Strosnider v. City of Nampa

Citations: 196 F. Supp. 3d 1159; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96956; 2016 WL 3983227Docket: Case No. 1:14-cv-00459-BLW

Court: District Court, D. Idaho; July 25, 2016; Federal District Court

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Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was heard on May 23, 2016, regarding the case initiated by Doug Strosnider, a former Assistant Fire Chief at the Nampa Fire Department, following his termination. Strosnider had raised fire safety concerns about Golden Glow Towers and Landmark Towers, leading him to assign Deputy Fire Marshals to inspect the buildings and communicate his concerns to Nampa's elected officials, including the Mayor. Despite the Mayor's opposition, Strosnider issued Notices and Orders to the building owners. Subsequently, he was placed on leave and terminated, prompting this lawsuit.

The standard for summary judgment requires that there be no genuine dispute over material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment aims to eliminate unsupported claims to conserve resources. A mere allegation of factual dispute does not suffice to defeat a properly supported motion. The court must view evidence favorably for the non-moving party without making credibility assessments, while direct evidence from the non-movant must be accepted unless unreasonable inferences are drawn. The moving party initially bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine factual dispute but does not need to provide affirmative evidence. Instead, they can point out the lack of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims, after which the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish a genuine dispute using evidence beyond mere pleadings.

Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act prohibits coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference against individuals who aid or encourage others in exercising their housing rights. This provision extends to individuals who may disrupt the enjoyment of such rights with discriminatory intent. To establish a claim under Section 3617, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) engagement in a protected activity, (2) experience of an adverse action by the defendant, and (3) a causal connection between the two. If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. If a reason is provided, the plaintiff must show it is a pretext for discrimination.

In this case, the defendants argue that Strosnider's claim does not fall under Section 3617, asserting that his employment-related actions are unrelated to housing rights. However, the court finds that Section 3617 is broad enough to encompass Strosnider's situation, as he allegedly faced retaliation for assisting in a fair housing investigation. The evidence indicates he was contacted by the Idaho Fair Housing Coalition (IFHC) to support their investigation and was subsequently placed on administrative leave and terminated for these actions. The court concludes that a jury could reasonably find that Strosnider was punished for aiding the investigation, and the defendants’ justification of poor management skills is deemed insufficient. Therefore, there is a disputed factual issue regarding the reasons for Strosnider's termination, leading the court to deny the motion for summary judgment on the Section 3617 claim.

To succeed in his First Amendment claim, Strosnider must demonstrate five elements: (1) he addressed a matter of public concern; (2) he spoke as a private citizen; (3) his speech was a significant factor in the adverse employment action; (4) the city lacked sufficient justification for treating him differently from the public; and (5) the adverse action would not have occurred without his protected speech. The summary judgment dispute focuses on whether Strosnider spoke in his capacity as a private citizen or as a public employee. Speech is considered citizen speech if it is not made as part of official duties. Strosnider's communication with the Idaho Fair Housing Coalition (IFHC) did not pertain to his duties concerning fire code compliance or housing discrimination, indicating he acted as a private citizen. Consequently, the Court will not grant summary judgment on this claim.

Regarding the Whistleblower Act claim, Idaho's statute protects public employees from adverse actions due to reporting misconduct. To establish a whistleblower claim, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an adverse action stemmed from protected activity. A prima facie case requires showing (1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took adverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between the two. The McDonnell Douglas framework applies, requiring the plaintiff to first establish a prima facie case, after which the employer must provide a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the action. If such a reason is presented, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason is a pretext for retaliation.

Strosnider inspected two buildings, Golden Glow and Landmark, identifying safety hazards for tenants and firefighters. He reported these findings to Mayor Henry and Chief Malott and initiated enforcement of the fire code by issuing Notice and Orders for both properties. Strosnider also notified Northwest ADA and the Idaho Fair Housing Council (IFHC), which used his findings in their investigation of housing violations. Under Idaho Code § 6-2104(2), an employer cannot retaliate against an employee for participating in investigations. Considering the facts favorably toward Strosnider, he established a prima facie case of retaliatory conduct under the whistleblower statute. The defendants' claim that Chief Malott terminated Strosnider for "poor management skills and lack of judgment" fails to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, leading the Court to deny summary judgment on the whistleblower claim.

