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Marcin v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance
Citations: 138 F. Supp. 3d 14; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140061; 2015 WL 5996341Docket: Civil Action No. 13-1308 (ABJ)
Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; October 14, 2015; Federal Appellate Court
Jill Marcin has been involved in litigation since 2010 against Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company and the Mitre Corporation Long Term Disability Insurance Program, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Reliance denied her disability benefits claim on three occasions, but the Court previously remanded the case for further review, finding that Reliance's justifications for denial were inadequate. On May 29, 2015, Reliance issued another denial, asserting Marcin was capable of full-time work when her coverage ended. However, the Court determined that there was insufficient evidence to support this conclusion, leading to a judgment in favor of Marcin. Importantly, the Court clarified that this ruling does not equate to a finding of total disability but rather indicates that Reliance's denial was unreasonable. The background details include Marcin's serious medical diagnoses beginning in November 2005, her partial return to work in November 2007, and her complete cessation of work on February 15, 2008. She applied for disability benefits on March 25, 2008, after claiming her last working day was August 19, 2007. Reliance initially denied her claim in June 2008 and affirmed this denial in September 2009. In May 2010, the Social Security Administration recognized her as disabled since August 20, 2007. Marcin's counsel submitted this decision to Reliance, which responded that it could not reconsider the claim due to a policy that allowed only one administrative appeal, maintaining that its previous decision was final. Marcin filed a complaint on October 26, 2010, prompting both parties to seek summary judgment. On September 28, 2012, the Court denied the defendants' motion and partially granted the plaintiff's motion, remanding the case to Reliance. The Court determined that the primary issue was whether the plaintiff was unable to work when she stopped in February 2008, emphasizing that she needed to demonstrate disability before her coverage expired on March 1, 2008. Although the plaintiff had severe medical conditions, the Court noted she had not sufficiently met her burden of proof under the policy during the relevant period. Conversely, the defendants also failed to provide substantial evidence to support their claim that the plaintiff was not disabled. The Court highlighted the ambiguity surrounding Reliance's decision to deny benefits, stating it could not ascertain whether that decision was reasonable without knowing the specific grounds for it. The Court remanded the case with instructions for Reliance to clarify how the policy applied to the evidence and the basis for its decision regarding Total, Partial, or Residual Disability. On January 7, 2013, Reliance reiterated its denial of benefits, relying on the same claim file and medical consultants' opinions, and introduced a report from a vocational specialist to assess partial disability. Subsequently, on June 28, 2013, the plaintiff submitted additional materials to appeal the denial, including a Social Security Administration decision awarding her disability benefits. However, on July 24, 2013, Reliance declined to consider the appeal, asserting that the plaintiff had exhausted her entitlement to appeal under its internal guidelines. On August 28, 2013, the plaintiff filed a second complaint contesting the denial of disability benefits from January 2013. Subsequently, on November 15, 2013, she filed a motion to establish the claim record and change the standard of review from 'abuse of discretion' to de novo, citing defendants' alleged ERISA violations. Defendants argued that the plaintiff could not appeal the January 2013 denial, thus the materials from her appeal were not part of the case record, and they maintained that the standard of review should remain unchanged. On April 16, 2014, the Court partially granted the plaintiff's motion, determining that her submitted materials were part of the record since Reliance had expanded it by considering a new vocational report. The Court also deemed Reliance's refusal to consider her appeal as a denial. However, it found no evidence of bad faith from the defendants, maintaining the deferential standard of review. Defendants moved for summary judgment on July 29, 2014, and on February 24, 2015, the Court granted the motion in part. It upheld the finding that the plaintiff's coverage under the Mitre policy ended on March 1, 2008, and affirmed that the reliance on medical consultants' opinions was not unreasonable. The Court did not determine the reasonableness of the reliance on a new vocational report or the ultimate question of whether the denial of benefits was reasonable. A hearing on the remaining issues occurred on March 20, 2015, where the