Rodriguez v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc.

Citations: 155 F. Supp. 3d 758; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168836; 2015 WL 9239821Docket: CASE NO. 3:15-cv-01048

Court: District Court, M.D. Tennessee; December 16, 2015; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs, residents and misdemeanor probationers of Rutherford County, Tennessee, have initiated a class action lawsuit against Rutherford County, Pathways Community Corrections, Inc. (PCC), and individual probation officers, alleging violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the county's contract with PCC for administering probation services. They are seeking a preliminary injunction to address the county's practices surrounding the sanctioning of probationers, particularly focusing on the failure to consider indigency when nonpayment is the sole violation alleged. The County’s contract with PCC mandates monitoring and collection of payments for fines and restitution, as well as reporting violations to the Court. Plaintiffs challenge the use of secured money bonds to jail probationers for nonpayment, arguing that this approach does not accommodate those unable to pay. The Court has denied evidentiary requests from both parties but granted Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, indicating a preliminary ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs. The Court's findings are based on largely undisputed facts regarding the execution of probation violations and the practices surrounding the issuance of arrest warrants by PCC.

Probationers face financial burdens as part of their probation conditions, including mandatory litter removal for first-offense DUI convictions, which costs $132 in Rutherford County. Those unable to afford this or other monetary payments for required alcohol, drug, or domestic violence classes are deemed in violation of probation. Such violations can lead to arrest or sanctions, with Judge McFarlin noting that if a probationer’s only violation is failure to pay, they may be released on recognizance in General Sessions Court. However, at least two arrest warrants from Rutherford County Circuit Court indicate that probationers failing to pay can be imprisoned on secured money bonds, which require payment for release. Those who can afford the bond are released immediately, while those who cannot remain in jail until their hearings. Judge McFarlin rarely issues warrants for bonds lower than $2,500, and there is no inquiry into probationers' indigency or alternative attendance methods at revocation hearings. Probationers may attend informal hearings during a “ten-day docket” held by judges, but there are conflicting reports on whether those jailed for probation violations are included. During these hearings, probationers are pressured to plead guilty for quicker release, with the alternative of waiting for a public defender potentially delaying their case by thirty days or more. Judge McFarlin confirmed that no assessment of indigency occurs during these proceedings.

The Court expresses concern over the cycle of guilty pleas by probationers, which often leads to extended probation terms and increased fees, perpetuating a cycle of violations, arrests, and further incarceration. One example involves a probationer whose term was extended at least five times since 2010, illustrating how financial inability to pay court costs contributes to this cycle. The Court highlights the impact of extreme poverty on probation violations and prolonged detention. 

Plaintiffs previously challenged this process concerning two Named Plaintiffs, Steven Gibbs and Fred Robinson, leading to a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) that was later converted into a preliminary injunction, preventing the Defendants from arresting these individuals solely for nonpayment of fees. Plaintiffs now seek classwide injunctive relief.

Both parties have raised objections regarding the evidence submitted in relation to the Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. The Court notes that neither party provided legal grounds for excluding the evidence, which includes declarations and arrest warrants relevant to understanding the Defendants' probation scheme. The Court will consider all evidence presented, as it offers important context for the requested injunctive relief.

Defendants have raised concerns about the scope of the Plaintiffs’ request, particularly regarding the practice of releasing probationers on their own recognizance for nonpayment violations. The Plaintiffs initially endorsed this practice, asserting that Defendants must either issue a valid summons for revocation or release probationers after an arrest if the only violation is nonpayment.

Plaintiffs have indicated that any arrest of probationers, regardless of their release status, raises concerns, particularly regarding arrest due to nonpayment of court costs. The Court interprets Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction as seeking to prevent the arrest and detention of probationers solely for nonpayment, emphasizing that the issue centers around the need for a determination of willfulness in nonpayment before incarceration can occur. The Court clarifies that Plaintiffs do not contest the authority of PCC to report probation violations or arrest probationers; instead, they argue that when a secured money bond is deemed necessary to ensure attendance at a revocation hearing, the determination must consider the probationer's financial ability. 

The Court addresses the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, which restricts federal court intervention in ongoing state criminal proceedings. Defendants argue that all class members are involved in such proceedings, thus satisfying Younger abstention. In contrast, Plaintiffs reference Gerstein v. Pugh to assert that Younger does not prevent equitable relief when the issue is the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing. The Court finds that Plaintiffs present a stronger argument, highlighting that Defendants do not assess probationers' ability to pay prior to incarceration on secured bonds. A state judge confirmed that no such inquiry is conducted during the ten-day docket, meaning constitutional harm may occur before any opportunity for redress arises. Furthermore, probationers who plead guilty while incarcerated may not have formal hearings to challenge these constitutional issues, and even if indigency inquiries were made, they would be insufficient and potentially delayed, as probationers may not have timely access to a judge or legal representation.

Probationers, having already faced liberty deprivation by being jailed due to their inability to post bond, assert that the process they undergo occurs after the alleged constitutional injury. They challenge the existence of pending state court proceedings, contending that their claims do not disturb prior criminal convictions. The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Gerstein emphasizes the need for federal courts to determine if issues are collateral to the main state proceedings before applying Younger abstention, which supports the Plaintiffs' view that no state court proceedings are "pending" as per Younger’s definition. Plaintiffs reference a recent Alabama district court decision that rejected Younger abstention, noting that the federal lawsuit targeted post-judgment procedures rather than contradicting state court decisions. They allege that probationers are not afforded the necessary indigency inquiries required by the Fourteenth Amendment before raising constitutional concerns, and this issue could be resolved without impacting the underlying state judgments.

