Court: District Court, D. Oregon; April 13, 2016; Federal District Court
Defendant Ryan John Snider filed a motion on May 27, 2015, to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, citing newly discovered evidence and the Burrage v. United States standard as grounds for arguing his conviction for drug distribution resulting in death is unconstitutional. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 1, 2016, but the Court denied the motion, concluding that Snider did not demonstrate that the drugs he distributed were not an independently sufficient cause of death.
Under § 2255, a federal prisoner can challenge their sentence if it violates the Constitution, exceeds legal limits, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. The petition must be filed within one year, with specific starting dates for the limitations period outlined in § 2255(f). The district court is required to hold a hearing unless the motions and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief. To warrant a hearing, the petitioner must make specific factual allegations that support a claim for relief. Conclusory statements alone do not necessitate a hearing.
If a habeas petition is denied, a certificate of appealability may be issued if reasonable jurists could disagree with the court's decision or find the issues worthy of further consideration. The petitioner must demonstrate more than a lack of frivolity or show good faith to obtain this certificate.
Kraig Crow, a 19-year-old, died from a cocaine overdose on August 21, 2006, after purchasing seven grams of cocaine. Concerned about his well-being, his friend alerted Crow's girlfriend, who, along with his parents, contacted the police. Authorities discovered Crow's body in a park with cocaine and propoxyphene in his system, confirming a cocaine overdose as the cause of death. This investigation led to Snider's arrest.
On October 11, 2007, Snider pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(C), admitting that his sale of cocaine contributed to Crow's death. The maximum sentence for this offense was 20 years. The plea agreement established Snider's relevant conduct as involving 50 to 100 grams of cocaine, with an initial base offense level of 38 due to the resulting death.
The U.S. Probation Office initially recommended a sentence of 168 to 210 months but later adjusted this to 210 to 262 months after accounting for firearms found at Snider’s residence. Following Snider's substantial assistance to the government, a downward departure to 72 months was recommended. However, after selling cocaine to a police informant while on pretrial supervision, the recommendation changed to 240 months. Ultimately, the advisory guideline range was 292 to 365 months.
On April 11, 2008, Snider pleaded guilty in a second case for distributing cocaine while on pretrial supervision, reaffirming his first plea. A joint sentencing recommendation was made for a total sentence of 144 months, along with three years of supervised release, contingent on Snider's acceptance of responsibility and cooperation in prosecuting others.
Snider, in his guilty plea, waived his rights to appeal or file for post-conviction relief, with exceptions for sentences exceeding recommendations and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. On April 21, 2008, U.S. District Judge Ancer L. Haggerty sentenced him to 144 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, with sentences running concurrently. The judge adopted most of the Presentence Report but did not enhance the sentence for firearms found at Snider's residence. Under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2), a base offense level of 38 applied for drug distribution resulting in death, leading to an advisory guideline range of 235 to 293 months, but Snider was instead sentenced based on a lower offense level of 16 for distributing 50 to 100 grams of cocaine, resulting in a 21 to 27-month range. His conviction activated a mandatory minimum of 20 years and a higher advisory range; however, he has served over seven years of his sentence and was scheduled for release on June 27, 2017. Post-sentencing, the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States clarified that for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the distributed drug must be the "but-for cause" of death, requiring proof that the death would not have occurred without the defendant's actions, rejecting more lenient causation standards used in some jurisdictions.
The Supreme Court clarified the definition of but-for cause under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), providing examples that illustrate its application. A is the but-for cause of B’s death if A's actions are essential to the outcome, even when other contributing factors exist. For instance, if poison is administered to a person with multiple diseases, the poison can still be considered a but-for cause if the person would have survived without it. Similarly, in a baseball game, the home run may be the decisive factor in a victory, despite other contributing factors. The Court concluded that heroin was not the but-for cause of a decedent's death since no expert could assert that it would have been fatal without the presence of other drugs.
Following Snider’s sentencing, new evidence emerged regarding propoxyphene, which was found in Mr. Crow's system at the time of death. The FDA determined in 2010 that propoxyphene could cause fatal heart rhythm abnormalities, leading to its market withdrawal. Snider claims this evidence proves his actual innocence in distributing a drug that caused Crow’s death. He submitted a report from toxicologist Dr. Richard Stripp, who analyzed Crow's autopsy and toxicology results. Dr. Stripp noted that Crow's cocaine blood concentration was 2.0 mg/L, below the average for acute fatalities, and that the propoxyphene concentration of 0.3 mg/L was also below levels indicating serious toxicity. However, he acknowledged that fatalities have occurred with propoxyphene levels under 1 mg/L and could not definitively exclude its role in Crow's death, despite the cocaine level being potentially lethal.
