Moore v. CVS Rx Services, Inc.

Citations: 142 F. Supp. 3d 321; 32 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 407; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147300; 2015 WL 6692266Docket: No. 4:14-cv-01318

Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania; October 30, 2015; Federal District Court

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Defendant CVS Rx Services, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiff Nicole L. Moore’s lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is granted due to the absence of genuine disputes of material fact. 

Plaintiff was employed as a "picker" at CVS's Chemung Distribution Center starting in June 2011, with job requirements including frequent medium-heavy lifting (1-20 lbs) and occasional very heavy lifting (up to 75 lbs), alongside constant physical activities such as bending, reaching, and climbing. Plaintiff confirmed the demanding nature of her job, noting the high frequency of climbing and lifting.

During her pregnancy in early 2012, Plaintiff experienced several medical issues, including round ligament syndrome, which significantly impaired her ability to perform her job functions. A certification from her OB/GYN in March 2012 indicated that while she could perform some work, she was unable to climb or lift overhead, rendering her unable to fulfill her job requirements. 

Plaintiff submitted her first accommodation request after being placed on bedrest by her doctor on February 19, 2012, which she communicated to Human Resources on February 20, 2012. However, she was informed that a transfer to another position was not feasible, as her current role was classified as light duty.

Plaintiff asserts that the Human Resources Department informed her that, due to her existing light-duty status, the only suitable accommodation was temporary leave, which she needed to apply for to avoid termination. Following this advice, Plaintiff called to request leave on February 20, 2012, for the period from February 10 to February 28, 2012. On March 9, 2012, Defendant notified her that sufficient documentation for her leave was missing. After her OB/GYN submitted the required certification on March 13, 2012, Defendant approved her initial leave and a subsequent extension until April 16, 2012. Further extensions were granted based on updated medical documentation, first extending the leave to May 23, 2012, then to June 22, 2012, and finally to August 2, 2012. Following additional health issues, another extension was approved through August 12, 2012, leading to a total of at least five extensions for her initial leave. During this time, Plaintiff received short-term disability payments, as evidenced by her 2012 W-2 forms, reflecting payments of $684.96 and $2,318.80 for “third-party sick pay.”

After returning to work on August 13, 2012, Plaintiff experienced postpartum depression and requested intermittent leave on September 24, 2012. She was informed that such leave was not available and opted for family bonding leave instead. Defendant approved her continuous leave for baby bonding from September 24 to September 30, 2012, with subsequent extensions granted on October 2, 3, 11, and 18, 2012, extending her leave to October 21, 2012.

On October 24, 2012, the Defendant granted the Plaintiff a leave extension to the same date. Subsequent requests were approved for extensions on October 26 (to October 29), October 31 (to October 31), November 2 (to November 4), November 6 (to November 6), November 8 (to November 7), November 10 (to November 12), November 12 (to November 13), November 16 (to November 18), and November 19 (to November 25), resulting in fourteen extensions by December 3, 2012. On that date, the Defendant acknowledged a request for medical leave from November 26 to December 9 and required a completed healthcare provider certification form within fifteen days. On December 16, 2012, Plaintiff's nurse practitioner submitted the form, indicating that the Plaintiff could perform her job and required intermittent leave due to follow-up appointments. The form stated that the Plaintiff could not return to her normal work schedule until December 31, 2012, contrary to her initial request for leave until December 9. The Plaintiff acknowledged understanding the definitions of "continuously" and "intermittently" regarding her leave request.

On December 20, 2012, Defendant notified Plaintiff that her leave request documentation was incomplete, citing conflicting information regarding her continuous health leave starting from November 26, 2012, and the need for verification of her return date by a doctor. On December 28, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a second certification form from her nurse practitioner, which reaffirmed that she could perform her job and required only intermittent leave, with an estimated return date of December 31, 2012. On January 3, 2013, Defendant sent another letter indicating the documentation remained conflicting and required a completed certification form within seven days to avoid denial of her leave request. Plaintiff acknowledged the documentation issues. Despite these complications, on January 9, 2013, Defendant approved her leave through December 30, 2012, and requested an extension certification within fifteen days. On January 28, 2013, Defendant sent a reminder due to non-receipt of the required documentation and reiterated the potential denial of her leave if not submitted within seven days. Plaintiff attempted to contact her doctor that same day but could not obtain the certification due to the doctor's vacation. Later that day, Human Resource Manager Deborah W. Montrose directed the termination of Plaintiff's employment, believing her leave had ended and that Plaintiff failed to respond to documentation requests. Montrose, having been in her position for only five months, admitted she was still learning the leave of absence processes.

