Competitive Enterprise Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

Docket: Civil Action No. 15-0346 (ABJ)

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; January 27, 2016; Federal District Court

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The Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), challenging the agency's slow production schedule for records related to emails from a false-identity account used by former EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson. CEI requested all emails sent to or from the 'Richard Windsor' account from December 15, 2008, to the present, leading to EPA identifying approximately 120,000 responsive records. The EPA planned to produce these records at a rate of 100 per month, which CEI argued was unreasonably slow, effectively denying access to the records. CEI claimed this delay violated FOIA and alleged that EPA's actions constituted improper means of withholding information, particularly as it was reportedly withholding other CEI FOIA requests until this one was processed. CEI sought a declaratory judgment affirming its right to timely production of records and an injunction compelling the EPA to produce records at a reasonable rate without discrimination against CEI. The parties later agreed on a production timetable, rendering the lawsuit moot and eliminating grounds for jurisdiction.

Plaintiff requested the Court to compel the EPA to either produce requested documents within ten days or initiate a reasonable production rate within that timeframe. Additionally, the plaintiff sought an order for the EPA to process its FOIA requests without bias against CEI and to recover litigation costs. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing that the EPA was releasing records on a rolling basis. The plaintiff countered that the production rate was inadequate, asserting that excessive delays constituted a withholding of records, which supported jurisdiction. During the pending motion, the Court held a status conference, where both parties expressed willingness to mediate. They subsequently reached an agreement to narrow the FOIA request, resulting in a stipulated production schedule that reduced responsive records to 3,723, with monthly production. By November 13, 2015, the parties reported complete production. The Court then inquired about any unresolved allegations, and the plaintiff asserted ongoing controversy due to potential challenges to the EPA's redactions. Following further briefing on jurisdiction regarding the redactions, the plaintiff introduced an argument about a 'pattern and practice' of delays. Ultimately, the Court determined that the matter was moot.

Federal courts operate under limited jurisdiction, presuming that cases lie outside this jurisdiction unless proven otherwise. Subject-matter jurisdiction is an essential requirement, and parties cannot confer it upon the court; the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Federal courts can only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies, which ties into the doctrines of standing and mootness. A case is deemed moot if events have occurred such that a decision would no longer affect the parties' rights or chances of future impact. When assessing jurisdiction, courts may consider materials beyond the complaint and must accept the factual allegations as true while disregarding unsupported inferences and legal conclusions presented by the plaintiff.

In the analysis section, it is determined that both Count I and Count II are moot, aligning with the constitutional prohibition against issuing advisory opinions. Once an agency complies with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by releasing all requested records, the court has no further statutory role. A declaration of unlawful refusal to disclose such information after compliance would violate the constitutional mandate against advisory opinions.

Plaintiff has achieved the relief sought through a negotiated resolution, leading to the mootness of Count II, which involved an injunction. Consequently, Count I also becomes moot as an intervening event has nullified the case's relevance. The D.C. Circuit's precedents establish that a declaratory judgment cannot address moot issues, and plaintiffs cannot circumvent mootness by seeking such a judgment. The case should be dismissed for both counts.

Plaintiff's assertion that the case remains active due to disputes over redactions and withholdings does not suffice to confer jurisdiction, as the complaint lacks claims regarding improper withholdings or requests for relief concerning those issues. The primary focus of the litigation was to challenge the pace of records production under FOIA, which has become moot as the relief sought is no longer applicable.

Furthermore, the claim alleging a 'pattern or practice' of delaying FOIA requests does not warrant the court's jurisdiction, as the complaint does not substantiate such a claim, and there is no evidence of a risk of future violations. The relief sought in Count II, which requested an injunction for record production, is moot, and similar declarations requested in Count I regarding the 2012 FOIA request are also moot.

Once the records have been produced, the request for declaratory relief becomes moot, as established in Payne Enterprises. In Count II, the plaintiff seeks an order for the EPA to process CEI’s FOIA requests reasonably and without discrimination based on CEI’s identity. Count I also includes similar requests for general declarations regarding the processing of plaintiff's requests. However, without an ongoing controversy or risk of future illegality, issuing broad advisory guidance would be beyond the Court's role.

The plaintiff references the D.C. Circuit's statement in Payne that a party's claim against an agency policy or practice cannot be mooted by the release of specific documents if the agency's actions reflect a broader issue. However, the current case differs from Payne, as the complaint does not assert that an agency policy will impair future lawful access to information. The plaintiff alleges that the EPA's slow production rate is due to CEI's identity, suggesting punitive measures for CEI's public disclosure of certain information. Yet, the plaintiff fails to provide factual support for these claims, merely offering conclusory allegations. The EPA’s actions, including holding other requests hostage until processing is completed, indicate a consideration of the requester's identity, which aligns with the agency's previous comments about CEI's requests contributing to processing delays.

Plaintiff argues that the biased application of the law leads to protracted administrative appeals and litigation, imposing costs on both CEI and taxpayers. The complaint states that after six months in the dispute resolution process, the EPA has failed to process a request in accordance with its customary practices, forcing the plaintiff to file this action. The legal precedent from Payne Enterprises involved the Air Force's refusal to release bid abstracts, despite a Secretary's ruling to the contrary, which the D.C. Circuit deemed a significant issue because it indicated ongoing unlawful conduct. In contrast, the current complaint lacks factual support for claims of discrimination or ongoing impropriety by the EPA. Instead, it suggests that the EPA's delays were in response to the plaintiff's insistence on expedited processing of a broad request, implying the agency used other requests as leverage. The EPA has met production milestones and there is no indication of records being withheld after a decision to produce them, nor are there claims of other denied FOIA requests. Since the original dispute has been resolved and there are no ongoing issues that would affect future access to records, the court finds the action moot and will dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). For a complaint to proceed, it must present sufficient factual matter for a plausible claim as established in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.

A claim is considered facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. This standard, while not requiring a probability, demands more than mere possibility or conclusory statements. Specifically, pleadings must avoid superficial labels or formulaic recitations of legal elements. In the case at hand, the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief sought to compel the EPA to produce responsive records without bias toward the requester's identity. However, since the only records deemed unreasonably delayed have now been produced, the request for an injunction lacks merit. The cited case, Better Government Association, illustrates that challenges to the facial validity of regulations are not moot even if specific requests for fee waivers are resolved, as multiple claims may exist. In contrast, the current case involves only two counts, each related to a specific FOIA request. Allegations regarding a pattern of untimely responses from the EPA, initiated after media scrutiny of the "Windsor" account, include claims that requests from CEI counsel were processed separately. Despite the plaintiff's responsibility to establish jurisdiction, they have not provided complete copies of the referenced emails to support their claims.