Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; March 30, 2016; Federal District Court
William Gilson, a former Pennsylvania State Trooper, filed a civil lawsuit against the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) and specific officers following his termination. Gilson claims violations of his rights under the U.S. Constitution, federal and state employment discrimination laws, and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). The court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1334(b), and 1367. The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims in Gilson's Fourth Amended Complaint, which the court intends to grant.
Gilson served with PSP from 1994 until 2011, primarily at Troop E Headquarters in Erie, under Captain Mark Schau. He alleges that fellow Trooper William Sibbald harbored animosity towards him due to a previous inquiry into Sibbald’s relationship with a female informant, leading Sibbald to disparage him publicly.
The incident at the center of the case occurred on August 17, 2009, when PSP officers, including Gilson and Sibbald, responded to a mental health commitment situation. After the individual was restrained, Gilson claims he merely tapped crisis worker Sandra Grgic on the elbow to inquire about the hospital to which the individual would be taken. He denies any inappropriate contact. In contrast, Defendants allege that Gilson inappropriately touched Grgic by putting his arm around her waist and pulling her toward him.
Following the incident, Sibbald encouraged Grgic to report her experience. Grgic subsequently filed a complaint with PSP on August 24, 2009. An Internal Affairs Division investigation led by Sergeant Mark Noce was conducted, during which Grgic characterized the contact as inappropriate and unwanted. Gilson consistently denied any misconduct during his interviews, maintaining that he only touched her elbow. Noce's report highlighted Gilson's denials regarding any inappropriate touching.
Trooper Gilson denied any inappropriate physical contact with Ms. Grgic during an investigation, stating he did not touch her except for her elbow and did not recall any other interactions. Other witnesses at the scene, including parents and neighbors, did not observe any contact between Gilson and Grgic. The only witness, Sibbald, supported Grgic’s claim but differed on the details, indicating she pushed away from the Plaintiff, while Grgic maintained she simply walked away.
On November 23, 2009, an investigative report by Noce was sent to commanding officer Schau, who then prepared a Summary Report. This report indicated that the investigation centered around a complaint of inappropriate contact by Gilson with a female crisis worker and concluded that the allegations had merit, leading to potential disciplinary actions. On December 8, 2009, Schau provided the Summary Report and the investigatory file to Gilson, informing him of his right to a pre-disciplinary conference (PDC) to address the allegations. Gilson opted not to have a union representative present to keep the matter confidential. The PDC was scheduled for December 11, 2009, but Schau was unavailable, so Operations Lieutenant Allen conducted the meeting. Schau had prepared a Disciplinary Action Report (DAR) contingent on whether Gilson could present counterarguments or mitigating factors during the PDC. Following the meeting, Allen issued the DAR to Gilson, concluding he had not offered any substantive defense regarding the misconduct allegations.
Trooper First Class William L. Gilson was found to have engaged in inappropriate and unwanted physical contact with a crisis services worker, which was witnessed by another individual. The allegation of improper On-Duty Conduct against him was sustained, and he was deemed less than truthful during administrative interviews related to the investigation. The evidence supporting the misconduct was summarized and provided to him in a report on December 8, 2009. Following the investigation, Major Terry L. Seilhamer concurred with the findings, emphasizing the overwhelming evidence of Gilson's inappropriate behavior and his previous history of dishonesty in an earlier Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigation. Despite these findings, Gilson continued his duties as a State Trooper until November 16, 2010.
In March 2010, the IAD Investigatory Report was forwarded to the Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEOO) for further review. Sergeant Kristal M. Turner-Childs assessed whether Gilson's actions constituted violations of internal regulations against sexual misconduct and harassment. In her memoranda dated March 2 and June 8, 2010, she concluded that Gilson's actions, which involved uninvited sexual touching, violated PSP regulations.
Consequently, on December 9, 2010, after consulting with Major Lisa Christie, Sergeant Kyle R. Teter from the Department Discipline Office issued a Notice of Disciplinary Penalty, terminating Gilson's employment and suspending him without pay pending arbitration.
Plaintiff was found to have violated seven PSP field regulations, including unbecoming conduct, discrimination, and providing false information, and received a Notice of Disciplinary Penalty on November 15, 2010. Following this, he initiated grievance arbitration on January 6, 2011, where the PSP accused him of committing a serious act of deception during an Internal Affairs investigation, a violation defined in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) as one of the 12 "deadly sins" warranting termination without mitigating circumstances. Despite the Notice not explicitly referencing this provision, PSP's focus during the arbitration was on the alleged deception.
During the hearing, evidence was presented showing that Plaintiff had repeatedly denied inappropriate contact with Sandra Grgic, and although Plaintiff and his union lawyer claimed surprise by the "serious act of deception" accusation, no formal objections were raised. On May 4, 2012, Arbitrator Steven M. Wolf ruled in favor of PSP, stating that the case centered on the existence of a serious act of deception. He deemed that Plaintiff’s fabrications during the investigation met the definition of this term under the CBA. Furthermore, he determined that Plaintiff's positive work history could not mitigate the severity of his dismissal, as the CBA mandated termination for established "deadly sins." Consequently, the arbitrator confirmed that the PSP's dismissal of Plaintiff was justified. Following the arbitration, a memo was drafted on May 4, 2011, regarding the imposition of the arbitration award.
