Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; January 14, 2016; Federal District Court
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was tried on a thirty-count indictment related to the Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013. Jury selection commenced on January 5, 2015, with a guilty verdict returned on April 8, 2015, for all counts, leading to a potential death penalty for seventeen crimes. On May 15, 2015, the jury decided to impose the death penalty on six of those counts. The Court sentenced Tsarnaev to death for these six counts and additional imprisonment terms for the remaining counts on June 24, 2015. Following the sentencing, Tsarnaev filed a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 and a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 on July 6, 2015, reiterating some previously raised grounds. The Court denied these repeated grounds, preserving the issues for appeal. Tsarnaev also challenged the venue of his trial, citing local media coverage and social media activity as prejudicial, invoking the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a). The Court referenced the four Skilling factors relevant to assessing presumption of prejudice: community characteristics, nature of publicity, time elapsed since the crime, and indications of jury bias. Although Tsarnaev did not provide a detailed legal analysis, the Court addressed all four factors in its post-trial review.
Boston, located in a large and diverse metropolitan area with around five million residents, serves as the jury pool's geographic region. This area encompasses urban, suburban, rural, and coastal communities, with residents accessing news from various sources. Such diversity suggests a lower likelihood of presumed prejudice against the defendant, aligning with precedent that indicates a substantial and varied jury pool can mitigate bias.
The defendant’s motion highlights the significant media coverage surrounding the bombings, including anniversary events, the 2015 Boston Marathon, and related victim stories. While local media extensively covered these events, the defendant fails to account for the broader national and international media interest, which indicates that the case was widely recognized beyond Boston. The defendant's own pretrial survey revealed that even in a different venue, such as Washington, D.C., a significant majority were aware of the bombings, underscoring the widespread knowledge of the incident.
The Boston Marathon is portrayed as a globally significant event, not limited to local interest, attracting around 27,000 participants from all 50 states and numerous countries, with over 40% coming from outside Massachusetts and New England. The event is likened to the Olympic Games, garnering extensive media coverage with approximately 1,000 media credentials issued to about 80 news organizations, and broadcast live to around 20 countries. This widespread attention was reflected in the trial coverage, which saw national and international media dominating the requests for courtroom seats. It is argued that the nature of coverage would have remained consistent regardless of the trial location, with local media in any new district likely to report extensively on the case. The defendant's claim of prejudicial local coverage is countered by the assertion that the reporting was factual and often favorable concerning the potential penalty, as polls indicated a growing local disapproval of the death penalty during the trial.
Support for the death penalty for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev has significantly declined over time, with polls indicating only 26% of Boston residents and 31% from the Boston area initially favoring execution, dropping to 15% in Boston and 19% statewide by late April 2015. Public sentiment against the death penalty was reflected in statements from victims' families, local officials, and various organizations. Notably, Martin Richard's parents publicly urged against pursuing the death penalty, and other victim representatives also expressed opposition. Prominent figures, including the Massachusetts Attorney General and local lawmakers, voiced their disapproval of execution. An anti-death penalty forum occurred shortly before jury deliberations, aiming to influence the prosecution to abandon capital punishment. Despite extensive media coverage of these sentiments, there is no evidence that the jury was unduly influenced or prejudiced. Jurors maintained they avoided media reports, and the coverage was not shown to be prejudicial to the defendant. Moving the trial would likely not have reduced media exposure significantly.
The defendant raises concerns about media coverage related to the arrival and accommodation of foreign witnesses who traveled to the U.S. with governmental assistance and a court order. He describes this situation as a "media circus" but fails to demonstrate any impact on the jurors or court proceedings. The trial atmosphere remained solemn and undisturbed, supported by a Decorum Order that prohibited contact between observers and jurors and restricted media activities. The courtroom had designated seating for media representatives who could take notes but not record the proceedings. The presence of the public was orderly, with some demonstrations occurring outside the courthouse. Jurors accessed the courthouse through a separate entrance, avoiding any potential exposure to the media or public outside. They remained in restricted areas away from public view throughout the trial. The court is confident that the Decorum Order was adhered to, and the defendant experienced the required solemnity during the proceedings.
