not pointed at Vann initially. He described Vann backing into another detective’s vehicle and noted the sequence of events upon Vann's impact with him. Logan's action in response to the approaching vehicle was instinctive; he fired a shot into Vann's windshield as he braced himself against the hood. After firing, he was struck by Vann's vehicle, causing him to roll off the hood. He sustained an injury to his arm when the tire of the vehicle rolled over it. Lt. Jones, who fired a second shot, stated he did so believing Logan’s life was in danger, confirming that they were yelling commands as they approached Vann's vehicle. Mr. Vann exhibited evasive behavior upon exiting his vehicle, indicating he was seeking an escape route. He then reversed into Detective Sheppard’s vehicle before moving forward towards Detective Logan’s vehicle, prompting the witness to draw his weapon. The witness confirmed observing multiple impacts between Vann's vehicle and both Logan’s and Sheppard’s vehicles. During the encounter, Detective Logan was seen attempting to evade Vann’s vehicle, ultimately being struck and thrown onto the hood before rolling off. The witness noted that Logan was incapacitated on the ground without his weapon, suggesting he was in serious distress. After Vann struck Sheppard’s vehicle a third time, the witness discharged his weapon to protect Logan, affirming he would not have fired had Logan not been in harm's way. Detective Sheppard corroborated that Vann’s vehicle hit Logan and his vehicle nearly simultaneously but refrained from firing due to concerns over crossfire. The plaintiff contends that Vann was either not trying to run anyone over or that this remains a disputed fact. Vann was attempting to escape when he made contact with Officer Logan, who was positioned in the only available opening between two vehicles. The critical issue is whether Logan shot Vann to prevent his escape or to protect himself from being struck by the vehicle. The plaintiff acknowledges that Logan was in the vehicle's path and was hit, sustaining non-serious injuries. The plaintiff argues that if Logan moved to block Vann's escape rather than to avoid being hit, the shooting could be deemed unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the plaintiff disputes whether the officers properly identified themselves as police. The officers involved were not in uniform and some wore police vests, but Logan and the other officer who shot Vann were not visibly identifiable as law enforcement. Logan was dressed casually, and though he believed he wore a badge, evidence contradicts this claim. Testimony indicates that while the defense asserts the use of lights and sirens, the plaintiff's witness did not see or hear any, and surveillance footage shows no emergency lights activated. The officers reportedly yelled "police" at Vann, but the effectiveness of this as identification is contested, with the plaintiff asserting that failure to adequately identify as police creates genuine factual disputes that could lead to liability under the Fourth Amendment. The court evaluates the motions for summary judgment by individual officers seeking qualified immunity against excessive force claims. To establish a Fourth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) injury directly resulting from excessively unreasonable force. Relevant factors for assessing excessive force include the severity of the crime, the suspect's threat level, and whether the suspect is resisting arrest (Graham v. Connor). The court applies a two-step qualified immunity analysis: first, determining if a constitutional violation occurred when evidence is viewed favorably to the plaintiff; second, assessing if the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable given the clearly established law at the time (Freeman v. Gore). The order of these prongs can be reversed if the "clearly established" prong offers a clearer resolution (Pearson v. Callahan). The burden rests on the plaintiff to prove that the defendants violated clearly established law, which is a significant challenge. The Supreme Court emphasized that officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown they violated a clearly established constitutional right, which must be defined with sufficient specificity to indicate that a reasonable official would recognize the violation (Plumhoff v. Rickard; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd). Courts are advised against defining clearly established law in overly broad terms to adequately assess the reasonableness of the official's actions in their specific context. The U.S. Supreme Court has established that to demonstrate a violation of "clearly established law," a plaintiff must provide specific legal authority that unequivocally addresses the statutory or constitutional issue at hand. This requirement was reinforced in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan*, where the Court stated that plaintiffs must cite either a relevant Supreme Court decision or a strong consensus of persuasive cases in the Court of Appeals. In *Taylor v. Barkes*, the Court noted that no Supreme Court decision discusses