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Langenbau v. Med-Trans Corp.
Citations: 167 F. Supp. 3d 983; 2016 WL 943765Docket: No. C13-3038-LTS
Court: District Court, N.D. Iowa; March 7, 2016; Federal District Court
On January 2, 2013, an air ambulance helicopter operated by Med-Trans Corporation crashed shortly after takeoff in central Iowa, resulting in the deaths of the pilot, nurse Shelly Lair-Langenbau, and a paramedic. The crash occurred under potentially hazardous icing conditions for which the helicopter was not certified. Lair-Langenbau's survivors filed negligence claims against Med-Trans. The case was reassigned to Judge Leonard T. Strand on March 1, 2016, and involves several evidentiary motions related to upcoming partial summary judgment motions and a jury trial set for June 6, 2016. Key evidentiary motions include a request for the jury to view the helicopter wreckage and challenges to the testimony of expert witnesses. The introduction provides a factual background detailing the circumstances of the crash, the operational protocols followed by Med-Trans, and the responsibilities of the pilot under Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), specifically FAR 135.617(c), regarding preflight risk analysis. The memorandum outlines a structured approach to addressing these motions, including legal standards, parties' arguments, and analyses for various aspects of the evidentiary disputes. Grell was trained by Med-Trans on Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) and preflight risk assessments, including weather considerations like potential icing conditions. Both parties acknowledged the risk of icing at the time Grell was requested to accept a flight, and Grell was expected to assess the weather before agreeing to the flight. The Bell Model 407 helicopter was certified for non-icing conditions, yet Grell decided to proceed. The helicopter took off from Mercy at 8:49 p.m. but crashed near Clear Lake, Iowa, at approximately 8:57 p.m., resulting in the deaths of all three occupants. The plaintiffs, including Jay W. Langenbau and family members of deceased Shelly R. Lair-Langenbau, filed a lawsuit against Med-Trans in the Iowa District Court on July 22, 2013, which was later removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 11, 2016, asserting three claims against Med-Trans: vicarious liability for Grell’s negligence, negligence in providing safe aircraft services, and negligent conduct in operating the helicopter. They seek compensatory and punitive damages. Med-Trans responded on January 25, 2016, denying the claims and raising affirmative defenses. It also filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding punitive damages. The plaintiffs countered with a motion addressing the comparative negligence of the deceased. Several evidentiary motions were exchanged, including Med-Trans's attempts to exclude testimonies from various witnesses and the plaintiffs' motions for a jury view of the wreckage and to strike certain expert opinions. The court found that no hearings were necessary, and the motions were submitted based on written arguments. The plaintiffs seek permission for a jury to view the helicopter wreckage stored at the Wentworth Hangar in Lakeville, Minnesota, citing the need for early arrangements for transportation and delivery ahead of trial. They argue that the wreckage, which cannot be accommodated in the courtroom, provides irreplaceable evidence regarding the crash's nature, impact dynamics, and the occupants' trauma, asserting its superiority over photographs and descriptions. In contrast, Med-Trans contends that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated how the wreckage view would assist the jury in resolving factual disputes, emphasizing that maintenance and mechanical issues are not contested. Med-Trans claims that the contentious areas involve piloting and procedures, where viewing the wreckage would hold minimal relevance and no more evidentiary value than courtroom evidence. They argue that allowing the view would be unnecessarily costly and burdensome. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals establishes that a trial court's decision to permit a jury view of external scenes or objects is highly discretionary. Citing precedent, it notes that a court does not abuse this discretion when a view would be time-consuming and redundant compared to photographic evidence and witness testimony. In United States v. Henderson, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that a jury did not need to view a vehicle directly due to the introduction of sufficient photographic evidence of its interior. Similarly, in United States v. Scroggins, the court upheld the district court's decision to deny a jury view of a car containing a firearm, noting that other evidence, including officer testimony and diagrams, rendered such a view unnecessary and cumulative. Historical cases, such as American Glycerin Co. v. Eason Oil Co., illustrate that trial judges have discretion in granting jury views, and such requests can be denied if they serve no additional purpose. The Eighth Circuit emphasizes the importance of relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits exclusion of