Court: District Court, S.D. New York; October 8, 2015; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs, comprising Irma Y. Drace, Dhyalma N. Vazquez, Sam Zherka, Dr. Giulio Cavallo, and the Westchester County Independence Party, have filed suit against over 90 Defendants under RICO, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) and § 1962(c). They also claim violations of the Due Process Clause, First Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause, as well as a state tort of breach of fiduciary duty by the Westchester County Board of Elections and Douglas A. Colety. Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims, and the motions were granted.
The Independence Party, a political third party in Westchester County, includes key individuals such as Drace (Treasurer), Vazquez (Vice-Chair), Zherka (District Leader), and Cavallo (Chairman). The Plaintiffs allege that a scheme orchestrated by Robert P. Astorino, the Westchester County Executive elected in 2009, involved infiltrating the Independence Party with over 4,000 individuals who did not align with its principles to manipulate the outcome of the September 2013 primary election. This scheme allegedly began in 2010, with evidence including a phone call in March 2013 where Astorino purportedly admitted to "raiding" the Party to ensure his nomination and disempower existing leadership. The registration deadline to join the Independence Party for the primary was October 12, 2012, yet the Plaintiffs claim that many new members registered just before the election, violating New York election laws.
Astorino allegedly recognized shortly after his 2009 election that he would not receive re-endorsement from Dr. Giulio Cavallo, chairman of the Westchester County Independence Party, prompting him to orchestrate a plan to infiltrate the party. Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants utilized various communication methods to deceptively portray individuals as supporters of the Independence Party, aiming to rig the outcome of the party's Primary Election. Specifically, Astorino is accused of leading a fraudulent scheme to manipulate the September 10, 2013 primary by coercing individuals to change party affiliations to the Independence Party. The Defendants purportedly included family members, county employees under Astorino's direction, and close associates, who were involved in an organized effort to register new voters and alter existing voters' party affiliations, all intended to influence the election results.
The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants breached multiple state election laws during this scheme, including making false statements as notaries, registering ineligible voters, backdating registration cards, and submitting late petitions. The latest alleged instance of improper registration occurred on October 19, 2012.
Additionally, two related lawsuits are mentioned: Rhoades v. The Westchester County Board of Elections, where Richard Rhoades sought to invalidate a write-in candidate's petition, resulting in the cancellation of several enrollments and the invalidation of the petition. In a subsequent lawsuit, Rhoades challenged party enrollments, leading to an investigation by Cavallo, which was ultimately denied by the New York Supreme Court in February 2014.
The Plaintiffs claim several injuries, including lost donations for the Independence Party, damage to the party's candidate selection process, disenfranchisement of voters, loss of county-level jobs due to unexpected election outcomes, and impairment of the Plaintiffs’ rights to associate.
The plaintiffs allege that the Independence Party of Westchester County suffered harm from a raid that impaired its fundraising capabilities, integrity, and role in the electoral process, particularly regarding candidate nominations. Key individuals, Drace and Vazquez, were reportedly terminated due to their opposition to actions taken by Astorino and Gille, with Drace's dismissal linked to her involvement in a hearing on voter disenrollment and Vazquez's dismissal following her resistance to a demotion plan for minority workers and her refusal to re-endorse Astorino for re-election. The complaint notes that Astorino retaliated by transferring Vazquez to a non-existent position before terminating her. Zherka is mentioned but has no specific claims against him and is withdrawing from the case.
Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that several defendants benefited from their involvement in the alleged scheme, receiving raises, job offers for themselves or family members, and significant monetary rewards from Astorino’s political fund.
The procedural history indicates that the plaintiffs initially filed a complaint on October 31, 2013, and subsequently amended it several times, with a significant amendment on June 24, 2014, dropping around 30 defendants. The court held multiple conferences regarding motions to dismiss and the plaintiffs’ discovery requests. The discussion includes the legal standard for dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that while detailed factual allegations are not required, plaintiffs must still provide sufficient grounds for their claims beyond mere labels or conclusory statements.
A complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to establish a right to relief that is plausible, rather than merely conceivable. If a plaintiff does not meet this standard, the complaint is subject to dismissal. The assessment of plausibility is context-dependent and requires the court to apply judicial experience and common sense. Legal conclusions are not accepted as true, and in a 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the complaint, attached documents, and items of which judicial notice can be taken.
