Andrews v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.
Docket: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16CV17TSL-RHW
Court: District Court, S.D. Mississippi; May 17, 2016; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Florence Andrews, representing the Estate of Willie Andrews, filed motions to remand the case to state court and to voluntarily dismiss defendant Weaver Leather, LLC, which was misidentified in the complaint. Defendant Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company opposed both motions. The court ruled that the motion to remand was without merit and denied it, while granting the motion to voluntarily dismiss Weaver.
The background indicates that Willie Andrews died following an accident involving faulty tree harness equipment while working on a property owned by J. Stacey Davidson. Florence Andrews initiated the lawsuit in Hinds County Circuit Court against Weaver, Davidson, Mississippi Farm Bureau, and several agents, claiming wrongful denial of insurance coverage related to her husband's death. Weaver, identified as the sole diverse defendant, removed the case to federal court, arguing that the other defendants were improperly joined, thus establishing diversity jurisdiction.
In her remand motion, Florence Andrews contended that the removal was procedurally flawed, that diversity jurisdiction ceased upon her dismissal of Weaver, and that the defendants failed to prove improper joinder. The court faced the procedural question of which motion to address first, referencing a similar case where the plaintiff sought to dismiss the sole diverse defendant to negate diversity jurisdiction and trigger remand.
The defendant contended that the court must establish subject matter jurisdiction before addressing the motion to dismiss. Judge Bramlette concurred, clarifying that Rule 41 outlines voluntary dismissal procedures: Rule 41(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to dismiss a claim unilaterally before an answer or motion for summary judgment is served, while Rule 41(a)(2) requires court approval for dismissal under different circumstances. Since the plaintiff's motion invoked Rule 41(a)(2), the court needed to confirm its subject matter jurisdiction before considering the dismissal request. The court denied the remand motion, determining that the resident defendant was improperly joined, and subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the diverse defendant. The Fifth Circuit upheld this decision, emphasizing that under Rule 41(a)(2), a court can only dismiss an action if it has subject matter jurisdiction; otherwise, any order apart from dismissal or remand is void. The district court's jurisdiction was questioned due to the remand motion. Thus, resolving jurisdictional issues before ruling on the dismissal was appropriate. The plaintiff's motion to dismiss was deemed to arise under Rule 41(a)(2) because the defendant had already answered the complaint, necessitating the remand motion's precedence. The plaintiff argued that removal was improper due to the lack of consent from all co-defendants, but the Fifth Circuit noted that improperly joined defendants are exempt from this unanimity requirement.
If the resident defendants were improperly joined, Weaver's removal from the case would not require unanimous consent from all defendants. The plaintiff contends that the removal was untimely, arguing it should have been filed within thirty days after service on the first defendant, Farm Bureau, which occurred on October 26, 2015. Thus, she claims removal should have been completed by November 25, 2015, yet Weaver filed on January 14, 2016. However, a 2011 amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 1446 established a last-served rule allowing each defendant 30 days from their own service to file for removal, making Weaver's action timely.
The plaintiff also claims procedural defects due to Weaver not being served at the time of removal, but this argument is invalid since service is not a prerequisite for removal; a defendant can remove based on receipt of the initial pleading, regardless of service. The Fifth Circuit confirms that an action must commence against a defendant for removal to be valid, but service is not necessary.
To prove improper joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either (1) fraud in jurisdictional fact pleading or (2) that the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action against a non-diverse party in state court. There are no fraud allegations; thus, the focus is on the possibility of recovery against the resident defendants. Weaver claims the plaintiff cannot recover against J. Stacy Davidson for two reasons: Mississippi law (Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-66) protects landowners from liability to independent contractors for known dangers, and the claims against Davidson are barred by the three-year statute of limitations (Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49). The lawsuit was filed three years post-accident, and the plaintiff failed to serve Davidson within the required time, despite receiving a 45-day extension until December 8, 2015.