evidence if its probative value is outweighed by issues such as unfair prejudice or cumulative evidence. The court respects the district court's discretion in these matters, reviewing decisions under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion, particularly concerning the balance of probative value against potential prejudice. Evidence is considered unfairly prejudicial not solely because it suggests guilt, but because it may lead the jury to base their decision on improper reasoning. The determination of unfair prejudice hinges on whether evidence unduly suggests a decision grounded in improper bases, often emotional. Unfairly prejudicial evidence can distract the jury from key issues in the trial. In the analysis regarding a jury view of the wreckage of the air ambulance helicopter, the discretion to allow such a view is acknowledged, but it is deemed to have only slight probative value. The plaintiffs have provided vague rationales for the relevance of viewing the wreckage, which include the crash's nature, impact dynamics, and the occupants' physical trauma. However, since there is no dispute regarding the cause of the crash and the immediate death of the occupants, the relevance of these issues is questionable. The potential downsides of a jury view, including time wastage, confusion, misdirection, and logistical challenges, outweigh its marginal probative value. The plaintiffs have not convincingly shown why courtroom evidence, such as expert testimony and photographs, would be insufficient for resolving pertinent issues. Moreover, there are concerns that a jury view could elicit an emotional response, leading to prejudicial outcomes under Rule 403. Consequently, the request for a jury view of the helicopter wreckage is denied. Additionally, several remaining motions involve challenges to expert testimony. Med-Trans seeks to exclude portions of testimony from multiple plaintiffs’ experts, including John Ward (economic loss), Rodney Doss (regulatory compliance), Arthur “Lee” Coffman and Don Sommer (causes of the crash), and William Lawrence (piloting issues and Med-Trans conduct). Plaintiffs aim to exclude portions of Michael Hurst's testimony regarding Med-Trans’s responsibilities and the helicopter crash's causes. The analysis of these motions can be addressed collectively based on relevant standards under the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Rule 702 outlines that expert testimony must be relevant and reliable, requiring the court to act as a gatekeeper to ensure this. An expert must have the necessary qualifications and provide testimony that aids in understanding evidence or determining facts, based on sufficient facts or data, reliable principles and methods, and proper application of those principles to the case's facts. The Eighth Circuit states that the threshold for relevance is low; testimony is admissible if it makes a consequential fact more or less probable. However, if the subject matter is within laypersons' knowledge, expert testimony may be deemed unnecessary. The court must perform a preliminary assessment to ensure the expert's reasoning is scientifically valid and applicable to the facts. Additionally, under Rule 704, expert opinions are not inadmissible solely because they pertain to an ultimate issue for the jury, but they must still provide a helpful basis for the jury's understanding, avoiding mere directives on conclusions. Expert evidence may be excluded if its potential prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value, as noted by the Eighth Circuit. A preliminary assessment shows that, except for specified exceptions, the reasoning and methodology of the challenged expert opinions are scientifically valid and applicable to the case facts. The experts will provide insights beyond common knowledge, particularly regarding air ambulance operations and helicopter piloting in varied weather conditions. Challenges to these experts’ opinions often stem from misinterpretations or out-of-context excerpts from their reports or depositions. Excluding the experts’ opinions would infringe on the jury’s role in assessing credibility and evidence weight. Traditional methods, such as cross-examination and contrary evidence presentation, are deemed appropriate for contesting questionable expert evidence. While certain challenges may serve as grounds for impeachment, they are insufficient for complete exclusion of the opinions. Specific exceptions to the general ruling have been identified, beginning with the testimony of John Ward, the plaintiffs’ expert on wrongful death economic loss. Ward's assertion that the average value of a statistical life (VSL) is $9.4 million, as per the USDOT, is contested by Med-Trans, which claims the testimony was disclosed untimely and is not justified or harmless. Med-Trans argues that the information was available before the expert disclosure deadline and that Ward lacks the qualifications to testify on VSL, as it falls outside his expertise. Additionally, Med-Trans asserts that such evidence is unreliable for individual cases and overly prejudicial under Rule 403. In contrast, the plaintiffs maintain that the issue was previously acknowledged in Dr. McCoin’s deposition, and with ample