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United States v. Prado

Citations: 143 F. Supp. 3d 94; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146253; 2015 WL 6526834Docket: No. 15-cr-455 (JSR)

Court: District Court, S.D. New York; October 28, 2015; Federal District Court

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Defendants Javier Joaquin Alarcon Prado, Luis Armando Valencia Bautista, and Hector Valencia Bautista were apprehended by the U.S. Coast Guard while aboard a go-fast boat approximately 280 miles from Ecuador and Costa Rica, carrying over 600 kilograms of cocaine. They face charges of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). The defendants have filed motions to dismiss the charges based on statutory and constitutional grounds, to suppress their post-arrest statements, and to impose sanctions for alleged spoliation of evidence. The court has denied the motions to dismiss and for sanctions but will hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the suppression of post-arrest statements.

The defendants, all Ecuadorian nationals, did not claim to be traveling to or from the U.S. and did not provide identifying information about their boat, which had a small Ecuadorian flag emblem. The Coast Guard, after boarding the vessel, found approximately 680 kilograms of cocaine and deemed the boat a navigation hazard, resulting in its sinking. Following their apprehension, the defendants were transported to New York City, where they allege mistreatment during transit, contrary to the Government's assertion of appropriate care.

Upon arrival in New York, the defendants were arrested and provided written Miranda waivers before making incriminating statements. They challenge the constitutionality of the MDLEA's extraterritorial application, arguing it improperly extends Congressional power over maritime conduct, referencing the definition of "high seas" as established by the Second Circuit in prior cases. It is acknowledged that the defendants were interdicted outside any country's territorial waters.

Defendants contend that the high seas commence beyond a nation's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 miles from territorial waters. However, the Court notes that the defendants were interdicted 248 miles from the nearest landmass, the Costa Rican Isle de Coca, indicating they were indeed on the high seas. The defendants also claim their prosecution violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, arguing that there is insufficient nexus with the U.S. for extraterritorial application of federal criminal statutes. The Government acknowledges that the defendants were not heading to the U.S. but asserts a nexus exists due to a Congressional finding that drug trafficking at sea poses a threat to U.S. security. The Court finds this argument insufficient to meet the nexus requirement established in United States v. Yousef, emphasizing that Congress cannot bypass this requirement by broadly asserting threats to societal well-being.

Alternatively, the Government argues that the defendants' stateless vessel falls under U.S. jurisdiction without the need for a nexus, as established by precedents in United States v. Henriquez and United States v. Pinto-Mejia. The Court interprets these decisions as modifying the nexus requirement for stateless vessels, determining that prosecuting individuals on such vessels is not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. The Court highlights that stateless vessels lack the protections of any nation's laws and that it is reasonable to prosecute individuals who have renounced legal protections, as they pose a potential threat to maritime order. Furthermore, the defendants were sufficiently on notice that their drug trafficking activities, universally condemned and criminalized in multiple jurisdictions, could lead to prosecution.

Defendants argue they are not stateless under constitutional law, asserting their vessel has a valid nationality. International law, particularly as outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its predecessor, dictates that a vessel is stateless if it lacks registration with any country. The Coast Guard found no registration documents on the defendants' boat, which had few identifiable features, making it impossible to trace any registration to Ecuadorian authorities. The Court concludes the vessel is unregistered and stateless under international and constitutional law.

On statutory grounds, the defendants claim the indictment under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) should be dismissed. The MDLEA applies to vessels without nationality, requiring evidence of nationality or registry through possession of registration documents, flying a national flag, or verbal claims by the vessel's operator. The defendants did not provide evidence of valid registration documents as required by the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and made no verbal claim of nationality. Although they argue they identified as Ecuadorian, the Court finds no statutory support allowing a captain's nationality to qualify as the vessel's nationality. The statute specifically refers to the vessel's claim of nationality, not the nationality of its operator.

A nation’s interests are less engaged when a ship is detained but only some crew members are citizens of that nation. There is no requirement for the vessel to be captained by someone from its registered country. The parties dispute the interpretation of “flying [a] nation’s ensign or flag” as per statute 70502(e)(2). The Government contends that a flag must be visibly waving, while the defendants maintain that displaying an image of a flag suffices. Both sides have presented various materials for interpretation, but the Court emphasizes adherence to the statute's text, which is clear in its maritime context and references the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. The statute mandates that a vessel must signal its protection by another nation to engage U.S. procedural requirements, though actual international protection is not necessary. A vessel must provide reasonable notice to U.S. officials regarding the interests of other nations. The defendants' small emblem of the Ecuadorian flag, which is not prominently displayed, does not meet this standard. The Court concludes that the defendants were not “flying [Ecuador’s] ensign or flag” as defined in the statute. 

Additionally, the defendants seek suppression of their post-arrest statements, claiming they were involuntary and that the twelve-day delay before their appearance before a magistrate was prejudicial. They argue their treatment during transport was traumatizing and coerced them into confession, while the Government denies any mistreatment. Both parties agree that an evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve these conflicting claims.

An evidentiary hearing is scheduled for November 19 at 3:30 pm. The Court will address one aspect of the defendants' claim of involuntariness regarding their statements, specifically their assertion that they were not informed of their right to contact the Ecuadorian consulate under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Supreme Court has established that violations of Article 36 do not automatically warrant suppression of evidence but may factor into a broader voluntariness assessment. The defendants have not demonstrated how awareness of their rights would have influenced their post-arrest statements, nor have they claimed they would have exercised those rights. The Court deems the consular notification concern to be of minimal relevance.

Regarding the defendants' request for sanctions against the Government for spoliation of evidence by sinking the go-fast boat, the Court finds the defendants have not met the necessary criteria. Although the first element regarding exculpatory value is not addressed, the second element is not satisfied since the Government has provided sufficient video and photographic evidence to obtain comparable data. The third element, concerning bad faith, is also unmet as the Government asserts the boat was destroyed in good faith due to being a navigational hazard, supported by video evidence. Consequently, the defendants’ motions are denied, with the exception of the motion to suppress their post-arrest statements, which will be further examined in the upcoming hearing.

Defendants have raised issues regarding Ecuadorian registration numbers on the go-fast, but these numbers are not visible in the submitted evidence. The Court will allow a brief inquiry into witness testimonies related to the interdiction during the evidentiary hearing, and if contradictions arise, a motion for reconsideration will be permitted.