plaintiff submitted new legal authority regarding the Social Security Administration's determination of her disability. The Court allowed the defendants to respond to this new submission regarding the consideration of the Social Security decision in the insurer's review process. Defendants submitted a supplemental pleading on March 31, 2015, asserting that Reliance's refusal to consider the Social Security decision was reasonable. However, on April 14, 2015, the Court denied their motion for summary judgment and remanded the case back to Reliance. The Court determined that Reliance's refusal to consider the Social Security Administration’s findings was unreasonable and noted ambiguity regarding whether Reliance had adequately addressed the critical time period from November 2007 to March 1, 2008. The Court directed Reliance to reassess its denial of benefits, specifically taking into account the Social Security determination and a vocational report submitted by the plaintiff. The remand decision must clarify if the plaintiff was disabled under the policy terms during the specified period, and no new evidence could be introduced. Reliance was required to communicate its final decision by May 29, 2015, which it did by denying the claim. Subsequently, the Court allowed the plaintiff to submit a response addressing whether the denial could withstand the deferential standard of review without introducing new evidence or revisiting resolved issues. On June 29, 2015, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in response to Reliance’s final decision, which defendants countered on July 7, 2015. The case now requires the Court to evaluate whether the insurer's decision should be upheld under the applicable ERISA standard, which typically mandates a de novo review unless the plan grants discretionary authority to the administrator, in which case a deferential standard applies. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company is designated as the claims review fiduciary for the insurance policy and Plan, possessing discretionary authority to interpret the Plan and determine benefit eligibility, with binding decisions on all parties involved. The Court applies a deferential abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the benefits determination, requiring an evaluation of whether the fiduciary reasonably construed and applied the Plan. A decision should not be overturned if it follows a principled process and is supported by substantial evidence, defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Review is limited to the administrative record at the time of decision-making. The Supreme Court emphasizes the need to consider potential conflicts of interest when the administrator both evaluates and pays benefits claims, suggesting this factor becomes more significant when evidence indicates it may have influenced decisions. The Court ultimately finds that while some of Reliance's Final Decision was reasonable, the conclusion that the plaintiff could perform all material duties of her occupation during the specified period lacks substantial evidence. Reliance's decision to deny the plaintiff's disability benefits claim was deemed reasonable by the Court, which found that Reliance adequately justified its refusal to defer to the Social Security Administration's (SSA) disability determination and its rejection of the vocational report submitted by the plaintiff. Reliance concluded that the plaintiff was capable of full-time work at the time she ceased working and based this on a commissioned vocational report, the plaintiff's medical records, and independent medical reviews. However, the Court noted that the vocational report merely reiterated prior conclusions without new insights, the medical records did not substantiate full-time work capability, and Reliance had misrepresented a significant aspect of the medical reviewer’s report. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff had not worked full-time in the months leading up to her cessation of work, challenging Reliance’s determination. Consequently, it found that Reliance’s conclusion regarding the plaintiff's ability to work full-time lacked reasonable support from the administrative record, leading to the decision not being upheld. Following a prior remand, Reliance had considered the SSA's finding of disability but ultimately found it reasonable to reject it, citing different guidelines used by the SSA and noting that the plaintiff had not provided the complete claim file for review. Additionally, Reliance highlighted that the SSA’s decision relied heavily on the plaintiff's subjective complaints rather than strictly on medical evidence. The plaintiff asserted that Reliance failed to adequately pursue the documentation related to the SSA's determination. Plaintiff failed to include the Social Security Administration (SSA) record in her appeal to Reliance, and there is no authority indicating it was Reliance's duty to seek that information. The court cited Block, which states that SSA determinations are given no weight if based on unsubmitted medical