time before trial, Med-Trans is not surprised or prejudiced by Ward's testimony. Plaintiffs argue that Ward, in his deposition, claims expertise in the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) measure, which they contend the jury may consider for assessing damages in a wrongful death case, despite it not being a direct measure of damages. They assert that the VSL reflects the societal value of a human being and should be admissible to aid the jury, without implying it as the basis for damages. However, Med-Trans counters that plaintiffs only label the disclosure as 'harmless' without justifying its untimeliness. They maintain that VSL evidence is unreliable, with Ward admitting ignorance about its calculations, thus rendering it misleading under Iowa law. The analysis concludes that the disclosure of Ward's VSL opinions is untimely and unjustified, violating the Magistrate's Scheduling Order, which is essential for managing litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow late disclosures only if justified or harmless, neither of which applies here, as the potential use of VSL has been known for an extended period. Allowing late rebuttal experts would disrupt trial preparation. Additionally, Ward's opinions are excluded for failing to meet Rule 702 and Daubert standards, as he lacks qualifications to provide opinions on VSL calculations. Furthermore, acknowledgment of VSL's validity does not equate to its appropriateness for measuring damages in wrongful death cases. Lastly, introducing VSL evidence would be prejudicial and confusing, detracting from the individualized damage assessments required by Iowa law. Therefore, Ward's opinions on VSL are barred. The plaintiffs also challenge non-expert testimony related to Med-Trans employees’ safety protocol understanding, which they argue is relevant. Med-Trans counters that this testimony is irrelevant as it does not relate to the crash events and lacks probative value. Testimony from employees regarding their understanding of safety protocols is deemed irrelevant to the negligence claims in this case, leading to the denial of the plaintiffs' challenge to exclude such non-expert testimony. The plaintiffs' motion for a jury view of the helicopter wreckage is also denied. Med-Trans’s motions to exclude John Ward's testimony on the value of a statistical life (VSL) are granted. The VSL, as defined in a 2015 USDOT memorandum, is intended for assessing benefits in preventing fatalities, not for calculating wrongful death damages under Iowa law. Iowa law defines wrongful death damages based on the present worth of what the decedent might have saved and accumulated. The VSL testimony is considered unhelpful and potentially misleading for jurors, possibly inflating damages based on emotional responses rather than proper legal standards. Concerns over the probative value of the VSL further support its exclusion under Rule 403. Med-Trans also seeks to exclude the testimony of Rodney Doss, the plaintiffs’ expert on regulatory compliance. Med-Trans argues that Doss's opinions do not meet the standards of Rule 702 and Daubert, particularly noting that he failed to cite specific regulatory requirements in his analysis and could not identify a source for “best industry practices.” Consequently, the motion to exclude Doss's testimony in its entirety is under consideration. Med-Trans challenges the reliability and relevance of Doss's expert opinions regarding its business decisions, training program, and the Operations Manual's instructions for the Risk Assessment Form. Med-Trans contends that Doss's opinions lack a thorough review of the relevant materials and are therefore unreliable and irrelevant to causation. In response, the plaintiffs assert Doss’s extensive experience in the aviation industry qualifies him to critique FAA regulations and industry practices, arguing that Med-Trans's uniform training across varied weather conditions is inadequate. They also claim Doss can criticize the Risk Assessment Form instructions without direct review because other experts will address the form itself. The court's preliminary assessment indicates that Doss's reasoning and methodology do not meet the scientific validity required under Daubert and Rule 702, despite his experience. The court emphasizes that Doss's reliance on his experience to support his opinions does not suffice, as he failed to provide identifiable sources or regulations to substantiate his claims about regulatory requirements and industry standards. His late reference to specific regulations is also excluded for similar reasons, reinforcing the inadequacy of his opinions based solely on his personal experience. Doss's claims regarding "best industry practices" derived from FAA guidance documents lack specific citations to support any requirement, rendering his expert opinions unreliable. His assertions about Med-Trans's training program and Risk Assessment Form are deemed insufficiently grounded, as he failed to review these materials comprehensively. Consequently, his testimony does not provide a valid basis for the jury's decision and is inadmissible. In contrast, expert Michael Hurst’s testimony on "spatial disorientation" is upheld due to his practical experience