In the context of RICO claims, plaintiffs allege violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1962(b), and 1962(d). Defendants seek dismissal, arguing that plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead the elements of a RICO claim. For a valid RICO claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (2) injury to business or property; and (3) causation linking the injury to the violation. To prove a violation, plaintiffs must establish seven elements, including the commission of two or more acts constituting a pattern of racketeering activity affecting interstate commerce. Predicate acts can include mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), but not state election fraud.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled most of these requirements. The plaintiffs argue that they have adequately alleged mail and wire fraud. The elements for both types of fraud include a scheme to defraud, the defendant’s participation, and the use of interstate wires or mails to further the scheme, with the aim of obtaining money or property through dishonest methods. The term "to defraud" implies wronging someone in their property rights through deceitful practices.
To constitute a violation of wire or mail fraud statutes, the fraudulent scheme must aim to deprive the victim of money or property. Historical interpretations by the Supreme Court highlight this requirement. In McNally v. United States, the Court overturned convictions related to a self-dealing scheme, emphasizing that the mail fraud statute protects property rights but does not cover intangible rights like the right to honest government. Subsequently, the Court clarified that intangible property rights are still protected under these statutes. In response to McNally, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346, defining schemes to deprive others of the intangible right to honest services as fraud.
The current case involves Plaintiffs alleging that Defendants used various forms of communication to defraud individuals regarding their affiliation with the Independence Party, specifically aiming to rig the 2013 Primary Election. However, the scheme fails as a RICO predicate because it does not target the deprivation of honest services or money/property. While Plaintiffs assert that some Defendants received benefits, such as raises, they do not demonstrate a breach of fiduciary duty necessary for honest services fraud. The allegations do not clarify how Astorino, identified as a Republican, had a fiduciary duty to the Independence Party, leading to a failure to establish deprivation of honest services.
Furthermore, the scheme's objective of controlling the Independence Party does not qualify as property in the victim's possession. The Supreme Court in McNally rejected broader interpretations of the fraud statutes that included schemes depriving individuals or governments of intangible rights, reaffirming that only tangible or specific intangible property rights are protected. The excerpt cites cases where mail fraud convictions were upheld for schemes undermining electoral integrity, thus establishing a clear distinction between protected property rights and the political rights of voters.
In the cases of Clapps and States, convictions were upheld not on the basis that victims lost property rights, but rather that individuals were deprived of the intangible right to an honest election. Following the McNally decision, no court has classified election rigging as money or property fraud. The plaintiffs failed to prove the necessary elements for their RICO claims since a fraudulent scheme to manipulate elections does not constitute money or property fraud as outlined in the legal precedents. The court highlighted that while a scheme to gain promotions through cheating on exams was treated as property fraud due to the government's control over financial expenditures, this reasoning does not apply to election fraud, where the electorate determines the outcome and the government merely fulfills its obligation to pay the elected official's salary. Most courts agree that obtaining a salary from an elected position cannot serve as a basis for money or property fraud. Additionally, the scheme in question would not deprive the parish of funds, as the budgeted salary is paid to the winner regardless of who that may be. Consequently, citizens do not lose money or property but only the right to elect their officials. The intangible right to honest governance, as asserted by the government, was deemed unprotected by mail fraud statutes. Ultimately, the electorate's only loss was the inability to choose their County Judge/Executive, with the salary being guaranteed by statute regardless of the election's integrity. The Second Circuit has mixed precedents regarding the salary theory in election tampering cases, with one court affirming that tampering deprives voters of their right to honest elections.
The court ruled that, following McNally, the scheme to obtain a salary and benefits of office did not equate to defrauding the public of a fair election, as the payment of a Supervisor's salary to the defendant instead of a rival did not constitute a loss of money or property under the mail fraud statute. The Second Circuit affirmed this position, focusing on the jury's general verdict without clarifying whether it was based on permissible grounds. Lower courts in the Second Circuit have suggested that the salary theory was implicitly accepted, indicating that the deprivation of the Supervisor's position and salary may be considered a property right under the statute. However, the Second Circuit has not definitively ruled on this theory. The court expressed agreement with other circuits that election fraud aimed at obtaining a salary does not amount to money or property fraud, as the government is not deprived of funds or the ability to allocate its spending. Instead, the public's right to a free election is at stake, which does not support fraud convictions related to money or property. Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to allege a valid salary theory, as their claims focused on rigging elections rather than obtaining a salary, with no direct salary associated with winning a primary election.
