Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; December 15, 2015; Federal District Court
A wrongful death and survival action has been initiated by Plaintiffs Cheryl Harris and Douglas Maseth against the contractor Kellogg, Brown, Root Services, Inc. (KBR), following the death of their son, Staff Sergeant Ryan Maseth, in 2008 at a military base in Iraq where KBR held operational responsibilities. The case is being reconsidered by this Court after a remand from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, specifically to resolve a conflict of law regarding which liability system governs the claims and defenses: Texas or Tennessee's proportional liability systems (allowing jury fault assignment to non-parties) versus Pennsylvania's joint and several liability system (restricting fault assignment to case parties). The Court of Appeals indicated that the political question doctrine might affect the justiciability of certain claims depending on the applicable law. Currently, KBR seeks the application of Texas law, which is opposed by the Plaintiffs advocating for Pennsylvania law. The parties have opted out of limited discovery on the conflict and have presented extensive briefs. KBR has also abandoned its alternative argument for Tennessee law. Following a thorough review of the arguments and evidence, the Court has denied KBR’s motion to apply Texas law and decided to apply Pennsylvania law to the apportionment and liability issues. Additionally, relevant factual background indicates that both Plaintiffs are Pennsylvania residents and parents of SSG Maseth, who was born and raised in Pittsburgh before enlisting in the Army.
On June 17, 2004, SSG Maseth was deployed to Baghdad, Iraq, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. During his first tour, he reenlisted for an additional four years on January 19, 2005, listing his father's address in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as his "home of record." He received orders to return to the U.S. in March 2005 and was subsequently transferred to several military bases, including Fort Polk, Fort Bragg, and Fort Campbell, where he purchased a home in Clarksville, Tennessee, two weeks after arriving. SSG Maseth financed the home with a 30-year mortgage through a Veteran’s Administration Program, which required him to occupy the property as his principal residence within 60 days of the deed's execution and maintain occupancy for at least one year, barring extenuating circumstances.
To secure the loan, SSG Maseth certified his intent to occupy the property as his home, as stipulated under 38 U.S.C. 3704(c)(1). However, his parents stated in affidavits that he bought the home as an investment due to lower costs compared to rentals and did not plan to make it his permanent residence. They noted he considered himself a Pennsylvanian, filed Pennsylvania tax returns, maintained a Pennsylvania cell phone number, and had no family or friends in Clarksville. SSG Maseth lived in the home for only four and a half months before receiving orders for a second tour in Iraq, during which he had roommates who paid rent. He was deployed again on October 15, 2007, and died on January 2, 2008, due to an electrocution incident while showering in his living quarters in Iraq.
SSG Maseth had just over a year left on his Army reenlistment commitment, set to expire around January 19, 2009, unless extended. He died without a will, and his remains were returned to Pennsylvania for burial in the National Cemetery of the Alleghenies. His parents opened his estate in the Chancery Court of Montgomery County, Tennessee, receiving certified letters of administration on March 13, 2008, and subsequently filed a lawsuit against KBR in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on March 24, 2008, which KBR later removed to a different court. In April 2008, Douglas Maseth filed tax returns for his son to claim refunds for withheld Pennsylvania income taxes due to military service exemption and similarly filed a federal return. The plaintiffs sold their son's house and initiated a second lawsuit against URS Corporation in December 2009, which was settled in 2011.
Regarding KBR's domicile, plaintiffs allege it is based in Texas and incorporated in Delaware, while presenting evidence to challenge its Texas connection. KBR, a subsidiary of KBR, Inc., was incorporated in Delaware in 2006. KBR, Inc. was previously owned by Halliburton, which acquired the entities that formed KBR, Inc. at different times. KBR, Inc. is publicly traded and involved in significant government contract projects, particularly for the U.S. military in the Middle East, including the LogCAP III and CENTCOM projects. KBR, Inc. is headquartered in Houston, Texas, and has global operations across over 45 countries.