reports. Consequently, Reliance rightly decided not to defer to the SSA's disability finding. In her latest appeal, plaintiff submitted various medical studies and articles, which Reliance deemed irrelevant to her ability to work as of March 1, 2008. Additionally, plaintiff alleged bias among Reliance's expert reviewers, but the court found this argument unpersuasive, allowing Reliance to disregard those claims. The insurer also determined that medical records from after March 1, 2008, were not pertinent to her disability status at that time. The court mandated Reliance to consider plaintiff's vocational report in conjunction with its own. However, Reliance rejected plaintiff's report, finding it relied on evidence postdating her eligibility window and on her subjective descriptions rather than objective evidence. The report also failed to consider the time she was capable of working. Reliance's decision not to accept plaintiff's vocational report was deemed reasonable, and its own report, which merely reiterated existing facts, was cited as supporting its denial of benefits. The court concluded that while it might not reach the same conclusion, Reliance did not abuse its discretion in its decision-making process. The report by Kate Hulsey outlines several key elements: it details the plaintiff's job responsibilities at Mitre, compares them with definitions of 'Project Engineer' and 'Computer Systems Engineer' from the Department of Labor, summarizes findings from expert witnesses Dr. Dean and Dr. Shipko, and concludes that the physical demands of the roles do not impose restrictions on Ms. Marcin, allowing her to perform her job full-time or part-time. In contrast, Reliance's vocational report merely reiterates existing evidence without introducing new information or considering the duration Ms. Marcin had worked part-time. The court finds Reliance's report insufficient as it does not contribute additional evidence to support its benefits denial. The record remains unchanged from the court's previous 2012 assessment, which indicated a lack of strong evidence from both the plaintiff and the defendants regarding disability. Although Reliance has provided a rationale for denying benefits, stating that the plaintiff could perform her job duties as of March 1, 2008, the court determines that this finding is unreasonable and cannot be upheld under the deferential review standard established by ERISA. The court clarifies that reasonableness requires a principled reasoning process backed by substantial evidence, and emphasizes that plan administrators are not required to prioritize the opinions of treating physicians over their own medical consultants. Judicial deference supports a plan administrator's decision if medical evidence is ambiguous and favors both outcomes. Reliance Insurance asserts that plaintiff was capable of full-time work as of March 1, 2008, relying on medical records from Dr. Felice, a treating physician. Notably, Dr. Felice reported on November 30, 2007, that the plaintiff might be anemic and ordered testing; on December 31, 2007, he noted mild fatigue but found the plaintiff "reasonably well;" and on February 29, 2008, he acknowledged ongoing fatigue that limited her ability to work. Importantly, Dr. Felice did not advise the plaintiff to cease working and described her condition as improving. Reliance also referenced a note from Dr. Abu-Elmagd, indicating the plaintiff reported low energy and other health issues on March 20, 2008, but found it "curious" that Dr. Abu-Elmagd did not see her until after she stopped working, questioning the validity of his support for her disability claim. Reliance concluded there was insufficient evidence to classify the plaintiff as 'totally disabled,' noting that the records indicated only mild fatigue and no discussions about stopping work. However, Reliance's decision lacked a thorough examination of additional medical records from both Dr. Felice and Dr. Abu-Elmagd, including a note that suggested the plaintiff needed to remain off work pending further testing and another form completed by Dr. Abu-Elmagd regarding her disability benefits. Dr. Abu-Elmagd assessed the plaintiff's condition, noting symptoms of extreme fatigue and frequent illness, concluding she was only capable of 'sedentary' work. He indicated that the plaintiff had not reached 'maximum medical improvement' but might do so in less than 16 months, and it was uncertain if she would fully recover. Additionally, Dr. Felice's April 14, 2008, progress note highlighted persistent fatigue as the plaintiff's main problem, along with low-grade temperatures and a new medication prescription to improve her condition. The records suggest a deterioration in the plaintiff's health from 'mild fatigue' to 'extreme fatigue' that limited her ability to work between December 2007 and March 2008. Post-March records indicated her energy was very low, she was failing to thrive, and she needed to remain off work indefinitely due to extreme fatigue and frequent illness. Although the medical evidence could support a finding of non-total disability, the