The Government faces challenges in proving that the defendant’s alleged scheme aimed to acquire the salary and benefits associated with being a state senator. Two district courts have acknowledged the difficulty of securing a conviction based on an intent to obtain a salary in election fraud cases. Although the Court accepts the plaintiffs' claim that property owners were misled by the defendants' fraudulent proposals, this alone does not satisfy the requirement that the property owners' funds were the object of the fraud under wire and mail fraud statutes. Moreover, while the plaintiffs assert that defendants benefited financially from their participation, they fail to demonstrate that obtaining money or property was the defendants' motive in the scheme.
Regarding the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) claims, the plaintiffs must sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity, which requires at least two related acts occurring within ten years. The plaintiffs argue that the scheme constitutes both a closed-ended and open-ended pattern of racketeering. They assert that the scheme initiated around 2010 involved numerous participants and victims aimed at taking over the Independence Party. They also contend there is a threat of future conduct that could replicate the scheme. However, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs do not adequately allege either a closed-ended or an open-ended pattern of racketeering activity as required under RICO.
To establish closed-ended continuity under RICO, the plaintiff must demonstrate a series of related predicate acts occurring over a substantial time frame. Closed-ended continuity is fundamentally a temporal concept, highlighted by the Second Circuit, which considers factors like the duration of the predicate acts, their variety, the number of participants, victims, and whether there are separate schemes. While no strict duration is mandated, the Second Circuit has indicated that a period of less than two years has never been deemed substantial. However, it is clarified that two years is not an absolute threshold, but rather, shorter durations are generally insufficient to establish closed-ended continuity. The relevant timeframe for assessing continuity is specifically the duration of RICO predicate activity, not the overall duration of the scheme or dispute.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in a coordinated effort over four years, purportedly beginning in 2010 and concluding in 2013. This assertion is largely based on a reference to a specific communication made in 2013. The plaintiffs’ argument in opposition to the motions relies heavily on this alleged timeline.
The duration of racketeering activity under RICO is determined by the specific predicate acts alleged. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (SAC) identifies potential mail fraud occurring in September and October 2012 through the mailing of registration forms containing fraudulent information. Although the SAC asserts that mail and wire fraud began in 2010, these claims are largely conclusory and lack sufficient detail to support the assertion of a continuous scheme. Specific allegations include Astorino’s alleged fraudulent activities starting in January 2010 and purported ongoing fraud until 2013. However, the court requires more than general assertions; it mandates that claims of fraud meet the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) and must demonstrate plausible continuity. Previous case law emphasizes that vague allegations do not qualify as RICO predicates. The plaintiffs' claims, despite asserting a prolonged enterprise, fail to provide concrete facts or details about specific predicate acts. While some flexibility exists for allegations based on information and belief, this cannot substitute for factual specificity, particularly in RICO cases. At oral argument, plaintiffs contended that voter registration information appended to the SAC could establish a longer pattern, but this assertion was made for the first time.
Plaintiffs’ counsel contended that cards attached to the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) showed that individuals who registered in 2010 and 2011 were purged from the Independence Party due to the Rhoades II decision. However, it was noted that the SAC does not allege these registrations were mailed or that the registrants were not genuine party members, acknowledging the possibility that some disenrolled members were legitimate. Consequently, the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any racketeering activity during that period.
Furthermore, the SAC did not adequately demonstrate an open-ended pattern of racketeering activity. To establish open-ended continuity, a threat of ongoing criminal activity beyond the time frame of the predicate acts must be shown. The nature of the enterprise and the predicate acts are crucial for this assessment. The SAC fails to assert that the alleged enterprise primarily engages in racketeering; rather, it describes the defendants' activities as running a political party and supporting a candidacy. The actions alleged do not fit the “inherently unlawful” category since fraud, which aims to obtain money or property, is not considered inherently unlawful in the RICO context. Unlike embezzlement or extortion, fraud does not imply a continuous threat of criminal activity. Even if the plaintiffs properly alleged mail and wire fraud, these acts do not suggest an ongoing threat. Thus, the plaintiffs must provide additional evidence to substantiate their claims of continuing criminal activity.
Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient facts for the Court to infer a pattern of ongoing criminal activity related to the alleged scheme to manipulate the September 10, 2013, countywide Independence Party primary elections. The scheme, primarily focused on infiltrating the Independence Party to rig election outcomes, is characterized as inherently terminable, as it had a clear endpoint with the disenrollment of 4,000 party members. Despite Plaintiffs' claims that the scheme poses a continuing threat due to unaccomplished objectives, such assertions lack factual support and are deemed speculative. Furthermore, the Court noted that the predicate acts, such as mail and wire fraud related to the repurchase of investor interests, would not persist once the available interests were depleted. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to establish either a closed-ended or open-ended pattern of racketeering activity, leading to the dismissal of their claims. Additionally, for a RICO suit, each plaintiff must demonstrate injury to their business or property causally linked to the RICO violation, a requirement that was not met in this case.
The district court's causation analysis for RICO claims requires the identification of (1) the specific property interest alleged to be protected by RICO, and (2) whether the injury to that interest resulted from a RICO violation, as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). A plaintiff must demonstrate standing by showing injury to business or property, as personal, emotional, or physical damages do not qualify for RICO recovery. Courts have consistently held that injuries such as emotional distress, character damage, and deprivation of constitutional rights are insufficient to establish RICO standing. The RICO statute allows for recovery solely for injuries to business or property, necessitating that plaintiffs assert actual, quantifiable financial loss to satisfy the injury requirement. The proximate causation analysis focuses on whether the RICO violation directly caused the plaintiffs' injuries.
Appellate courts have established that to demonstrate a RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) injury, a plaintiff must show a concrete financial loss rather than merely an injury to an intangible property interest. For instance, the loss of intangible rights, such as the right to a democratic union, does not qualify as a RICO injury. Under RICO's provisions, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), a plaintiff must be "injured in his business or property," necessitating actual financial loss that is clear and definite, not speculative. Courts have ruled that speculative losses or unprovable damages cannot form the basis for recovery under RICO.
The court finds the plaintiffs' claims of injury inadequate. The plaintiffs allege that the Independence Party suffered from a loss of donations and its ability to secure candidates sympathetic to its principles. Individual plaintiffs claim injury from their votes not counting, job losses at the county level, and impaired rights of association. However, personal and constitutional injuries, such as those claimed by individual plaintiffs, do not support a RICO claim. The alleged job losses are insufficient, as the plaintiffs failed to link these injuries to any specific RICO violation.
For example, the plaintiffs assert that certain individuals lost their jobs or were not reappointed to positions due to alleged retaliation related to their political activities. However, these claims are deemed insufficient for RICO purposes, as they lack a direct causal connection to any RICO violation.
No causal connection is established between the alleged racketeering acts and the loss of jobs, which is essential for standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). A claim is only recognized if the defendant’s actions proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, as highlighted in relevant case law including Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. and Grewal v. Cuneo, where claims were dismissed due to lack of standing. The plaintiffs’ injuries were characterized as retaliatory actions for opposing the alleged scheme, but such retaliation does not constitute a cognizable RICO injury. Prior rulings indicate that loss of employment due to reporting or refusing to participate in racketeering does not provide sufficient standing under RICO.
Furthermore, the allegations concerning the Independence Party are also insufficient. The claim that the Party has been unable to secure typical donations lacks the necessary specificity to constitute a RICO injury, as indefinite injuries do not meet the standards for standing. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the alleged racketeering activity would negatively impact the Party’s donations, suggesting that increased membership could likely enhance fundraising. Additionally, the injury claimed regarding the Party's ability to choose candidates does not qualify as a business injury under RICO. Lastly, plaintiffs attempt to assert injury through attorney fees, but this claim is deemed implicit and does not directly support a RICO injury claim.
The SAC did not explicitly enumerate legal fees as an injury but included a request for them in the wherefore clause, asserting that legal fees were incurred in relation to state court cases. It is established that legal fees can be considered a recognized injury, particularly if they arise from defending against a RICO claim. However, the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that their legal fees were proximately caused by the alleged RICO violation, resulting in a lack of standing based on this injury. Consequently, their claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) was dismissed.
Regarding the RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), the plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering to acquire or maintain control of an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce. To succeed, they must allege: (1) defendants engaged in two or more acts constituting a pattern of racketeering activity; (2) these acts led to the acquisition or maintenance of an interest in the enterprise; and (3) the plaintiffs suffered a distinct injury from this acquisition or control, separate from the injuries caused by individual racketeering acts. A civil RICO claim requires proving seven elements, including the existence of an enterprise and the impact on interstate or foreign commerce. Overall, the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead their claims under both § 1962(b) and § 1962(c).
Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege the essential RICO predicates necessary for both the 1962(b) and 1962(c) claims, leading to their dismissal. Courts have consistently ruled that to establish a RICO claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity, which the Plaintiffs did not do. Specific precedents cited include Kilkenny, Curtis, and Mikhlin, all emphasizing the need for pleading underlying predicate acts to support claims. Furthermore, a plaintiff must show injury to business or property due to a RICO violation, as established by cases like DeFalco and Fischbein. The injuries claimed by the Plaintiffs, such as voters' rights violations and job losses, were deemed personal or constitutional rather than injuries to business or property, failing to meet the standing requirement for a RICO claim. Additionally, the assertion regarding the Independence Party's inability to collect donations was considered too speculative to constitute a valid RICO injury. The court concluded that actual financial loss must be clear and definite for standing, and noted that Plaintiffs had effectively abandoned their 1962(b) claim following multiple motions to dismiss.
Plaintiffs did not oppose the dismissal of their claims, leading to a determination of abandonment. Citing case law, it was established that failure to respond to a defendant's motion to dismiss results in the abandonment of claims, such as those under RICO. Specifically, the plaintiffs' claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), concerning RICO conspiracy, was dismissed due to insufficient pleading of a substantive RICO violation under § 1962(a), (b), or (c). The court emphasized that a conspiracy claim cannot stand if the underlying substantive claims are inadequate. Additionally, there were no new allegations suggesting that the defendants had agreed to commit acts that would satisfy the RICO requirements. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of the RICO conspiracy claim, confirming that without a substantive RICO claim, the conspiracy claim inherently fails.
A conspirator must have the intent to further an endeavor that would fulfill all elements of a substantive criminal offense, as established in BWP Media USA. The plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient allegations to support a RICO conspiracy claim, resulting in its dismissal.
Regarding constitutional claims, plaintiffs allege violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, and First Amendment, but do not contend that the election laws themselves are unconstitutional. Instead, they argue that municipal and private actors violated these laws to harm them, including actions such as registering unsympathetic individuals and improperly handling voter registrations. The plaintiffs clarify that their claims do not pertain to employment actions against them.
For the Equal Protection claim, plaintiffs suggest discrimination as members of a political group. However, they do not specify the legal theory behind their claim, and while they may have alleged violations of New York election law, such violations alone do not constitute a valid claim under Section 1983. Merely violating a state statute does not equate to a constitutional infringement. Further, to establish an equal protection claim, there must be evidence of invidious discrimination, which is not present in this case. Laws that burden the rights of minority groups raise concerns of discrimination, but the plaintiffs must demonstrate that such burdens are purposeful and discriminatory.
In Green Party of State of N.Y. v. Weiner, the court determined that election laws are subject to strict scrutiny but noted that the Plaintiffs did not claim that the laws themselves infringed on the voting rights of Independence Party members. Instead, they alleged that certain Defendants applied these laws improperly, including allowing late filings and back-dated voter registrations, and orchestrating an alleged raid on the Independence Party. The court emphasized that uneven application of a valid statute constitutes a denial of equal protection only if it reflects intentional or purposeful discrimination, as established in Powell v. Power. It has been a longstanding doctrine in the Second Circuit that a Section 1983 action alleging equal protection violations due to election process errors is only viable when there is evidence of intentional discrimination. The court highlighted that to succeed in an equal protection claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their political group was treated differently compared to others and that this differential treatment was intentional. The Plaintiffs failed to meet this requirement as they did not allege that any other political group was treated differently, which undermines their equal protection claim.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination based on race, requiring proof of differential treatment rather than mere discriminatory intent. In this case, the plaintiffs argue that comments made by defendant Frederick Johnson to the zoning board constituted arbitrary treatment of their application. However, the claim is insufficient as it lacks allegations that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. To establish an equal protection claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate both discriminatory treatment and intent to discriminate based on impermissible factors, which the plaintiffs failed to do. Additionally, their theory that the defendants aimed to influence voter registration for electoral gain does not satisfy the requirements for an equal protection claim, leading to its dismissal.
