Court: District Court, E.D. New York; October 28, 2015; Federal District Court
A second superseding indictment filed by Senior District Judge Glasser charges the Defendant with multiple offenses, including:
- Count One: sex trafficking a child under 14 (18 U.S.C. 1591)
- Counts Two and Three: sex trafficking a child under 18 (18 U.S.C. 1591)
- Count Four: promoting prostitution (Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952)
- Count Five: sexual exploitation of a child (18 U.S.C. 2251)
- Count Six: possessing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252)
- Counts Seven and Ten: illicit transportation of a minor (18 U.S.C. 2423)
- Counts Eight and Eleven: transporting persons in interstate commerce for prostitution (18 U.S.C. 2421)
- Counts Nine and Twelve: interstate prostitution (18 U.S.C. 2422)
The Defendant motions to dismiss Counts Four and Seven through Twelve on grounds of violating Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires clarity in the indictment. Additionally, the Defendant seeks to dismiss Counts One through Three on the basis that the statute 18 U.S.C. 1591 is unconstitutionally overbroad and argues for insufficient scienter in those counts. The Defendant also requests a bill of particulars and to strike surplusage from the indictment.
The court finds merit in some of the claims regarding the sufficiency of Counts Four and Seven through Twelve, particularly in the context of the indictment's failure to adequately cite the applicable state law or to detail the underlying conduct. The indictment's specifications for Counts Seven through Twelve align with federal statutes but replace "or" with "and," which could create ambiguity. Count Four alleges the use of the Internet to promote unlawful activities involving prostitution in New York, but the Defendant contends that the phrase "sexual activity for which a person could be charged" lacks definition, encompassing various potential state and federal crimes. The court grants the motion to dismiss in part, without prejudice, indicating that further clarification may be necessary.
The government’s evidence may include allegations of sexual relationships involving the defendant and two individuals, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. The defendant asserts he requires clarity on whether charges pertain to transporting women for prostitution or other sex crimes. He argues that Count Four lacks specificity due to the variety of prostitution-related offenses in New York. The government contends that the defendant's request is essentially for a bill of particulars, which he is not entitled to, and emphasizes that all counts cite violations of New York Penal Law Articles 130 and 230, as well as relevant Maryland and Pennsylvania laws regarding sexual offenses and prostitution. The government also indicated it plans to present evidence related to prostitution and statutory rape during the trial but has not detailed what was shown to the grand jury.
The excerpt further elaborates on the constitutional role of grand jury indictments under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, emphasizing their functions: informing the accused of charges, preventing double jeopardy, and ensuring no one is tried for serious crimes without a grand jury indictment. Typically, indictments need only align with statutory language and provide a general timeframe and location of the alleged crime, while also offering sufficient factual detail to prevent the prosecution from introducing unconsidered facts. The Second Circuit has historically declined to dismiss charges based on specificity issues unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice.
An indictment that lacks essential information necessary for a defendant's defense can be remedied by a motion for a bill of particulars. However, a defective indictment that fails to adequately allege an essential element cannot be corrected by such a bill. For example, in *Gonzalez*, an indictment was dismissed for not specifying the quantity of drugs, a critical element of the charge. Similarly, in *Awan*, the indictment was found insufficient for not detailing the type of material support in a conspiracy charge. The Supreme Court case *Bussell* emphasized that the indictment must specify facts central to the prosecution, rather than merely repeating statutory language. Subsequent rulings clarified that this requirement applies only to elements crucial to guilt and does not necessitate detailing how every essential element is met. For instance, in *Resendiz-Ponce*, the indictment was upheld despite lacking an overt act allegation, as the concept of "attempt" inherently includes such an act. Certain statutes may require specific allegations for fairness, while others do not need to identify all participants or implicit elements. Indictments must go beyond generic terms and specify the details of the offense, as demonstrated in cases regarding fraud and controlled substances, where particular details about the alleged actions must be included.