Strosnider's due process claims hinge on whether he was an at-will employee. To have a protected property interest in continued employment, an employee must possess a reasonable expectation or legitimate claim of entitlement to it. In Idaho, employment is generally at-will, allowing either party to terminate the relationship without liability. However, this presumption can be rebutted by express or implied limitations on termination rights. An implied limitation may arise when circumstances suggest both parties intended to restrict the right to terminate. Relevant factors in determining Strosnider's employment status include the city of Nampa's employee handbook, the Nampa Fire Department's Rules and Regulations, disciplinary policies, and Nampa City code.

Strosnider acknowledges that the Nampa employee handbook does not create a property interest in his employment but points to sections suggesting that the Nampa Fire Department's Rules and Regulations might. These regulations state that dismissal can occur for reasons such as misconduct or inefficiency and provide over 30 examples of conduct warranting disciplinary action. The Court finds that a reasonable person could conclude that both parties intended to limit the Department's right to terminate employees, contingent upon whether these Rules apply to non-union members like Strosnider. There is ambiguity in the terminology of "members," as it may encompass all Department members, including those in leadership roles. This determination is left for the finder of fact.

The Court also notes that it need not address whether Policy 1000 creates a property interest, although it likely does not, as it outlines the responsibilities of higher-ranking officials in the disciplinary process. The question of whether the Nampa City code creates a property interest for Strosnider is also left open, as it involves factual questions regarding merit principles in employee separations. Although the Idaho fire code does not explicitly state that assistant fire marshals can only be terminated for cause, it does not automatically classify them as at-will employees. The terms defining exempted positions are undefined, and there is recognition that Strosnider was not a typical department head. Thus, the Court denies summary judgment, allowing for further examination of these factual issues.

Establishing a deprivation of a liberty interest due to governmental defamation requires meeting the "stigma plus" test, which necessitates public disclosure of a contested stigmatizing statement by the government alongside the denial of a tangible interest, such as employment. In this case, the defendants concede that the elements of the claim are met, arguing instead that no stigmatizing comments were made public and that Strosnider received a name-clearing hearing. However, Idaho Code 74-106(1) restricts public access to certain personnel records, potentially allowing for the stigmatizing language to be disclosed as part of Strosnider's employment history. Due process mandates that a terminated employee has a right to clear their name when stigmatizing information is publicly disclosed, requiring notice and a pre-termination hearing. Evidence suggests Strosnider did not receive a pre-termination hearing, and the post-termination hearing conducted by Mayor Henry raises questions about his impartiality, given his opposition to Strosnider's actions. Consequently, there's a genuine issue of material fact regarding the procedural due process claim, leading to the denial of summary judgment on this claim. Regarding the breach of contract and good faith claims, the defendants argue these claims fail based on their earlier due process arguments. Since there remains a question of fact on the due process issue, summary judgment on the breach of contract and good faith claims is also denied.

Qualified immunity is sought by defendants concerning Strosnider’s constitutional claims, which protects government officials from lawsuits unless their actions violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would recognize. To defeat qualified immunity, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the allegations, if true, constitute a constitutional violation; and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. The defendants argue that the law regarding Strosnider’s claims was not clearly established, noting that existing precedent must make the statutory or constitutional issue indisputable, rather than requiring a directly applicable case. The right must be articulated with reasonable specificity to ensure that officials understand their conduct may violate that right. In this case, Nampa Fire Department Rules and Regulations create a property interest in employment, which stipulates that termination can occur only under specific conditions. Consequently, it was clearly established that Strosnider could not be deprived of his job without due process. Additionally, it was recognized that disclosing a stigmatizing statement by the government without prior notice and hearing constitutes a procedural due process violation. The court concluded that a brief meeting with the Mayor did not suffice to meet due process requirements. Therefore, the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. The court will not address the whistleblower claim against individual defendants, as Strosnider asserts that claim only against the City of Nampa.