Regarding the Due Process claim, it is ambiguous whether the plaintiffs assert a procedural or substantive due process violation, but they appear to frame it as procedural. The Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of protected interests only when due process is lacking. The court must evaluate the adequacy of the process provided by the state. It is essential to distinguish between claims arising from state law or procedures and those stemming from unauthorized actions by state employees. The plaintiffs did not adequately articulate a due process violation, further complicating their claims.
A state can avoid liability under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for claims based on unauthorized acts by state employees. To establish a due process claim regarding election misconduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate intentional conduct, as opposed to negligence, and assert that no adequate state remedy exists. The court presumes the plaintiffs have adequately alleged intentional actions by the defendants. In evaluating the state’s remedial process, the court finds that New York law offers mechanisms to remove party members who do not align with party principles, allowing enrolled members to file complaints and seek hearings. The plaintiffs utilized this process to remove approximately 4,000 individuals from the Independence Party rolls, indicating that a meaningful remedy was available. Their failure to act timely before the September 2013 primary does not negate the existence of this remedy. The court emphasizes that the plaintiffs’ inability to pursue state court action does not undermine the due process analysis, as state law provides a meaningful opportunity to challenge state actions.
Failure to utilize available legal remedies does not constitute a deprivation of due process. In cases where plaintiffs did not pursue a 16-102 proceeding, their failure is deemed inconsequential since they had the option to do so. The court disagrees with plaintiffs' assertion that the state procedures are inadequate, referencing *Rosario*, in which the Supreme Court evaluated New York’s Election Law mandating voter registration for primaries thirty days before general elections. The court highlighted that while challenges to voter enrollment exist, these procedures are ineffective against large-scale raiding. The Supreme Court did not conclude that the registration requirements and challenge mechanisms lack meaningful post-deprivation remedies, especially since they allowed plaintiffs to potentially remove 4,000 voters from party rolls.
Plaintiffs also claimed injuries beyond voting rights, including diminished ability to gather campaign contributions, reputational damage, and electoral defeats. However, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection is limited to legitimate property claims. Speculative interests, such as potential future campaign contributions or electoral success, do not qualify for due process safeguards. Only established property rights, like a granted business license, are protected under due process, meaning the right to win an election or anticipate future contributions cannot form the basis of a due process claim.
The plaintiff has a constitutional right to run for and hold office, but not a right to win an election, as established in Emanuele v. Town of Greenville. There is no constitutionally protected interest in being elected, and claims of conspiracy to prevent election victories do not support a due process violation. Additionally, reputational harm related to the Westchester Independence Party does not constitute a due process violation, as an interest in reputation alone is insufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. A due process claim based on reputational injury requires coupling it with loss of employment or other legal rights. Assumption of reputational injury does not arise from the termination of a legal right concerning the party, leading to the dismissal of the due process claim.
Regarding the First Amendment, the plaintiffs allege impairment of their right to free association due to election law violations by state actors. However, the analysis of this claim aligns with the due process claim since both rely on the validity of state election laws. The plaintiffs do not contest the laws or regulations themselves, and adequate procedures exist to remedy alleged illegality, rendering the First Amendment claim intertwined with the due process claim. Consequently, since the due process claim fails, the First Amendment claim is also dismissed.
Finally, the failure of the substantive constitutional claims leads to the dismissal of the Section 1983 conspiracy claim as well.
The court ruled that the claims for conspiracy failed because the underlying Section 1983 causes of action could not be established, agreeing with the precedent set in Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff that an actual violation of constitutional rights must be proven for a conspiracy claim to succeed. Consequently, the district court dismissed the federal claims, leading it to decline supplementary jurisdiction over the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim, citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs as precedent for dismissing state claims when federal claims are dismissed before trial. The court granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss, denied the motion for attorneys' fees without prejudice, and directed the Clerk of the Court to terminate pending motions and close the case. Additionally, it noted clerical errors regarding the status of Defendants Joseph Dalli and Morgan D. Abdelnour, who were incorrectly marked as terminated, and acknowledged a potential withdrawal of Plaintiff Zherka, though no formal action had been taken. The document also clarified voting regulations under New York law related to party affiliation changes and referenced various Defendants dismissed from the case. It concluded that Plaintiffs' reliance on outdated pleading standards was inappropriate, emphasizing that a complaint can only be dismissed when it is clear that no facts could support the claim for relief.