William J. Brady, M.D. reviewed Mr. Crow's autopsy and toxicology reports on behalf of Snider, concluding that Mr. Crow's death was primarily due to the ingestion of Darvon, which amplified cocaine's effects. Conversely, Larry V. Lewman, M.D., the Deputy Medical Examiner for Oregon, opined that propoxyphene did not significantly contribute to Mr. Crow's death. Following these reports, an evidentiary hearing was held on March 1, 2016.
Snider contends that new evidence and a recent legal decision, Burrage, render his sentence unlawful, asserting that the harmful effects of propoxyphene and its market removal suggest cocaine was not the but-for cause of Mr. Crow's death. He claims this means he pleaded guilty to a crime he didn't commit, as his detachment from the sale of cocaine and Mr. Crow's suicidal intent indicate his actual innocence.
The government argues that Snider waived his right to contest his sentence through his plea agreement and that even without the waiver, Burrage does not impact his case since his actions were the but-for cause of Mr. Crow's death. If the waiver is enforceable, the court may not need to consider the merits of Snider's § 2255 motion, as established in previous Ninth Circuit cases. Waivers of the right to file a § 2255 motion are generally upheld if they are knowingly and voluntarily made, with courts interpreting plea agreements under contract principles and resolving ambiguities in favor of the defendant. Waivers are valid when they encompass the grounds claimed on appeal and are voluntarily given.
A plea agreement does not waive the right to file a § 2255 motion unless such a waiver is explicitly stated. The government is bound by its terms but cannot extend beyond them. In the case of United States v. Navarro-Botello, the Ninth Circuit ruled that waiving the right to appeal in a plea agreement does not render the agreement unknowing or involuntary, even if the defendant cannot foresee potential appellate issues. The court emphasized that the certainty of a negotiated plea outweighs speculative appellate claims. The Ninth Circuit maintains that valid waivers will be enforced regardless of the merits of the claims that could have been raised.
In the case of Snider, he acknowledged committing a crime under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and accepted a plea agreement that included a waiver of his right to file any collateral attacks, including a § 2255 motion, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Snider confirmed that he willingly accepted the plea terms after consultation with his attorney, and the court informed him of the appeal waiver during sentencing. Therefore, Snider's waiver, which was made knowingly and voluntarily, generally precludes a collateral attack on his sentence.
However, Snider contends that his waiver should not apply due to a change in law following Burrage, which he claims altered his substantive rights. The Ninth Circuit's precedent indicates that changes in substantive law do not invalidate plea agreements, as established in United States v. Cardenas and United States v. Cortez-Arias, both asserting that a favorable legal change does not allow a defendant to withdraw a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. This principle is rooted in the Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. United States, which held that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea remains valid despite subsequent legal developments.
A defendant may challenge the constitutionality of a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding using a new Supreme Court rule, as established in *United States v. Benboe*. In this case, the defendant contested his sentence for 'using or carrying' a firearm during a drug crime after the Supreme Court clarified that such terms do not encompass merely storing a firearm in proximity to drugs. For a new rule to impact the constitutionality of a plea, it must apply retroactively, as per *Schriro v. Summerlin*. A new rule is identified as one that breaks new ground or imposes new obligations, distinct from existing precedent at the time of conviction.
Generally, new procedural rules do not apply retroactively, while substantive rules—those that narrow criminal statutes or remove certain conduct from state prosecution—do. A valid waiver of the right to file a § 2255 motion can prevent a defendant from using retroactive substantive changes to challenge their plea agreement, as illustrated in *Benboe*.
The Ninth Circuit in *United States v. Johnson* examined whether changes in law invalidate appeal waivers. The defendant, who pled guilty to heroin possession and waived his appeal rights, found his sentence unaffected by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which altered sentencing provisions. The Ninth Circuit upheld the waiver, asserting it included appeals related to sentencing laws, noting that a potential change in law was foreseeable at the time of the plea. Other circuits concur that broad appeal waivers remain effective despite subsequent favorable legal changes for the defendant. The *Bownes* court highlighted that allowing rescission of waivers in light of new laws could disadvantage defendants by complicating plea negotiations.