records do not substantiate the conclusion that the plaintiff was capable of performing her job's material duties full-time when she ceased working. Reliance, the insurer, was not required to give deference to treating physicians' opinions; however, its selective interpretation of medical records questioned the reasonableness of its decision. Reliance leaned on the opinions of its independent expert, Dr. Dean, who reported a greater than 90% likelihood of cure related only to the plaintiff's Stage 1 kidney cancer, not her broader medical issues. Dr. Dean's conclusion that the plaintiff could perform her job's material duties was based on a narrow assessment and was misrepresented by Reliance to support its Final Decision. Plaintiff suffers from chronic portal hypertension due to thrombophilia linked to a Factor 5 Leiden mutation, which has resulted in portal vein thrombosis, hypersplenism, cytopenias, and esophageal and gastric varices, posing risks of bleeding. Dr. Dean's assessment indicates multiple diagnoses, including hypercoagulable thrombosis and renal cell carcinoma, leading to extreme fatigue and frequent illness, which prompted the plaintiff to cease full-time work. The insurer, Reliance, misrepresented Dr. Dean's report and failed to acknowledge that the plaintiff did not work full-time from November 2007 to March 2008. While the insurer noted she worked part-time during that period, it did not consider medical evidence indicating her incapacity for full-time work or address the decline in her working hours. The Court found that Reliance's decision lacked substantial evidence due to selective review of medical records, mischaracterization of Dr. Dean's findings, and failure to engage with clear evidence of the plaintiff's work history. Although Dr. Dean suggested that the plaintiff may have had the capacity for light work, this alone was insufficient to support Reliance's conclusion that she could work full-time. Reliance’s determination that the plaintiff was capable of performing all material duties of her regular occupation full-time from November 6, 2007, to March 1, 2008, is deemed unsustainable by the Court, which will enter judgment for the plaintiff. The Court does not address whether the plaintiff was "totally disabled" under the plan but finds insufficient evidence to support the plan administrator's conclusion regarding her capacity for full-time work at the time of her cessation. As a result, the denial of benefits cannot be upheld. The Court highlights that the review of the records reveals minimal support for the assertion that the plaintiff, Ms. Marcin, was unable to perform her full-time duties due to her medical conditions. Specifically, Dr. Felice’s records do not indicate a full-time work impairment, and Dr. Elmagd’s notes do not require complete work stoppage. Consequently, RSL’s conclusion that Ms. Marcin did not meet the "Total Disability" definition is upheld, implying she was also not "Partially" or "Residual" Disabled. Additionally, Ms. Marcin submitted a substantial administrative record to the Court, but only in paper form, violating local electronic filing rules. The Court acknowledges her reference to the Social Security Administration's decision and notes that insurers cannot disregard subjective evidence from claimants without adequate justification, referencing Leger v. Tribune Co. for context. Reliance also disputes a claimed misstatement of medical evidence by the SSA. The Court rejects the defendants' argument that records dated after March 2008 are irrelevant to Ms. Marcin's eligibility. It highlights that the insurer and its experts previously utilized records from May 2008 and later. Specifically, Dr. Dean, the defendants’ expert, considered records up to January 22, 2009, and Dr. Abu-Elmagd's expertise indicates that Ms. Marcin's inability to travel significant distances around her cessation of work supports her disability claim. While the Court agrees that records significantly postdating March 1, 2008, do not reflect her disability status at that time, it questions Reliance's selective consideration of records from March 20, 2008, and its failure to address others from the same period. Dr. Shipko, another expert for Reliance, concluded that Ms. Marcin was not mentally disabled when she stopped working, a finding consistent with her own mental health expert’s report. The distinction between "light" and "sedentary" work categories is noted, with Dr. Abu-Elmagd placing her in the latter. The work hours logged by Ms. Marcin leading up to her full cessation on February 18, 2008, are detailed, showing variability in her ability to work. Additionally, Reliance's critique of the plaintiff’s vocational expert for not considering her work history is seen as inconsistent, especially since Dr. Dean's assessment included observations about her travel to medical appointments, which does not necessarily correlate with her work capacity or full-time employment ability. The Court points out the inconsistency in Reliance's comments regarding her medical consultations during the relevant timeframe.