Mervyn v. Nelson Westerberg, Inc.

Citations: 142 F. Supp. 3d 663; 2015 WL 6792104Docket: 11 C 6594

Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; October 30, 2015; Federal District Court

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In the class action lawsuit against Nelson Westerberg, Inc., Newesco, Inc., Nelson Westerberg International, and Atlas Van Lines, Thomas Mervyn alleges violations of 49 C.F.R. 376.12 and common law unjust enrichment. The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, except for claims seeking disgorgement, restitution, or constructive trust related to the 376.12 claims. Following a motion for summary judgment by the defendants, the court granted Mervyn additional discovery and ultimately denied the renewed summary judgment motion. 

Key issues addressed included whether 376.12 solely governs lease content or also mandates compliance, and the viability of the unjust enrichment claim alongside a written agreement. The court denied summary judgment on the breach of lease issue, citing the defendants' non-compliance with Local Rule 56.1, which requires parties to reference Local Rule 56.1 statements rather than directly citing record materials. The court reiterated that this citation practice is consistently enforced in the district to streamline summary judgment proceedings. The defendants’ request to reconsider the Local Rule 56.1 ruling was noted, but the court affirmed the established requirement for proper citation.

The Court emphasizes that legal memoranda must cite the Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact, not raw record materials. Numerous cases illustrate this requirement, indicating that failures to adhere to this practice are improper. Plaintiffs' motion outlines copyright infringement elements but lacks citations to specific statements of fact, relying instead on evidentiary exhibits, which is deemed inappropriate. The Court points out that both parties repeatedly violated Local Rule 56.1 by citing directly to the record in their summary judgment briefs. Specific examples include improper citations to the record concerning bankruptcy considerations and other factual assertions. The Court reiterates that citations should only reference the numbered paragraphs of the Local Rule 56.1 statements, which then link to relevant record portions. Overall, the Court finds these citation practices materially improper and contrary to established procedural rules.

An exception is made regarding the Defendants' claim that the interpretation of Local Rule 56.1 is unique. The interpretation is supported by established decisions from prominent judges in the District, including the current and former chief judges, and is rooted in the precedent set by Malec v. Sanford, which emphasizes the necessity for parties to reference Local Rule 56.1 statements instead of directly citing record materials. This requirement is well-known among litigants, including pro se parties, as evidenced by their compliance in summary judgment motions. The enforcement of this requirement aims to facilitate the court's understanding of fact-intensive arguments, as Local Rule 56.1 statements serve as a critical link between the record and the parties' legal positions. 

Ignoring these statements, as FirstMerit did by citing raw evidence instead, undermines the purpose of Local Rule 56.1, requiring the court to sift through numerous exhibits to verify claims. The failure to cite Local Rule 56.1 statements forces the court into a burdensome search for disputed facts, thereby diminishing the statements' intended utility as a consolidated source of factual information relevant to summary judgment. Both parties are expected to adhere to this rule, as non-compliance can lead to the denial of motions. The court reinforces the importance of strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1, rejecting Defendants' assertions that prior case law contradicts this interpretation.

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant in Sojka, as the plaintiff presented his tort theories solely in his Local Rule 56.1 response rather than in his brief. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed this decision, stating that a litigant is not required to repeat facts in both the statement of facts and the memorandum of law to demonstrate a factual dispute. The court highlighted that the plaintiff's brief did reference his tort theories and cited Local Rule 56.1 statements rather than the record itself, which did not constitute a violation of the rule. 

Defendants, instead of pursuing reconsideration, requested permission to file a revised summary judgment motion, which the court granted. The court acknowledged that the issues regarding whether the defendants breached the lease are relevant not only to summary judgment but also to potential jury instructions if the case proceeds to trial. The court determined that addressing these issues promptly would be more efficient and could prevent unnecessary trial matters. Defendants are allowed to submit a revised summary judgment motion focused solely on the breach of lease issue by November 21, 2015. The motion for reconsideration was denied, while the request for a revised motion was approved.