Deranamie v. Seiu Local 509

Docket: CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-CV-40120-TSH

Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; November 18, 2015; Federal District Court

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Esther G. Deranamie filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Community Health Link, Inc. (CHL), and her labor union, SEIU Local 509, after her termination as a rehabilitation specialist. Deranamie claims she was unjustly warned and terminated, and that SEIU failed to fulfill its obligations by not filing grievances regarding her termination. CHL and SEIU both moved to dismiss all but one count of her complaint. The court granted both motions to dismiss. 

Deranamie, an African American woman of Liberian descent from Worcester, Massachusetts, was employed by CHL from 2009 to 2014. In early 2014, an incident arose in which she was accused of falsifying a signature, leading to a 'final warning' being issued without SEIU's intervention. Following a racially charged encounter with a client in June 2014, Deranamie was terminated for allegedly disrupting a meeting related to that client. Although SEIU was notified of her termination, it did not act on her behalf, despite its duty under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to defend her against dismissals without just cause. Deranamie did not pursue the grievance procedure outlined in the CBA prior to filing her lawsuit in Worcester Superior Court.

Seven counts were asserted by the plaintiff: (1) wrongful termination against CHL, (2) breach of contract by CHL, (3) employment discrimination by CHL, (4) discrimination by SEIU, (5) breach of contract by SEIU, and (7) violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A. The case was removed to federal court under the jurisdiction of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185. CHL filed motions to dismiss counts I, II, and VII, while SEIU moved to dismiss counts IV, V, and VII. Count III, regarding employment discrimination against CHL, is not subject to dismissal motions.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must assert a plausible entitlement to relief, requiring more than mere labels or a formulaic recitation of legal elements. The court must accept all factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Section 301 of the LMRA allows lawsuits regarding violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations in federal courts. The Supreme Court considers labor contracts under this section as governed by federal law, allowing for the removal and dismissal of state law claims that are preempted by it. Preemption applies particularly to state-law contract claims enforcing collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) and extends to claims that require interpreting CBAs. A state law claim is preempted if it relies on the meaning of provisions within a CBA, which includes allegations of conduct that potentially breaches duties arising from the CBA. 

CHL contends that the wrongful termination claim (count I) is preempted by Section 301 as it relates to protections afforded by the CBA due to the plaintiff's membership in SEIU. The plaintiff argues that her wrongful termination claim stands independently of the CBA, claiming CHL created a situation preventing her discharge without cause outside the CBA context.

Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim is based on an alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) due to termination without just cause, necessitating an interpretation of the CBA to establish her employment status and the adequacy of the termination grounds. Consequently, Count I is dismissed as preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Additionally, Plaintiff's discrimination claim (Count IV) is preempted by the duty of fair representation (DFR), which obligates unions to act fairly and without discrimination towards all members. SEIU's failure to file grievances on behalf of Plaintiff, who claims discrimination based on her African-American and Liberian descent, falls under DFR implications. Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to file a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), a necessary step for state law claims. Even if she had filed, the claim would still be preempted as it relates to DFR. Hybrid claims arise when an employee alleges both a DFR breach by the union and a CBA breach by the employer, requiring the court to determine the responsibilities of both parties regarding the employee's rights.

Plaintiff alleges SEIU breached the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) by failing to file grievances after her termination, and this conduct also constitutes a violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A. SEIU contends these claims are hybrid and preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and the Duty of Fair Representation (DFR). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges CHL breached the CBA by terminating her without just cause, to which CHL raises similar preemption arguments. Plaintiff argues her claim against CHL is independent of the CBA, asserting her termination was influenced by CHL's relationship with her and other employees. 

The court finds that the breach of contract claims against both SEIU and CHL are hybrid, dependent on the CBA, as the success of the claims requires showing both a breach of the CBA by CHL and SEIU's failure to initiate grievance procedures. The Chapter 93A claim against SEIU is also deemed hybrid since it claims a breach of the DFR and the CBA. Consequently, Counts II, V, VI, and VII are preempted and must be dismissed. The court grants motions to dismiss from both Community Health Link, Inc. (CHL) and SEIU Local 509, resulting in the dismissal of Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, and VII of the Plaintiff's complaint.

The CBA, attached to CHL's motion, can be considered due to its undisputed authenticity and relevance to the claims. Plaintiff clarified at the hearing that a certain claim is against SEIU only. To support her claim against CHL, Plaintiff must demonstrate SEIU's breach of duty to bypass the requirement for exhausting grievance procedures. Although both defendants assert that any claims construed as federal are subject to a six-month statute of limitations, the court finds that Plaintiff did not intend to present her claims under federal law.