In fiscal year 2007, KBR, Inc. derived 89% of its revenues from international operations, with 50% specifically from work in Iraq for the United States. The company's 10-K disclosure includes a disclaimer regarding government contract work, particularly for the Department of Defense and agencies like LogCAP and USAREUR. KBR anticipates various claims related to its Iraq operations, including wrongful termination, personal injury, and contractor disputes. Although KBR believes most claims are governed by the Defense Base Act or otherwise defensible, adverse outcomes could significantly impact its business and finances.
Mark E. Lowes, KBR’s Vice President of Litigation, notes that KBR and its parent companies are headquartered in Houston, Texas, with minimal presence in Delaware, where they are incorporated. They employ 6,993 individuals in Texas, primarily in Houston, and have no operational presence in Delaware. KBR is also registered in Pennsylvania as a foreign corporation, listing Houston addresses for its officers.
Additionally, during the Iraq occupation, CPA Orders governed contractor activities. Specifically, Revised CPA Order 174 section 18 stipulates that third-party claims arising from contractors' actions unrelated to military operations must be submitted to the Sending State, following its legal frameworks.
In 2003, the U.S. Army contracted an Iraqi subcontractor for renovations at the RPC and engaged Washington Group International (WGI) for operations and maintenance from April 2003 to March or April 2006. The contract was issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) from Winchester, Virginia, to WGI in Boise, Idaho. Subsequently, USACE contracted KBR for operations and maintenance from March 2006 to February 2007 under the CENTCOM program, also issued from Winchester, Virginia, to KBR in Arlington, Virginia. Responsibility for operations then transitioned to the LogCAP III program managed by the Defense Management Contract Agency (DCMA), with KBR's predecessor, Brown & Root, having entered into the LogCAP III contract in December 2001. The transition to LogCAP III was finalized with Task Order 139 in February 2007, which lacked recorded addresses for the involved parties, though the DCMA International Division in Alexandria, Virginia, managed it from Baghdad, Iraq. KBR established its headquarters at the Victory Base Complex in Baghdad.
The base LogCAP III contract referenced federal regulations concerning contractor liability and insurance for third-party claims. On January 2, 2008, SSG Maseth was electrocuted in his living quarters at the RPC, leading to his death from cardiac arrest caused by electric current from a water pump on the building's roof. Plaintiffs filed wrongful death and survival claims against KBR under Pennsylvania law, asserting two liability theories: the “installation theory,” claiming KBR negligently installed the water pump without proper grounding during the CENTCOM contract period, and the “maintenance theory,” alleging KBR failed to fulfill its maintenance obligations under the CENTCOM and LogCAP III contracts. KBR has presented defenses including proximate causation and contributory negligence. There is a dispute over whether KBR installed the faulty water pump, which was of Chinese origin and not built to U.S. standards, with plaintiffs arguing that KBR was responsible for the installation during the CENTCOM contract, while KBR contends that installation occurred before their involvement at the RPC.
KBR asserts it did not install the water pump in question, suggesting it was installed by the military, an Iraqi subcontractor, WGI, or one of WGI's subcontractors. It is acknowledged that SSG Maseth was required to remain stateside during the CENTCOM contract. The Plaintiffs claim there are nine work orders indicating that a reasonable contractor would have addressed the grounding and bonding of the water pump. Notable work orders include requests for grounding due to electrical shocks and issues with the water pump's operation. These requests were made by soldiers at the base and processed through the Mayor’s Cell before being sent to KBR. KBR refutes any negligence related to the work orders or the water pump's failure. SSG Maseth initiated the work order on November 2, 2007, which is the only one he filed concerning the failed pump.
The procedural history reveals that KBR's motion to apply Iraqi law was denied in 2011, followed by a discovery phase and a renewed motion to dismiss based on the political question doctrine and the combatant activities exception, which was granted in 2012 but later reversed by the Court of Appeals in 2013. KBR's petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied in January 2015, after which the Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the lower court. A briefing schedule was established regarding the conflict of law issue, with KBR filing a motion for Texas law application in March 2015. The parties confirmed that no further discovery was necessary for the pending motion during a status conference in May 2015.