Trooper Gilson violated multiple Field Regulations, including Unbecoming Conduct, Internal Investigations, Discrimination or Harassment, Sexual Impropriety, Performance of Duty, Competency, and Providing False Information. On October 7, 2010, he was notified of accusations leading to potential court-martial proceedings and chose the grievance procedure instead. On November 15, 2010, he was informed of his dismissal from the Pennsylvania State Police, pending grievance resolution, which led to a suspension without pay. After grieving the dismissal, an arbitration hearing occurred on January 6, 2011, resulting in an award on May 2, 2011, that denied his grievance and confirmed his dismissal effective that date.
Following his termination, Gilson claimed that the Pennsylvania State Police's (PSP) communication of his dismissal to the Department of Labor and Industry led to lost job opportunities, as prospective employers were misled into believing he was fired for sexual harassment. On January 6, 2012, he filed a civil action against various PSP officials and entities, alleging thirteen causes of action. These include violations of procedural due process and equal protection rights, conspiracy related to equal protection, and claims under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). Additional counts accuse a PSP officer of defamation and emotional distress, along with gender discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). Lastly, a due process claim is raised concerning the vagueness of the term "serious act of deception" as applied to him.
Count 12 of the complaint presents a due process claim against Defendants Schau, Teter, Christie, Facciolo, and Noonan, alleging they violated Plaintiff's protected liberty interest in future employment by disseminating information regarding his termination proceedings. Count 13 similarly claims a due process violation, asserting that the defendants deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional right to employment without due process when the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) pursued a "serious act of deception" charge during arbitration without prior notice to him.
On January 30, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 80) along with supporting documents (ECF Nos. 81, 82, and 83). Plaintiff opposed this motion (ECF Nos. 96, 97, 98, and 99) on April 9, 2015, and Defendants replied (ECF Nos. 104, 105) on May 7, 2015. The filings have joined the issues for resolution.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes over material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). An issue is considered genuine if reasonable evidence could lead a factfinder to rule for the non-moving party. The court must view facts in favor of the non-moving party and requires a trial to resolve factual disagreements.
Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 assert violations of constitutional rights, which necessitate proving a violation of rights secured by the Constitution and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. The named Defendants are recognized as acting under state law. The court will assess whether Plaintiff has sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Defendants violated his federal rights and whether there was adequate personal involvement from each Defendant to establish constitutional liability, as personal involvement cannot be based solely on respondeat superior. The examination will focus on the specific theories of liability presented by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges procedural due process violations in Counts 1 and 13 of the First Amended Complaint (FAC) related to his termination. In Count 1, he claims that Schau, Teter, Christie, and Sibbald deprived him of his reputation and employment rights without due process. He contends that Teter inadequately reviewed exculpatory evidence and overlooked potential motives for false accusations against him. The Plaintiff accuses Schau, Teter, and Christie of conducting a delayed investigation without sufficient evidence of misconduct and collectively over-penalizing him for a minor infraction while wrongfully labeling him a liar and sexual harasser.
Count 13 presents a claim against Schau, Teter, Christie, Facciolo, and Noonan, asserting that they unconstitutionally deprived him of his property interest in continued employment by pursuing a "serious act of deception" charge at the arbitration hearing without prior notice. This lack of notice hindered his ability to defend himself against the charge during the termination proceedings.
In opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that Schau’s Summary Report was insufficient as it failed to notify him of all charges, particularly regarding his conduct during the investigation. He asserts he was disciplined for being "less than truthful" despite not being formally advised of this potential discipline. He further claims that Teter’s November 2010 Notice of Disciplinary Penalty, which cited seven violations, did not provide him with prior notice or an opportunity to respond to these charges, including those related to internal investigations and sexual harassment. Plaintiff emphasizes that he lacked the chance to contest these serious allegations before the dismissal notice was issued. He concludes by reiterating that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding the "serious act of deception" accusation, which was not specifically referenced in his Notice of Disciplinary Penalty, despite being a significant charge under the collective bargaining agreement that warranted automatic termination.
Plaintiff argues that the charge against him was fundamentally different from an internal regulation violation as it did not allow for consideration of mitigating circumstances. He contends that the lack of prior notice regarding the specific charge left him and his arbitration counsel unprepared to defend against it, infringing his constitutional right to a meaningful hearing. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a protected interest and (2) lack of due process. Plaintiff claims a protected property interest in his employment, which Defendants do not contest, leading to the question of whether he was deprived of that interest without due process.
