Prosser v. Thiele Kaolin Co.

Citations: 135 F. Supp. 3d 1342; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131863; 2015 WL 5769233Docket: CIVIL ACTION No. 5:14-cv-21 (CAR)

Court: District Court, M.D. Georgia; September 30, 2015; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Plaintiff Arrie Prosser has initiated a lawsuit against Defendant Thiele Kaolin, alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act, specifically claiming unequal wages and retaliatory actions leading to her suspension and termination. The court is currently addressing cross motions for summary judgment filed by both parties, ultimately denying both motions. 

The standard for summary judgment requires the movant to demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact exists, allowing the court to grant judgment as a matter of law. The court assesses evidence favorably for the nonmoving party and does not engage in credibility assessments or evidence weighing. The burden initially rests with the moving party to substantiate its motion; if successful, the nonmoving party must then present specific evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 

In the background, Thiele Kaolin operates a mining and processing business with about 300 employees at its Sandersville, Georgia facility, where only 5% are female. Prosser served the company for 22 years, progressing from an entry-level bagger to a Centrifuge Operator, a role she held for twelve years. All Centrifuge Operators shared identical job responsibilities, with no additional qualifications beyond those for entry-level positions, which Prosser met. As a Centrifuge Operator, she occupied the highest pay level in the operations department, just below management.

Plaintiff was the senior Centrifuge Operator at the time of her termination, alongside three male operators: James "Buddy" Caneega, Kenny Smith, and David Brantley. Defendant's pay raise structure includes general increases, merit-based increases, and promotional increases. General increases are awarded annually and were never denied to Plaintiff. Merit-based increases, introduced in 2005, consider performance and pay grade; managers have the discretion to award these increases. Plaintiff’s manager, George Lord, emphasized performance but also considered relative pay among employees. The minimum hourly pay for Centrifuge Operators in 2012 was $23.74, with Plaintiff earning $23.98, while her male counterparts earned between $25.65 and $25.82. Lord and Shift Supervisor Ronnie Adams were aware of the pay discrepancy but agreed that Plaintiff's performance did not justify a merit increase. Plaintiff last received a merit increase in 2002, while her male counterparts received multiple merit increases thereafter for various performance-related reasons. Promotional increases are awarded at management’s discretion and may not always accompany a promotion. They can be granted due to retirements, departures, or shift realignments, but are not guaranteed.

Defendant's promotional increase structure originated in 2003, although promotional increases were awarded to employees prior to that year. Plaintiff was promoted six times throughout her employment, with her last promotion occurring in 2001 to Centrifuge Operator, bypassing three intermediate positions (Assistant Filter Operator, Filter Operator, and Senior Filter Operator), which meant she did not receive the corresponding promotional increases. In contrast, her male counterparts received multiple promotional increases in various years. 

Defendant's performance review process only occurs during the initial probationary period, specifically at three and six months post-hire, and lacks a systematic culture of performance documentation. Performance issues are addressed through a counseling procedure, which is not quantitatively defined. Plaintiff received generally positive performance evaluations, but had negative remarks in 1996 and 1997 regarding her attitude and a counseling incident for failing to wash filters, which she disputed. While Defendant claims ongoing performance issues with Plaintiff from 2004 until her termination, including allegations of slow work and a rude attitude, these concerns were not formally documented and were thought to be related to another employee's issues. Plaintiff contests these assertions.

Defendant failed to document performance issues concerning the Plaintiff. Ronnie Adams, the Plaintiff's Shift Supervisor since 2012, testified to a disciplinary incident involving Plaintiff’s alleged refusal to follow a task from Relief Foreman Brian Lovett, which Plaintiff denies. Hutchings and Lord claim to have verbally counseled Plaintiff about her job performance and attitude in early 2012, addressing her rudeness and a failure to complete tasks timely, a meeting that Plaintiff also denies took place, with no documentation existing for either the meeting or the issues raised.

In January 2013, Plaintiff inquired about a potential raise, prompting Adams to consult with Lord, who indicated that Plaintiff had not received a raise since 2002 due to performance issues. Adams asserts he discussed performance improvement with Plaintiff, which she disputes. On April 4, 2013, Plaintiff utilized the "open door policy" to question Alex Cawthon, the Executive VP of HR, about her stagnant pay and alleged gender-based pay disparity. Cawthon learned that Plaintiff's last merit raise was in 2002 and would investigate further. He communicated with Hutchings, who expressed negative opinions about Plaintiff's performance.

Subsequently, Cawthon called a meeting on April 5, 2013, with Hutchings and Plaintiff to address the situation. During this meeting, Hutchings claimed Plaintiff had a history of problematic interactions, including an incident involving a tank that Plaintiff denied occurred. Cawthon described Plaintiff as becoming agitated and argumentative, leading him to ask her to leave, while Plaintiff contended that she did not act disruptively and provided a different account of their conversation, including a discussion about her salary and employment prospects.

Cawthon questioned the Plaintiff about her potential to earn a comparable salary elsewhere and criticized her non-verbal responses during a meeting, suggesting she had an "attitude." He subsequently instructed her to leave for the day and later mailed her a letter stating she was suspended due to her unacceptable attitude, requiring her to provide a written commitment to improve before returning to work. When she reported to work the following Saturday, she was informed of her suspension and told to contact Cawthon on the upcoming Monday. On that Monday, Plaintiff claimed to have communicated her intent to submit a letter addressing her situation. 