The defendant contends that jurors could not avoid exposure to events and publicity regarding the Boston Marathon and related issues during the trial, citing the prevalence of “Boston Strong” signs and paraphernalia in the courthouse vicinity and public areas. Although the defendant presented photographs to support this claim, there is no definitive evidence indicating when or how extensively jurors may have been exposed to such materials. It is noted that the jurors, prior to their selection, were already aware of the bombings and the term “Boston Strong,” as confirmed through their questionnaires and voir dire. The court ultimately seated the jurors, believing that any prior exposure would not impair their ability to be impartial.
Significant media coverage occurred between the verdict in the guilt phase and the start of the penalty phase, including events related to the 2015 marathon and commemorations of the bombings. Throughout the trial, jurors were repeatedly instructed to avoid media and discussions about the case. The court confirmed compliance through individual inquiries to each juror, who assured adherence to these instructions. Additionally, during a brief court session before the penalty phase commenced, jurors were again strongly reminded to avoid media coverage related to the marathon.
Upon resuming for the penalty phase, jurors reaffirmed their compliance with the court's instructions. There were no objections or requests for further inquiries from the defendant at these times. Furthermore, alongside materials sympathetic to victims, jurors may have encountered anti-death penalty protests outside the courthouse, featuring messages that could be interpreted as supportive of the defendant. However, the court noted that jurors did not pass through the main entrance where these signs were displayed, suggesting any exposure would have been minimal.
The defendant claims jurors were prejudiced due to social media activity by uninvolved third parties, but this argument is largely considered waived, as the defendant had opportunities to address these concerns during the trial. Evidence regarding jurors' social media use was available throughout the proceedings, and the defendant actively researched social networks during jury selection. The assertion of "social media saturation" is deemed exaggerated; much of the cited activity is not inflammatory, and the defendant fails to provide a context for assessing saturation. The government’s analysis suggests that the social media activity represented only a minor portion of daily news feeds. Additionally, nearly two years elapsed between the bombings and the trial, allowing community passions to diminish, contrasting with cases where trials followed closely after highly publicized confessions. Media attention was expected to increase as the trial approached, but it largely consisted of factual reporting rather than emotional coverage.
Prior to the trial, the Court observed that jurors in high-profile cases within the District have demonstrated the ability to objectively assess evidence, even amidst extensive media coverage. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant on all counts during the guilt phase, a verdict that was not unexpected given the defense strategy and the substantial evidence against him. The defense counsel acknowledged the defendant's culpability in the opening statements, detailing his actions during the week of the bombings, including carrying a pressure cooker bomb, participating in a carjacking, and being involved in a shootout with police. The counsel made clear that they did not dispute the evidence of the defendant's presence and actions during these events. In the closing arguments, the defense reiterated the defendant's involvement in the crimes, emphasizing his awareness of the bomb's potential for devastation and his participation in subsequent criminal activities alongside his brother. The narrative culminated in a depiction of the chaotic events that transpired, underscoring the defendant's direct involvement and responsibility.
The speaker acknowledges prior discussions regarding the evidence against Jahar Tsarnaev, affirming that the evidence substantiates the claims made and that they do not contest this evidence. The speaker emphasizes the inexcusable nature of Tsarnaev's actions and expresses confidence that the jury will hold him accountable for his crimes. The speaker urges the jury to condemn the horrific acts and to deliver a just verdict that reflects the truth.
During the guilt phase, the defense adopted a strategy of minimal cross-examination and did not challenge the prosecution's narrative, yet the jury engaged thoughtfully with the evidence. Their inquiries indicated a careful consideration of the legal principles relevant to the charges, particularly regarding conspiracy and the distinction between aiding and abetting. This suggests that the jury did not simply accept the government's arguments but critically evaluated the weaker aspects of the case.
In the penalty phase, the jury similarly demonstrated diligence, posing questions about the verdict form and the legal concepts of aiding and abetting and conspiracy as they pertained to the government's proof of intent. Their questions indicate serious deliberation and a nuanced decision-making process, as reflected in their rejection of the government's aggravating factors related to the defendant's statements about violence. Overall, both phases of the trial reveal a jury that was methodical and not swayed by prejudice, engaging deeply with the complexities of the case.