Oral arguments were presented by counsel during a motion hearing on June 2, 2015, with transcripts filed afterward. Both parties submitted supplemental briefs on July 16, 2015, and KBR responded to the Plaintiffs' brief on July 24, 2015, after receiving court permission. The court is now ready to address KBR's motion. In determining the applicable jurisdiction's laws for apportionment and liability, the court follows Pennsylvania's choice of law rules, which utilize a hybrid approach combining governmental interest analysis with the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts theory. This requires the court to first identify any relevant differences between the laws of the jurisdictions involved. If laws are the same, Pennsylvania law applies without further analysis. If there are differences, the court assesses the policies behind each jurisdiction's law to determine whether a true conflict exists, defined as a situation where governmental interests would be compromised if one jurisdiction's law was not applied. If a true conflict is found, the court must identify which state has a greater interest in applying its law.
The Court evaluates each state's contacts based on their relevance to the underlying policies of the issue, referencing Hammersmith and Shields. A false conflict arises when one jurisdiction's governmental interests would be negatively impacted by applying another jurisdiction's law, necessitating the application of the law from the sole interested jurisdiction. If no jurisdiction's interests would be affected, the law of the place where the wrong occurred (lex loci delicti) governs. Relevant contacts for tort cases, as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, include the location of the injury, the conduct causing the injury, and the parties' domiciles, among others. Factors influencing the choice of law include the needs of interstate systems, the policies of the forum and other interested states, protection of expectations, and the uniformity and predictability of results. Pennsylvania’s choice of law analysis allows for different states' laws to apply to distinct issues within a single case (depecage). In this litigation, it is agreed that Iraq is where the injury occurred, the conduct took place, and the parties' relationship was centered. The Court maintains its prior decision not to apply Iraqi law, which has not been challenged or revisited, and thus moves forward with its choice of law analysis, focusing on the domicile and other factors relevant to the parties involved.
Plaintiffs claim domicile in Pennsylvania, countering KBR's argument that SSG Maseth's domicile was Tennessee due to his home purchase and estate administration there. KBR's stance was influenced by a previous court assessment identifying Tennessee as a potentially interested jurisdiction alongside Pennsylvania and Texas. The plaintiffs argue for a serviceman presumption, asserting that Maseth enlisted as a Pennsylvania domiciliary, which remained unchanged despite his activities in Tennessee. KBR attempted to establish a domicile change through a Deed of Trust linked to the home purchase. During a telephone conference, both parties agreed that fact discovery was unnecessary for resolving the domicile dispute. KBR later indicated it would assume Maseth was a Pennsylvania domiciliary for the purposes of its argument, effectively abandoning its previous position. The Court finds that evidence supports the plaintiffs' claim of domicile in Pennsylvania, referencing the federal diversity statute that designates the domicile of an estate as that of the decedent prior to death. Domicile is defined as an individual's true, permanent home, determined by both physical presence and intent to remain.
An individual's domicile changes instantly upon taking up residence at a new location with the intent to remain there, but there is a presumption favoring an established domicile until evidence of a change is presented. In diversity jurisdiction cases, the party claiming a change of domicile bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Federal courts have recognized a "serviceman presumption," which holds that a serviceman's domicile at enlistment is presumed to remain unchanged unless there is clear and unequivocal evidence of intent to change it. This presumption is based on the understanding that military personnel often do not have a voluntary choice in their residence due to military orders. Courts have ruled that mere establishment or purchase of off-base homes does not suffice to change a serviceman's domicile.
