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United States v. Cornejo
Citations: 196 F. Supp. 3d 1137; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96229; 2016 WL 3960002Docket: No. 2:14-cr-00342-KJM-1
Court: District Court, E.D. California; July 22, 2016; Federal District Court
Defendant Jairo Cornejo seeks to suppress evidence and statements from a December 13, 2014 traffic stop, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States. The government opposes this motion. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing over multiple dates in 2015 and 2016, with testimony from government and defense witnesses, including law enforcement and rental car employees, and accepted various exhibits, such as dash cam footage and photographs relevant to the traffic stop. Procedurally, the government filed a criminal complaint against Cornejo for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin, leading to an indictment on December 18, 2014. Cornejo pleaded not guilty and subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence on June 17, 2015. After initial hearings, the court determined further evidentiary hearings were necessary to resolve factual disputes. The initial traffic stop occurred on December 13, 2014, when Deputy Gunsauls, a K-9 unit officer, was patrolling Interstate 5. His vehicle was equipped with radar and recording systems, and he was part of a specialized unit focused on counter-terrorism and smuggling. The case includes the submission of closing arguments and supplemental authorities, with the motion ultimately submitted for decision on June 15, 2016. The court granted part of Cornejo's motion. Gunsauls conducts high-volume traffic enforcement in Shasta County, specifically along highways and Interstate 5. He observed a white Nissan Sentra, driven by Cornejo, traveling at an estimated seventy miles per hour in a sixty-five miles per hour zone. After moving behind the sedan and confirming the speed with radar, Gunsauls noted Cornejo slowed to sixty miles per hour, which he deemed a violation of California Vehicle Code sections 22349 and 22400 due to its impact on traffic flow. The stop occurred just north of the Fawndale Road exit on Interstate 5, where Gunsauls activated his lights, prompting his in-car recording systems. Gunsauls selectively muted the audio during the stop for officer safety to prevent criminals from learning his tactics. Cornejo complied promptly with the stop, albeit mistakenly activating the windshield wipers instead of the blinker. Upon approach, Gunsauls informed Cornejo of the speeding and subsequent slowing. He requested Cornejo's license and vehicle documentation. Cornejo initially presented a credit card before providing a Washington state driver’s license and a rental agreement from Enterprise, which Gunsauls found suspicious due to handwritten elements, a manual credit card imprint, and the note “CA only” on the agreement, despite Cornejo stating he was en route to Washington. Cornejo claimed to have rented the vehicle the previous day from San Jose, California. Gunsauls observed several items in the car during a traffic stop, including empty beverage containers indicating potential long-distance travel, which he found suspicious given the short time frame. He noted that San Jose was approximately six hours south and expressed concern about the quantity of liquids consumed in that time. Although he acknowledged uncertainty about when the drinks were consumed, he reported that the driver, Cornejo, appeared nervous and was breathing rapidly, though the video did not clearly corroborate this behavior. During their brief initial conversation, Gunsauls informed Cornejo he would likely just issue a warning. After this interaction, he returned to his patrol car, turned off his microphone, and expressed a sixty percent suspicion that Cornejo might be smuggling something based on his demeanor and the items in the vehicle. Gunsauls then notified dispatch, conducted a records check, and ran the vehicle's license plate, confirming it was not reported stolen and that Cornejo had no outstanding warrants. However, he did not verify the validity of Cornejo’s driver’s license or the rental agreement at that time, nor did he begin filling out a warning citation, allowing about ten minutes to pass without further action. Gunsauls initiated a traffic stop and observed Cornejo fidgeting in his vehicle, although dashboard video did not indicate clear nervousness. After broadcasting the stop, Deputy Ray Hughes arrived to assist, which is typical for Gunsauls. Eight minutes post-initiation, Hughes instructed Cornejo to exit the vehicle, and Cornejo consented to a pat-down, during which no weapons were found. While Hughes conducted the search, Gunsauls began filling out a written warning citation. Gunsauls engaged Cornejo in conversation while completing the citation, with Hughes monitoring the surroundings. Later, Hughes filled out part of the citation while Gunsauls performed a K-9 sniff of the sedan. The citation process was detailed, requiring the documentation of various personal and vehicle information, including Cornejo's description and the vehicle's license plate. Cornejo stated he had been driving at 66 mph, and Gunsauls informed