An indictment must provide specific facts describing a particular criminal act to notify the defendant of the charges and ensure they are tried on matters considered by the grand jury. Merely citing a statute and stating that an act is "contrary to law" is insufficient; the indictment must detail the specific law violated or present sufficient factual allegations. Courts have held that when a crime depends on the violation of another statute, the indictment must identify that underlying offense. Defendants who object to indictments before trial are entitled to a more stringent review than those who wait until after trial.
In the case at hand, Counts Seven through Twelve, which charge violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2241, § 2242, and § 2243, are partially deficient because they fail to specify the particular "sexual activity" constituting a criminal offense. Indictments under § 2422 and § 2423 must either cite a specific statute or describe the particular sexual activity involved. Portions of the indictment are dismissed without prejudice, while the remaining parts, including those related to prostitution offenses, are deemed sufficient. The court emphasizes that unlawful sexual activity must be described with particularity, as "sexual activity" is a generic term not defined by the statute, and specific acts underlying charges must be specified due to the statutory definition containing multiple distinct acts.
The term "for which a person could be charged with a criminal offense" is broadly interpreted and does not narrow the scope of potential crimes. References to various distinct offenses without specific descriptions do not meet the requirement of detailing a particular criminal act. An indictment must clearly state the essential elements of the crime to ensure a defendant understands the charges against them and can adequately prepare a defense. In this case, the indictment fails to inform the defendant about the need to defend against charges of statutory rape, as the reference to "sexual activity" appears limited to the victims' acts. The indictment lists various offenses related to unlawful sexual activity, yet does not specify any acts in which the defendant personally engaged. While a bill of particulars could clarify some issues, it would not address whether the grand jury was presented with evidence of statutory rape. Consequently, references to "any sexual activity for which a person could be charged with a criminal offense" in Counts Seven through Twelve are dismissed without prejudice. However, the allegations that the defendant induced Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 to engage in prostitution are deemed sufficient, as prostitution is a specific act defined under New York law. Thus, the indictment provides an adequate description of the charges related to prostitution.
Count Four adequately charges the Defendant with using the Internet to promote a prostitution business in violation of New York law, despite the Defendant's claim that the law covers various prostitution-related activities. The charge explicitly relates to a business involving prostitution, and a commonsense interpretation reveals it addresses the promotion of a prostitution enterprise involving specific individuals, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. The Court emphasizes that if the Government opts to reindict, Counts Seven through Twelve must provide more detailed allegations than those currently presented. Broad references to state penal codes do not sufficiently specify a criminal act, as demonstrated in prior cases where general citations were deemed inadequate to establish a clear offense. The Court also notes that citing a statute without accompanying factual details does not fulfill the requirement to allege a crime's elements effectively. Consequently, the portions of Counts Seven through Twelve that allege inducing sexual activity or transporting individuals for such purposes are dismissed without prejudice, as they represent a vague category of crime rather than specific acts.
The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 1591 is challenged by the Defendant, who argues that the statute is overbroad and therefore invalid. This statute addresses sex trafficking of children or through means of force, fraud, or coercion, specifically prohibiting actions such as recruiting or transporting individuals for commercial sex acts. While the Defendant acknowledges that the statute does not infringe upon his own constitutional rights, he invokes the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which allows for challenges based on the potential chilling effect on others' rights to free expression. Overbreadth challenges are typically facial and can lead to significant social costs, especially when a statute has legitimate applications.
For a law to be deemed facially invalid, its application to protected speech must be both real and substantial compared to its legitimate applications. Challenges to laws that primarily regulate conduct rather than speech are rarely successful. The Defendant contends that terms like 'harbors' and 'transports' could be interpreted to restrict intimate and expressive associations protected by the First Amendment, potentially labeling various social and familial relationships as sex trafficking. However, this interpretation is dismissed as unpersuasive. The terms in question must be understood in context, aligned with the statute's primary aim to combat human trafficking, which predominantly affects women and children. The position of 18 U.S.C. 1591 within the broader legal framework regarding peonage, slavery, and trafficking indicates that it is not meant to apply to standard social or charitable interactions.