In the case at hand, the Court determined that SSG Maseth was domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of his death. This conclusion would stand regardless of whether the serviceman presumption or a lesser standard of preponderance of the evidence was applied. Despite being transferred to Fort Campbell and residing temporarily in Clarksville, Tennessee, the evidence does not demonstrate that SSG Maseth intended to remain in Tennessee indefinitely following his military orders. Notably, he was a Pennsylvania domiciliary at the time of his enlistment and reenlistment in 2001 and 2005, respectively.
An individual's domicile is established upon taking up residence in a new location with the intent to remain, but once acquired, it is presumed to continue until evidence shows otherwise. In diversity jurisdiction cases, the burden lies with the party seeking to prove a change in domicile, which must be done by a preponderance of the evidence. In military contexts, a serviceman's domicile at enlistment is presumed to remain unchanged unless clear and unequivocal evidence indicates an intent to change. Courts recognize that military personnel's living arrangements are often dictated by orders rather than personal choice, placing a high burden of proof on those asserting a change in domicile. The mere establishment of an off-base home does not suffice to alter a serviceman’s domicile. Activities such as opening bank accounts or obtaining licenses near a service location do not negate the serviceman presumption. Applying these principles, the court determined that SSG Maseth was domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of his death, a conclusion reached regardless of whether the stricter serviceman presumption or a more lenient standard was applied. Notably, there was no dispute regarding Maseth's initial domicile in Pennsylvania upon his enlistment in 2001 and subsequent reenlistment in 2005.
SSG Maseth received military orders to transfer to Fort Campbell and subsequently purchased a home in Clarksville, Tennessee, where he lived for four and a half months. However, the Deed of Trust did not establish his intent to remain in Tennessee indefinitely. The court found that KBR failed to demonstrate a change in SSG Maseth's domicile from Pennsylvania to Tennessee. The Deed of Trust's “Occupancy” provision required him to reside in the home within 60 days and use it as his residence for at least one year, which he complied with until he received further military orders in October 2007 to serve in Iraq. The statutory requirement for SSG Maseth to certify his actual residence or intent to move into the property was satisfied since he lived there until transferred.
The evidence indicated he could not have had the subjective intent to remain in Tennessee indefinitely at the time of the real estate transaction in May 2007, as he was bound by military orders for an additional two and a half years. During his absence, SSG Maseth rented the home to other soldiers and likely would have continued to do so upon his return. His parents' affidavits suggested that he had no reason to stay in Tennessee other than military requirements. Ultimately, at the time of his death, he was considered a Pennsylvania domiciliary living in Iraq while owning rental property in Tennessee. The administration of his estate in Tennessee by his parents did not alter this assessment.
Plaintiffs potentially could have opened the estate of SSG Maseth in Pennsylvania, but opted for Tennessee to reduce administrative expenses and for convenience, given that the only significant asset—a house—was located there. SSG Maseth, who was unmarried, childless, and died intestate, had a mortgage that needed to be satisfied through the sale of the Tennessee property. KBR acknowledged that an ancillary proceeding might have been necessary in Tennessee if the estate had been opened in Pennsylvania, suggesting that doing so in Pennsylvania would have been redundant and costly. Following the sale of the house, the mortgage holder was presumably paid, and since all of SSG Maseth's heirs reside in Pennsylvania, Tennessee's involvement in the case is minimal. Thus, for legal purposes, the estate is treated as domiciled in Pennsylvania, rendering the actions of his parents after his death irrelevant.
Regarding KBR's domicile, Plaintiffs do not dispute its headquarters in Texas but argue that its incorporation in Delaware and operations in Pennsylvania lessen Texas's governmental interests. KBR counters that its Texas headquarters is the most significant contact for this choice of law matter. The court agrees with KBR's Texas domicile, noting that the "nerve center" test from Hertz Corp. v. Friend determines corporate domicile. This test focuses on where a corporation's executive activities are directed. The evidence supports that KBR's "nerve center" is in Texas, including its fiscal reports and official registrations, affirming Texas as the location of its corporate officers.
