Bourne v. V.C. Enterprise/Kirby Home Cleaning System
Docket: Civ. Action No. 14-1459-GMS
Court: District Court, D. Delaware; January 19, 2016; Federal District Court
Carole Bourne, a pro se plaintiff, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. alleging sex-based employment discrimination against her former employer, V.C. Enterprise/Kirby Home Cleaning Systems. Bourne submitted a discrimination complaint to the Delaware Department of Labor (DDOL) on June 16, 2014, and a dual charge with the EEOC on July 1, 2014, claiming discrimination based on sex and disability, as well as adverse employment actions occurring from May 23, 2014, until her discharge on June 10, 2014. Bourne, employed as a telemarketer from November 15, 2013, to June 10, 2014, alleged that owner Vaughn Colter sexually harassed her and discharged her to conceal their relationship from his fiancée and employees. Colter denied the allegations, calling them absurd and defamatory. The DDOL recommended dismissal of the charge due to insufficient evidence, and the EEOC later adopted these findings, dismissing the charges on October 14, 2014, for lack of probable cause. Bourne initiated her lawsuit on December 3, 2014, focusing on claims of discrimination related to promotion and termination, with no current claims of disability discrimination. The court ordered Bourne to provide service forms for the defendant, which led to complications in serving V.C. Enterprise/Kirby Home Cleaning Systems at their listed addresses, resulting in the return of the service packet from one address and a waiver from the corporate office in Ohio. The court has now granted summary judgment in favor of The Kirby Company.
On April 27, 2015, The Kirby Company informed Bourne that it had no involvement in her employment with VC Enterprises, which is described as an independent distributor of Kirby products. The Kirby Company clarified that it did not own VC Enterprises and had no role in employment decisions made by it. Despite this, Bourne refused to dismiss her claim against The Kirby Company, arguing that VC Enterprises, while independent, sold Kirby products for both its and Kirby's profit. An affidavit from Lamb states that The Kirby Company is an unincorporated division of The Scott Fetzer Company and that there is no entity named Kirby Home Cleaning System affiliated with either company. Lamb emphasized that The Kirby Company has no ownership or decision-making involvement with VC Enterprises regarding employment matters.
Bourne had no prior knowledge of The Kirby Company or Scott Fetzer before receiving legal documents and had not been compensated by The Kirby Company. Her pay stubs, labeled 'dealer profit form,' did not reference VC Enterprises or The Kirby Company, and her paychecks were issued by Vanessa Colter, her superior, under a verbal agreement that Bourne would market Kirby systems via phone. Bourne maintained that her role involved direct communication with Kirby customers, and she used Kirby's name when making calls, which were scripted.
The document also outlines the standard for granting summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, stating that the court must grant it if no genuine dispute exists regarding any material fact, with the moving party responsible for proving the absence of such an issue.
The court is required to make reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party during summary judgment motions, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence. If the moving party shows no disputed material facts, the nonmoving party must provide specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. Merely presenting some evidence is insufficient; the nonmoving party must present enough evidence for a jury to reasonably rule in its favor. If the nonmoving party fails to demonstrate an essential element of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The same standards apply to cross-motions for summary judgment. In discrimination cases, the court must determine if sufficient evidence exists to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding intentional discrimination by the employer.
The Kirby Company seeks summary judgment, claiming it was not Bourne's employer and had no involvement in her employment with VC Enterprises. Bourne disputes this, alleging she was employed through a contractual agreement with Kirby's independent distributor and seeks summary judgment on damages due to negligence by both The Kirby Company and VC Enterprises. The Kirby Company also seeks to strike Bourne's motion as untimely.
Bourne's complaint named V.C. Enterprise/Kirby Home Cleaning System as the sole defendant. While The Kirby Company was served, attempts to serve VC Enterprises were unsuccessful, and Bourne did not seek a summons afterward. Bourne claims The Kirby Company is her employer, but since she is representing herself, the court will require her to explain why VC Enterprises should not be dismissed for failure to serve within 120 days. The case also raises the issue of whether The Kirby Company qualifies as an employer under Title VII, which governs employer-employee relationships and permits actions against specific entities, including employers.
When a statute does not define "employee," courts apply the common law definition, as established in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden. The Supreme Court identified factors to assess whether a hired party is an employee under ERISA, focusing on the hiring party's control over the work. Key factors include: the skill required, tools used, work location, duration of the relationship, right to assign projects, hired party’s discretion, payment methods, role in hiring assistants, whether the work is part of the hiring party's business, and benefits provided. The Third Circuit emphasizes three main indicia of control: who paid the plaintiff, who hired and fired them, and who controlled their daily activities.
In the case of Bourne, evidence indicates that The Kirby Company did not pay her; her compensation came from VC Enterprises, as reflected in pay stubs signed by VC Enterprises' owner, Colter. Bourne speculated about her employment status but provided no evidence to dispute that she was never on The Kirby Company's payroll. Additionally, Bourne's hiring and firing were managed by Colter, not The Kirby Company, which had no involvement in her employment decisions. Lastly, VC Enterprises had control over Bourne’s daily activities, with Colter identified as her superior, further confirming that The Kirby Company was not her employer.
Colter’s response to the DDOL revealed that he tracked Bourne’s work attendance, noting her 'no shows.' However, The Kirby Company claimed no prior knowledge of Bourne or her employment with VC Enterprises. Bourne cited her recognition as a top telemarketer but was unaware that The Kirby Company did not dictate how she performed her job. The court found that, even favoring Bourne's perspective, the evidence did not substantiate a genuine dispute regarding The Kirby Company’s control over her daily work activities. Consequently, the court concluded that Bourne was not employed by The Kirby Company.
Furthermore, the court examined whether The Kirby Company was Bourne’s joint employer under Title VII, which requires that two entities significantly control the same employee. Key factors include the authority to hire and fire, daily supervision, and control over employee records. The court determined there was no genuine issue regarding The Kirby Company’s authority to hire or fire Bourne, as her paychecks were issued by VC Enterprises, and Colter had the sole authority over her employment.
Regarding daily supervision, the evidence indicated that Colter, not The Kirby Company, was Bourne’s supervisor. As for employee records, Bourne reported that her documentation was maintained at VC Enterprises, with no evidence supporting that The Kirby Company held her records. Thus, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that The Kirby Company was Bourne’s joint employer. Lastly, the court dismissed Bourne’s reliance on the Read v. Scott Fetzer Co. case, clarifying that it was not applicable to her situation.
Read acknowledged that a dealer operates as an independent contractor rather than an employee of Kirby. Consequently, the court determined that no reasonable jury could conclude that The Kirby Company was Bourne’s employer or that it engaged in discriminatory practices against Bourne as prohibited by Title VII. The court ordered Bourne to demonstrate why VC Enterprises should not be dismissed for failure to serve process within 120 days of filing the complaint, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The court's rulings include: granting The Kirby Company’s motions for summary judgment, denying Bourne’s motion for damages, granting Bourne’s motion to submit evidence, denying Bourne’s requests for a subpoena and lie detector test, denying The Kirby Company’s motion to strike Bourne’s summary judgment motion, and granting Bourne leave to file the summary judgment motion late, while denying it in other respects. An appropriate order will follow. The document does not specify the disability, and the address provided is 3700A, Old Capitol Trail, Wilmington, Delaware. The Darden test is applicable to Title VII cases, as established in Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2015).