Congress established through the statute that traffickers deceive women and girls with false promises of employment in various roles, often transporting them to unfamiliar locations, thereby drawing them away from sources of support and protection. The statute's intent is clear, focusing on the traffickers rather than benevolent institutions like soup kitchens or shelters. The defendant's interpretation of the statute contradicts its purpose and could lead to unreasonable outcomes, as noted in historical case law. The statute, although criticized for being poorly drawn, is deemed facially valid, with its overbreadth considered hypothetical and unrealistic.
Regarding the sufficiency of scienter allegations in Counts One through Three, which charge sex trafficking of minors under 14 and between 14 and 18 under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the defendant claims that the charges lack adequate scienter. However, the statute explicitly states that anyone who knowingly engages in these acts, with awareness or reckless disregard of the victim's age, shall be punished accordingly. Subsection (b) outlines minimum sentences based on the victim's age, while subsection (c) specifies that the government does not need to prove the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age if the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim. Thus, a conviction can occur if the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's awareness or reckless disregard regarding the victim's age.
Punishment may be increased under subsection (b) if the Government proves that the crime involved force, fraud, or coercion, or if the victim was under 14 years old, without needing to show the defendant's awareness of the victim's age. The indictment's Counts One, Two, and Three are deemed sufficient as they allege the defendant acted with knowledge or reckless disregard regarding the victims' ages, in line with United States v. Robinson. The motion concerning these counts is denied.
Regarding Counts Nine and Twelve, the defendant requested a bill of particulars for not identifying victims; however, the Government indicated ten potential victims, rendering the motion moot. The defendant also sought to strike references to two aliases, 'Love Pimpin' and 'Legit Pimp,' from the indictment. The Government agreed to remove 'Legit Pimp' but maintained that 'Love Pimpin' is relevant and integral to the case, asserting it constitutes evidence of the defendant's involvement in the crimes charged, which includes evidence from social media posts and branding associated with the defendant's prostitution activities. Consequently, 'Love Pimpin' will not be stricken from the indictment.
Defendant's motion to dismiss is partially granted and partially denied; specifically, references to "any sexual activity for which a person could be charged with a criminal offense" in Counts Seven through Twelve are dismissed without prejudice. The motion for a bill of particulars is denied as moot. The motion to strike surplusage is also partially granted and denied, with references to "Legit Pimp" ordered to be removed from the indictment and case caption.
The relevant legal statutes include the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3)(A)(b)(i)(l)), which penalizes individuals who promote unlawful activities, including prostitution, during interstate travel. Count 1 charges the Defendant with using the Internet to facilitate a prostitution business in New York between April 2013 and January 2015.
The Illicit Transportation of a Minor statute (18 U.S.C. 2423(a)) imposes penalties for transporting minors for prostitution or other criminal sexual activities. Counts 7 and 10 accuse the Defendant of knowingly transporting minors Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in prostitution during specific periods in 2014.
The Mann Act (18 U.S.C. 2421(a)) addresses the transportation of individuals across state lines for prostitution or related offenses, with Counts 8 and 11 alleging the Defendant transported Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 for these purposes during the aforementioned time frames.
Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces an individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce for prostitution or any sexual activity that is criminally chargeable shall face a fine or imprisonment for up to 20 years, according to 18 U.S.C. 2422(a). The document details two counts against the defendant for actions occurring in August and November 2014, where they allegedly persuaded individuals to travel across state lines for prostitution and other criminal sexual activities. It references a superseding indictment in the Southern District of New York that successfully overcame a challenge by citing specific New York Penal Laws pertaining to nonconsensual sexual conduct and statutory rape. The excerpt illustrates a legal principle where Congress has allowed for enhanced penalties based on specific circumstances without requiring proof of the defendant's knowledge regarding those circumstances. This aligns with precedent in drug-related cases where knowledge of drug type or quantity is not necessary for conviction if the defendant was directly involved in the drug transaction. Additionally, it notes that the imposition of penalties under 18 U.S.C. 1591(b) for crimes involving minors reflects established legal standards for sex crimes against individuals under 14 years of age.