KBR's contacts with Delaware and Pennsylvania are unrelated to the claims in this case, and the plaintiffs have not provided evidence to challenge this finding. For choice of law purposes, KBR is considered a domiciliary of Texas, as it is the center of its operations. However, the Court must also evaluate KBR's claim-specific contacts with Virginia, where it entered into significant agreements with the government and conducted operations relevant to the case.
The Court identifies an "actual conflict" between Pennsylvania and Texas laws regarding the apportionment of fault to non-parties, specifically the differences in their joint and several versus proportional liability systems. The analysis focuses on the laws in effect at the time of SSG Maseth’s death on January 2, 2008, acknowledging subsequent amendments that affect liability.
Both parties argue that the case presents a "false conflict," where only one jurisdiction's governmental interests would be impacted by the application of the other's law. The plaintiffs contend that applying Pennsylvania law would not compromise Texas's interests, while KBR argues the opposite. However, the Court disagrees with this characterization and concludes that the conflict is not false.
This case exemplifies a "true conflict" between the "plaintiff-protecting rules" of Pennsylvania and the "defendant-protecting rules" of Texas, requiring an evaluation of which jurisdiction's laws should apply due to potential impairment of each jurisdiction's legal principles. Pennsylvania law does not allow juries to assign liability to non-parties, unlike some other states, which can apportion liability among all tortfeasors. Pennsylvania’s traditional joint and several liability doctrine holds that any liable defendant is responsible for the full damages, enabling plaintiffs to recover the total amount from any defendant not barred from recovery. This legal framework underscores Pennsylvania's commitment to fully compensate plaintiffs for their injuries, particularly in survival actions, where the state has a significant interest in the well-being of the decedent's family. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasizes the state's concern over the administration of the decedent’s estate, asserting that assigning fault to non-parties serves no purpose and is not legislatively authorized. Instead, defendants can seek contribution from nonpaying joint tortfeasors if they pay more than their proportional share.
The excerpt outlines the differences between Pennsylvania and Texas liability laws concerning joint tortfeasors. In Pennsylvania, defendants found jointly and severally liable bear the burden of litigating contribution claims against other liable parties, increasing the likelihood of full recovery for plaintiffs. This system is designed to protect plaintiffs by allowing multiple avenues for recovery. Conversely, Texas operates under a modified comparative fault system established by Section 33.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which permits the trier of fact to assign responsibility percentages to all parties involved, including plaintiffs, defendants, and settling persons. Under Texas law, defendants are liable only for their percentage of responsibility, unless a defendant is found to bear over 50% responsibility, in which case they are jointly and severally liable. This change was implemented to address perceived unfairness in the previous system, which allowed plaintiffs to leverage joint and several liability against defendants with marginal responsibility. The current Texas system allows for more liberal designation of responsible third parties and requires a solid evidentiary foundation to support claims of shared liability. This shift aims to ensure defendants are accountable for their own actions rather than disproportionately bearing costs for others' conduct.
In Texas tort law, the responsible third party system allows defendants to avoid joint and several liability by persuading a jury to assign more than 50% of the liability to other parties. A responsible third party is not considered a true party or responsible entity; its sole purpose is to enable a defendant to limit their liability exposure. If a jury finds a defendant to be less than 50% responsible, their liability and compensatory damages are capped at that percentage. However, the system does not completely shield defendants from joint and several liability; only one defendant can be assigned more than 50% liability at a time. This proportional liability framework aims to balance the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, requiring plaintiffs to prove that a defendant is more than 50% responsible for joint and several liability to apply.
Defendants found to be less than or equal to 50% responsible are not accountable for the full damages or the risks associated with pursuing other liable parties, while those deemed more than 50% responsible remain liable for the entirety of the plaintiff's damages and must bear the pursuit risks. The Texas statute generally favors defendants, allowing them to mitigate liability by having juries apportion damages among all involved parties. Without this framework, the ability of Texas-domiciled entities like KBR to leverage the system would be significantly hindered.