Pre-deprivation hearings are generally required for employment-related property interests but need not be elaborate. They should provide notice of charges, an explanation of evidence, and an opportunity to present a defense, serving as a check against mistaken decisions. While he received a pre-termination notice and an informal hearing, Plaintiff argues these were inadequate because they did not inform him of all relevant charges, specifically regarding his denials of inappropriate contact and allegations of sexual misconduct.
The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding his procedural due process claims. It considers not only the pre-discipline notice but also the investigatory evidence from Noce. The Third Circuit’s precedent indicates that a formal hearing is not mandatory before suspension to meet due process requirements, and it is acknowledged that Plaintiff was interviewed multiple times during the investigation.
On October 26, 2009, Plaintiff was informed of Grgic's allegation of nonconsensual touching, specifically that he had placed his left hand around her waist and pulled her close. Grgic deemed this contact as inappropriate and unwanted. Prior to questioning, Plaintiff received a written notice stating he was required to answer questions truthfully in relation to the administrative investigation by the Pennsylvania State Police, with similar warnings issued during his second interview on November 18, 2009. Throughout the interviews, Plaintiff was presented with evidence, primarily Grgic’s testimony and corroboration from Sibbald. Although Plaintiff denied the allegations, he could not explain why Grgic would fabricate her claims.
During the investigation, he was questioned repeatedly about the alleged touching and maintained his denial, suggesting Grgic was untruthful. After reviewing the investigation materials, including Grgic’s statements, Plaintiff attended a pre-disciplinary conference on December 11, 2009, where he could address the allegations and evidence against him. Following these proceedings, Schau’s Disciplinary Action Report was issued, citing both inappropriate contact with Grgic and dishonesty during interviews as grounds for discipline. The Court concluded that the pre-disciplinary process provided adequate notice, explanation of evidence, and opportunity for Plaintiff to respond, thereby satisfying constitutional due process requirements. The Court rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Schau’s report was constitutionally deficient for not explicitly detailing his alleged untruthfulness, affirming that adequate notice was given as it informed him of the substance of the allegations and allowed time for a response.
Plaintiff was aware during his pre-disciplinary conference that Grgic's allegation of inappropriate contact involved a credibility determination between his account and those of Grgic and Sibbald. He had been cautioned about the potential consequences of untruthfulness by Noce and had been questioned multiple times about the incident. By December 11, 2009, he understood that his credibility was at stake and that he could face discipline for being untruthful. Plaintiff did not present any additional facts he could have used to counter the untruthfulness charge, indicating that he had adequate notice of the charges against him. The court determined that the pre-deprivation process was constitutionally sufficient regarding the untruthfulness charge, despite the absence of a specific sexual harassment allegation in the Summary Report. Citing relevant case law, the court noted that due process does not require the identification of specific rules violated if the notice sufficiently conveys the nature of the plaintiff's conduct. Furthermore, the court concluded that Plaintiff was adequately informed of the allegations and had the opportunity to respond before any disciplinary action was taken. The omission of a specific reference to a "serious act of deception" in the November 9, 2010 Notice of Discipline did not violate due process, as the evidence did not support Plaintiff's claim that he was unprepared for the arbitration hearing. The arbitrator's inquiries at the outset of the proceeding further indicated a proper handling of the issues.
PSP's attorney proposed a two-part inquiry regarding the Plaintiff's alleged serious deception during the IAD investigation, which could justify dismissal under the CBA. Alternatively, the Union's attorney framed the issue around whether the Plaintiff violated department policy warranting disciplinary action and the appropriate remedy if he did not. The arbitrator decided to keep this matter open for further review after hearing testimony.
The Union’s counsel did not object to PSP’s framing of the issues, indicating no perceived disadvantage or due process violation for the Plaintiff or the Union. Trooper Gilson and his lawyer did not express any surprise or lack of notice regarding the proceedings. The Union defended the Plaintiff by maintaining his position from prior interviews, asserting no inappropriate contact occurred and challenging the credibility of PSP's witnesses. They presented the Plaintiff's testimony, called additional witnesses, submitted exhibits, and cross-examined PSP's witnesses.
After the hearing, both parties could submit written arguments on various points, including the framing of issues and the seriousness of the alleged deception. The evidence suggests that the arbitration permitted a meaningful opportunity for the Plaintiff to be heard. Additionally, even if deficiencies in the arbitration process were claimed, the Plaintiff had access to judicial review through state law, which he did not pursue. Relevant case law indicates that judicial review involves assessing the arbitrator's jurisdiction, the regularity of proceedings, and any deprivation of constitutional rights, with established grievance and arbitration procedures satisfying due process requirements.
Public employee rights are governed by collective bargaining agreements with provisions for state court review, ensuring due process. If a plaintiff perceives irregular conduct in arbitration, state law provides a mechanism for redress. The court emphasizes that the plaintiff's failure to utilize available procedures does not equate to a deprivation of due process; it indicates a choice not to engage with the process. The case Dykes v. SEPTA illustrates that post-deprivation procedures under collective bargaining agreements and state law satisfy due process requirements. The court finds that the plaintiff was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to contest the charge of “serious act of deception” because of Teter's omission in the disciplinary notice. Consequently, the court grants summary judgment for the defendants on Counts 1 and 13.
