Casey v. Stephens

Citations: 161 F. Supp. 3d 496; 2016 WL 543233Docket: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-13

Court: District Court, S.D. Texas; February 8, 2016; Federal District Court

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In this case, Plaintiff William Casey, a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, challenges TDCJ-CID policies that he claims infringe on his Native American religious practices, violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to allow him to grow his hair long, wear a kouplock, possess a medicine bag, and smoke a prayer pipe. The Court, presided over by Judge Nelva Gonzalez Ramos, reviewed Defendant William Stephens' motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss Casey's claims. 

The Court determined that TDCJ-CID's practices do impose a substantial burden on Casey's religious exercise under RLUIPA; however, it concluded these policies are the least restrictive means to balance religious freedom with security and budgetary constraints. Furthermore, the Court found no constitutional violations under the First Amendment. As a result, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Casey's claims with prejudice.

Casey has been incarcerated since 1994, serving a combined sentence of one hundred years for aggravated sexual assault of a child. The procedural history includes multiple filings and motions, including a Spears hearing and a recommendation regarding qualified immunity for co-defendant Clint Morris, which ultimately led to the dismissal of claims against Morris. The Court's jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331.

Plaintiff, a Cherokee descent inmate practicing his Native American faith since 2003, designated his religious preference with the TDCJ-CID on November 9, 2003. He is a minimum custody inmate allowed to possess specific religious items, including a medicine bag and a prayer feather, and can practice his faith within his living area. However, he cannot wear his medicine bag while moving around the prison. Plaintiff attends weekly Native American educational classes and monthly prayer ceremonies, expressing no complaints about their frequency.

On May 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed a grievance (No. 2013154441) citing TDCJ policies that hindered his ability to practice his faith. He claimed that the grooming policy requiring short hair conflicted with his religious tenet of hair growth, which he only cuts in mourning. He sought an exemption from this policy. Additionally, he argued that restrictions on wearing his medicine bag and using a sacred prayer pipe limited his religious practices. Warden Barber denied the grievance on September 20, 2013, only addressing the grooming policy. Plaintiff appealed the denial on September 29, 2013, but his claims regarding the medicine bag and prayer pipe remained unaddressed. On October 28, 2013, the Step 2 appeal was denied, with the chaplaincy department stating it could not authorize grooming policy exemptions.

The document also references the Yellowquill case, where Jolene Yellowquill, a Native American inmate, sought injunctive relief in 1995 for sacred pipe ceremonies within the TDCJ. The district court granted a temporary restraining order regarding communal pipes, leading to a settlement that influenced TDCJ policies for Native American religious practices.

Effective October 13, 1997, all prisons within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) implemented a tobacco-free policy. In November 2008, following the Yellowquill litigation, the TDCJ Chaplaincy Department amended the Chaplaincy Manual (Policy 09.03) to allow a tobacco use exception for Native American religious practices during pipe ceremonies. This policy permits Native American practitioners to participate in pipe ceremonies held no more than twice a month, contingent upon the availability of a qualified chaplain or approved volunteer, and is conducted under supervision. The ceremonies can include tobacco and other traditional materials as prescribed by Native American customs.

On June 16, 2011, William Chance, a Native American inmate, filed a lawsuit against the TDCJ and certain officials, asserting that he was denied participation in pipe ceremonies and smudging rituals, claiming violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and his First Amendment rights. Chance, suffering from Hepatitis C and Tuberculosis, requested permission to use a personal pipe due to his inability to smoke from a communal pipe.

In response to the litigation, TDCJ officials, including Director Rick Thaler and Chaplaincy Director Bill Pierce, convened on September 8, 2011, to address concerns about Native American chaplaincy, communal pipe services, and health risks associated with communicable diseases in prison settings. Dr. Robert Lewis Williams from TDCJ-CID Health Services advised against communal pipe use due to the potential spread of infections. Consequently, it was decided that only the Native American chaplain would be permitted to smoke the ceremonial pipe during these ceremonies. In July 2012, the TDCJ revised the Chaplaincy Manual to formalize this restriction, limiting pipe use to the chaplain or approved volunteer. Additionally, revisions were made to policies regarding religious devotional items, specifying restrictions on where items like medicine bags could be worn.

Since 2012, five Native American prisoners at the McConnell Unit have initiated lawsuits under RLUIPA and the First Amendment, presenting claims similar to those of the current plaintiff. 