Montrose testified that she was not aware of Plaintiff's request for a leave extension and stated in a sworn affidavit that on January 28, 2013, she directed Human Resources to send a termination letter to Plaintiff, Nicole Moore, without reviewing any medical documentation or knowing about her disability. Montrose's decision was based solely on information from the leave department indicating that Moore's leave had expired and her knowledge that Moore had not returned to work. Plaintiff contends that the termination letter indicated that a critical decision point had been reached due to her disability. She argues that there is a material fact dispute regarding whether Montrose reasonably believed Moore had exhausted her leave. Plaintiff suggests that Montrose was motivated by discriminatory intent, as she was aware of Moore's pregnancy when ordering the termination and failed to inform Moore that the termination was a mistake.

Montrose stated in her deposition that she did not contact Moore because she believed communication was already occurring between Moore and the leave department regarding required documentation for her leave extension. It is undisputed that Moore called the leave department on the day she received her termination letter, asking whether she should submit supporting documentation despite the termination. The leave department advised her to proceed with the submission and Moore requested an extension of her leave until February 4, 2013, due to her doctor's vacation and lost paperwork.

On February 5, 2013, the leave department sent Moore a reminder letter indicating that supporting documentation had not been received and warned that failure to supply the required information within seven days could result in the denial of her leave request and separation from employment. Moore responded by checking on her healthcare provider's certification status, which was subsequently submitted on February 8, 2013. The certification indicated that Moore could perform her job but did not specify whether her absence would be continuous or intermittent; instead, it noted that she would need to be away from work three to four times a year for doctor’s appointments.

Plaintiff's nurse practitioner confirmed on February 11, 2013, that she could resume her regular work schedule. Plaintiff acknowledged that her leave request was for continuous leave. On February 13, 2013, Defendant issued a letter indicating that the documentation submitted for her leave extension was incomplete, specifically noting conflicting information in the third certification form that did not support her request. The letter warned that failure to provide the necessary information within seven days could lead to a denial of her leave and potential termination of employment benefits. A similar letter was sent on February 20, 2013, reiterating the incompleteness of the documentation and the risks involved. In response, Plaintiff's nurse practitioner submitted a fourth certification form on February 22, 2013, which differed from the third only in that it indicated a request for intermittent leave. Defendant's representative did not compare this new form to previous submissions or verify if earlier deficiencies had been addressed. During her deposition, Plaintiff confirmed that no comparisons were made regarding the certification forms. On February 25, 2013, Plaintiff learned from a phone call with Defendant’s Leave of Absence Department that her leave was only approved until December 30, 2012, and that she was mistakenly seeking continuous leave despite her documentation indicating intermittent leave.

Plaintiff communicated with Defendant's Leave of Absence Department regarding her leave status, indicating a preference for continuous leave despite her nurse practitioner certifying her for intermittent leave. This inconsistency raised concerns for Defendant about the validity of Plaintiff's leave certifications. On February 25, 2013, Defendant contacted Plaintiff's nurse practitioner's office to clarify the discrepancies, but the office refused to share information. Plaintiff was advised on February 28 to submit her certification form despite receiving a termination notice. On March 6, Defendant's Leave of Absence Department left a message stating that updated paperwork for an extension had not been received and that they had contacted Human Resources to halt her termination. However, on March 11, Plaintiff received a letter denying her leave extension request due to insufficient documentation, which also indicated that any absences were unauthorized, effectively terminating her employment. Plaintiff admitted she did not submit the necessary documentation, relying instead on her medical providers. Subsequently, on July 10, 2014, she filed a Complaint alleging three ADA claims: failure to accommodate, discriminatory termination, and retaliation. Defendant moved for summary judgment on April 27, 2015, and Plaintiff later withdrew her retaliation claim, leading to its dismissal with prejudice. The court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, determining that no genuine disputes of material fact existed to preclude judgment. Summary judgment is warranted when the movant demonstrates the absence of genuine factual disputes and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

