Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; October 5, 2015; Federal District Court
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is denied by the Court. Initially indicted on three counts related to murder-for-hire, Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of transmitting threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(c) on May 26, 2015, under a plea agreement that resulted in the dismissal of the initial indictment. During the plea hearing, Defendant acknowledged intent to intimidate and possibly injure a specific victim, C.A., and confirmed that he transmitted threats regarding this victim.
Following the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Elonis, which clarified the mens rea requirement for 875(c), Defendant argued that the factual basis from the plea hearing was insufficient to uphold his plea. He claimed he did not intend his communications to be threatening and that his statements were merely inquiries. The Government maintained that the plea's factual basis remained valid and suggested Defendant was experiencing remorse after the plea.
Per Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B), a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing if a fair and just reason is presented. However, the Court found no sufficient basis for withdrawal in this case.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, but a trial court may grant such a request if the defendant presents a fair and just reason before sentencing. A guilty plea is serious and should not be retracted lightly, with the decision to allow withdrawal resting in the trial court's discretion. Insufficient factual basis for the plea is a valid reason for withdrawal. A guilty plea requires a factual basis supported by sufficient evidence at the time of the plea, which can be derived from various sources, such as the plea agreement, court colloquy, or presentence report.
In the case at hand, despite the implications of the Elonis decision, the defendant's sworn admissions indicated he knowingly communicated a threat, as he explicitly stated an intention to threaten and to hire someone to intimidate or harm the victim. His actions included persistent inquiries about hiring an individual for intimidation and delivering a substantial amount of money and information about the victim to facilitate this. The defendant's argument that his statements do not constitute threats since they were not communicated to the victim is based on pre-existing law, thus may be dismissed by the court. Ultimately, the court affirms that the defendant's communications to third parties qualify as threats, as they express an intention to inflict harm, aligning with established legal definitions of threats.
Section 875(c) prohibits threats to injure another person made through interstate commerce, regardless of whether the threat is directed at the intended victim. The court affirmed a conviction under this section in Morales, where a defendant threatened to kill students at his high school in an online chat, and in Rutherford, where threatening statements related to a murder-for-hire plot were not communicated directly to victims. The defendant's threats were specific and aimed at C.A., with consistent statements made to third parties expressing an intention to inflict harm.
Although the defendant argued that his threats were not valid because they were not communicated to C.A. and there was no direct connection between the third party and C.A., the court distinguished this case from Fenton, where threats lacked any connection to the intended victim. In contrast, there was a relevant connection between the third party (Edwards) and C.A., as they were part of the same social circle, making this case closer to Murillo, where the threat was directed towards a more immediate target.
Evidence indicated that the defendant's statements constituted threats, justifying the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea despite the evolving interpretation of Section 875(c). The Supreme Court has not clarified whether a defendant must act with purpose, knowledge, or recklessness regarding threats. The defendant also contended that his statements were protected under the First Amendment; however, the court referenced Watts, which differentiates between public political speech and private threats. The defendant's statements arose from a personal dispute, lacking special protection.
Prior cases have established that threatening statements made to third parties can still be considered threats under federal statutes. The court cited Stewart and Cotner as examples where threats were recognized even if communicated to third parties. In contrast, Wheeler found explicit threats in social media posts, while Bagdasarian found no threat in ambiguous statements directed at a public figure. Overall, sufficient evidence supported the classification of the defendant's statements as threats.