suicide screening protocols, and the prevailing authority at the time of the plaintiff's decedent's death indicated that such a right was not recognized. The Court unanimously held that the plaintiff failed to meet the necessary burden of showing relevant authority, thus justifying dismissal based on qualified immunity. This standard is critical, particularly as the plaintiff in the current case relies on a Sixth Circuit decision that was issued after the incident in question, which means it cannot support the qualified immunity claim. Even if there had been a contemporaneous circuit court decision, it would not suffice to demonstrate a "robust consensus" of authority. The Supreme Court clarified that a plaintiff's inability to show the requisite authority is grounds for granting a qualified immunity motion without needing to assess the constitutionality of the defendant’s actions. The plaintiff's arguments regarding "clearly established" law are weak and contradict established Supreme Court precedent, particularly his reliance on the *Godawa* decision, which states that the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects is unconstitutional. The plaintiffs' argument misinterprets the Supreme Court's guidelines regarding the citation of case law, particularly in the context of deadly force. While the Court in *Garner* indicated that not all uses of deadly force to prevent escape are reasonable, this does not provide specific notice to law enforcement regarding the legality of a particular use of force in a specific situation. The assertion that the broad principles from *Garner* could satisfy the 'clearly established' standard in most cases involving fleeing suspects is contrary to the Supreme Court's intent, which emphasizes the need for a more detailed understanding of the rights at stake. In *Brosseau v. Haugen*, the Court clarified that vague references to excessive force standards do not suffice to give police officers fair warning of unlawful conduct, reiterating that rights must be clearly established in a specific context. The plaintiff's reliance on the general *Garner* standard fails to meet this requirement for qualified immunity. This principle was further reinforced in *Plumhoff v. Rickard*, where the Supreme Court overturned a ruling that police officers had violated the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force. The case involved a high-speed chase initiated when police attempted to stop Rickard for a traffic violation, resulting in dangerous driving conditions. The Court's decision highlighted that qualified immunity would exist regardless of the Fourth Amendment issue, underscoring the necessity for clear legal standards in evaluating the use of deadly force by police officers. Rickard exited I-40 in Memphis, made a right turn that led to contact with Evans’ police cruiser, causing his car to spin into a parking lot where it collided with Plumhoff's cruiser. In an attempt to evade capture, Rickard reversed his car as Evans and Plumhoff approached, with Evans brandishing a firearm. During this encounter, Rickard's car made contact with another police cruiser, and despite being pinned, he accelerated, prompting Plumhoff to fire three shots into the vehicle. Rickard then executed a 180-degree turn and fled down another street, triggering Gardner and Galtelli to fire an additional 12 shots, totaling 15 shots fired during the incident. Both Rickard and his passenger, Allen, died from gunshot wounds and crash-related injuries. The case bears similarities to Plumhoff, which involved a fatal shooting after a suspect was initially stopped for a nonviolent crime. The Supreme Court found that the circumstances in Plumhoff were somewhat more favorable to the plaintiff, as the total shots fired during that incident were highlighted. The Court emphasized the need for a nuanced analysis of qualified immunity, stating that clearly established law should not be defined broadly and that cases must be assessed based on specific facts. Citing Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court noted that there was no clearly established law preventing officers from firing at a fleeing vehicle to protect nearby officers and civilians. They concluded that, as of February 21, 1999, it was not unconstitutional for an officer to shoot at a fleeing driver under such conditions. To overcome qualified immunity, the respondent must demonstrate either that the officers' actions were materially different from those in Brosseau or that subsequent legal developments established a clear standard contrary to the officers' conduct. The respondent failed to make either showing. In Plumhoff, the Supreme Court analyzed the facts and determined they were not materially different from those in Brosseau, finding them more favorable for the defendants. The Court noted that, unlike Brosseau, where an officer shot at a driver who had just begun to flee without posing an immediate danger, the officers in Plumhoff fired at Rickard after a prolonged, high-speed chase that endangered both officers and civilians. The Court highlighted the absence of any case between 1999 and 2004 establishing the