The government can rescind a favorable plea agreement if a significant legal change occurs, and it retains the right to demand a compensating concession. In the Ninth Circuit, a knowingly and voluntarily made appeal waiver, compliant with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, generally limits collateral attacks on sentences to three exceptions: (1) if the sentencing judge informs the defendant they maintain the right to appeal; (2) if the sentence does not align with the plea agreement; or (3) if the sentence violates the law. Citing rulings in United States v. Biller and United States v. Gordon, the Ninth Circuit clarifies that a valid appeal waiver does not apply if the sentence exceeds the maximum statutory penalty or is unconstitutional. Changes in law alone, even retroactive ones, do not invalidate a defendant's waiver of the right to file a § 2255 motion challenging the conviction or sentence. In this case, Snider's waiver is enforceable unless the sentence is deemed 'illegal', which occurs if it surpasses the statutory limits or violates the Constitution. Snider does not contest that his sentence falls within the applicable guideline range related to his actions, nor does he claim that the guidelines are unconstitutional. His sentence could only be considered illegal if it exceeded the statutory penalty for the alleged crime of distributing a drug resulting in death under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
The legal framework surrounding Snider’s sentence addresses whether the Supreme Court’s Burrage decision, which requires a substance to be the but-for cause of death for a defendant’s conviction, is a new substantive rule that applies retroactively. Courts are divided on this issue. The government acknowledges that Burrage is a new substantive rule applicable to initial collateral review, while Snider claims the Eighth Circuit has found it retroactive, referencing Ragland v. United States where the Eighth Circuit remanded a case for reconsideration based on Burrage. However, the Eighth Circuit did not explicitly rule on retroactivity. The Ninth Circuit has consistently interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) as necessitating but-for causation, as established in United States v. Houston. The Court finds that it need not decide on the retroactive applicability of Burrage since the government concedes that Snider’s § 2255 motion is timely and does not dispute the Burrage standard's relevance to this case. The focus shifts to whether the evidence sufficiently supported the conviction of distributing a drug that caused Mr. Crow’s death, considering the Burrage rule and new evidence regarding propoxyphene.
Two medical experts testified in the Burrage case regarding the decedent's drug-related death, where heroin, along with other drugs like codeine, alprazolam, clonazepam metabolites, and oxycodone, was found in the decedent's system. One expert indicated that morphine was the only drug exceeding the therapeutic range but could not determine if the decedent would have survived without heroin. The second expert attributed the death to "mixed drug intoxication," asserting that heroin and other drugs contributed to the fatal outcome, stating that the decedent's death would have been "very less likely" without heroin, but again could not confirm survival without it. Neither expert claimed that heroin alone would have caused the death.
The Burrage court did not resolve whether a "special rule" applies when multiple sufficient causes lead to a result. The Supreme Court ruled that if the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of death, the defendant cannot be held liable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) unless the drug's use is a but-for cause of death. The ruling suggests that the but-for standard might not apply or may include cases where a drug is independently sufficient to cause death, even with other concurrent causes present.
In the current case involving Mr. Crow, two experts indicated that propoxyphene contributed to his death, but neither could confirm he would have survived taking it alone or cocaine alone. The government’s expert, Dr. Lewman, opined that propoxyphene did not significantly contribute to Mr. Crow's death. During the evidentiary hearing, both experts were questioned about the likelihood of Mr. Crow surviving without cocaine and whether he would have died from cocaine alone. Dr. Lewman affirmed both queries with "yes," while Dr. Brady responded "other" to the first and "yes" to the second.
Dr. Lewman testified that propoxyphene did not contribute to Mr. Crow’s death, as it was present at therapeutic levels in his system, supported by a three-to-one ratio of the metabolite norpropoxyphene to propoxyphene. He noted that norpropoxyphene accumulates over time, indicating prior therapeutic use. However, he acknowledged the absence of evidence for a prescription for propoxyphene. Dr. Lewman attributed Mr. Crow's death to a cocaine overdose, citing the high cocaine levels in his system, Mr. Crow's calls to friends about taking too much cocaine shortly before his death, and the rapid post-mortem stiffening of his body, which suggested sudden death from a stimulant.
In contrast, Dr. Brady, representing the defense, indicated that the propoxyphene levels could be fatal and could not rule out its contribution to Mr. Crow’s death. He agreed that the cocaine levels were fatal but expressed uncertainty about Mr. Crow's survival had he received prompt medical treatment. Dr. Brady emphasized that Mr. Crow likely could not have survived the cocaine concentration found in his blood, especially given his lack of a history of regular cocaine use. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Crow would have survived had he not taken cocaine, acknowledging that propoxyphene could be lethal at the detected levels but noting the lack of evidence for a prescription and consistent therapeutic use.