In Count 12, the plaintiff claims a violation of procedural due process regarding future employment opportunities, alleging that the defendants misrepresented the reasons for his termination, which impeded his job prospects. He asserts that the publication of the arbitration award by Facciolo harmed his reputation and restricted his employment options. The defendants counter that the statements made were true, and even if the plaintiff experienced reputational harm, he received adequate due process through the arbitration process. To establish a due process claim for reputational harm, the plaintiff must demonstrate both a stigma to his reputation and the deprivation of an additional right or interest, as outlined in the "stigma-plus" test. This test applies in public employment contexts, where dissemination of false information related to termination can violate protected liberty interests.
The “stigma-plus” test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that allegedly defamatory statements were both publicly made and false. In this case, the court agrees with the defendants that the plaintiff has not met the “stigma” criterion, as the publication in question did not convey false information. The plaintiff claims to have been stigmatized by a memo sent to the Department of Labor and Industry, which outlined disciplinary actions against him, including allegations of sexual harassment and other violations. The court finds that the memo accurately reflected the grounds for the plaintiff's termination, supported by the Equal Employment Opportunity Office's findings. Although the plaintiff argues that the memo misleadingly implied that an arbitrator upheld the sexual harassment allegations, the court concludes that the memo's statements were true. The ambiguity regarding the arbitrator's decision was clarified by the forwarding of the actual arbitration decision alongside the memo, ensuring the context was correctly understood.
In Civil Action No. 09-3014, the court determined that communications in question must be assessed in context to establish possible defamatory meaning. The plaintiff's claims regarding violations of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) regulations on discrimination, harassment, and sexual impropriety were deemed unfounded. The plaintiff contended that his conduct did not meet the definitions of sexual harassment or misconduct according to PSP's regulations and argued that PSP abandoned these charges during arbitration due to an inability to defend them. Furthermore, the plaintiff asserted that the arbitrator did not address his grievance regarding the alleged violations.
The court rejected these arguments, noting that the plaintiff essentially sought an administrative review of the PSP's internal decision-making, which is not appropriate for judicial review without evidence of a constitutional violation. The court found insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's claims regarding misapplication of regulations by Turner-Child. Additionally, the court clarified that PSP did not abandon its charges at arbitration; instead, PSP’s counsel presented a two-part analysis, maintaining that there was just cause for termination based on deception. Testimony was provided regarding the grounds for dismissal, which included the alleged discrimination and harassment. The arbitrator's ruling, focusing solely on deception, did not substantiate the plaintiff's assertion of false and stigmatizing statements by Facciolo.
The ruling states that the defendant had no obligation to decide on the allegations against the Plaintiff regarding “discrimination or harassment” and “sexual impropriety” because the PSP had already determined the Plaintiff violated these regulations, leading to his dismissal. This finding was communicated to the Department of Labor through the publication of relevant documents, indicating no false publication occurred. Consequently, the Plaintiff could not satisfy the “stigma” requirement necessary for his due process claim, resulting in a dismissal of Count 12.
In Count 11, the Plaintiff asserts that the term “serious act of deception” in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is unconstitutionally vague. He contends the phrase lacks definition within the CBA and that PSP does not provide training regarding its meaning, leading to uncertainty about what constitutes a serious act of deception. The “void for vagueness” principle, rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, aims to ensure individuals receive fair warning about prohibited conduct. In the context of public employment, a standard is deemed vague only if ordinary individuals cannot discern the risks of discharge associated with their actions. The analysis of vagueness is case-specific, requiring the challenging party to demonstrate its applicability to their situation. The ruling notes that, in civil matters, standards need not be as precise as in criminal cases, making them less likely to be invalidated. The Plaintiff's termination was justified based on the determination that he committed a “serious act of deception,” categorized as one of the twelve “deadly sins” in the CBA, which jeopardizes the integrity of the Department's duties.
Termination of employment is deemed appropriate discipline for serious acts of deception during investigations, particularly when there is an obligation to provide truthful information. Such acts include intentional lying, fabrication, misleading statements, fraud, and perjury. In this case, the Plaintiff's deception occurred during an internal administrative investigation regarding allegations of inappropriate conduct while on duty. Despite being warned about the necessity to answer truthfully, the Plaintiff denied the allegations and claimed the accuser was untruthful. The arbitrator found the accounts of the Plaintiff and the accuser to be irreconcilable, supporting the conclusion that the Plaintiff was lying. The credibility of the accuser's account was upheld by both the PSP and the arbitrator, who described the Plaintiff's behavior as a conscious choice to fabricate testimony multiple times. The court determined that an ordinary person would recognize that such repeated false denials during an investigation constitute serious deception, justifying potential discharge. The court also noted that the lack of a precise definition for "serious act of deception" in the collective bargaining agreement or related policies does not render the term unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Plaintiff's circumstances. Vagueness challenges must be assessed based on the specific facts of the case rather than in abstract terms.
