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Doe v. Ohio State University
Citations: 136 F. Supp. 3d 854; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7700; 2016 WL 270205Docket: Case No. 2:15-cv-2996
Court: District Court, S.D. Ohio; January 21, 2016; Federal District Court
John Doe filed a motion to prevent a preliminary meeting with officials from The Ohio State University (OSU) regarding alleged violations of the Student Code of Conduct, claiming due-process violations. The court denied Doe’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, determining he is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claims. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(2), the court provided findings of fact and conclusions of law to support this denial. The procedural history reveals that Doe sought a declaratory judgment asserting that OSU lacked jurisdiction over him and violated constitutional and university policies during its investigation. He also requested an injunction against any disciplinary actions and sought damages. The motion was filed on November 16, 2015, to block a preliminary conference scheduled for November 19, which was later postponed to allow further research and briefing. Factual background includes Doe being a student and instructor at OSU, with the investigation stemming from a complaint by his ex-girlfriend, a Capital University student. After their relationship ended in August 2015, she reported to Capital University Police on October 1, 2015, that Doe had sexually harassed her by posting her pictures online. Although the police took no action, the Dean of Students at Capital University informed Doe he was no longer welcome on campus. The ex-girlfriend later filed a police report with the Dublin Police Department detailing Doe’s alleged online harassment, which included posting her personal information on 4chan. The Dublin Police Department also closed the case without taking action. On October 26, 2015, Doe was notified by the OSU Office of Student Life of an allegation involving his potential violation of the Code of Student Conduct, specifically regarding Stalking, Sexual Harassment, and Sexual Exploitation. He was requested to attend a preliminary conference, with a warning that failure to do so by November 2, 2015, would result in a disciplinary hold affecting his student account and access to academic resources. The letter included the Statement of Student Rights and Hearing Procedures, detailing the process for notification and hearings related to university charges. The Code of Student Conduct governs student behavior at OSU, applying to both on-campus and certain off-campus actions. It includes a category for "Sexual Misconduct," defined as any sexual conduct without clear consent. The Code outlines procedures for initiating investigations, filing complaints, providing notice of charges, conducting hearings, applying sanctions, and detailing the appellate process. Doe seeks a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, which requires the court to evaluate four factors: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the risk of irreparable harm without the injunction, (3) potential substantial harm to others, and (4) the public interest. These factors serve as guidelines rather than strict requirements. The burden lies with the party requesting the injunction to demonstrate irreparable harm and a likelihood of success. A preliminary injunction is considered an extraordinary remedy and should be granted only if clearly warranted. The court concludes that Doe has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. To establish this likelihood, a plaintiff must show more than a mere possibility; they must demonstrate a substantial probability of success. Doe's verified complaint presents three counts: (1) a request for a declaratory judgment asserting that OSU lacks jurisdiction over him, (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of due process, and (3) a request for an injunction against any disciplinary investigations or actions by OSU. The court identifies that Doe's claims lack merit for several reasons: some are unripe, the procedural due-process claim regarding OSU's jurisdiction is unlikely to succeed, the substantive due-process claim about privacy invasion is also unlikely to succeed, and the claim based on the Ohio Constitution likely fails as a matter of law. Doe argues that OSU cannot initiate disciplinary proceedings because the complainant is a Capital University student and there is insufficient connection to Doe’s status at OSU. Doe contends a violation of his due process rights, asserting that he is not under the jurisdiction of the OSU Code of Conduct and Sexual Misconduct Policy due to a lack of sufficient relationship with OSU. Consequently, he argues that the disciplinary process initiated by OSU is fundamentally unfair. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the state from depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property without due process, which encompasses both substantive and procedural due process. Substantive due process protects individual liberties from certain government actions, while procedural due process mandates fair procedures, including notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court finds that Doe has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on either due-process claim. It notes that some of Doe's claims are unripe since OSU has not commenced a formal disciplinary process. Granting an injunction at this stage would disrupt OSU's normal procedures, including notice and hearing requirements essential to procedural due process. The Court evaluates ripeness based on three factors: the likelihood of the alleged harm occurring, the development of the factual record for fair adjudication, and the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied. A constitutional violation under § 1983 is not complete until the state fails to provide due process. Claims are deemed unripe if they hinge on uncertain future events that may not occur. Most of Doe's claims are deemed unripe due to the following reasons: the alleged hardships are unlikely to materialize, the factual record is insufficiently developed, and the hardship to parties involved will be minimal if Ohio State University (OSU) proceeds without an injunction. Specifically, Doe's substantive-due-process claims are unripe as he has not demonstrated that any fundamental rights are likely to be infringed by OSU's actions. The only potentially ripe claim is Doe's procedural-due-process argument regarding OSU's jurisdiction to initiate proceedings against him. Other procedural-due-process claims are also unripe since Doe has not yet experienced any deprivation of liberty or property rights, nor has OSU failed to provide due process. Doe's claims related to the disciplinary process and appeal rights are unripe as well, given that there have been no charges, hearings, decisions, or sanctions; hence, no basis for an appeal exists. The appeal process under the OSU Code of Student Conduct requires a sequence of events that must occur to allow for an appeal, which has not yet happened. Additionally, Doe's procedural-due-process claim faces challenges in succeeding on the merits. To establish such a claim, Doe must demonstrate a protected interest, a deprivation of that interest, and the absence of adequate procedural rights. While university disciplinary processes typically implicate due process rights, OSU contends that mere initiation of an investigation does not trigger such rights. However, the situation is complicated by a preliminary meeting notice indicating that failure to attend could result in a disciplinary hold on Doe's student account, which may significantly impact his academic access and opportunities. Preventing a student from scheduling classes and receiving a diploma is comparable to a suspension, as it denies essential student benefits. OSU defines suspension as a sanction terminating a student's enrollment for a specific period, indicating that a "disciplinary hold" similarly threatens educational benefits and implicates a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The application of due process raises the question of what process is required, generally necessitating notice and an opportunity to be heard before depriving someone of a property or liberty interest. Doe challenges OSU's jurisdiction to investigate him for alleged violations of the Code of Student Conduct, arguing that the Capital Student’s lack of a relationship with OSU limits its authority. He contends that since the Capital Student is not a vendor, instructor, student, or visitor, OSU cannot remedy her complaint and thus lacks jurisdiction. Additionally, he interprets the statute empowering OSU to regulate student conduct as imposing geographical limits based on campus boundaries. Jurisdiction, fundamentally, relates to authority over a defendant. OSU, as a state university, is granted the power to regulate student conduct under Ohio law, ensuring that law and order are maintained for the pursuit of educational objectives. The relevant code specifies that its rules apply to both on-campus and certain off-campus conduct, particularly when a police report is involved. Doe is named in police reports from both the Capital University Police Department and the Dublin Police Department, which provides OSU with jurisdiction over his case. OSU is authorized by the Ohio Revised Code to establish rules governing student conduct, which includes off-campus incidents where a police report has been filed. Doe’s challenge centers on whether OSU's jurisdiction in such cases exceeds statutory provisions. Doe contends, without supporting authority, that OSU lacks jurisdiction over off-campus behavior. However, precedent indicates that universities generally have the right to regulate off-campus activities as long as they align with their broader mission. Courts have upheld that universities can take disciplinary action based on off-campus conduct, especially in cases involving serious offenses like sexual assault. OSU has both the statutory authority and a valid interest in investigating Doe regarding allegations of sexual misconduct. The court expresses skepticism towards Doe’s procedural-due-process claim, noting the absence of supporting legal authority. Additionally, Doe's assertion that OSU's jurisdiction is overly broad and potentially subject to abuse is viewed as speculative and not relevant to the current motion. The court emphasizes that arguments presented without substantial development may be deemed waived and will not be further explored. Ultimately, the court affirms OSU's authority to investigate Doe based on the circumstances detailed in the complaint. Doe's substantive-due-process claim faces significant challenges. Substantive due process protects against unreasonable government actions that deprive individuals of rights specified in the Constitution, independently of the procedures used. This protection