The jury did not find certain statutory aggravating factors proposed by the government, such as whether the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death or committed the offense in an especially heinous manner. The jury engaged thoughtfully with mitigating factors about the defendant, showing varying degrees of approval in their responses. Importantly, they differentiated between the defendant and his brother, attributing the death penalty only for the direct harms caused by the defendant and his bomb, specifically the deaths of Lingzi Lu and Martin Richard. This careful deliberation indicates that the jury was not acting out of prejudice but rather as a conscientious group fulfilling their duty. The jury's discernment of the government's failure to prove certain aspects and their individual considerations of mitigating factors suggest a fair assessment, reinforcing the conclusion that media coverage did not infringe on the defendant's right to an impartial trial. The jury's penalty verdict was a reasoned moral judgment based on evidence, and the defendant has not shown that this case warranted an assumption of prejudice that would violate constitutional norms regarding trial venue. The defendant's renewed challenge to the venue is rejected. Additionally, regarding the convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the defendant claims that a Supreme Court ruling on the vagueness of a related definition necessitates a similar conclusion here. However, the defendant was convicted of fifteen distinct § 924(c) offenses related to specific crimes of violence identified in the indictment, including the use of a weapon of mass destruction and bombing a public place.
Carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 and Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, along with related conspiracies, are discussed in the context of mandatory minimum sentences established by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). This statute imposes additional consecutive sentences for “carrying” charges tied to violent crimes. A "crime of violence," as defined under § 924(c), requires either the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force or involves a substantial risk of such force during the offense.
The Supreme Court's decision in *Samuel Johnson* addressed definitions under § 924(e) related to enhanced penalties for recidivist offenders unlawfully possessing firearms. A prior felon faces enhanced punishment under § 922(g) if they have three or more prior violent felony or serious drug offense convictions. The definitions of "violent felony" under § 924(e) and "crime of violence" under § 924(c) are similar but differ in structure and terminology.
The first clause in both definitions, often referred to as the "force" clause, is aligned, while the second clause—known as the "residual" clause—differs. The Supreme Court ruled that the residual clause in § 924(e) was too vague and violated the Due Process Clause. However, this ruling does not directly affect the current case's sentencing under § 924(c), despite the defendant’s argument for its broader implications regarding vagueness in assessing substantial risk under § 924(c)(3)(B). This argument is viewed as an overly expansive interpretation of the Court's decision.
The Court acknowledged concerns about the implications of declaring the residual clause unconstitutional, particularly regarding the potential constitutional doubt cast on numerous federal and state laws using terms like "substantial risk" and "grave risk." However, it affirmed the constitutionality of laws applying qualitative standards to real-world conduct, stating that assessing risk is often straightforward. For instance, using the mail for fraud does not inherently involve a substantial risk of physical force, whereas using it for a weapon of mass destruction does. The Court noted that while some cases may be debatable, they call for case-specific judgments rather than broad interpretations.
The Court's decision in Samuel Johnson that the residual clause of 924(e) was facially void was based on the clause’s vague standard leading to inconsistent application. Despite the challenges posed by the categorical approach over nearly two decades, the Court distinguished this from 924(c), which does not share the same application issues. It emphasized that the focus should be on whether the elements of a crime, in the ordinary case, pose a serious potential risk of injury. The residual clause, following an enumeration of offenses like burglary and arson, lacked clarity in guiding the categorical inquiry, raising questions about its application under the law.
The offenses in question lack clarity regarding the level of risk they present, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in Begay v. United States, highlighting issues with the unique text of 924(e), which is not mirrored in 924(c). There is a notable absence of a confusing list of examples linking "substantial risk" to specific laws. The comparison of vague color descriptions illustrates this point, where a simple phrase creates less ambiguity than a detailed list of variations. The categorical approach, as discussed in Taylor, is not applicable in the 924(c) context because it relies on prior convictions, while 924(c) involves simultaneous offenses. This approach avoids complications stemming from varying state law definitions, as 924(c) predicates are always federal crimes. The conclusion drawn is that the Supreme Court's opinion in Samuel Johnson does not suggest that 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, despite differing views from some courts. Under 924(c)(3)(A), a “crime of violence” is defined by the "force" clause, requiring an element of physical force against a person or property, as supported by Johnson v. United States.
The defendant contends that the “physical force” in the statutory definition must be “violent force,” as established in Curtis Johnson, arguing that the predicate offenses against him could be committed without necessary violence. He cites prior cases, including Taylor, to support his assertion that it cannot be reliably concluded these offenses involve violent force. The defendant misinterprets the Curtis Johnson ruling, which determined that the Florida felony offense of battery requires physical force against another person to qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Florida statute allows for battery through mere intentional touching that does not necessarily cause bodily harm, which can result in a non-violent conviction. Thus, the Court ruled that a battery conviction cannot be classified as a “violent felony” if it is non-violent.