him that his radar recorded a speed of 60 mph. The citation was ultimately a warning, with no court appearance required for Cornejo. Gunsauls questioned Cornejo while completing a warning citation, asking about his time in San Jose, the location of Toppenish, his occupation as a car detailer, and his rental car return plans. Cornejo indicated he was visiting his parents, planned to return the car to Washington, and claimed Enterprise was aware of this change, despite the rental agreement stating California only. Gunsauls expressed skepticism about Cornejo's story, noting his increasing nervousness and body language during the interaction, but observed no signs of aggression or disrespect from Cornejo. Gunsauls informed Cornejo he was stopped for speeding and inquired about any guns, drugs, or large amounts of money in the vehicle, to which Cornejo replied negatively. Gunsauls requested permission to search the sedan, which Cornejo initially granted but later rescinded after being told he could decline. After confirming the status of Cornejo's driver’s license and his past ticket for a rolling stop sign, Gunsauls instructed Hughes to finish the warning citation after about six and a half minutes of conversation. Approximately twenty minutes after the initial stop, Gunsauls retrieved a narcotics K-9 to perform a sniff of the rental car. The K-9 alerted to the front of the sedan, showing enthusiasm near the open passenger window and sniffing intently at the right front bumper area. Although the video evidence was partially obstructed during a second sniff, Gunsauls testified that the K-9 displayed strong interest in the front of the vehicle, indicating potential narcotics presence. Gunsauls returned the K-9 to his patrol car and asked Cornejo if there was anything illegal in his rental car, to which Cornejo replied no. Cornejo stated he had rented the vehicle the day prior and denied any friends used marijuana. Gunsauls informed Cornejo that the K-9 had alerted to the car's front, prompting a search. During the search, Gunsauls found a store receipt from Bakersfield that contradicted Cornejo's statements, as Bakersfield is several hours from San Jose. Cornejo continued to deny any illegal items and consented to a search. He was placed in the back of another officer's patrol car while the search continued. Cornejo's driver’s license was confirmed as valid. The search revealed drug packages in the rear driver’s side door, leading to the dispatch of a third officer for safety reasons to transport the sedan for further examination. Later, Cornejo admitted to driving from Sunnyvale to Los Angeles to pick up drugs for transport to Salem, Oregon, acknowledging awareness of the drugs without knowing their exact location in the car. Cornejo is seeking to suppress evidence obtained from the search, which includes three bundles of suspected methamphetamine (3,028.6 grams), three bundles of suspected heroin (2,218 grams), $5,000 in cash, two cell phones, the rental agreement, a GPS unit, and any additional evidence found in the vehicle. He also seeks to suppress all statements made, though he does not specify a timeframe for these statements. The legal standards for suppressing evidence reference the exclusionary rule established under the Fourth Amendment, which protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. A criminal defendant can seek to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment rights under the exclusionary rule, which applies to both direct and indirect products of an illegal search. The rule serves as a judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations rather than a personal right of the aggrieved party. Not all Fourth Amendment violations necessitate evidence suppression; courts first determine if a violation occurred and then assess the appropriateness of suppression. Searches without judicial approval are generally per se unreasonable, with limited exceptions. The government must prove that warrantless searches fall within these exceptions. One such exception is a Terry stop, allowing brief detentions based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion requires specific, articulable facts that justify the stop. This standard extends to traffic stops, which are akin to Terry stops. The scope of the stop must relate to the reasoning behind it. In this case, Cornejo contends that his warrantless traffic stop and subsequent search of his rental car were unlawful based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Rodriguez, made after the events in question. Rodriguez established that a K-9 sniff conducted during a traffic stop requires independent, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity if it prolongs the stop. Cornejo can reference Rodriguez for his motion since Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment apply retroactively to cases not yet final at the time of the decision. Even if a Fourth Amendment violation is found, the government can still admit the evidence if an exception to the exclusionary rule applies, such as the good-faith exception. This exception allows evidence obtained through searches conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent to be admissible. The government argues that the officers relied on pre-Rodriguez case law, specifically Illinois v. Caballes, to extend the stop. The Court in Davis emphasized balancing the deterrent effect of exclusion against the significant social costs it incurs. Exclusion is not warranted if the societal costs outweigh the benefits, as it can suppress reliable evidence and hinder justice. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the good-faith exception as applicable only to police actions authorized by binding precedent, distinguishing it from qualified immunity. Cornejo does not contest the legality of his initial stop, which was based on reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation as determined by radar readings. Gunsauls had a valid basis for suspecting Cornejo of violating California Vehicle Code sections 22349 and 22400. This suspicion was supported by the K-9 alert from Chase, a well-trained drug-detection dog, which established probable cause for searching Cornejo's vehicle, as affirmed by Supreme Court precedent. Cornejo's motion raises two key issues: whether the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged under Rodriguez and, if so, whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court found that after a traffic stop's initial purpose—addressing the traffic violation—has been fulfilled, any further detention requires reasonable suspicion. The Court rejected the government's claim that a brief delay (seven to eight minutes) was a minor intrusion, emphasizing that the duration of a traffic stop should not exceed what is necessary to complete its purpose. Related tasks may include checking the driver's license, verifying vehicle registration, and looking for outstanding warrants. The Court concluded that officers cannot conduct unrelated checks that extend the stop without reasonable suspicion. An officer can detain a driver during a traffic stop to perform routine tasks related to the traffic violation, such as checking the vehicle's registration and the driver's license. However, a dog sniff for detecting criminal activity is not part of the traffic mission and cannot be conducted unless there is independent, reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior. The court analyzes whether the duration of the stop was extended beyond what was necessary for the traffic mission and if there was reasonable suspicion justifying any delay leading to the dog sniff. Cornejo acknowledged that the first twelve minutes of the stop were lawful, during which time the officer completed tasks connected to the traffic mission. However, Cornejo contended that the stop was unlawfully extended when the officer filled out a written warning and asked questions, while a K-9 sniff was conducted. Previous cases established that questioning unrelated to the traffic mission does not convert a lawful stop into an unlawful seizure, provided it does not prolong the stop. The Ninth Circuit has allowed brief, unrelated questioning during stops if the overall detention remains reasonable, but there is a conflict with Rodriguez, which mandates that any extension for a dog sniff requires independent suspicion. Rodriguez did not differentiate between delays caused by dog sniffs and those from unrelated questioning, treating both as part of the same analysis. The precedent from *Illinois v. Caballes* and *Arizona v. Johnson* established that the Fourth Amendment permits certain unrelated inquiries during a traffic stop, provided they do not extend the duration of the stop. However, *Caballes* warned that a stop becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time necessary to issue a warning ticket. This caution was reiterated in *Johnson*, which stated that the legality of the seizure depends on whether unrelated inquiries extend the stop's duration. Although it appears unrelated questioning, like dog sniffs, requires reasonable suspicion if it prolongs a stop, the court need not address conflicts between *Rodriguez* and *Turvin* because Officer Gunsauls’ questioning extended the stop unreasonably under either standard. Gunsauls did not begin filling out the written warning citation during the ten minutes he waited in his patrol car for record checks and backup. By the time he started the citation and questioned Cornejo, he knew Cornejo had no outstanding warrants, the vehicle was not stolen, and Cornejo carried no weapons. After completing preliminary checks, Gunsauls spent approximately six-and-a-half minutes on unrelated questions while filling out the citation. Questions included Cornejo's occupation, duration of his stay in San Jose, and inquiries about weapons or drugs in the rental car. Approximately twenty minutes into the stop, Gunsauls directed Hughes to finish the citation, which took less than one minute. The court found that the eight minutes taken to complete a simple citation was unreasonably prolonged. Gunsauls suggested that safety concerns typically slow citation processes, but since Hughes was present for backup, the court concluded Gunsauls intentionally delayed the citation process to gather additional information. The video evidence demonstrates that the dog sniff prolonged the traffic stop, as Officer Hughes retained the citation and documents for an additional minute and a