The legal standard for assessing vagueness is case-specific, requiring courts to evaluate whether a statute is vague as applied to the individual involved. In civil contexts, standards do not need to be as precise as in criminal contexts, making them less prone to void-for-vagueness challenges. Nevertheless, in criminal cases, vagueness can be contested if a reasonable person would understand that their actions could lead to prosecution. A statute that includes a mens rea requirement, or a scienter component, mitigates vagueness concerns, reducing the likelihood of wrongful convictions for unintentional conduct.
The court determined that reasonable individuals in the plaintiff's position would recognize that persistently and falsely denying misconduct during an administrative investigation could result in termination under the collective bargaining agreement's ("CBA") provision regarding "serious acts of deception." The requirement of "deception" inherently incorporates a mens rea element, thereby safeguarding against inadvertent discharges based on erroneous information.
Regarding Count 2 of the First Amended Complaint (FAC), the plaintiff claims violations of equal protection rights against Schau, Teter, Christie, and Sibbald. He asserts that Schau, Teter, and Christie treated him less favorably than similarly situated Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) officers who engaged in comparable or more serious misconduct. Sibbald is accused of gender discrimination through derogatory comments and false misconduct allegations. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection mandates that individuals in similar situations be treated equally, necessitating proof of purposeful discrimination for a successful Section 1983 claim. To establish sexual discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegedly disparate treatment was based on gender. Individuals are considered "similarly situated" when they are alike in all relevant aspects.
In Castaneira v. Potteiger, the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Sibbald or Schau treated the plaintiff less favorably than similarly situated female officers or acted with discriminatory intent based on gender. The court emphasized that mere allegations are inadequate to oppose summary judgment; the plaintiff must provide substantive evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment against Sibbald and Schau was granted.
The court further analyzed the claims against Teter and Christie, ultimately finding them legally unsupportable. The plaintiff pointed to two pieces of evidence to support his claim of gender-based discrimination. The first involved a male officer's inappropriate physical contact with another male officer, which was not investigated as sexual harassment, leading the plaintiff to argue that PSP applied gender-based stereotypes by assuming male-female contact was inherently sexual. However, the court found this evidence irrelevant to Teter or Christie, as the plaintiff provided no proof of their involvement in the incident or in the disciplinary actions resulting from it.
The second piece of evidence referenced Trooper Carrie Gula, who was discharged for lying but later reinstated by an arbitrator who found insufficient just cause for her dismissal. The court concluded that this case did not provide a basis for inferring gender-based animus in the plaintiff's situation, especially since PSP's Equal Employment Opportunity Office had previously affirmed that the plaintiff's conduct violated regulations concerning sexual harassment and impropriety.
Gula received a Notice of Disciplinary Penalty from PSP, alleging she violated a provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which the Plaintiff argues is significant because he did not receive similar notification regarding his own case. However, the court finds that the incident involving Gula does not support a claim of gender-based discrimination against the named Defendants. There is no evidence indicating that Teter was involved in Gula’s case, and the role of Christie remains unclear. Without evidence of their personal involvement, it is unreasonable to infer that the Defendants acted with discriminatory intent toward the Plaintiff.
Moreover, the case of Trooper Gula, who was dismissed for lying, actually supports the Defendants’ position by showing that both male and female Troopers were treated similarly. The distinction made by the Plaintiff regarding Gula’s pre-arbitration notice does not substantiate an inference of procedural disadvantage based on gender. The arbitrator, not the PSP or the Defendants, reinstated Gula, further weakening the Plaintiff's claims.
Regarding Counts 7 and 9, the Plaintiff alleges gender-based discrimination under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. To establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate: membership in a protected class, qualification for the position, suffering of an adverse employment action, and that members of the opposite sex were treated more favorably or that the circumstances suggest intentional discrimination. The analysis follows the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which the court references in evaluating the claims. Ultimately, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted concerning Count 2 of the First Amended Complaint (FAC).
A plaintiff must establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the elements of a prima facie case to avoid summary judgment in favor of the defendant. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer must then provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the adverse employment action. Once the employer does this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's justification is a pretext for discrimination. This can be achieved by presenting evidence—either direct or circumstantial—that undermines the credibility of the employer's reasons or suggests that discriminatory motives were likely a factor in the employer's decision.
To successfully show pretext, the plaintiff must highlight significant weaknesses or inconsistencies in the employer's explanation that would lead a reasonable fact-finder to view it as unworthy of credence. If the plaintiff does so, the jury may infer that the employer's actions were motivated by discriminatory reasons, based on the rejection of the employer's justification and the establishment of a prima facie case.