and examination of relevant flight data, despite his lack of scientific jargon. Med-Trans's motion to exclude Doss's testimony is granted. Furthermore, Med-Trans seeks to exclude expert testimony from Doss, Coffman, and Sommer regarding Med-Trans's alleged "conscious business decisions," arguing such opinions are speculative. The plaintiffs counter that their experts have sufficient factual grounding based on testimony from Med-Trans's vice president. However, case law indicates expert testimony on corporate intent or state of mind lacks a relevant foundation in expertise. In a products liability case, expert testimony regarding a manufacturer's motives is deemed inherently unreliable and speculative, as established in previous cases. Both parties concur that experts should not speculate on manufacturers' intentions. Specific testimony from a corporate official regarding "conscious decisions" in safety matters cannot substantiate claims for punitive damages under Iowa law, which requires clear proof of willful disregard for safety. Consequently, motions to exclude expert testimony suggesting Med-Trans made conscious business decisions to disregard safety are granted. Regarding maintenance practices, Med-Trans argues for the exclusion of expert Coffman's testimony about FAA maintenance violations, asserting irrelevance since maintenance issues did not cause the crash, as confirmed by experts and the NTSB. The plaintiffs counter that such violations indicate a disregard for the standard of care and should be allowed as evidence of "bad acts" under Rule 404(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, Med-Trans contests this by claiming the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a valid purpose for introducing this evidence and that it may confuse or prejudice the jury. Ultimately, the conclusion is that Coffman’s testimony on maintenance practices and violations is excluded under Rules 403 and 404, as prior "bad acts" cannot be used merely to imply a propensity for misconduct; they must serve a legitimate evidentiary purpose, which has not been adequately established in this case. Admissibility of 404(b) evidence requires four specific criteria: it must be relevant to a material issue, proven by a preponderance of the evidence, possess greater probative value than prejudicial effect, and be similar in kind and close in time to the charged offense. The court has substantial discretion in this determination. In evaluating Coffman’s testimony regarding maintenance practices, the court finds it lacks relevance since maintenance issues were not involved in the helicopter crash and are not similar to the flight risk assessment policy issues central to the plaintiffs’ claims. The court emphasizes the importance of balancing probative value against potential prejudice, concluding that any probative value of Coffman’s testimony is minimal and outweighed by potential prejudice, which could mislead the jury. Consequently, Med-Trans's motion to exclude Coffman’s testimony is granted. In a related motion, Med-Trans seeks to exclude Don Sommer’s testimony claiming violations of the Operations Manual concerning Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), arguing that Sommer’s opinion is unreliable due to a lack of comparative analysis with the FARs, acknowledgment that the manual was FAA-approved, and failure to identify any specific FAR that was violated. The plaintiffs oppose this exclusion. Sommer's opinion that Med-Trans’ Operations Manual violated the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) is defended by the plaintiffs as being based on sound methodology and relevant facts. In contrast, Med-Trans argues that the plaintiffs overlook flaws in Sommer's compliance testimony. The analysis begins with the established legal principle that experts cannot provide opinions on whether a party violated regulations. Citing relevant case law, it is noted that while experts can discuss regulatory requirements and evidence of conduct, they cannot opine on actual violations. Med-Trans contends that Sommer’s assertions regarding violations of FARs and their "spirit" are inadmissible, leading to the granting of Med-Trans's motion to exclude Sommer's testimony on these points. Additionally, the plaintiffs have filed a motion to strike the declaration of Brian Foster, presented by Med-Trans in support of a motion for partial summary judgment on punitive damages. The plaintiffs argue that Foster, not designated as an expert, offers unsubstantiated opinions about the applicability of FARs, which should be left to qualified experts. They emphasize that Foster lacks the necessary expertise, having never worked for the FAA, and that Med-Trans failed to disclose any expert testimony regarding Foster's declarations. Med-Trans contends that Foster, as its director of flight operations, possesses personal knowledge of the Med-Trans Operations Manual, associated safety procedures, and relevant Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), thereby validating his statements in both his declaration and deposition. Med-Trans argues that the plaintiffs' request to strike Foster's entire declaration is excessive, especially since not all statements pertain to the