Leonard v. Golden Touch Transportation of New York, Inc.
Docket: Civ. No. 15-02084 (WHW)(CLW)
Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; November 17, 2015; Federal District Court
Flora Leonard alleges that Defendants Golden Touch Transportation of New York, United Airlines, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey are liable for her injury sustained at Newark Liberty International Airport. Leonard seeks to amend her complaint to include a new defendant, correct the spelling of United Airlines, and add a claim for her daughter, Karen Velazquez. Defendants oppose the amendment and file a cross-motion to dismiss the Port Authority from the case, asserting it owed no duty of care as an "out-of-possession commercial landlord." The Court decides to handle the cross-motion to dismiss without oral argument, ultimately denying it. Leonard's injury occurred on August 6, 2014, while she was boarding a shuttle bus operated by Golden Touch, which had a permit from the Port Authority. The complaint indicates she fell while trying to board the bus, cutting her leg, but does not detail the injury mechanism. Defendants assert that Golden Touch was responsible for maintenance and repairs, as per the privilege permit, and should indemnify the Port Authority for any negligence claims.
Plaintiff opposed Defendants' motion to dismiss on October 19, 2015, with Defendants replying on October 26, 2015. Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant demonstrates no genuine dispute exists regarding material facts, which must affect the case's outcome. A genuine dispute arises only if a rational fact-finder could favor the non-movant, who must then provide more than mere doubt regarding material facts. Both parties must substantiate their claims with specific record citations or demonstrate the other party cannot produce admissible evidence. Facts are viewed favorably for the non-moving party if a genuine dispute exists, with judges not weighing evidence at this stage. A party may file for summary judgment until 30 days post-discovery closure, and such a motion can also serve as a dismissal for failure to state a claim.
In New Jersey, to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove four elements: duty of care, breach, proximate cause, and actual damages, with the existence of duty being a legal question. A landowner generally owes a duty to invitees for business purposes to maintain a safe environment. However, New Jersey courts, following McBride v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, do not impose a duty of reasonable care on landlords who lease property to commercial tenants responsible for maintenance. This principle has been extended to situations where landlords retain control over parts of the property but do not hold a non-delegable duty to maintain the premises when the lease places that obligation on the tenant. Defendants argue that a privilege permit issued to Golden Touch for bus services at Newark Airport parallels the lease in McBride, where the landlord was found not liable due to the tenant's exclusive maintenance responsibilities.
The Defendants assert that the 2009 Privilege Permit, particularly Sections 6 and 7, mirrors provisions previously analyzed in the McBride case, warranting summary judgment. They argue that there is no material fact dispute regarding the Port Authority's assignment of rights to Golden Touch. The Plaintiff counters that factual disputes exist due to the Defendants' reliance on the 2009 permit, despite the existence of separate permits from 2010 and 2011. The Plaintiff claims these disputes could determine which permit governed the relationship at the time of the incident. However, the Defendants maintain that the relevant provisions in all three permits are identical. The Court concludes that the question of which permit was in effect is not material, as the analysis remains unchanged. The Plaintiff also raises concerns about a potential lease requirement between the City of Newark and the Port Authority, implying responsibility for maintenance at the airport. However, the Plaintiff's complaint does not reference this lease, nor do the Defendants in their dismissal motion, and the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate its relevance to the Port Authority's liability, merely expressing speculative doubt. Consequently, summary judgment is deemed appropriate. The Court finds that the Port Authority does not qualify as an out-of-possession commercial landlord as described in McBride, since the privilege permits do not grant Golden Touch exclusive possession or maintenance responsibility. The privileges allow Golden Touch to operate non-exclusively at Newark Airport without exclusive control, distinguishing this scenario from the McBride lease, which provided exclusive control over specific property. The Court notes a lack of precedent extending McBride’s protections to landlords retaining possession while granting nonexclusive operational privileges.
Courts have established that the Port Authority is held to a landlord's standard of reasonable care in leasing space to businesses at its transportation stations. The plaintiff, who was robbed while leaving a bakery at the Port Authority Bus Terminal, claims under New Jersey law that the Port Authority may have negligently failed to ensure safe premises for its invitees. The court determined that the privilege permit granted to Golden Touch does not convey any land interest, and therefore, the Port Authority owes a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff.
Defendants' argument that Section 6 of the privilege permits assigns full responsibility for maintaining the premises to Golden Touch is incorrect. Section 6(c) outlines Golden Touch’s obligations for repairs related to damages caused by its actions, while Section 6(d) requires it to maintain a first-class operation. However, these provisions do not absolve the Port Authority of its general responsibility for repairs and maintenance across the premises.
The court finds that the privilege permits do not delegate all repair and maintenance responsibilities to Golden Touch as they did in the precedent case of McBride. Additionally, the court disagrees with the Defendants' assertion that Section 7 of the privilege permits, which includes an indemnification clause, relieves the Port Authority of its duty of care. The McBride case referenced an indemnification clause but did not hinge its decision on it. Instead, subsequent cases have focused on the exclusive control of tenants over the premises as a determining factor in liability for injuries, rather than solely on indemnification clauses.
The privilege permits do not grant Golden Touch exclusive possession or sole responsibility for the premises, meaning the indemnification clause cannot absolve the Port Authority of its duty of care to the Plaintiff. An indemnification clause alone does not justify dismissing a claim, as it does not prevent the Port Authority from being found negligent. While the Port Authority may assert a cross-claim against Golden Touch based on potential liability, under New Jersey law, indemnity claims do not arise until liability is established by a judgment or payment. The Port Authority remains liable to the Plaintiff regardless of indemnification. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argues that her active attempt to board a bus at the time of her fall imposes a common carrier duty on the Port Authority, which entails a higher standard of care. However, the precedent cited does not confirm that the common carrier standard applies to the Port Authority in this context. The Court concludes that the Port Authority owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff and denies the Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Additionally, the Plaintiff’s second motion to amend the complaint is referred to Magistrate Judge Cathy L. Waldor, with a correction to a date noted in the motion.