half while waiting for Officer Gunsauls to walk his dog around the vehicle. According to Rodriguez v. United States, a traffic stop becomes unlawful if it is extended beyond the time necessary to issue a citation. In this instance, issuing a warning citation should have taken significantly less than eight minutes, making the deputies' delay of over twenty-five minutes unjustifiable for checking Cornejo’s license. The Supreme Court clarified that the critical issue is whether the K-9 sniff added time to the stop, rather than its timing relative to the issuance of a ticket. The Court also disallowed the argument that officers could incrementally prolong a stop for unrelated tasks as long as the overall duration remained reasonable. Since the stop was unnecessarily extended, it was deemed unlawful unless the deputies possessed independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion requires an officer to have a specific and objective basis for believing that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that broad profiles, such as ethnic appearance or mere actions like checking a rearview mirror, do not constitute particularized suspicion. Courts evaluate reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, allowing officers to use their training and experience to interpret cumulative information, while avoiding a piecemeal analysis of individual innocent actions that, when considered collectively, might justify further investigation. Examination of whether police conducted a diligent investigation to confirm or dispel suspicions is essential. The government highlights initial signs of potential criminal activity related to Cornejo's behavior and vehicle. Notable factors include: 1) Cornejo's route on I-5, known for drug transport; 2) his visibly increased nervousness and rapid breathing during the initial stop; 3) the presence of multiple energy drinks and water bottles, which seemed excessive for the travel duration. As the stop progressed, further indicators raised concerns: 1) Cornejo’s persistent arguments about his speed despite being told he would only receive a warning; 2) escalating nervousness; 3) hesitance in responding to questions about his destination; and 4) inability to explain a rental agreement that limited use to California while intending to return the car in Washington. The government argues these factors collectively provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court’s reasonable suspicion analysis relies on the credibility of the officers' testimony and the sufficiency of information available. However, inconsistencies arise in Officer Gunsauls’ account, particularly regarding his claim that Cornejo was significantly impacting traffic, which is contradicted by dashboard video evidence. Gunsauls expressed uncertainty about Cornejo's involvement in drug smuggling but failed to pursue further investigation effectively, such as not verifying the legitimacy of the rental agreement or questioning Cornejo about the beverage containers. Additionally, the K-9 sniff was delayed by approximately twenty minutes, despite the presence of another officer who could have assisted. Concerns about the selective muting of audio during critical moments of the interaction further complicate the reliability of Gunsauls' explanations, which he attributed to officer safety and tactical considerations, yet his rationale does not justify the muting during pivotal investigative actions. Selective muting in the case may have excluded Hughes' questioning that was irrelevant to the traffic stop, sounds that could challenge the reliability of the K-9 alert, or exculpatory statements made by the defendant. Even if Gunsauls' testimony is fully accepted, there is insufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion of drug activity prior to unrelated questioning or the K-9 sniff. The court previously rejected overly broad categorizations similar to the northbound travel on I-6. Although nervousness is a factor, it is often common during traffic stops and lacks significant weight in establishing reasonable suspicion, as highlighted in multiple cases. Cornejo’s nervousness, which did not notably increase during the stop, alongside his conversational tone when questioning the stop's basis, did not provide an objective foundation for suspicion of drug smuggling. His nervousness alone did not justify further detention. Other courts have varied in their assessment of indicators such as energy drinks or fast food wrappers, which may suggest either innocent travel or hurried trips, depending on the context. Specific cases are cited where the presence of such items did not lead to reasonable suspicion of drug smuggling, reinforcing the need for a holistic view of the circumstances. The report indicates that the presence of a large suitcase with clothes, an energy drink, food, and wrappers did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity against the defendant, Cornejo, who claimed he was picking up a passenger from his girlfriend’s house. The Ninth Circuit acknowledges that seemingly innocent factors, when considered collectively, may justify further investigation. However, the empty beverage containers and handwritten rental agreement were consistent with legitimate