A defendant successfully meets the standard for summary judgment by demonstrating a lack of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s case. Conversely, a plaintiff must provide admissible evidence sufficient to establish all elements of a prima facie case under applicable law. Speculation does not create genuine factual disputes; instead, it misrepresents issues, which summary judgment aims to clarify. The summary judgment rule is designed to eliminate unsupported claims or defenses, emphasizing the need for a fair-minded jury to potentially rule in favor of the plaintiff based on the presented evidence. The presence of minimal evidence is inadequate; there must be substantial evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.

The judge's assessment during summary judgment motions involves determining whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to support a verdict for the plaintiff. The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine material fact issues, using evidence from pleadings, depositions, and affidavits. The motion may still be granted without affidavits if the existing record meets the summary judgment standard outlined in Rule 56(c). To counter a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present genuine factual disputes that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either side, supported by evidence that surpasses mere allegations. Assertions of fact being disputed must be substantiated by specific references to the record, showing that the materials presented do not resolve the issue of genuine dispute or that the opposing party lacks admissible evidence.

Failure to support or address factual assertions as required by Rule 56(c) results in those facts being considered undisputed for summary judgment motions (Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(e)(2)). Courts primarily rely on cited materials but may also consider additional record materials (Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(c)(3)). The role of the judge at this stage is to identify genuine issues for trial rather than to weigh evidence or determine the truth (Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249). A genuine issue for trial exists only if sufficient evidence favors the nonmoving party to allow a jury verdict for them; if the evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment can be granted (Id. at 249-50). In employment discrimination cases, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, they must counter the defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions with evidence that supports a reasonable inference of either disbelief in those reasons or that discrimination was a likely motivating factor. This requires the plaintiff to show weaknesses or contradictions in the employer's reasons that a reasonable factfinder could deem unworthy of credence. Merely demonstrating that the employer's decision was mistaken is insufficient; the focus must be on discriminatory motivation (Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65).

The defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim is granted. Under the ADA, "qualified individuals" with disabilities can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation (42 U.S.C. 12112(a), 12111(8)). Failure to provide reasonable accommodations, unless it imposes undue hardship on the employer, constitutes discrimination (42 U.S.C. 12112(5)(A)).

An employer may breach its duty to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA if it fails to engage in good faith during the interactive process. This can be established by demonstrating that: 1) the employer was aware of the employee’s disability; 2) the employee requested accommodations; 3) the employer did not make a genuine effort to assist in finding accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith. Reasonable accommodations may include making existing facilities accessible, job restructuring, modified work schedules, reassignment to vacant positions, and adjustments to examinations or training materials. Reassignment is considered a last resort and should only occur when other accommodations would impose undue hardship. The employee must seek an existing position rather than require the creation of a new one. Effective communication between the employer and employee is essential, necessitating an informal interactive process to identify the employee's limitations and explore potential accommodations.

‘Reasonable accommodation’ entails the employer's obligation to assist and communicate in good faith with the employee. The Third Circuit, in Mengine v. Runyon, outlined that while an employer is not required to create a job for a disabled employee, there is a duty to reassign nonprobationary employees unable to perform essential job functions, barring undue hardship. The employee must demonstrate the feasibility of accommodation by showing available, funded positions they are capable of performing, either with or without reasonable accommodation, at an equivalent level to their former job.

The interactive process does not mandate specific concessions from the employer, nor does it absolve the employee from proving that a rejected accommodation would have qualified them for the job's essential functions. Employers must engage in good-faith efforts to seek accommodations but are not obligated to provide a specific accommodation if another reasonable option is available. They hold the discretion to select among effective accommodations, prioritizing those that are less costly or easier to implement. 

In claims of failure to accommodate, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer refused a proposed reasonable accommodation. Additionally, an employer cannot be held responsible for the failure of the interactive process if it was caused by the employee's actions or inactions. In the current case, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's offer of short-term disability leave instead of modifying her job responsibilities related to climbing and lifting during and after her pregnancy constituted a violation of the ADA.

