United States v. Fattah

Citations: 191 F. Supp. 3d 461; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74282; 2016 WL 3574645Docket: CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 15-346

Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania; June 7, 2016; Federal District Court

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The Government filed a motion in limine to admit a recorded conversation involving Renee Chenault-Fattah, the wife of defendant Chaka Fattah, Sr., related to an alleged bribery scheme. The court granted this motion during the trial, outlining its reasoning in detail. Chaka Fattah, along with co-defendants Herbert Vederman, Robert Brand, Karen Nicholas, and Bonnie Bowser, is charged with multiple offenses, including conspiracy to commit racketeering and various forms of fraud.

The recorded conversation pertains to a transaction where Chenault-Fattah allegedly sold a Porsche to Vederman for $18,000, which the Government claims was a ruse to disguise a bribe to Fattah. Evidence indicates that in January 2012, the Fattahs needed extra funds for a vacation home purchase. On January 13, Vederman wired $18,000 to Fattah's Congressional Federal Credit Union account, and Fattah later provided CUMA with documentation claiming the funds were from the car sale, including a bill of sale and title transfer dated January 16.

However, the Government asserts that the sale was fraudulent, arguing that the $18,000 was actually a bribe linked to Fattah's efforts to secure an ambassadorship for Vederman and to hire Vederman's girlfriend for his Congressional staff. Supporting this claim, evidence shows that the Fattahs retained possession of the Porsche long after the sale, with Chenault-Fattah renewing its registration and paying insurance premiums through 2013. Additionally, records indicate the car was serviced post-sale, and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation has no record of the vehicle being registered to Vederman.

The recorded telephone conversation occurred on November 30, 2012, between Chenault-Fattah and an insurance representative, focusing on insurance changes for their vehicles, including a Porsche. Chenault-Fattah stated that the Porsche would be garaged and requested to remove insurance coverage for winter, effective December 3. The representative confirmed the removal of various coverages, leaving a $1,000 comprehensive deductible for theft or damage while it remained garaged. The conversation included assurances that the car would still have coverage against certain damages and emphasized the need for a 24-hour notice to reinstate coverage. The Government argued for the recording's admissibility, asserting that Chenault-Fattah's statements about the Porsche's possession and insurance were relevant as "performative utterances" rather than for their truthfulness, citing precedent from United States v. Montana.

The Government argues that certain statements made by Chenault-Fattah are admissible as hearsay exceptions under Rule 804(b)(3) (statements against penal interest) or Rule 803(3) (statements of intent). The defendants contend that these statements are only relevant for their truth and thus constitute inadmissible hearsay. The court agrees with the defendants, noting that the Government aims to introduce these statements to prove the truth regarding the Fattahs' possession and insurance of a Porsche, suggesting the January 2012 sale to Vederman was fraudulent. 

Under Rule 801(c), hearsay is defined as a statement not made during current testimony and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, which is generally inadmissible per Rule 802. Rule 804(b)(3) allows for hearsay exceptions if the declarant is unavailable and the statement is against their penal interest. Such statements must be made only if the declarant believed them to be true due to their potential to expose them to criminal liability and must be corroborated for trustworthiness.

The court finds Chenault-Fattah's statements regarding the Porsche to fit the criteria for statements against penal interest, as they contradict her earlier assertions to a mortgage company about the car's sale. She had signed documents affirming the Porsche's sale to Vederman, which, if false, could lead to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 for mortgage fraud. Moreover, these statements also expose her to liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud) and § 1519 (falsifying documents). The court concludes that her statements were made only under the belief that they were true due to their implications for her legal and financial standing.

Defendants assert that Chenault-Fattah's claim of keeping her car in the garage indicates her innocence. However, the court finds that this assertion is misleading. Chenault-Fattah’s recorded statement about the Porsche being insured while stored in the garage contradicts her earlier claim to a mortgage company that she sold the car for $18,000 ten months prior. Additional actions, such as continuing to insure, register, drive, and service the Porsche, further support the court's view that her statements are incriminating rather than innocent. The court dismisses the defendants’ argument, citing that the context surrounding her statements demonstrates they are against her penal interest and credible. As Chenault-Fattah is unavailable as a witness, the court admits the recorded conversation with the insurance company into evidence under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court concludes that while some statements may not be hearsay, the focus remains on their classification as statements against penal interest, rendering further classification as statements of intent unnecessary.