In this case, defendants have moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's Title VII and PHRA claims, arguing that the plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence for either the prima facie case or to show that the reasons for termination were pretextual. The court agrees with the defendants, noting that the evidence presented by the plaintiff, including an incident involving two male officers and the termination of another officer, does not support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff's termination was motivated by gender. There is no evidence suggesting that similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably based on their gender, which is necessary to demonstrate a nexus between the plaintiff's protected status and the adverse action.
The fourth prima facie element of a Title VII claim necessitates that the plaintiff demonstrate that individuals outside their protected class were treated more favorably or that other circumstances suggest unlawful discrimination. The plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII or the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), leading to summary judgment on Counts 7 and 9. Additionally, the plaintiff has not provided evidence to support a reasonable inference of pretext regarding the defendant's stated reason for termination, which was the plaintiff's untruthfulness during an investigation. The defendant, Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), successfully articulated a non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge, which was upheld by a neutral arbitrator. The plaintiff's attempt to highlight inconsistencies in the disciplinary notices does not sufficiently support an inference of pretext, given that PSP's decisions were based on the plaintiff's lack of truthfulness, and similar disciplinary actions were taken against female troopers for comparable conduct. Therefore, the plaintiff has not shown sufficient evidence for a factfinder to disbelieve PSP's explanation or conclude that gender discrimination motivated the decision, resulting in the failure of the Title VII and PHRA claims.
In Counts 8 and 10, the plaintiff alleges a hostile work environment due to gender-based discrimination. The defendants argue that the plaintiff has not produced adequate evidence to establish such a claim. The court focuses on the defendants' argument regarding the lack of evidence for a hostile work environment, which is sufficient for granting summary judgment. To succeed, a plaintiff must demonstrate intentional discrimination based on gender that is severe or pervasive, adversely affecting the plaintiff and a reasonable person in similar circumstances, alongside the existence of respondeat superior liability.
Federal courts utilize a "totality of the circumstances" standard to assess whether a hostile work environment exists, focusing on the frequency and severity of discriminatory conduct, its physical or emotional impact, and its effect on an employee's job performance. In this case, the Plaintiff claims he was falsely accused of sexual harassment, which he argues created a hostile work environment. He references various cases to support his assertion that accusations based on stereotypes can indicate a sexually hostile work environment. However, the cited cases involved significantly more severe and pervasive harassment than what the Plaintiff has alleged. Unlike those precedents, the Plaintiff has not provided specific evidence demonstrating the nature, severity, or frequency of the alleged hostile conduct, nor does he show that it unreasonably interfered with his work performance. His arguments primarily rely on the alleged bias of the investigation and arbitration process, along with claims of post-termination interference with job prospects. The record indicates that the investigation involved two interviews with the Plaintiff and a one-day arbitration, with no substantial evidence of frequent or severe hostility from colleagues or supervisors.
Plaintiff's claims of a hostile work environment due to his termination and the IAD investigation are unsupported by evidence of threatening or humiliating conduct from PSP agents. Despite claiming embarrassment, Plaintiff's work conditions remained unchanged during the investigation, and he received positive evaluations while engaged in multiple criminal investigations. Allegations of post-termination harassment do not constitute a hostile work environment since Plaintiff was no longer employed at that time. Consequently, the Court determined that Plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence for Counts 8 and 10, leading to the granting of Defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims.
In Count 4, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his rights under the Public Health Services Act (PHSA) and COBRA regarding the lack of continuing health coverage post-termination. The PHSA mandates that state-operated group health plans must provide 18 months of coverage to beneficiaries losing coverage due to a "qualifying event," which excludes terminations for "gross misconduct." Defendants assert that Plaintiff's termination was for gross misconduct, thereby relieving them of the obligation to provide continuing coverage. Plaintiff disputes this characterization, noting that neither the PHSA nor COBRA defines "gross misconduct." The Court referenced previous cases indicating that definitions may be drawn from state unemployment compensation standards.
The court evaluated the findings of fact regarding a terminated employee's job performance from a state labor department report related to unemployment compensation eligibility. Under Pennsylvania law, an employee discharged for "willful misconduct connected with work" is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, as defined by 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 802(e). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court characterizes "willful misconduct" as a severe disregard for the employer’s interests, including deliberate rule violations or negligence that indicates intentional neglect of duties.
In this case, defendants argued that the plaintiff's inappropriate touching of an employee and subsequent dishonesty constituted "willful misconduct," qualifying as "gross misconduct" under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). They cited multiple cases where dishonesty was deemed gross misconduct. The plaintiff's termination stemmed from his inappropriate behavior and repeated denials during an investigation, which an arbitrator classified as a serious deception.
The court concurred that these actions met the criteria for willful misconduct under McLean's definition, demonstrating a clear disregard for the employer's interests and rules. However, the plaintiff contended that a material fact issue existed, based on the unemployment compensation office’s finding that his separation was not sufficiently linked to the incident, as it occurred over a year prior. The plaintiff referenced a ruling as “Exhibit 39,” which was not included in the record, preventing the court from assessing its significance. Ultimately, the court found no genuine issue of fact regarding the plaintiff's misconduct, even accepting his claims at face value.