The defendant acknowledges that some offenses under 924(c) can be committed violently but argues that non-violent methods also exist, making it impossible to categorically determine they qualify as “crimes of violence.” He further claims that the definition of a “weapon of mass destruction” includes both violent and non-violent agents (like poisons), suggesting that these can be deployed passively and thus not involve violent force. This argument relies on a narrow interpretation of “violent force” tied to the specific context of the Curtis Johnson case, and it implies that lethal agents such as poison do not involve violent physical force, contradicting the notion that causing harm through such means constitutes violence.
Curtis Johnson does not support the defendant's narrow interpretation of what constitutes a "crime of violence." The defendant claims that offenses such as the use of a weapon of mass destruction, bombing in public spaces, and malicious destruction by fire or explosive are insufficiently violent. However, this argument is dismissed as unconvincing. The defendant's position regarding carjacking and Hobbs Act robbery is slightly more compelling due to their potential commission through intimidation or extortion, which might not involve physical force. Nonetheless, Hobbs Act robbery is firmly classified as a crime of violence by First Circuit precedent. Although the First Circuit has not explicitly categorized carjacking as a crime of violence, other circuits have. The statute's language indicates that intimidation in carjacking implies a threat of physical harm, as it requires the intent to cause serious bodily harm and mandates that the vehicle be taken from another person, which suggests a direct confrontation. The use of "intimidation" in this context strongly relates to threats of physical force. The defendant's reliance on Descamps v. United States to argue that neither carjacking nor Hobbs Act robbery can be classified as crimes of violence due to the possibility of non-violent commission misinterprets the relevant case law. Descamps specifically dealt with the classification of burglary under California law as a violent felony under the ACCA, which does not apply to the current context.
Proving the crime does not require establishing that the “entry” was unlawful, unlike the generic crime of burglary, as discussed in Taylor. A conviction can occur under either generic burglary (if the entry is unlawful) or non-generic burglary (if not). The Court ruled that a statute with a “single, indivisible” set of elements that broadly encompasses the generic offense does not allow for the modified categorical approach to discern if the conviction aligns with the generic definition of burglary. However, the modified categorical approach is permissible for a “divisible” statute with alternative elements, allowing a comparison of the elements of the generic crime to those of the defendant's prior conviction.
The defendant argues that carjacking and Hobbs Act robbery statutes should be seen as “indivisible,” complicating the determination of whether these crimes involve force or non-violent intimidation/extortion. Yet, by asserting that these crimes can be committed through non-violent means, the defendant acknowledges that the statutes contain alternative proofs, classifying them as “divisible” under Descamps. The defendant attempts to differentiate between “intimidation” and “extortion” as non-alternate elements, but the Court clarified that the distinction between elements and means is irrelevant for this analysis. The approved documents used to identify the elements of the crime will still apply regardless of how the statute is drafted. Finally, it remains uncertain if Congress intended “intimidation” and “extortion” to represent distinct alternatives or merely synonymous terms; context suggests they may imply intimidation through physical force.
The excerpt outlines the legal definition of obtaining property through wrongful means, specifically under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, emphasizing that the offense can occur via actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. In the case at hand, the vehicle was not obtained under color of official right, and the court asserts that the conviction rests on the alternative of using force or threats, which is indivisible as per the statute. The defendant's challenge to the "force" clause is deemed meritless.
The excerpt also addresses a renewed challenge to the constitutionality of the federal death penalty based on a dissent in Glossip v. Gross, where concerns about reliability and arbitrary application were raised. However, the court maintains that binding precedent contradicts the dissenting opinion.
In conclusion, the defendant’s motion for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is denied. The court notes that the defendant did not claim actual prejudice nor argued the relevance of juror excusal metrics, despite some case law suggesting such factors could be relevant. A significant number of jurors were excused due to personal hardships, but this did not reliably indicate potential juror prejudice in this trial.