encompasses official acts that are arbitrary or excessively extreme, with the latter requiring conduct that "shocks the conscience." Fundamental rights protected under the Due Process Clause include the rights to marry, have children, and privacy, among others. Government actions impacting these rights undergo strict scrutiny, while those affecting non-fundamental rights are assessed for rational relation to legitimate state interests. Doe claims a violation related to his reputation or privacy. However, there is no evidence that the actions of Ohio State University (OSU) were egregious or inspired by malice, as they merely initiated an investigation into alleged misconduct. Reputation is not recognized as a fundamental right under the Constitution, and while Doe asserts a liberty interest in his reputation, it lacks constitutional significance unless it involves a fundamental right. Consequently, without the deprivation of a fundamental right, Doe's reputational claim does not have constitutional dimensions, making his likelihood of success on this claim very low. The right to privacy encompasses two interests: (1) an individual's autonomy in significant life decisions, and (2) the avoidance of disclosing highly personal information. In the case at hand, the focus is on the second interest, which Doe claims is threatened by Ohio State University (OSU)’s investigation. Doe expresses concern over the potential creation of records documenting a sensitive incident, arguing these records could be accessible to litigants and prospective employers, thereby impacting his future job applications. However, Doe's assertions are largely speculative; he suggests possible changes in law or access to records through FERPA waivers, including the potential for employers to view his disciplinary records during background checks. Despite these claims, it is established that student disciplinary records are protected under FERPA, which prohibits their release without student consent. OSU and the Sixth Circuit have affirmed this protection, indicating that the production of such records does not infringe on privacy rights concerning personal disclosures. Consequently, Doe's argument that OSU's actions violate the Due Process Clause and his privacy rights is unfounded, as the protections afforded by FERPA mitigate the risk of public disclosure. Thus, Doe's claims do not sufficiently demonstrate a likely violation of a constitutional right, particularly in the context of seeking a preliminary injunction. Doe’s substantive-due-process claim is evaluated under the rational-basis standard due to the absence of a fundamental right. The court notes that such claims in school discipline cases are rarely successful unless there is no rational link between the punishment and the offense. In this instance, there are multiple justifications for Ohio State University’s (OSU) investigation into Doe’s conduct: compliance with Title IX, the statutory obligation to regulate student conduct for educational objectives, and the necessity of maintaining a safe environment for students. Doe has not demonstrated an arbitrary deprivation of constitutional rights or egregious government action, rendering his substantive-due-process claim unlikely to succeed. Doe's claim under the Ohio Constitution is similarly weak. Although it can be raised alongside his federal due-process claim, violations of state constitutional rights are not actionable under § 1983. However, the analysis of "due course of law" claims under the Ohio Constitution mirrors that of federal due-process claims. Consequently, Doe's Ohio Constitution claim is also unlikely to succeed. Regarding irreparable injury, Doe must prove that harm is likely without an injunction. He claims that failing to obtain an injunction will lead to humiliation, anxiety, mental distress, and reputational damage, exacerbated by potential public access to investigation documents. However, the court finds that the disciplinary records are protected educational records and not publicly accessible, negating Doe’s claim of irreparable injury. Moreover, police reports related to the allegations are already public, further undermining his argument. The court concludes that Doe has not sufficiently shown an irreparable injury to meet the standards for a preliminary injunction. Doe's request for a preliminary injunction has been denied on several grounds. The court found that the investigatory process initiated by Ohio State University (OSU) does not constitute irreparable harm, as OSU is authorized to conduct such investigations. Doe failed to demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction or that the balance of harms favored him. The court noted that granting the injunction could obstruct OSU’s ability to investigate misconduct, thereby compromising student safety and potentially jeopardizing federal funding due to Title IX implications. Additionally, the court determined that issuing the injunction would not serve the public interest, as Doe did not show a substantial likelihood of success on his constitutional claims. The court referenced that if a regulation is likely constitutional, enforcing it aligns with the public interest. Overall, the factors collectively favored denying Doe's motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The court concluded with an order denying the motion, recognizing a procedural due process liberty interest in reputation but indicating that a name-clearing hearing is the proper remedy for such deprivation.