Plaintiffs claim regarding the ruling indicates that the unemployment compensation office may have hesitated to conclude that their discharge stemmed from misconduct due to the time elapsed between the August 2009 incident and the November 2010 termination notice. According to 43 P.S. 802(e), an employee is ineligible for compensation if unemployment arises from a discharge for willful misconduct related to their work. The ruling focuses on the timing of the discharge and does not address whether the Plaintiff's actions constituted "willful misconduct" per the statute. The Court found no genuine dispute of fact regarding the Plaintiff’s alleged "willful" and "gross" misconduct, leading to the granting of the Defendants' summary judgment motion on Count 4 of the Fourth Amended Complaint (FAC). Consequently, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted for all counts in the FAC. The individual Defendants included Major Mark Schau, Sergeant Kyle Teter, Major Lisa Christie, Trooper William Sibbald, Jr., Debra Facciolo, and Commissioner Frank Noonon. Mark Noce was dropped from the case in an amended pleading. The Plaintiff argued that he was not informed of all evidence related to the disciplinary action, specifically citing missing recordings and transcripts. Under PSP regulations, "sexual misconduct" encompasses uninvited sexual touching or contact intended to harm or gratify another's sexual desire, as well as various defined sexual offenses in Pennsylvania law. Additionally, "sexual harassment" includes unwelcome sexual advances and other inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature.
Submission to or rejection of certain conduct can be a condition of employment, influence employment decisions, or create a hostile work environment, as outlined in the excerpt. The plaintiff does not oppose the defendants’ motion regarding Counts 3, 5, and 6, leading to the court granting judgment in favor of the defendants on these counts. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals can seek redress for constitutional violations perpetrated by persons acting under state authority, with claims requiring the personal involvement of the alleged violator. Complaints about the arbitration process cannot impose liability on the named defendants in Count 1, as the plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge the arbitration award in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The plaintiff was previously disciplined for dishonesty during an investigation and was warned that future violations would result in harsher penalties. An arbitrator found that his prior untruthfulness justified disciplinary action, reaffirming that the plaintiff was aware that dishonesty during investigations could lead to discipline. Additionally, relevant regulations and the collective bargaining agreement prohibit sexual harassment and false statements by a Trooper.
Gilson was informed of the charges against him and understood his obligations under the Field Regulations and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). His claim of lacking notice regarding the rules and evidence is viewed as disingenuous, as he was aware of the alleged wrongdoing. A review of the record suggests that Gilson's intent with Counts 1 and 13 is to challenge the merits of his termination disguised as a due process issue. It could be inferred that the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) manipulated the charges to justify his discharge, but the court cannot review the merits of the PSP’s disciplinary actions or the arbitrator's ruling, as such reviews fall under Pennsylvania state law and are subject to appeal in the Commonwealth Court.
Plaintiff's assertion about a memo being sent to various state agencies is contradicted by evidence showing it was only sent to the Department of Labor and Industry. The record indicates that Turner-Childs had reasonable grounds to believe that Gilson violated specific Field Regulations regarding discrimination and sexual impropriety. The definitions of sexual harassment under these regulations include unwelcome advances that impact employment conditions or create a hostile work environment. Although Gilson argues that the circumstances of his case do not meet the definitions, Turner-Childs testified that the relevant subsections apply to situations involving supervisors and subordinates.
Plaintiff was found in violation of PSP's harassment policy for engaging in "unwelcomed sexual advances" and "physical conduct of a sexual nature" towards Grgic. Turner-Childs documented this in her June 8, 2010 memorandum, emphasizing that PSP prohibits inappropriate behavior in work-related contexts. The policy encompasses both sexual harassment and sexual misconduct, the latter defined to include any unwelcome sexual touching or contact intended to abuse, humiliate, or gratify sexual desire. Plaintiff contested this finding, arguing that Turner-Childs did not classify Gilson's alleged touching as "sexual," but the memorandum clearly defined "sexual misconduct" to include such actions. It detailed an incident where Trooper Gilson, while in uniform, grabbed Grgic inappropriately, which she deemed unwanted and inappropriate. Thus, there was a reasonable basis for concluding that Plaintiff violated PSP's policy.
Additionally, Facciolo's report to the Department of Labor and Industry was deemed absolutely privileged under a Management Directive from the Governor's Office mandating such disclosures. This privilege protects against defamation claims, as established in prior case law. The privileged nature of the communication may also resolve Plaintiff's "stigma-plus" claim regarding the alleged defamatory content.
Statements made by defendants in court filings were deemed privileged under Vermont law, preventing them from being the basis of the plaintiff's "stigma plus" claim. Under Vermont law, defamatory statements made during judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged if they relate to those proceedings. Federal courts in New York also reference New York defamation law when analyzing "stigma-plus" claims.
