Court: District Court, D. Maine; March 2, 2016; Federal District Court
The court ruled in favor of Amtrak, granting its motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death lawsuit following the death of Sean Page, who was struck by an Amtrak train while crossing tracks in Biddeford. The judge determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding Amtrak's liability, based on Maine law and the specifics of the case, including a video recording of the incident. Amtrak operates the train under an agreement with Pan Am Railways but does not own or maintain the accident site. There is a dispute over the ownership of the tracks and underlying property, with the plaintiff arguing that Amtrak and Pan Am have not provided adequate proof of title. The video evidence shows Page crossing the tracks at an angle with his head down, and the location of the accident was not a designated crossing, although a nearby path was frequently used by pedestrians. Page lived close to the tracks, and the responding police officer estimated the incident occurred approximately a hundred yards from the nearest designated crossing. The train engineer first observed Page as he approached the crossing.
The engineer activated the train's whistle upon seeing Page approaching the tracks, but Page did not respond and walked with his head down, failing to acknowledge the train or alter his path. The engineer subsequently applied the emergency brakes. The personal representative of Page’s estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the City of Biddeford and Amtrak in Maine Superior Court. Biddeford's motion to dismiss was granted based on immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act, leading Amtrak to remove the case to federal court, citing both diversity and federal-question jurisdiction, with Maine law governing the dispute.
The wrongful death claim is based on negligence, requiring proof of four elements: duty of care, breach, injury, and causation, with the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff. The main legal question is whether Amtrak owed a duty to Page at the time of the incident. Under Maine law, a duty is an obligation to act in a certain manner towards others, and the existence and scope of such duty are legal questions. It is established that there is no general duty to protect others from harm not caused by the actor.
The plaintiff contends that Amtrak owed a duty because Page had a right to cross the tracks via a public prescriptive easement. However, the plaintiff did not adequately demonstrate to whom Page's claimed right is adverse, as establishing a prescriptive easement requires proof of continuous use for at least twenty years under a claim of right that is adverse to the owner. Evidence suggests that the property in question may be owned by either Pan Am or the City of Biddeford.
Title to the accident location lies with Pan Am Railways (or Boston, Maine), and under Maine law, no real estate title can be acquired against a railroad corporation through adverse possession, negating any potential prescriptive easement based on local customs by Biddeford residents. If the City of Biddeford retained title, Page similarly could not establish a public prescriptive easement against the municipality, as such claims require clearer evidence of possession than those for adverse possession. The plaintiff's argument that Page had a superior right through a public prescriptive easement fails due to a lack of evidence regarding the entity to which Page’s claim was adverse.
Additionally, the plaintiff contends that Amtrak's failure to prove ownership of the accident site undermines its authority. However, Maine law prohibits standing or walking on railroad tracks without permission, and this prohibition does not necessitate Amtrak or Pan Am to prove ownership. The plaintiff has not established any right for Page to be on the tracks at the time of the accident, thus failing to demonstrate any duty owed by Amtrak.
The plaintiff has also suggested that the City of Biddeford may have retained a public right to cross the tracks. However, without evidence to establish such an interest, the plaintiff has not met the burden to show Page had a superior right. Lastly, the plaintiff argues that Amtrak, as a non-possessor, had a duty to mitigate danger created by its actions. While Maine law allows for liability of non-possessors who negligently create dangerous conditions, the plaintiff must demonstrate that Amtrak's actions directly resulted in harm, which has not been established.
The "dangerous condition on the land" pertains to the use of a path by pedestrians and bicyclists, which Amtrak did not create or control. The plaintiff claims Amtrak operated its trains negligently, citing a failure to provide signage, fencing, or operate at a speed that could prevent collisions with pedestrians. However, it is established that Amtrak did not own the tracks or the premises and had no authority to change the conditions at the site of the incident. The plaintiff's assertion that the Downeaster was speeding is unsupported by evidence showing the engineer exceeded speed limits, failed to pay attention, or improperly timed the activation of emergency brakes. The argument suggests that Amtrak should operate at a speed that allows complete stops for crossing pedestrians, which is unreasonable for a non-owning rail operator. Maine law stipulates that individuals crossing tracks are responsible for their own safety, and Sean Page's actions at the time of the incident establish his negligence. Consequently, without evidence of Amtrak's negligence exceeding that of Page, the plaintiff cannot recover damages. Additionally, the plaintiff's claim regarding the unconstitutionality of 23 M.R.S.A. 7006 lacks supporting legal authority, as Maine's legislative authority is upheld by existing precedents.