unconstitutionality of lethal force in high-speed chases, with the District Court citing only one distinguishable case. The Court noted that the factual scenario in that case differed significantly from Plumhoff, where there was clear evidence of a police officer’s immediate danger due to the suspect's reckless driving. Consequently, the plaintiff failed to provide authority that clearly established the illegality of the officers' actions prior to the 2014 shooting, thus upholding the defense of qualified immunity for the defendants. Additionally, the court acknowledged an important exception to the requirement for prior authority, referencing Hope v. Pelzer, which emphasizes the need to consider the unique circumstances of a case, particularly in tragic incidents like fatal shootings. Six Supreme Court Justices determined that the Eleventh Circuit mistakenly found qualified immunity applicable to the defendants in a case involving Eighth Amendment violations, stating that the alleged facts made such violations apparent. Although the plaintiff could not provide federal appellate authority explicitly deeming the act of tying a prisoner to a hitching post unlawful, the Supreme Court clarified in subsequent rulings that the absence of such authority could be overlooked when the constitutional violation is evident. This principle, known as the Hope exception, suggests that in clear cases, the absence of case law does not preclude establishing a violation. In Cooper v. Brown, a 2016 case, the court applied the Hope exception when a police officer allowed a police dog to attack a defenseless suspect, inflicting serious injuries. The court denied the officer’s qualified immunity motion, affirming that the situation was “obvious” enough to warrant this exception, despite the plaintiff citing only one relevant circuit decision. The court emphasized the importance of the Hope exception to prevent defendants from engaging in egregiously unconstitutional behavior unchallenged by existing case law. However, the court concluded that the actions of the officers in the current case did not meet the threshold for the Hope exception, as they did not find those actions to be unreasonable or “obvious.” At the summary judgment stage, the court must view facts favorably for the plaintiff, the non-moving party, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in Tolan v. Cotton, which mandates drawing inferences in favor of the non-movant even when assessing the clearly-established prong of qualified immunity. The non-moving party is required to present "significant probative" evidence to counter a properly supported motion for summary judgment; mere conclusory allegations or minimal evidence are insufficient. In this case, the plaintiff argues whether Detective Logan positioned himself to prevent Vann's escape or to protect himself. While the court finds only one of the plaintiff's requested inferences reasonable—that Logan aimed to block Vann's escape—it acknowledges the plausibility of Logan's self-defense claim. The court emphasizes that Detective Logan's actions must be evaluated based on the circumstances he faced, including the unexpected actions of Vann, who was recklessly endangering officers. The Supreme Court's guidance indicates that the reasonableness of a use of force should be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the field, considering the fast-paced and tense nature of police work where split-second decisions are often necessary. Great deference is warranted for the split-second decisions made by Detective Logan in the chaotic circumstances of this case. The court finds no evidence suggesting that Logan acted outside his job duties. It is the natural instinct of police officers to arrest individuals engaging in unlawful conduct, and yielding to a suspect's violent resistance, as the plaintiff suggests, would undermine law enforcement effectiveness. The court believes that allowing suspects to escape under such circumstances would lead to increased dangerous behavior towards police. Regarding the plaintiff's claim about the failure of officers to properly identify themselves, the court acknowledges that reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the plaintiff; however, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the defendants. The plaintiff admits that some officers wore police vests, indicating their identity as law enforcement. The court asserts that the overall identification provided by all officers involved must be considered, and testimony indicates that multiple officers either verbally identified themselves or displayed badges. Detective Kenneth Bryant confirmed that he activated his lights and was wearing a vest, while others also testified to similar identification efforts during the arrest. The court finds the plaintiff's argument regarding identification unreasonable given the evidence presented. Yoakum was responsible for monitoring the confidential informant, which limited his ability to witness the incident. Detective Lance Sheppard testified he was in a marked police vehicle, activated his lights upon approaching the suspect's vehicle, and recalled another