travel, failing to raise reasonable suspicion. Fast-food wrappers in Cornejo's vehicle were similarly unremarkable, lacking contradictory information to suggest illicit activity. Cornejo had rented the vehicle just before the traffic stop, and the travel time from San Jose to the stop location was approximately six hours. There was also no indication of the rental car being lost or stolen upon checking its license plate. Any inconsistencies in Cornejo’s travel plans or the notations on the rental agreement were deemed insufficient to generate genuine suspicion. Minor discrepancies and a slight nervousness observed during the interaction did not constitute articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. Cornejo provided a valid Washington driver’s license and explained his choice to rent a car due to issues with his own vehicle. Despite the officer's suspicion and belief that Cornejo was lying, such feelings alone do not support a reasonable suspicion. The officer's reliance on generalized profiles and failure to promptly investigate further contributed to the lack of reasonable suspicion. Gun-sauls expressed a "sixty percent" certainty regarding Cornejo's drug smuggling upon returning to his patrol car but failed to verify the rental agreement or investigate empty beverage containers and delayed the K-9 sniff until Hughes arrived. The court determined that the prolongation of the stop was unjustified, emphasizing the principle that the end does not justify the means, citing United States v. Richardson and Weeks v. United States. The deputies extended the stop unnecessarily by asking unrelated questions and conducting a K-9 sniff without the required reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Regarding the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the court analyzed whether suppressing the evidence was warranted, referencing Davis v. United States. The government argued for this exception based on Illinois v. Caballes, where a K-9 sniff occurred during a brief and lawful traffic stop. However, the court found that unlike in Caballes, the deputies in this case improperly extended the stop beyond what was necessary for the traffic violation, thus the good-faith exception did not apply. Caballes only permitted dog sniffs during lawful and timely traffic stops, not after an unjustified prolongation of the stop. A dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop, which only reveals the location of an illegal substance, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. In contrast to the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Rodriguez, where a brief delay for a dog sniff was deemed constitutional, the Ninth Circuit found no similar precedent permitting de minimis extensions of traffic stops. The court distinguished this case from Rodriguez, noting that the government did not cite any relevant Ninth Circuit authority supporting the officers' conduct. The good-faith exception from Davis was deemed inapplicable, as the evidence suppression serves to deter officers from unconstitutionally prolonging stops based on insufficient grounds. Consequently, the motion to suppress physical evidence and statements obtained following the traffic stop on December 13, 2014, was partially granted. The court has suppressed several items of evidence, including three bundles of suspected methamphetamine (3,028.6 grams, booked as D100), three bundles of suspected heroin (2,218 grams, booked as D101), $5,000 in bulk U.S. currency (booked as C100), two LG cell phones (booked as M100), an Enterprise rental agreement and receipts (booked as M101), a GPS unit from a sedan, and any other evidence recovered from the sedan. This suppression is based on the exclusionary rule, which applies to evidence obtained from an illegal search. Additionally, any statements made by Cornejo after an unlawful prolongation of the stop are also excluded, specifically during a period when questioning and citation writing occurred approximately thirteen minutes post-initial stop. However, statements made prior to this prolongation are admissible. The court references 21 U.S.C. § 841, which criminalizes the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent regarding controlled substances. Time stamps from the government’s video exhibit are acknowledged, and Cornejo does not contest their accuracy. The defendant argues that a second agency, the Shasta Interagency Narcotics Task Force (SINTF), first contacted dispatch regarding Cornejo's license plate at 9:15 a.m., while Gunsauls was dispatched at 9:18 a.m. However, this assertion lacks support from Sowder's testimony or other evidence. The dashboard video indicates that Gunsauls initiated the traffic stop at 9:08:52 a.m., and it is inferred that he was the one who first contacted dispatch. The court also notes California Vehicle Code sections 22349 and 22400, which prohibit exceeding a speed limit of 65 mph and driving at such a slow speed as to impede traffic, respectively. Finally, the court takes judicial notice of the distance between Bakersfield and San Jose, approximately 241 miles, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, referencing the "good-faith exception" to the exclusionary rule as outlined in case law.