A cohort of prospective jurors was excused due to their strong beliefs about the death penalty, which disqualified them under relevant laws. The Court showed deference to the parties' joint agreements regarding the for-cause excusals of jurors, often based on their general views on the death penalty, rendering the percentage of excused jurors an unreliable indicator of potential bias against the defendant. The empaneled jury displayed geographic diversity. The defendant submitted two compact discs with extensive materials to support his post-trial motion, but the Court emphasized the need for specific citations to the record and legal authority as outlined in the Scheduling Order. The Court declined to review uncited materials to identify relevant information, stating that it is the party’s responsibility to connect evidence to legal arguments. Additionally, a significant percentage (86.1%) of respondents in a pretrial poll indicated a belief in the defendant's guilt based on media exposure. Media coverage during the trial, particularly through a Washington Post graphics editor, chronicled key trial phases. While potential for prejudice from media coverage existed, it was deemed largely confined to the sentencing phase rather than guilt. The previous motions for a change of venue were denied based on the conclusion that, despite extensive media coverage, it had subsided and was primarily factual and non-inflammatory.
The Decorum Order mandated that trial observers could not wear or carry any items with messages or symbols related to the case, including law enforcement uniforms and badges. Throughout the trial from January to mid-May, the United States Marshals Service and other officials monitored courtroom security, with only a few instances of public reprimands for decorum violations that did not involve jurors. The "Boston Strong" theme, associated with resilience after the marathon bombings, was noted to have become commercialized and less impactful over time. Items related to this theme were sold alongside unrelated merchandise, indicating its diluted significance. Moreover, banners and construction sites near the courthouse were not visible to jurors, who were largely insulated from external distractions. By the trial's anniversary of the bombings, jurors had extensively engaged with trial evidence, having heard from nearly 100 witnesses and reviewed over 1,000 exhibits, making incidental media exposure inconsequential. An alternate juror confirmed their commitment to following court instructions regarding media avoidance. The defendant cited limited social media activity by jurors to argue for presumed prejudice but failed to demonstrate actual juror bias or misconduct, suggesting that any juror exposure to social media content was irrelevant. Additionally, some submitted social media files appeared to be created during the trial.
Facebook's timestamps on posts, referred to as "stories," indicate user interactions that may range from genuine friendships to mere acquaintances or strangers. A story can encompass various types of content, including status updates, photos, videos, and interactions like likes and app activity, which are then displayed on the news feeds of a user's friends. The defendant introduced evidence of his capture, including photographs and messages from a boat, which were part of a motion for jury inspection. The document also addresses legal clarifications regarding case citations, specifically differentiating between two cases involving a petitioner named Curtis Johnson to avoid misinterpretation of their relationship. Furthermore, it discusses the nuances of the residual clause in 924(e) and compares it to 924(c), emphasizing that the latter defines a separate crime from the underlying offense. It highlights the necessity of examining specific allegations in the indictment to convict under 924(c), utilizing a modified categorical approach that involves referencing approved documents, as established in Shepard v. United States. This approach requires assessing the riskiness of the defendant's conduct during the alleged offense.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of laws applying a qualitative standard like ‘substantial risk’ to conduct, emphasizing that under 924(c)(3)(B), the focus must be on the specific case in the indictment rather than an idealized ordinary case. The determination of whether a crime qualifies as a “crime of violence” under 924(c) is a legal question for the court to resolve, as established in relevant case law. The government sought jury instructions that the underlying offenses were crimes of violence, to which the defendant did not object during the trial, suggesting a possible waiver of any claim against the instruction. The absence of an objection, especially in light of the defendant’s active objections to other jury instructions, indicates a tacit acquiescence to the instruction on crimes of violence. Although the defendant raised arguments related to the "force" clause, these were available prior to indictment, and the lack of objection could be construed as waiver or forfeiture, allowing for plain error review by the Court of Appeals. The Court ultimately found no error in the instructions, clarifying that the relevant language of 924(c) involves the use of physical force, and refuting the defendant's argument regarding the nature of force in the context of poisoning.
The act of 'use of force' involves knowingly employing poison to inflict harm, regardless of whether the harm is direct or indirect, as illustrated by Castleman's example. The distinction is made clear by comparing it to the act of pulling a trigger, which is still considered a 'use of force' despite the bullet being the actual agent of harm. Under First Circuit precedent, conspiracy to commit a crime of violence qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), as established in United States v. Turner. Additionally, in United States v. Quinones, the court assumed carjacking is inherently a violent felony, further supported by the case of United States v. Gonzalez-Melendez, where aiding and abetting a carjacking and using a firearm during such an act were classified as crimes of violence. Congress has also identified extortion as a "violent felony" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