police vehicle sounding its siren, though he could not identify which one. He yelled "Police Stop!" as the suspect, Jeremy Vann, struck his vehicle. Lt. Jones confirmed that both he and Sheppard activated their lights and sirens, noting that all officers were shouting "Police." Detective Jeff Logan, who was wearing his police badge, was struck by a vehicle and had his badge removed afterward. His primary vehicle was inoperable due to a prior accident, so he drove a backup without lights or sirens but heard sirens from other vehicles. Logan observed Lt. Jones activate emergency lights before Vann attempted to flee and identified himself as a police officer upon exiting his vehicle. Testimony from the officers strongly indicates that multiple police officers identified themselves during the incident. In contrast, Teon Katchens provided inconsistent accounts of the events. Initially, he claimed he was on a social media platform when he communicated with Vann about a drug deal. He described how they were approached by police, raised his hands, and witnessed Vann’s evasive actions before he exited the vehicle. The defendants highlighted that Katchens' video-taped police interview aligned with his written statement; he consistently referred to the officers as “the Police” and suggested that Vann was aware they were law enforcement. Teon asserts he repeatedly instructed Jeremy to stop and raised his hands when surrounded. He supports his claim by stating he heard a police officer order Vann to "Freeze." However, Teon's affidavit dated December 24, 2015, contradicts earlier statements. Initially, he claimed to have heard sirens, but now asserts he did not. In a recorded interview, he mentioned a potential setup by a buyer but later suggests he believed they were being robbed. The court must evaluate Teon's credibility and the affidavit's relevance, but the defendants argue it lacks merit in light of other evidence. Katchens' December 2015 affidavit conflicts with his previous statements, notably his claim of not seeing police lights or hearing sirens, which contradicts his earlier assertion of police presence. His statement that he was unaware the individuals were police officers conflicts with his admission that he informed Vann about calling the police. The court finds Katchens' original statements more credible and consistent with the facts, particularly given the circumstances of the attempted drug transaction where officers surrounded their vehicle with guns drawn. The court highlights that Katchens' later affidavit does not provide a reasonable basis for inferring facts regarding identification, and the plaintiff fails to cite any federal appellate decision establishing that the officers' actions, under the plaintiff's account, violated constitutional rights. This omission is critical to the qualified immunity defense, which precludes applying the “obvious case” exception in this instance. Plaintiff failed to argue the Hope exception in his briefing, conceding a crucial fact: Detective Logan was in the path of Vann’s vehicle during the shooting. In the context of qualified immunity, merely presenting a version of the facts is insufficient without supporting it with relevant federal appellate authority that establishes the illegality of the defendants’ actions. The court emphasizes that plaintiffs face a significant challenge in "clearly establishing" the illegality of actions under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, as highlighted in cases like Brosseau, Plumhoff, and Taylor. The court references Mullenix v. Luna, which reinforces the need for plaintiffs to base their claims on specific legal precedents rather than generalized principles. The court notes that the requirement to "clearly establish" the law cannot be overlooked and that the plaintiff has not met this burden. Furthermore, there is existing authority suggesting the defendants' actions were reasonable, particularly citing Hathaway v. Bazany, which upheld the use of deadly force by an officer when faced with an imminent threat. The court concludes that the plaintiff's failure to provide supporting authority and the presence of contrary authority necessitate dismissal of the case. The distinguishing factor in this case is the rapid response required from Officer Bazany when faced with a perceived threat from an oncoming vehicle. The Fifth Circuit emphasizes that officers are afforded significant deference in their decision to use lethal force in such high-pressure situations. The court aligns with the defendants, citing Bazany as supportive of their stance. It addresses allegations against some officers for failing to identify themselves during a lawful arrest, framing these as mere negligence, insufficient for constitutional claims. The court also discusses Officer Logan's quick decision-making regarding his positioning relative to Vann’s vehicle, concluding that any potential negligence does not equate to a constitutional violation. The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Daniels v. Williams establishes that governmental negligence does not constitute a constitutional injury, and this principle extends to Fourth Amendment cases. The court notes that an officer's negligent actions do not render their subsequent use of force unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Only intentional or reckless provocations, which constitute independent constitutional violations, could make defensive actions unreasonable. The court finds that the defendants' actions were not unreasonable, even in a negligence context, and therefore do not violate Fourth Amendment standards within the scope of Section 1983. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a "robust consensus" of legal authority to support his claims against the individual defendants, which undermines his ability to counter their qualified immunity motion. He did not present any relevant legal decisions established prior to the shooting, nor did he argue that this case falls under the "obvious" exception outlined in Hope v. Pelzer. The court acknowledges the tragic nature of the shooting and sympathizes with Vann’s family but emphasizes that federal law favors the individual defendants, leading to the conclusion that their motions for summary judgment should be granted. Regarding the City of Southaven, the absence of constitutional violations by its police officers negates any potential liability for the City under the Monell doctrine. According to Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, a municipality can only be held liable if its actions resulted from an official policy or custom causing a constitutional tort. The Fourth Amendment claims stem from the officers' responses to unexpected violent resistance from Vann during arrest, which the court finds lawful. Even if the officers acted unconstitutionally, the plaintiff fails to show that their actions were in line with a municipal policy or custom. The plaintiff attempts to argue broader police practices linked to municipal policy but does not successfully establish that these practices were in effect at the time of the incident. The excerpt outlines issues related to the use of confidential informants (CIs) and the practice of conducting "reverse sting operations" (RIPs) by the Southaven Police Department (SPD). It highlights that officers, including Sergeant Yoakum, commonly offer money to individuals to travel to Southaven to sell drugs, with no formal written policies governing these CIs. The practice is described as widespread, posing risks, especially during RIPs where plainclothes officers confront unknown occupants in vehicles, including children, over minor drug transactions. Changes to RIP practices were implemented following incidents of violence, including an officer shooting into vehicles. Captain Stewart from the Narcotics division indicated that RIPs are now conducted on a case-by-case basis rather than routinely. The court acknowledges the broader controversies surrounding the coercion of drug suspects as CIs but asserts that this case is focused on specific police actions taken in response to an incident involving an individual named Vann. The court concludes that the police conduct in this situation did not violate the Fourth Amendment, despite recognizing the plaintiff's right to raise related issues. The court further determines that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the officers' actions were executed under a city policy, as his arguments concerning general police practices do not establish a direct causal link to his claims. While acknowledging the legitimacy of concerns regarding the use of CIs and RIPs, the court emphasizes that imperfections in police practices do not automatically imply constitutional violations. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient legal authority supporting his claims that the city’s methods regarding CIs or RIPs violate the Fourth Amendment. The court finds that the plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority to support his claims. The argument that the City ratified the actions of the defendant officers through a flawed investigation is rejected, as the court determines that the officers' actions were not unconstitutional, negating potential liability for the City. The plaintiff's assertion of "deliberate indifference" based on prior incidents involving City officers is deemed insufficient, as those incidents lack a reasonable connection to the current case and have not been established as misconduct. Consequently, the court concludes that the plaintiff's municipal liability arguments are meritless and denies them. Having upheld the individual defendants' qualified immunity, the court grants the motion for summary judgment in its entirety. A separate judgment will follow as per Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. Additionally, the court notes the relevance of the case Godawa v. Byrd but finds significant differences, particularly stronger evidence in the current case regarding the danger faced by the officers. It emphasizes that the analysis should not consider decisions made after the events in question. Lastly, the plaintiff's mention of plainclothes officers conducting arrests is countered by the acknowledgment that some officers wore police vests.