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Estate of Guled ex rel. Abdi v. City of Minneapolis

Citations: 179 F. Supp. 3d 895; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51458; 2016 WL 1559567Docket: Civ. No. 14-4674 (RHK/TNL)

Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; April 18, 2016; Federal District Court

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On February 5, 2009, Minneapolis police officers shot and killed Ahmed Guled, prompting his father, Mohamed Abdi, to initiate legal action against the officers and the City of Minneapolis, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Abdi, acting as the "special administrator" of Guled’s estate, faced a motion for summary judgment from the defendants, who contended that Abdi lacked standing to sue.

The background reveals that Abdi previously filed a pro se lawsuit in 2012 (Abdi I) against the same defendants, claiming excessive force. He alleged standing as "trustee for the heirs and next-of-kin" of Guled, having been appointed as trustee by the Hennepin County District Court. This case was dismissed without prejudice in 2013 due to lack of prosecution. In 2014, Abdi, now represented by counsel, filed a second lawsuit (Abdi II) with similar claims but focused on damages for Guled’s suffering and death rather than losses to heirs. The complaint did not mention a trustee appointment, and it was revealed that Abdi’s trustee status had been revoked after a forged signature was discovered on his appointment petition.

Following the revocation, Abdi requested a stay of Abdi II while seeking reappointment or alternatively sought dismissal without prejudice, which the court granted in July 2014. Abdi subsequently filed a third lawsuit, this one as the "Special Administrator for the Estate of Guled," repeating the same allegations and claims as in Abdi II but differing only in his designation. With discovery complete, the City has moved for summary judgment, challenging Abdi's standing to pursue the claims.

Abdi alleges that the City and its officers violated Guled’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through excessive force, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Initially, Abdi filed these claims in a pro se lawsuit on behalf of Guled’s heirs, but the current claims focus on Guled’s suffering after being shot, classifying them as "survival" claims rather than "wrongful death" claims. A survival claim arises from damages incurred during the decedent's lifetime, while a wrongful death claim pertains to damages suffered by the estate due to the decedent's death. The distinction is critical as federal law under § 1983 does not expressly address who may bring claims after the injured party's death.

Due to a gap in the statute, Congress has instructed courts to look to state law to determine the validity of such claims. In Minnesota, personal injury claims typically abate upon the death of the injured party, but exceptions exist under Minnesota Statutes § 573.02, which allows a court-appointed trustee to maintain a survival action if the decedent could have pursued it. Abdi concedes that his claims abated with Guled's death and acknowledges he is no longer the trustee, thus lacking standing to proceed with the claims. The court must apply Minnesota law to assess Abdi's standing, ensuring it aligns with the constitutional principles underpinning § 1983, which aims to deter state abuses and provide remedies for unconstitutional actions.

If Minnesota law is found inconsistent with federal policies, the Court should refrain from applying it. The focus is on whether Minnesota's statutory scheme conflicts with § 1983, not on the outcome of the case. A state statute is not "inconsistent" simply because it results in a plaintiff's loss. Abdi argues that Minnesota's Sections 573.01 and 573.02 are inconsistent with § 1983 as they limit damages to the decedent’s heirs and do not allow recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering due to the abatement of "survival" claims. He claims this makes Minnesota law incapable of fulfilling § 1983's objectives, thus depriving him of standing. However, the Court disagrees, noting the damages limitations of § 573.02 may not apply to federal civil-rights actions. Even if they do, the trustee can still pursue damages for unconstitutional actions, albeit potentially less than a "survival" claim would offer. The Court emphasizes that the deterrent effect of potential damages remains intact, and punitive damages are available under state law. Previous cases have established that Minnesota statutes do not undermine the goals of § 1983, and the requirement for a trustee to bring a claim does not conflict with its purposes. Ultimately, while the decedent cannot recover, any successful litigation benefits the estate and heirs, supporting the compensatory and deterrent aims of § 1983.

Abdi contends that Minnesota law should not apply to his case, relying on the Carlson decision, where the Supreme Court ruled that a Bivens claim does not survive the injured party's death under Indiana law because Bivens actions are rooted in federal law. The Court emphasized the necessity for a uniform federal rule of survivorship for redressing constitutional violations. However, unlike Carlson, which dealt with a purely federal claim, Abdi's case requires adherence to state law, making uniformity impossible. The Court highlighted that federal courts often reference state law to address procedural gaps in national remedies, and Congress did not mandate uniformity in § 1983 actions in § 1988, resulting in a lack of nationwide consistency.

Abdi's primary issue appears to stem from losing his trustee status, which bars him from pursuing claims against the Defendants under § 573.02 (as incorporated by § 1988). His loss of trustee status does not indicate a conflict between Minnesota law and federal law, but rather a lack of standing, leading to the dismissal of his claims. The Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Complaint without prejudice, while also denying Abdi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as moot. Although there are allegations of misleading actions regarding Abdi's status, the Court focused on the revocation of that status by the Hennepin County District Court. Despite Abdi's suggestion that the standing issue could have been raised earlier, the Court emphasized that standing is a jurisdictional matter that must be addressed regardless of timing.