Plaintiff claims her decision to take short-term disability leave was influenced by Defendant's failure to engage adequately in the interactive process regarding her accommodation requests. She requested a position transfer during her pregnancy, which was denied on the grounds that the "picking" job was classified as light duty. Plaintiff argues that she was aware of another employee receiving a transfer for pregnancy-related reasons and was threatened with termination if she did not take a leave of absence. Additionally, she asserts that accommodations could have been made during her postpartum depression if she had been isolated from interactions with others.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant did not properly engage in the interactive process, citing conflicting medical documentation. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff was unable to perform essential functions of her job due to pregnancy-related complications, as corroborated by her OB/GYN. Although she could perform some work, she could not fulfill the requirements of her job, which included lifting and climbing. When discussing her potential accommodation options, Plaintiff acknowledges that her current position was already light duty, making temporary leave a logical choice.

The Court emphasizes that many individuals seeking accommodations under the ADA would find temporary leave acceptable. It also highlights legal precedents indicating that while extended leave may be a reasonable accommodation, it cannot be indefinite or open-ended. The ADA does not mandate that employers provide unlimited disability leave.

Federal courts have recognized that granting a leave of absence can serve as a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), provided it enables the employee to eventually perform essential job functions. However, a blanket requirement for such leave is not mandated by the ADA if the employee cannot fulfill essential responsibilities during the absence. In the case examined, the employer allowed the plaintiff to take a paid leave of absence for pregnancy-related complications, extending it multiple times contingent on proper documentation. The plaintiff received short-term disability payments while on leave and the employer's accommodation exceeded what federal courts typically require under the ADA.

The plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim primarily revolves around whether the employer was obligated to transfer her to a different position or create a new role during her recovery. It was determined that the employer had no such obligation. The plaintiff suggested two theories: that another employee was transferred and that a new role should have been created to minimize interactions with others during her postpartum depression. The court found these suggestions vague and lacking the necessary clarity and feasibility required for reasonable accommodations, emphasizing that the burden lies on the employee to demonstrate that such accommodations are possible and that any rejected accommodations would enable them to perform the essential job functions.

Plaintiff's deposition revealed she could only identify one employee, Michelle Filer, who was allegedly transferred due to pregnancy, and her knowledge was based on hearsay. Plaintiff mentioned that Filer was accommodated and transferred to a different department without a job posting, claiming Filer “bragged” about the transfer. Defense counsel questioned Plaintiff about the specifics of Filer’s situation, highlighting her lack of knowledge regarding Filer’s work responsibilities and whether Filer had any disabilities other than pregnancy. In contrast, the Human Resources Manager, Deb Montrose, provided an affidavit stating that Filer performed her stocker position without accommodations and was not transferred as an accommodation for pregnancy.

The Court noted a discrepancy in Plaintiff's argument concerning the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, which discusses creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding discrimination. The Court found that Plaintiff's comparison of her situation to Filer's did not logically support an inference of discrimination based solely on pregnancy, suggesting there may be other distinguishing factors between the two employees. Additionally, the Court indicated that Plaintiff's failure to engage adequately in the interactive process may have contributed to her situation, and she did not raise a triable issue regarding discrimination.

Ms. Filer failed to provide evidence of alternative light-duty positions at the Defendant's Chemung facility that were vacant during the relevant time frame, which undermines her claim for reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Her request for the creation of a new position to isolate her during postpartum depression exceeds what is deemed "reasonable" under the ADA. Case law supports that requiring an employer to transfer an employee to avoid stress from coworkers is impractical and not a reasonable accommodation. Ms. Filer acknowledged that her depression impaired her ability to perform her job, further justifying the conclusion that her request for isolation was unreasonable and not a feasible way to maintain her employment. The purpose of ADA accommodations is to enable employees to continue their roles with necessary adjustments, not to compel employers to create new positions or hold vacancies open indefinitely. Her claim essentially hinges on the lack of her desired accommodation, which is not sufficient for an ADA claim, as employers are permitted to choose among effective accommodations.