The court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment, determining that it is unnecessary to resolve disputes between the parties regarding real estate title and admissible evidence. Amtrak's operating agreement involves Springfield Terminal Railway Company, Boston and Maine Corporation, Portland Terminal Company, and Maine Central Railroad Company, collectively known as "Pan Am Railways." Although the plaintiff denies Amtrak's assertion about the operating agreement, they do not contest its existence and acknowledge obligations under it, such as indemnification. The plaintiff does not claim Amtrak has ownership of the accident location, which the court accepts as established.
During oral arguments, the plaintiff's lawyer disputed track ownership without supporting evidence, while Amtrak maintained that Boston, Maine Corporation owned the tracks and surrounding areas. The court acknowledges the plaintiff's objections to Amtrak's late submission of a title examiner's opinion, yet will allow the evidence for consideration but does not require a ruling on the title dispute itself. The plaintiff's response to Amtrak's title opinion failed to demonstrate any alternative ownership interest at the accident location. Despite the lengthy history of railway use, the status of the title appears unclear due to historical documentation challenges. The plaintiff's claim regarding the location not being a designated crossing is supported only by limited deposition testimony.
Sergeant Allaire testified that the location of the incident was not a designated grade crossing, and although his response to a leading question was ambiguous, it was clarified that there were no signs, lights, or paved pathways indicating a legitimate crossing. The defendant acknowledged Allaire's testimony but noted that crossing at that location constituted trespassing. The court favors the plaintiff's position when stating facts but has adjusted the plaintiff's assertion to align with the record. Jurisdiction is based on federal-question jurisdiction, requiring interpretation of federal law, yet when federal law is silent on tort liability, state law is applied. Relevant cases indicate that simply using a railroad crossing does not imply an invitation without further facts about its maintenance and use. The plaintiff alleges that Amtrak lacked evidence of the right to operate on the tracks where the incident occurred, but has not substantiated this claim. The statutory term "conveyance" pertains to the carrying of persons rather than real estate, and violations can escalate to a Class E crime after repeated offenses. Previous cases illustrate that public use alone does not establish a legal crossing without further supporting facts.
If a jury determines that the plaintiff is an implied invitee, liability for the railroad is based solely on negligence rather than willful or reckless conduct, which would apply if the plaintiff were a trespasser. In Boothby v. Boston, Me. R.R., it was established that although there was no formal road over the crossing, a path had existed prior to the railroad's construction. The railroad initially attempted to restrict access but ultimately ceased such efforts, allowing public use of the crossing, thus requiring due care from the railroad. The ruling on Amtrak’s summary judgment does not rely on the classification of the plaintiff's status as an invitee or otherwise, since the plaintiff argues against being classified as an implied invitee and does not claim that Amtrak had a duty to inform Pan Am about the pedestrian path's usage. Maine case law emphasizes that at grade crossings, both travelers and railroads have mutual rights and responsibilities. The railroad cannot be expected to yield to travelers unless there is a clear danger of collision; thus, travelers must wait for trains, which have the right of way. It is considered negligent for a driver to cross a railroad track without first looking and listening for trains. In Ham v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., liability was assigned to the railroad due to obstructed visibility caused by overgrown vegetation. However, there is no evidence suggesting that the plaintiff could not see the train. The Law Court has affirmed that both the traveler and the railroad must exercise reasonable care, with the train generally holding the right of way at crossings. A collision at a crossing is typically indicative of the traveler’s negligence.
The plaintiff attempts to establish a duty for Amtrak based on an indemnification provision in the operating agreement, which obligates Amtrak to indemnify Railroad for all liabilities associated with injuries or property damage resulting from Amtrak's activities, regardless of any negligence by Railroad or its personnel. However, any duty created by this provision is owed to Pan Am, not to Page, and since the plaintiff has not pursued a claim against Pan Am, the indemnification clause does not apply. Additionally, the Maine Constitution guarantees a remedy for injuries to individuals, ensuring that justice is administered promptly and without denial.