Mr. Crow's death cannot be attributed solely to propoxyphene due to a lack of evidence regarding his tolerance to therapeutic levels of the drug, suggesting he could have died from it. However, it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the fatal dose of cocaine in his system was sufficient to cause his death independently of propoxyphene. Although timely medical intervention might have altered the outcome, Mr. Crow died before help could arrive. The Court concluded that the cocaine alone could have caused his death, differentiating this case from Burrage, where the cause was less clear. Unlike Burrage, both experts confirmed that cocaine was an independently sufficient cause of Mr. Crow's death, implicating Snider in violating 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) for distributing cocaine. Consequently, Snider's sentence is deemed legal, and his waiver of the right to file a 2255 motion is enforceable. Snider's claim of actual innocence regarding the distribution of drugs that caused Mr. Crow’s death does not hold, as the Court finds his sentence legal and the appeal waiver enforceable. Even if he had not waived his right to appeal, he failed to demonstrate actual innocence based on established standards, which require more than a reasonable doubt but proof that no reasonable juror would convict him. The Supreme Court's discussions on actual innocence claims indicate higher thresholds for freestanding claims compared to gateway claims, which Snider has not met.
The district court must assess whether no reasonable juror would find the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on new evidence, rather than making an independent judgment on reasonable doubt itself. A petitioner must demonstrate that he is probably innocent to meet the threshold for challenging a conviction after valid sentencing, as stated in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera. The Ninth Circuit permits claims of actual innocence that can challenge convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but the standard for proving actual innocence is extremely high. A petitioner must show more than mere doubt about guilt; they must provide affirmative proof of probable innocence, which is a stronger requirement than showing insufficient evidence for conviction. Courts must conduct a holistic assessment of the evidence when evaluating actual innocence claims. In Snider's case, he failed to prove his probable innocence regarding the distribution of drugs causing death, as his own expert indicated that the victim ingested a fatal dose of cocaine, regardless of other substances. Consequently, Snider's sentence is within the legal limits, and he is not entitled to habeas relief. However, the court grants a Certificate of Appealability due to the legal interpretation of Burrage being untested by higher courts. Snider was not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence due to a government motion under the Sentencing Guidelines, despite the presence of cocaine and propoxyphene metabolites in the victim's blood.
U.S.S.G. 5K and 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) relate to substantial assistance in sentencing. The government filed two charges of cocaine distribution against Snider in Case Nos. 07-124-HA and 08-172-HA. According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, a defendant can request a new trial if justice requires, with specific timelines for motions based on newly discovered evidence (within 3 years) or other grounds (within 14 days). Under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), a court may modify a prison term if the sentencing range has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission, considering applicable factors from section 3553(a). The base offense level for cocaine distribution was set at 14 under the 2015 guidelines for amounts between 50 and 100 grams. Senior U.S. District Judge Haggerty retired on December 31, 2014. The government acknowledges that Snider's motion, referencing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Burrage, is timely. Snider's plea agreement waives his right to file a 2255 motion, except under limited circumstances that do not apply here. He has not claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, did not file for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, nor sought a sentence reduction due to guideline changes. Various circuit courts have differing approaches to enforcing appeal waivers, generally allowing them unless they result in a miscarriage of justice or violate fairness principles. Federal courts have rarely addressed concurrent sufficient causes.
State courts frequently address causation in criminal law, with a consensus that an act causing harm can still be deemed a cause-in-fact, even if the harm would have occurred independently of that act. Legal precedents illustrate that multiple parties can contribute to a single death without diminishing their culpability for homicide. Iowa recognizes a legal rule that classifies multiple independent causes as factual causes under the "but-for" test. Similarly, New Mexico’s murder statute does not suggest that multiple actors involved in a death bear differing degrees of guilt. In criminal proceedings, the question of whether expert opinions hold to "a reasonable degree of medical certainty" can lead to confusion regarding the burden of proof, as this standard is typically civil in nature. The holding in Burrage raises questions about independently sufficient concurrent causes in the context of causation. A defendant, Snider, contends his actions were too far removed from the victim’s death, especially given indications of the victim's intent to commit suicide; however, this argument fails. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), foreseeability or proximate cause is not required, as the statute stipulates that heightened penalties apply when death results from distributing a controlled substance, without necessitating any foreseeability of that death.