Federal courts exhibit restraint regarding an employer's choice of accommodations, acknowledging the deference owed to business managers' operational insights. In the case of *Solomon v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia*, the Third Circuit upheld a decision favoring the School District after Sharyn Solomon claimed inadequate accommodation for her back issues. Solomon requested a first-floor room but was offered elevator access instead, which the court found sufficient. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of her motion for a new trial, emphasizing the reasonableness of the accommodation.

In the current case, the Plaintiff similarly failed to establish a genuine dispute regarding the Defendant's accommodation efforts, resulting in summary judgment for the Defendant. Regarding the interactive process, the Defendant demonstrated good faith and engaged in extensive communication, estimated at thirty exchanges, with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's claim of inadequate engagement was undermined by documented communications from the first accommodation request in early 2012 through her failure to provide necessary medical documentation by early 2013. The court concluded that while quality of communication is paramount, the volume of exchanges indicated sufficient engagement, thereby addressing the Plaintiff's claims comprehensively.

The Court found that the Defendant's Leave Department made significant efforts to accommodate the Plaintiff's requests under the ADA, granting fourteen leave extensions and engaging in at least thirty communications with the Plaintiff. These communications included explanations of documentation deficiencies and guidance on how to correct them. The Court emphasized that both employer and employee must act in good faith during the interactive process and determined that the Defendant fulfilled its obligation to seek accommodations. The Plaintiff's failure to provide adequate documentation from her nurse practitioner ultimately led to her inability to engage meaningfully with the Defendant. The Court clarified that an employer cannot be expected to possess clairvoyance regarding an employee’s needs, and thus the Plaintiff's lack of communication and information fell solely on her. Consequently, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, concluding that there was no genuine dispute regarding the Defendant's good faith engagement in the interactive process. Additionally, the Court granted summary judgment on the Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim, asserting that the Defendant demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding the Plaintiff’s termination related to her disability.

The central issue in the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim revolves around causation—specifically, whether the plaintiff was terminated due to her disability. Causation is a critical factor in employment discrimination cases based on disability, serving two functions: it is part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case and is also used to assess whether the defendant's stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination. The Third Circuit employs the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which consists of three stages: the plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination; if successful, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination; and finally, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the reason is a pretext for discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff throughout the process.

The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the plaintiff's failure to establish her prima facie case, noting that the defendant had provided a legitimate justification for the termination, which the plaintiff did not successfully challenge as pretextual. To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) she is a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) she is qualified to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action due to discrimination. The parties concur that certain pregnancy-related complications, such as round-ligament syndrome and postpartum depression, are considered disabilities under the ADA, though pregnancy itself is not classified as a qualifying disability.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' claims of 'pregnancy-related complications' can potentially support an ADA claim, despite pregnancy itself not being classified as a disability under the ADA or PHRA. However, the Plaintiff did not sufficiently demonstrate that she experienced an "adverse employment decision" or that any adverse action was due to discrimination. The main argument concerning adverse action is that her employment privileges, specifically the leave policy, were disrupted by receiving a termination letter and the Defendant’s lack of follow-up. The Court clarifies that the termination letter, sent on January 28, 2013, did not impact her employment privileges since she remained on leave and communicated with the Defendant’s Leave of Absence Department thereafter. The Plaintiff’s assertion that she believed her employment was terminated upon receiving the letter is countered by her immediate inquiry to the Department about submitting documentation for her leave, which they confirmed she should still provide. The Court emphasizes that a terminated employee would not require leave extensions or instructions to submit documentation. Additionally, the Court references the Weisel case, where the plaintiff's belief of termination was rejected based on clear communications indicating she had not been terminated. The Court, therefore, concludes that there is no reasonable belief that the Plaintiff's employment was terminated based on the circumstances presented.