The plaintiff did not seek an extension or contest the timeliness of service against Davidson, acknowledging that her claims are time-barred. She only states that Davidson was not served and does not dispute his improper joinder. The plaintiff claims Farm Bureau breached a contract, alleging that at the time of the accident, Willie Andrews had an active insurance policy purchased through Farm Bureau agents, which included a $2 million aggregate limit covering various liabilities. Farm Bureau presented a general liability policy with effective dates from April 11, 2012, to April 11, 2013, specifically listing Willie Andrews as the insured, with limits matching the plaintiff's claims. However, the policy explicitly excludes coverage for bodily injuries to any insured, consistent with commercial general liability standards. The plaintiff does not contest that the policy provided by Farm Bureau is the one referenced in her complaint and submitted an affidavit asserting that her husband had insurance with Farm Bureau for many years, suggesting he had renewed coverage before his death. Despite this, the court finds that her claims regarding the policy's renewal are vague, hearsay, and not admissible as evidence. Consequently, the plaintiff lacks a valid breach of contract claim against Farm Bureau.
Plaintiff asserts claims against Farm Bureau agents Steve Griffin, James Thomas Guthrie, and Bill Pierce for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Farm Bureau argues that Griffin and Guthrie were never served, and the statute of limitations has expired, as the plaintiff's insurance claim denial notice was received on July 26, 2012, and the complaint was filed on June 26, 2015, with less than thirty days remaining on the three-year limitation period. The plaintiff did not serve Griffin or Guthrie within 120 days of filing, barring any claims against them, a point the plaintiff concedes.
Regarding Bill Pierce, the breach of contract claim is based on the allegation of improper denial of the claim, but the policy explicitly excludes 'bodily injury' from coverage, preventing recovery for breach of contract. The breach of fiduciary duty claim lacks specificity; the plaintiff vaguely states that Farm Bureau agents did not provide adequate information to Willie Andrews, without detailing what information was lacking or its impact on his coverage decisions. The plaintiff refers to a past claim paid in 1996 but does not substantiate how this relates to the denial of her claim.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a claim must present sufficient factual content for a plausible inference of liability. The court finds that the plaintiff has not provided enough factual basis to support a claim against Pierce, as there are no allegations of him changing coverages or misrepresenting information. Consequently, the court concludes that the plaintiff cannot reasonably recover against Pierce. As a result, the motion to remand is denied, and the claims against the resident defendants are dismissed. The court grants the plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss defendant Weaver, as there is no objection from Weaver and dismissing him does not cause legal prejudice.
Plaintiff's motion to remand is denied, and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice against defendants Farm Bureau, Griffin, Guthrie, Pierce, and Davidson. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss Weaver Leather without prejudice is granted. A separate judgment will be issued in accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court notes that Farm Bureau's response to the motion was untimely and lacked a supporting memorandum brief, violating Local Rule 7(b)(4). Despite this, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to strike the response, attributing the denial to errors made in docketing the motion to remand. The court identified that the correct name of the defendant is Bill Pierce, not Bill Pearce. The plaintiff initially filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of Weaver Leather but improperly docketed it as a stipulation, which led to procedural confusion. Subsequent attempts to correct the docketing errors were also mishandled. While the plaintiff's errors did not negatively impact the case, she is cautioned to properly title and select filing options for future motions. The court indicated that if the defendants were not improperly joined, remand would be inappropriate regardless of procedural compliance.
Plaintiff references the decedent's multiple insurance policies at the time of death but fails to provide evidence beyond claims made in Farm Bureau’s pleadings, which only mention one commercial general liability policy. The court notes that plaintiff's motion to remand incorrectly refers to an affidavit that was not filed with the relevant motion but rather with her rebuttal. Although plaintiff argues that Farm Bureau’s negligence regarding policy reinstatement creates a possibility of recovery, these claims have not been formally pled, preventing remand based on unpleaded claims. The court emphasizes that only existing pleadings at the time of removal are relevant, and any post-removal documents can only clarify existing allegations, not introduce new claims. The court also highlights that Pierce, an agent for Farm Bureau, cannot be held liable for breach of contract with the insured, as established in precedent. While plaintiff suggests a claim for negligent procurement of insurance, no adequate claim has been pled. Additionally, the court rejects the applicability of the 'common defense' doctrine to this case, stating it does not compel remand due to a lack of merit in the lawsuit against both defendants.