1. **Davis**: In *Goodman v. Pierce*, prisoners Davis and Goodman sought injunctive and declaratory relief for the right to smoke communal and personal pipes during ceremonies, hold a minimum of two ceremonies per month, grow hair, and wear medicine bags. They also claimed personal liability against Clint Morris for not advocating for their rights. The TDCJ submitted extensive evidence, leading to a summary judgment in favor of TDCJ-CID, dismissing their claims, which they have appealed to the Fifth Circuit.

2. **Legate v. Stephens**: On June 6, 2014, similar claims were addressed. Magistrate Judge Ellington recommended dismissing Legate's claims based on the same evidence from the Davis case, and the court adopted this recommendation on July 21, 2014. Legate did not appeal.

3. **Cox v. Stephens**: Filed on May 28, 2013, Cox raised claims related to hair length, his medicine bag, and a personal prayer pipe. The defendants moved for summary judgment using evidence similar to that in the Davis case, resulting in a judgment in favor of Stephens and Morris on March 27, 2015. Although Cox appealed, his request to proceed in forma pauperis was denied, and the appeal is pending in the Fifth Circuit.

4. **Cobb v. Stephens**: Cobb filed his complaint on January 21, 2014, with claims regarding hair length, medicine bag, and a personal prayer pipe. The case was stayed on December 12, 2014, and no further actions have occurred since.

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue exists regarding any material fact, allowing the moving party to receive judgment as a matter of law, as outlined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue is defined as evidence that could permit a reasonable jury to rule in favor of the nonmoving party (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248). The court must assess whether the evidence necessitates a jury trial or if it overwhelmingly favors one party (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). This evaluation involves a comprehensive review of all relevant evidence, including pleadings and affidavits, while drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the opposing party (Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451). The court is prohibited from weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility (Caboni, 278 F.3d at 451).

Affidavits must be based on personal knowledge, contain admissible facts, and demonstrate the affiant's competence (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Hearsay or unauthenticated documents are inadmissible (Cormier v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 1559, 1561; King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346). The initial burden lies with the moving party to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323). If successful, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue exists (Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587). The nonmoving party cannot rely solely on the allegations in their pleadings (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). If, after the nonmoving party has had a chance to present evidence, no reasonable juror could favor them, summary judgment will be granted. Conversely, if reasonable minds could interpret the evidence differently, a directed verdict is inappropriate (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51). The substantive law will determine which facts are material, meaning only disputes that could influence the case's outcome under governing law will bar summary judgment (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the least restrictive means due to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)'s past more liberal policies, such as allowing communal pipes and permitting women prisoners to grow their hair, as well as practices permitted in other correctional facilities. However, referencing the Chance case, the court states that differences in past or external policies do not create a fact issue. In Chance v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the practices of other institutions are irrelevant as they do not consider institutional differences or other relevant factors. The court emphasized that the existence of differing policies does not automatically allow a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment on a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim, and past tolerances of unsafe practices do not bind the TDCJ to those practices. The analysis under RLUIPA requires a case-specific approach to determine the least restrictive means. Additionally, while the sincerity of the plaintiff's Native American beliefs is acknowledged, the defendant contends that the TDCJ's policies do not impose a substantial burden on the plaintiff's faith, without evidence questioning the sincerity of those beliefs.

The RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden on the religious exercise of individuals in institutions unless the government demonstrates that the burden serves a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest (42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a)). Plaintiffs must initially prove that a law or practice significantly burdens their religious exercise. Once established, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the regulation is the least restrictive option available (Id. 2000cc-2(b); Sossamon v. Texas). While RLUIPA aims to protect individual religious observance, courts must defer to the expertise and judgment of prison officials, recognizing the necessity of maintaining order and safety within penal institutions (Cutter v. Wilkinson). The Supreme Court emphasized that accommodations for religious observances must not compromise institutional interests such as security and discipline. Deference to prison authorities is expected, but it does not extend to policies based on speculation or unfounded fears (Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.). Courts are instructed to apply RLUIPA in a balanced manner, mindful of the urgent needs for discipline and security in correctional settings.

The policies in question impose a substantial burden on the Plaintiff's ability to practice his Native American faith, as required for a claim under RLUIPA. To establish this burden, the Court must first assess whether the activities affected qualify as religious exercise and then determine the extent of the burden. RLUIPA defines religious exercise broadly, encompassing any religious practice. A substantial burden exists if a government action pressures the individual to significantly alter their religious behavior or violates their beliefs.