FARs. They emphasize that 14 C.F.R. 119.69(d) mandates a director of operations like Foster to fully understand the FARs and assert that federal regulations are not solely the domain of experts. Additionally, Med-Trans points out that the FARs are subject to judicial notice under 44 U.S.C. 1507. In contrast, the plaintiffs argue against Foster's ability to opine on the applicability and meaning of the FARs, claiming he lacks the necessary personal knowledge to provide such testimony. They highlight that courts have permitted lay testimony regarding regulations only when witnesses are employees of the agency responsible for those regulations. The analysis underscores a legal principle that experts are prohibited from opining on whether a party violated regulations, although they may discuss evidence related to compliance and regulatory requirements. Laypersons, however, can refer to regulations if they have sufficient personal knowledge of them. A cited example involves a case where a lay witness from the NIH was permitted to testify about grant processes based on personal experience, countering claims that the testimony required expert qualification. A witness may testify as a fact witness regarding NIH grant procedures due to her personal knowledge from her employment, which requires familiarity with NIH regulations and related documents. Her testimony is admissible except for legal conclusions, as established by Fed. R. Evid. 602. The plaintiffs' argument that only agency employees can testify about agency regulations is countered by referencing the case Bloemendaal, where compliance officers with sufficient personal knowledge were allowed to testify about adherence to SEC regulations. The testimony of compliance officers is relevant to understanding the defendant's intent in implementing policies. However, a witness cannot provide legal conclusions about regulatory compliance. If a witness demonstrates requisite personal knowledge, they can testify about awareness of regulations and related training programs. As the plaintiffs seek to strike the entirety of a declaration without specific challenges to most of it, the motion to strike the declaration of Brian Foster will be denied in full. Foster's Declaration and testimony will be restricted to permissible topics during the consideration of pending motions for partial summary judgment and at trial. The following rulings were made: 1. Plaintiffs' motion for a jury view of the helicopter wreckage is denied. 2. Med-Trans’s motion to partially exclude John Ward's testimony is granted, specifically barring any opinions regarding the VSL. 3. Med-Trans’s motion to exclude Rodney Doss’s testimony is granted in full. 4. Med-Trans’s motion to partially exclude Arthur “Lee” Coffman’s testimony is granted concerning maintenance practices and "conscious business decisions." 5. Med-Trans’s motion to partially exclude Don Sommer’s testimony is granted regarding "conscious business decisions" and opinions on FAR violations, but denied concerning opinions on icing conditions as a cause of the crash. 6. Med-Trans’s motion to partially exclude William Lawrence’s testimony is granted on opinions of conscious disregard for safety, but denied on the Risk Assessment Form and operational necessity opinions. 7. Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Brian Foster’s declaration is denied; however, his testimony will be limited to permissible subjects. 8. Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude opinions from expert Michael C. Hurst regarding spatial disorientation is denied. The court will address the motions for partial summary judgment in a separate ruling, referencing various case law to support the decisions made regarding jury views and the discretion exercised by the district court. In a criminal case, the court affirmed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's request to view the truck used in his escape, as adequate evidence was provided through photographs and testimony. The request was also considered late and lacked a supporting subpoena. In a civil insurance case, the court reached a similar conclusion regarding a request to view a collapsed building, determining that diagrams and photographs sufficed. A reference to Eighth Circuit precedent indicated that viewing a lake where a collision occurred was unnecessary, as the conditions could be inferred from evidence presented. Key challenges arose regarding expert testimony by Lawrence on the concept of "operational necessity" for civil air ambulance flights, which Med-Trans claimed was based on a military standard not applicable to civil services. Despite concerns, the court found Lawrence qualified to testify, stating his opinions were reliable and relevant, even if Med-Trans’s criticisms may stem from misinterpretation of his testimony. Med-Trans's arguments against the reliability of Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) opinions were noted, highlighting that several cases have excluded such opinions as unreliable for wrongful death damages. Contrarily, some cases have considered VSL useful in determining damages. The discussion on VSL will be addressed alongside other expert testimony challenges in subsequent sections of the ruling.