The provision cited from 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) criminalizes participation in the affairs of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through racketeering or unlawful debt collection. The mail and wire fraud statutes are interpreted uniformly, allowing legal principles from one to apply to the other. This is supported by cases such as Pasquantino and Carpenter, which emphasize the shared language and analysis of both statutes. Under New York law, a fiduciary relationship is defined by one party's duty to act for the benefit of another, characterized by trust and reliance, distinct from typical business transactions. The allegations against multiple defendants lack substantial factual support, reflecting a broader, speculative claim without specific wrongdoing. The Supreme Court's decision in McNally illustrates that a party must show actual fraud involving money or property to establish a violation, emphasizing that mere specification of a commission-sharing arrangement does not inherently constitute fraud. The court suggests that the reasoning applied in McNally could also be relevant in evaluating claims of election fraud, particularly concerning the sufficiency of evidence related to salary motivations among co-conspirators, which appears weak in this instance.
The excerpt outlines allegations against the Defendants related to a scheme involving mail fraud aimed at disenfranchising voters and controlling election outcomes in Westchester County. The scheme purportedly sought to secure advantageous positions within the Independence Party by replacing existing leadership with individuals aligned with the Defendants' political interests. Additionally, it is alleged that the Co-Conspirator Defendants attempted to artificially inflate Independence Party membership by registering over 4,000 individuals to ensure their candidates' election to lucrative positions.
However, the Court finds these allegations insufficient to establish a plausible mail or wire fraud claim, primarily because the scheme did not target money or property. The Court expresses skepticism regarding the Plaintiffs' compliance with Rule 9(b) requirements for fraud claims, which necessitate specific details about fraudulent statements, the speakers, the context of these statements, and the reasons they are deemed fraudulent. The Plaintiffs’ allegations are criticized for their vagueness, particularly regarding the registration of individuals and the fraudulent nature of their claims.
Furthermore, the Court emphasizes that the Plaintiffs did not adequately cite relevant portions of their 174-page Second Amended Complaint (SAC) in their Opposition, complicating the Defendants' ability to respond. The excerpt also addresses a cited case, United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, stating that it does not support the Plaintiffs' argument regarding RICO injury, as it concluded that the government lacked standing for monetary damages under RICO. Finally, the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any specific injury to an individual named Zherka, and their counsel conceded that a referenced case undermined their RICO injury theory.
When the specifics of a loss are uniquely known to defendants, plaintiffs are not required to specify a dollar amount of loss. However, in this case, the plaintiffs failed to allege any legal fees incurred in two prior legal actions, Rhoades I and Rhoades II, with Rhoades being the sole petitioner in Rhoades I. Other parties involved in Rhoades II were not the only petitioners, and prior adverse employment actions against one petitioner, Vazquez, were previously litigated in a different lawsuit. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs inadequately alleged actions under state law, raising questions about the sufficiency of the Section 1983 claims against all defendants. Nevertheless, the court dismisses these claims on other grounds and does not address this specific issue. The plaintiffs did not provide factual allegations showing that similarly situated individuals were treated differently concerning election law violations. Regarding substantive due process claims, the plaintiffs' claims are already encompassed within their procedural due process, equal protection, and First Amendment claims, as established in previous case law. The court emphasizes that when a specific constitutional provision addresses certain government actions, claims must be analyzed under that provision rather than under the broader substantive due process framework. The defendants' actions are alleged to be shocking primarily due to their intent to violate First Amendment rights or deprive the plaintiff of liberty without procedural due process, suggesting that facts which could prove these claims would indicate specific constitutional violations.
The plaintiff's substantive due process claim is deemed insufficient due to previously addressed constitutional violations in the complaint. The excerpt emphasizes that when a deprivation occurs through established state procedures, the state can anticipate such actions and provide pre-deprivation hearings; therefore, mere availability of post-deprivation procedures does not fulfill due process requirements. The plaintiffs reference a document that inaccurately suggests a connection to a Second Department decision concerning the New York State disenrollment statute, while the actual ruling did not mention the statute and simply affirmed a dismissal regarding disenrollment petitions. The plaintiffs allege improper enrollments occurred just before a deadline but filed their lawsuit over nine months later. They argue that their property rights were infringed due to decreased fundraising capabilities following these alleged actions; however, they do not claim any direct restrictions on fundraising, only a reduction in contributions, which lacks specific details. The court notes the plaintiffs did not respond to motions to dismiss this claim and subsequently dismisses the motions with prejudice, indicating that the plaintiffs have been given multiple opportunities to amend their complaint.