The Plaintiff contests the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) grooming policy, which restricts him from growing his hair or wearing a kouplock, the religious objects policy that limits the use of his medicine bag, and the pipe policy that prohibits possession and use of his prayer pipe. Noncompliance with the grooming policy results in disciplinary action, and failing to maintain his hair as per his beliefs hinders his mourning practices and subjects him to ancestral ridicule. The TDCJ defends its grooming policy by citing security risks associated with long hair, which may conceal contraband and complicate searches, thus straining resources.

Regarding the medicine bag, the Plaintiff clarifies that it contains sacred items meant to provide spiritual protection, and he seeks to wear it at all times, not just during specific events. The TDCJ argues that allowing unrestricted access to medicine bags would incur prohibitive search costs. The Plaintiff also emphasizes the significance of using his personal prayer pipe to communicate with the Creator, expressing concerns about health risks associated with shared pipes. Ultimately, the Court concludes that the TDCJ's policies place a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s religious exercise, justifying his claims under RLUIPA.

Plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial burden under RLUIPA, necessitating that Defendant Stephens prove the challenged grooming policies are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. Testimony from Robert Eason, Deputy Director of TDCJ-CID, indicates that allowing long hair would heighten security risks and operational costs. Longer hair necessitates increased searches and physical contact, disrupting officer supervision and inmate movement, and heightening the risk of assaults using hair. Additionally, long hair complicates prisoner identification, particularly in escape scenarios. Financial assessments project that permitting long hair would incur approximately $149,405.45 annually for additional searches. The Fifth Circuit has previously upheld similar grooming policies, emphasizing that security interests cannot be adequately addressed through less restrictive measures. The court has ruled that even if such policies impose on religious practices, they are justified by security and cost management needs, as seen in cases like Longoria v. Dretke and Thunderhorse v. Pierce. The evidence supports that the grooming policy is the least restrictive means to uphold TDCJ’s compelling interests, and allowing long hair or a kouplock would exacerbate security risks and increase liability for the agency.

Since 2009, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) Chaplaincy Department has permitted offenders to possess medicine bags as devotional items, with restrictions on their use. Offenders may wear these bags only in their cells, immediate bunk areas, and during religious services. The policy mandates that inspecting officers conduct visual examinations of the bags without touching them or inquiring about their contents, unless contraband is suspected. Testimony indicates that unrestricted access to medicine bags could increase risks to offenders and complicate security procedures, as non-transparent bags can conceal contraband, such as drugs or weapons. Regular searches of these bags during religious service transitions require offenders to display and empty their contents, which is time-consuming and can lead to sensitivity and potential lawsuits regarding the handling of personal items. Economic analysis estimates that allowing offenders to wear bags outside their cells would cost approximately $19.33 daily per 50 offenders, totaling over $7,000 annually. Defendant Stephens argues that the current policy, which restricts the wearing of medicine bags, is the least restrictive option concerning security and cost implications.

Following the Yellowquill ruling, Native American practitioners were initially permitted to smoke communal or personal pipes. However, grievances were raised concerning the risk of communicable diseases from communal pipe use. TDCJ-CID sought medical advice from Dr. Robert Williams, who concluded that sharing mouthpieces posed a significant health risk and advised against communal pipe ceremonies. He stated that if TDCJ prioritized this practice, effective measures would need to be taken to mitigate disease transmission, acknowledging potential risks to others.

Consequently, TDCJ prohibited communal pipe ceremonies, allowing only the chaplain to smoke on behalf of participants. The change was justified by TDCJ's compelling interest in disease prevention. The plaintiff contends that this new arrangement violates RLUIPA, arguing that personal participation in pipe ceremonies is crucial and suggesting that inmates should be allowed to possess personal pipes, which could be stored by the chaplain to mitigate health concerns.

However, TDCJ previously assessed the security risks and costs associated with personal pipes and determined that these outweighed the benefits. A meeting on September 8, 2011, highlighted ongoing issues related to Native American ceremonies, including sanitation and security concerns. It was noted that communal pipes led to theft of tobacco, and the consensus reached was to prohibit communal pipes, offender-owned pipes, and the storage of personal pipes by TDCJ, limiting ceremonies to one per month with smoking restricted to the chaplain.

Cost, security, and operational challenges hinder offenders' ownership and possession of ceremonial pipes. Significant time would be required to manage and track individual pipes for each ceremony, necessitating cataloging and storage, which presents logistical difficulties. Disposable pipes are impractical due to Texas prisons prohibiting tobacco, which is considered contraband. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) would need substantial manpower to prevent theft or concealment of pipes during ceremonies. Additionally, severe staff shortages at the McConnell Unit, exacerbated by the hydraulic fracturing industry's demand for labor, limit TDCJ's capacity to manage pipe ceremonies effectively.