The Court identifies a "true conflict" between Pennsylvania and Texas laws due to competing governmental interests that would be compromised if only one jurisdiction's laws were applied. The assessment will focus on which state has a "greater interest" based on the qualitative evaluation of both states' contacts in relation to the underlying policies of the issue.
Key contacts include SSG Maseth's domicile in Pennsylvania, where he enlisted in the Army and where his estate beneficiaries reside. In contrast, the plaintiffs have no connections to Texas, as SSG Maseth served only in locations outside of Texas. KBR, the defendant, is domiciled in Texas, with operations directed from Houston, although its relevant activities for this case were conducted primarily from Virginia and Iraq.
After evaluating these contacts, the Court concludes that Pennsylvania has a greater interest in applying its laws, particularly its joint and several liability system, which enhances recovery for plaintiffs in wrongful death and survival actions. Texas's interests are deemed less significant due to the lack of substantial connections to the case and the fact that KBR's relevant operations were based in Virginia, despite Texas retaining some joint liability provisions.
A defendant in Texas can be jointly and severally liable even if they are found to be more than 50% responsible for the damages, as Texas prioritizes the plaintiffs' right to full recovery over the defendant's protections against joint liability. Texas courts have affirmed this approach, allowing plaintiffs to hold a majority defendant accountable for damages attributed to a third party, even if that third party is immune from suit. Defendants can mitigate joint and several liability by including non-parties in the jury's apportionment of fault, but this opportunity is primarily beneficial for defendants deemed marginal (50% or less responsible). In the current case, plaintiffs would have to prove KBR's liability exceeds 50% to seek full recovery; otherwise, damages would be limited to the jury's assigned percentage of KBR's fault. The court has been advised against allowing jury consideration of the United States as a responsible third party, as this would require evaluating military decisions and render the claims nonjusticiable. Consequently, KBR could be entirely shielded from liability due to the United States' involvement in the case. If Pennsylvania law were applied, it would favor full recovery for plaintiffs, allowing them to pursue claims against KBR, which would still have defenses available under that jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals determined that KBR's "empty chair" defense at trial does not render the case nonjusticiable, as other parties, including the United States and WGI/URS, may share responsibility, and KBR’s actions were not deemed a proximate cause of SSG Maseth’s death. The Court also permitted KBR to argue contributory negligence, asserting that SSG Maseth’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his death. However, the jury cannot formally assign responsibility to the United States due to the political question doctrine, which prohibits evaluating unreviewable military orders.
The Court decided to apply Pennsylvania law regarding liability and apportionment issues, supported by factors from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Specifically, applying Pennsylvania law satisfies the "needs of the interstate and international systems." The Court evaluated various relevant policies and determined that factors promoting "certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result" are less significant in this case, as multiple jurisdictions may apply to interstate torts.
The protection of justified expectations was discussed, noting that plaintiffs likely had no expectations regarding the applicable law for claims against a government contractor related to an accidental death in Iraq. In contrast, KBR, as a sophisticated contractor, was aware it could face lawsuits under various state laws due to its operations and could not expect all claims to be governed by favorable Texas law. KBR was familiar with revised CPA Order 17, which indicated it could be subject to claims under any state law, and its contracts did not specify which law would govern in such cases or indicate reliance on Texas law.
KBR, having contracted with the Government from its Virginia office, should have been aware of the potential for joint and several liability due to Virginia's legal framework. The Court notes that Texas law also supports such liability against a single defendant. The Court recognizes that plaintiffs likely understood they could not pursue a negligence claim against the United States, nor could KBR seek contribution from the government due to its sovereign immunity, as established in Feres v. United States. KBR has suggested possible indemnification claims against the United States based on its contracts, which could have been included during negotiations. If KBR lacks a viable indemnification claim, it does not justify its concerns regarding Pennsylvania's joint and several liability system, which may require it to compensate plaintiffs for damages attributed to the United States, a non-party. The Court concludes that KBR should bear the risks associated with joint and several liability, favoring Pennsylvania law over Texas law due to Pennsylvania's greater interest in this case. Consequently, KBR's motion to apply Texas's proportional liability scheme is denied, and Pennsylvania's laws of joint and several liability will govern the case. The Court also reaffirmed its prior decision that Iraqi law does not apply and has not been challenged by either party. Additionally, it clarified the geographical location of Fort Campbell, which spans both Kentucky and Tennessee.