In an arbitration context, the arbitrator referenced two Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) from different periods, noting that the language regarding "serious acts of deception" was identical in both. The plaintiff contends that the labor agreement negotiated by his union was unconstitutional, but he provides no legal authority to support this claim. The plaintiff has sued several defendants in their individual capacities for damages related to his termination and one in an official capacity for injunctive relief, including reinstatement.
During an Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigation, a witness described the plaintiff as exhibiting a "machismo attitude," although no allegations of sexual harassment or inappropriate touching were made. The court clarifies inconsistencies regarding the name of Trooper Gula, opting to refer to her as "Carrie Gula" as per the arbitrator's decision.
The arbitrator found that Trooper Gula faced charges for making false reports and dishonesty in investigations. The defendants pointed to other instances of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) dismissing female troopers for dishonesty, noting that Trooper A.Y. was dismissed for lying during an investigation but later reinstated after an arbitrator ruled she had not been untruthful.
Teeter recommended the dismissal of Trooper A.W. after finding her untruthful during a PSP investigation regarding inaccurate radar reporting; however, she retired before being fired. Although neither Trooper A.Y. nor Trooper A.W. was ultimately dismissed, their cases undermine the Plaintiff’s assertion of gender discrimination by PSP decision-makers. The court references Third Circuit guidance that claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) should align with Title VII interpretations. It finds no need to address the Defendants' arguments regarding the timeliness of the Plaintiff's Title VII claim or exhaustion of administrative remedies for the PHRA claim. The court also states that the arbitrator’s decision does not preclude the Plaintiff from contesting his discharge on gender discrimination grounds, as per precedents indicating that arbitration decisions lack preclusive effect in federal court for Title VII claims. The court must evaluate the Plaintiff's Title VII claims anew but may consider the arbitrator's decision as evidence, weighing factors such as the relevance of the collective bargaining agreement, procedural fairness, and the adequacy of the arbitration record concerning discrimination issues. The absence of a complete record of the collective bargaining agreement renders the first factor inconclusive. The third factor suggests the arbitrator's decision should not carry substantial weight due to the lack of focus on gender discrimination during arbitration, while the second and fourth factors support some weight due to the arbitrator's competence and due process adherence. Ultimately, the court decides the arbitrator’s ruling supports PSP’s rationale for the Plaintiff's discharge but is not given substantial weight.
No credible evidence has been presented to suggest that the PSP's actions in compliance with the award were pretextual. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Title VII claims are time-barred, as they were filed over 90 days after Plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, which is in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The Plaintiff received the letter on April 30, 2012, but did not file his Title VII claims until November 16, 2012. Plaintiff asserts that his attorney’s office misplaced the right-to-sue letter, leading to a delay in filing until it was found on October 22, 2012. The Court finds no grounds for equitable tolling in this case, as established in Carter v. Keystone, which outlines circumstances under which such tolling is appropriate.
While Plaintiff might argue that his Title VII claims relate back to earlier claims under Rule 15(c), the Court does not need to address this issue due to its decision on the merits of the Title VII claims. For Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims, the standard for employer liability under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) mirrors that of Title VII. The Court clarifies that Plaintiff's interviews and arbitration processes do not constitute PSP-directed hostility, but rather are part of the due process he claims to have been denied.
Furthermore, under Pennsylvania law, findings from unemployment compensation proceedings do not have preclusive effect in subsequent civil litigation. Additionally, while Defendants argue for qualified immunity regarding Plaintiff's PHSA/COBRA claim, this argument fails because the only named Defendant in this count is PSP.
Qualified immunity is applicable only to defendants sued in their individual capacities for monetary damages, thus the Court will not grant summary judgment based on this defense. The Court is also addressing a motion from the Defendants to "clawback" attorney notes from PSP lawyers, which they claim are protected under the work product doctrine. These materials have been filed under seal, and further briefs have been submitted by both parties regarding their status. The Defendants seek a ruling affirming the protected status of these materials and requesting their return, while the Plaintiff wants to retain them for consideration in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court finds that the materials are not relevant to the Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Plaintiff has not sufficiently argued otherwise. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), the Court concludes that the disclosure was inadvertent and mandates the return of all copies of the materials by Plaintiff's counsel and the Plaintiff within thirty days, with a certification of return filed on the docket. The Defendants will retain custody of the documents until further Court order.
The Plaintiff's argument against the inadvertent disclosure claims that the notes, which are difficult to read and contain a specific notation, should have indicated their protected status. However, the Court reasons that if the protection was not obvious to the Plaintiff's counsel, it should not be deemed apparent to the Defendants' counsel either. The Court is reluctant to critique the Commonwealth's document review process and finds that the Defendants' counsel acted reasonably in seeking the return of the documents after the deposition. Consequently, the Defendants' motions to clawback the materials are granted.