The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Chance, which examined similar evidence regarding pipe ceremonies, determined that TDCJ's restrictions on communal and individual pipes, permitting only the ceremony leader to smoke, constituted the least restrictive means to accommodate pipe ceremonies under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). In this case, TDCJ provided further compelling evidence supporting this conclusion, particularly regarding documented staff shortages.

Moreover, evidence was presented indicating that Native American beliefs may discourage offenders from using the sacred pipe while imprisoned. Chief Chari Bouse found no tribes permitting this practice, citing negative spiritual implications. Chaplain Edward Hernandez testified that tribes do not require personal smoking of the pipe for prayer, emphasizing the importance of belief over method in worshipping the Creator.

Defendant Stephens provided unrefuted evidence that TDCJ’s policy, which prohibits personal and communal pipes but allows a contract chaplain to smoke the ceremonial pipe and pray on behalf of attendees, is the least restrictive means to conduct the ceremonies without violating RLUIPA. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate constitutional violations under the Free Exercise Clause, as established by the Supreme Court, which recognizes that while prisoners must have reasonable opportunities to practice their religion, limitations on these rights are permissible.

Prison regulations may limit inmates' rights if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, as established by the Turner test. This test includes four factors: (1) a rational connection between the regulation and the justified governmental interest; (2) alternative means for inmates to exercise their rights; (3) the impact on guards, other inmates, and resource allocation; and (4) the absence of alternatives. The Supreme Court upheld a prison policy barring Islamic prayer attendance in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz and the Fifth Circuit clarified that no single factor is dispositive, with rationality being the controlling factor. 

Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a stricter standard applies than the First Amendment. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate a violation under RLUIPA, leading to the dismissal of claims regarding the Free Exercise Clause. Previous Fifth Circuit cases have rejected similar free exercise claims, affirming valid rational connections between policies and governmental interests. 

The plaintiff's argument regarding a settlement allowing Native American tobacco use is dismissed as he is not a proper party to the contract, and his breach of contract claim is not before the court due to prior dismissal. Furthermore, the Yellowquill settlement did not prevent future challenges to practices. The plaintiff also cited Holt v. Hobbs, where the Supreme Court ruled against a no-beard policy for a Muslim inmate, but this does not apply to his case regarding the TDCJ's grooming policy.

Plaintiff acknowledges that a general ban on long hair is the least restrictive means for ensuring security and managing costs, yet he maintains that his kouplock claim remains valid. He argues that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID) has not adequately demonstrated that kouplocks pose security risks. Citing the case Odneal v. Pierce, Plaintiff references expert testimony from George Sullivan, who indicated that kouplocks do not present security concerns or increase search times. However, the court in previous cases, including Davis, Legate, and Cox, has addressed kouplock issues, with Defendant Stephens providing expert opinions that searching kouplocks could lead to increased risks for officers and inmates, as well as operational disruptions. Testimonies highlighted that searching kouplocks requires officers to be in close proximity to inmates, potentially escalating tensions and diverting resources from other essential duties. Additionally, the presence of kouplocks may expose inmates to risks from other offenders and hazards in work environments involving machinery. The TDCJ's grooming policies aim to mitigate these liabilities. Although the TDCJ policies significantly burden the Plaintiff's religious exercise, they are justified as the least restrictive means to uphold security and manage costs. Consequently, the Plaintiff's claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment are dismissed, and Defendant Stephen’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The order was issued on February 9, 2016. A kouplock is defined as a two-inch wide strip of hair at the base of the skull that grows continuously.

In Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1985), it is emphasized that terms like "Native American faith" or "Native American religion" do not accurately capture the diverse belief systems of Native American practitioners, including the Plaintiff, Casey. There are 566 federally recognized tribes, each with unique customs, though some inter-tribal practices exist. Native American spirituality is characterized as a monotheistic "way of life," centered on the relationship between humans, the land, and spirituality. The court cites Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n to highlight these beliefs. The TDCJ’s Chaplaincy Manual, relevant to the case, was not provided by the Defendant but was included in a related litigation, indicating a shift in policies based on medical and staffing changes. Other circuit courts, such as in Mays v. Springborn and Spratt v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., have rejected rigid standards in assessing RLUIPA’s least restrictive means requirement, asserting that evidence from one institution does not apply universally. The Plaintiff alleges that TDCJ's policy of using a communal pipe has exposed him to serious health risks, constituting deliberate indifference to his medical needs; however, this Eighth Amendment claim was not included in his administrative grievances or original complaint and cannot be introduced at the summary judgment stage.