Plaintiffs highlight that SSG Maseth’s two brothers also served in the military and returned to Pennsylvania after their service. Revised CPA Order 17, effective from 2004 until December 31, 2008, was relevant to the case surrounding SSG Maseth's accident. In their Complaint (Civ. A. No. 09-1673), Plaintiffs asserted that URS acquired WGI in November 2007, with URS being a Nevada corporation based in San Francisco. A specific contractual provision mandated reimbursement to the Contractor for reasonable insurance costs and liabilities incurred due to contract performance, regardless of negligence, provided these liabilities were validated by final judgments or written settlements with the Government. KBR argued this provision could justify indemnity from the government, as indicated in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari and acknowledged by the United States in an Amicus Brief. Many military contracts include indemnification clauses transferring liability and litigation costs to the U.S. government under certain conditions. The Court of Appeals confirmed that Plaintiffs did not contest the dismissal of claims related to safety measures and facility maintenance, which were barred by the political question doctrine. The DOD-IG Report indicated KBR installed the water pump involved in SSG Maseth’s electrocution, and KBR replaced the previous contractor in February 2006, with the contract lasting until February 2007. Notably, the faulty pump was part of a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers contract, and a water heater replacement occurred after service members experienced electric shocks in April or May 2006.
The contractor, KBR-Middle East Region Office, replaced a water heater and grounded it to a metal pipe, using Card Industries as a subcontractor. They installed a pump on the roof, which contributed to the electrocution of SSG Maseth and adjacent water tanks in June 2006, while KBR was contracted for operations and maintenance with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Court reiterates its previous legal standards regarding conflict of law, specifically noting KBR's failure to demonstrate the applicability of Iraqi law, as there is no interest from Iraq in applying its laws to this lawsuit involving an American serviceman harmed by a government contractor on a U.S. military base.
The Court references precedents indicating that a serviceman's domicile is presumed unchanged from enlistment unless proven otherwise. After his first tour, SSG Maseth was stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana, where he spent part of his leave with family in Pittsburgh. KBR highlighted that Douglas Maseth did not report rental income for his son on his 2007 tax return, but this fact did not influence the domicile issue, and discovery on these matters was not pursued by the parties.
The document also notes that Pennsylvania eliminated traditional joint and several liability for many torts in 2011, and recent amendments are not considered for this evaluation. It further details the threshold changes for liability percentages in Pennsylvania from 1987 to 1995 and clarifies that Texas' apportionment procedures do not apply to exemplary damages.
A defendant found responsible for exemplary damages is liable for the full amount awarded by the jury. Under Texas law, exemplary damages can only be awarded if there are compensatory damages, meaning a plaintiff cannot seek exemplary damages without first obtaining compensatory damages. In cases involving multiple defendants, exemplary damage awards must specify amounts for each defendant, who are only liable for their designated amounts. Plaintiffs argue that KBR's motion to designate the United States as a responsible third party is untimely, referencing an amended statute effective September 1, 2011. KBR contends that the plaintiffs’ argument relies on a statute that did not take effect until then. Additionally, plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the responsible third party statute based on a Montana Supreme Court case; however, that decision is not binding in Texas. The court concludes that even if KBR could designate the United States as a responsible third party under Texas law, Pennsylvania law is applicable in this case. A hypothetical juror verdict form would require percentages of negligence attributed to each party involved, totaling 100%. Virginia law supports that if two parties' independent negligence results in a single injury, both are responsible for the entire injury, with no consideration of comparative negligence.