Regarding classwide injunctive relief, Defendants argue against it on the grounds that Plaintiffs have not certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, claiming Plaintiffs are attempting to bypass this requirement. However, the Court finds that the preliminary injunctive relief sought is appropriate for class-wide application since it addresses a systemic deficiency affecting all probationers regarding the lack of indigency inquiries before their jailing. The proposed relief aims to universally address this constitutional right without necessitating individualized remedies. The Court can grant classwide injunctive relief based on either conditional class certification or its general equity powers, making formal class certification unnecessary for such relief when the defendants’ actions impact a broad group.

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate four key factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of suffering irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of equities, and that the injunction serves the public interest. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have satisfactorily established these factors, warranting injunctive relief. 

The plaintiffs argue that the defendants' failure to assess indigency violates the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly regarding the jailing of probationers held on secured money bonds. The Court agrees, asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment necessitates an inquiry into an individual’s financial status before imposing secured bonds, especially when imprisonment may result solely from nonpayment. 

The Court addresses that the use of secured money bonds effectively imprisons indigent individuals while allowing those with financial means to secure their release for the same or worse violations. This disparity contradicts the principle of equal justice, as established in precedent cases. The Court highlights that individuals cannot be penalized for their inability to pay fines, affirming that wealth-based distinctions in legal treatment are unconstitutional. The Court references several cases reinforcing the notion that bond systems failing to consider indigency are unconstitutional, particularly when they do not provide a hearing to assess both the individual's financial status and the appropriateness of the bail amount.

A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued based on Fourteenth Amendment violations concerning a post-arrest detention scheme that relies on a secured bond system, which does not account for indigency. The Court emphasizes that equal protection principles, as established in Pugh and related cases, apply to probationers. The defendants argue that these precedents are irrelevant since they pertain to pretrial release, yet they fail to justify why probationers' rights under the equal protection clause should be diminished. The defendants allow immediate release for PCC probationers upon bond payment, neglecting any assessment of indigency, thus effectively conditioning freedom on financial means. This practice raises constitutional concerns.

The Court's conclusion aligns with precedents such as Tate v. Short and Bearden v. Georgia, which assert that imprisonment due to inability to pay fines or fees violates constitutional protections. In Tate, the Supreme Court ruled against converting fines into jail time for indigent defendants, while Bearden extended this principle by mandating an inquiry into indigency before probation revocation for nonpayment. Although these cases do not directly correspond to the current probation scheme, they highlight the necessity of considering indigency in related judicial proceedings.

Furthermore, the defendants cannot rely on Morrissey v. Brewer to defend their actions, as that case discusses the procedural requirements post-arrest, acknowledging a need for a preliminary inquiry into factors like indigency at the arrest stage. The Court notes that defendants fail to provide any preliminary safeguards for probationers, who often feel coerced into pleading guilty before formal hearings, thereby missing opportunities to contest their indigency, which exacerbates their cycle of debt and deprivation of liberty. Overall, the lack of consideration for indigency undermines the defendants' position.

Jailing probationers solely for nonpayment without assessing their ability to pay is a violation of constitutional rights, as established in Bearden v. Georgia. The court rejects Defendants' argument that this issue is moot, noting that despite claims of not jailing probationers for nonpayment, there is evidence of warrants issued that include secured money bonds. This practice effectively revokes probation for indigent individuals who cannot afford to pay, leading to prolonged incarceration and implicating both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The court finds a critical failure in Defendants' lack of inquiry into a probationer’s indigency, particularly given the demographics of the probationers involved. Consequently, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Additionally, Plaintiffs demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely without an injunction due to ongoing unconstitutional deprivation of liberty, supported by evidence such as arrest warrants and testimonies indicating a systemic issue within the probation scheme.

The balance of the equities and the public interest supports the granting of a preliminary injunction. Courts evaluate competing claims of injury and consider the effects on each party when deciding on relief. The necessity for an injunction should also factor in public consequences, as established in relevant case law. Defendants have not identified any substantial injury resulting from the proposed injunction, claiming only that it would require them to find alternative measures for dealing with probationers. However, existing alternatives like ROR warrants suggest that the alleged burden is minimal. Both parties acknowledge that enforcing constitutional rights benefits the public interest. The court finds that all factors favor granting the preliminary injunction, and neither abstention nor Rule 23 offers protection to the Defendants. Although preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies not awarded as of right, the circumstances presented here are deemed extraordinary. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is granted, with specific terms outlined in an attached Order. 

Additionally, the document discusses the nature of secured money bonds and court costs associated with probation, highlighting that probationers must pay fees including for drug testing. Discrepancies are noted regarding how costs are handled by PCC, with evidence suggesting that costs may be added to probationers' debts rather than absorbed by PCC. Examples are provided of Named Plaintiff Fred Robinson, who faced exorbitant secured bonds that effectively prolonged his detention due to financial inability to pay. The court dates for probationers vary significantly, indicating potential issues in managing their cases efficiently.

The term "preset secured money bond," initially coined by Plaintiffs’ counsel, refers to a secured money bond imposed without assessing the probationer's ability to pay. The Court adopts this definition for consistency, using it to describe bonds assigned without inquiry into the individual's financial situation or alternatives to ensure attendance at revocation hearings. Citing Williams v. Illinois, the Court emphasizes that defendants cannot be imprisoned solely for inability to pay fines. Although the current case involves probation rather than parole, it finds the two to be constitutionally equivalent, referencing Gagnon v. Scarpelli. The Court notes that the Defendants' probation scheme mirrors the issues outlined in Bearden, particularly regarding revocation for nonpayment without an indigency assessment. Key factors include that PCC probationers are typically misdemeanor offenders unable to pay court costs and that other probation conditions require monetary payments, leading to potential violations due to financial constraints. This highlights the necessity for assessing indigency, even as the Court clarifies that Defendants are not required to release probationers pending revocation; however, they must consider indigency when determining the amount of a money bond.