Plaintiff was not terminated for any reason related to her disabilities, as established by Defendant's email, which indicated that continued employment relied on Plaintiff contacting her employer. The Court determined that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of adverse actions connected to her disabilities, as required under the ADA. To establish a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that their disability influenced the employer's decision-making process and had a determinative impact on the outcome. Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant reached a “breaking point” due to her leave requests lacked supporting evidence; rather, the record indicated a willingness to accommodate her as long as proper documentation was provided. Additionally, Montrose, who initiated the termination process, stated she did not review any medical documentation concerning Plaintiff nor was she aware of her disability. Montrose's decision was based solely on information about Plaintiff's expired leave and her absence from work. The Court emphasized that an employer cannot be presumed to have discriminated against an employee for a condition of which it was unaware, as knowledge of the disability is crucial to a prima facie case of discrimination. While the Court could dismiss the case based on this failure alone, it also considered Defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination—Montrose's belief that Plaintiff's leave had expired and her failure to return to work. At this stage, the employer’s burden is minimal, requiring only a legitimate reason for the adverse action without needing to prove that the reason was the actual motivation behind it.

The court concluded that the Defendant met its burden of articulation by establishing that Montrose decided to terminate the Plaintiff not due to her disabilities, but because she failed to provide necessary documentation to extend her leave and did not return to work. The court evaluated whether this nondiscriminatory rationale was a mere pretext for discrimination. To demonstrate pretext, the Plaintiff needed to present evidence that could lead a reasonable factfinder to either disbelieve the employer's stated reasons or believe that a discriminatory motive was more likely. The Plaintiff must show that the employer's reason was not just incorrect but so obviously flawed that it couldn't be the real reason for the termination.

The court referenced a precedent where slight inconsistencies regarding the decision-maker did not indicate pretext, and affirmed that the Plaintiff in this case had not shown that the employer's reasons for termination were implausible or unworthy of belief. The Plaintiff's narrative suggested a spiteful motive behind the termination, but the court found insufficient factual support for this claim. It largely accepted Montrose's testimony, which indicated her decision was based on the belief that the Plaintiff had exhausted her leave and failed to reapply properly. The court noted that Montrose's position in Human Resources did not involve daily leave determinations, reinforcing the Defendant's credibility regarding the justification for the termination. Overall, the court found no genuine dispute to preclude summary judgment in favor of the Defendant.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant's justification for termination was so flawed as to lack credibility, as established in the case law. Summary judgment was affirmed in prior cases where plaintiffs could not provide evidence to suggest that discrimination was the more likely cause of their dismissal, particularly in contexts where decision-makers disagreed on qualifications without indicating discrimination. In the current case, the plaintiff did not present facts to suggest a pattern of anti-pregnancy discrimination within the defendant's practices. Testimonies indicated that no negative comments were made about disabilities by the defendant's employees. The defendant's extensive efforts to accommodate the plaintiff, including multiple leave extensions and communications, undermined claims of discrimination. The court emphasized that while disputes of fact may exist, they must be genuine to prevent summary judgment. Unsupported narratives about discriminatory intent are insufficient. The court noted the importance of avoiding credibility determinations at this stage but affirmed that claims without genuine disputes of material facts could be dismissed. The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate in this instance, referencing historical precedents that underscore the importance of this legal remedy. An order will follow.

On October 30, 2015, the court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, resulting in a final judgment in favor of the Defendant and the closure of the case. The court interpreted Dr. Lubell’s unclear handwriting regarding bedrest as advising "thru" February 20, 2012, due to the absence of an end date. Although the Defendant could not approve Plaintiff's leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) due to her not meeting the 12-month service requirement, it did allow her leave under state provisions and company policies. The Defendant sent a letter approving a continuous leave of absence for maternity, which Plaintiff claimed she did not receive, despite receiving other documents. The court noted a common law presumption that mailed items are received by the addressee. Additionally, the court highlighted inconsistencies between undisputed facts and allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, particularly that she did not receive any notice regarding the violation of disability leave policies or job jeopardy during her medical leave. The court reminded Plaintiff of the obligation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) for attorneys to conduct reasonable inquiries before filing. It was confirmed that CVS Rx Services, Inc. is a "covered entity" under the relevant statute. The court referenced precedents indicating that interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act regarding "reasonable accommodation" are applicable to the ADA. Employers demonstrate good faith by engaging with employees about their accommodation requests and considering alternatives. Lastly, the court noted that another employee, Sue Tolan, was terminated for performance issues, not pregnancy, after receiving multiple counseling sessions.