Plaintiff responded to Cawthon's first letter on April 9, 2013, explaining her actions during the meeting and apologizing for any perceived disrespect. Despite this, Cawthon sent a second letter reiterating the need for a satisfactory written assurance from her by April 12, warning that failure to do so would result in termination. On April 10, both parties received each other’s letters; Cawthon deemed her apology insufficient. On April 11, he communicated to HR that Plaintiff had been given multiple chances to comply but found her response "unresponsive." Plaintiff was terminated on April 12, 2013, without being informed that her previous letter was inadequate. She received confirmation of her termination on April 16, 2013, and later filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on June 28, 2013, and a lawsuit on January 13, 2014. The Court is examining her claims of unequal pay and retaliation under the Equal Pay Act, finding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding both claims.

The Equal Pay Act (EPA) prohibits wage discrimination based on sex for equal work. A female employee establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating that male colleagues are paid more for jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar conditions. Once this case is made, the employer can avoid liability by proving, with a preponderance of evidence, that wage differences arise from a seniority system, a merit system, production-based earnings, or any other non-sex factor. The defendant has conceded that the plaintiff has established her prima facie case and is relying on the "factors other than sex" defense, which is broad and must be substantiated with objective, business-related factors rather than general practices.

The employer must prove that sex was not a factor in wage discrepancies. If the employer fails, the plaintiff prevails without needing to show discriminatory intent. Conversely, if the employer successfully establishes a valid defense, the plaintiff must then provide evidence that this reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. The court has identified genuine issues of fact regarding the defendant's merit and promotional increase policies, questioning their objectivity. The defendant claims that the plaintiff’s lack of merit or promotional increases was due to poor performance, but this assertion is contested and cannot warrant summary judgment for either party at this stage.

An employee’s performance can serve as a legitimate, non-sexual factor in merit increases, provided it is sufficiently objective to allow for rebuttal. In this case, the Court identifies genuine issues of material fact regarding the objectivity of the Defendant’s merit increase policy. The Defendant provided inconsistent testimony about this policy. A corporate witness claimed that merit increases are "based solely" on performance, but there is a lack of clarity concerning the objective criteria used by management. Cawthon noted the absence of a consistent policy, suggesting merit increases should be awarded judiciously based on performance. Furthermore, George Lord, who made merit increase recommendations, indicated that while exceptional performance is a key factor, he also considered an employee's pay relative to their pay grade and peers. Evidence indicates merit increases were sometimes awarded solely for meeting minimum pay grade requirements, as exemplified by the Plaintiff’s 2002 increase, which was based on pay grade rather than performance.

The Court emphasizes that while discretion based on objective criteria like performance could meet the necessary standard, such criteria are lacking here, rendering the management's decision-making overly subjective. Similarly, issues of material fact exist concerning the subjectivity of the promotional increase policy. The Defendant claims promotions are based on performance and occur at management's discretion, distinguishing between promotions due to retirements or "shift realignments." The Defendant argues that not all promotions come with pay increases and that the Plaintiff's lack of promotional increases was due to poor performance. However, no substantive evidence supports that promotions are performance-based, as the corporate witness could not specify criteria for promotions post-2003 and lacked knowledge of prior determinations. The Plaintiff counters that promotions are primarily based on seniority, with her personnel records indicating she was promoted to fill vacancies. This evidence suggests a genuine issue regarding whether promotional increases are linked to performance. Additionally, the Plaintiff has established an inference of pretext regarding the disparity in her pay.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's performance did not justify merit or promotional increases, citing performance issues from 2004, 2008, and verbal critiques in 2012 and 2013, which Plaintiff disputes. Although Defendant claims a history of denying general increases for poor performance, it has never specifically denied Plaintiff such increases. Notably, Defendant only counseled Plaintiff once in 1997, despite having a procedure for addressing poor performance. Additionally, Defendant has not provided evidence, aside from post-complaint documentation and a dated counseling form, to substantiate its claims of Plaintiff's performance issues. 

Defendant acknowledges a lack of documentation regarding performance problems, which may indicate pretext. Furthermore, Plaintiff received six promotions over her twenty-two years, undermining Defendant's claims of her poor performance. While Defendant argues that not all promotions entail increases, it contrasts Plaintiff's situation with male colleagues who received multiple promotional increases. Defendant's rationale for Plaintiff's lack of promotional increases—due to her rapid advancement to Centrifuge Operator—has been deemed tautological and unconvincing. Despite her title elevation, Plaintiff's pay was lower than that of her male counterparts. A jury could reasonably find that Defendant's reasons for not awarding Plaintiff merit and promotional increases were pretextual.

Regarding retaliation, Plaintiff claims her termination was in response to complaints about unequal pay, violating the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA) anti-retaliation provision. To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) engagement in protected activity, 2) suffering an adverse employment action, and 3) a causal link between the two. Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to meet the first and third elements of this claim. As a result, the Court denies both parties' Motions for Summary Judgment concerning Plaintiff's Equal Pay Act (EPA) claims.

A complaint of unequal pay constitutes a protected activity under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), and the Plaintiff asserted that her April 4, 2013, complaint to Cawthon about her pay being lower than male colleagues was a valid claim. The Court found that while the Plaintiff did not explicitly use the terms "equal pay act" or "gender-based wage differential," her complaint was sufficiently clear to inform the employer of a potential violation of law. 

To establish a causal connection for retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer was aware of the protected activity and that the adverse action was not unrelated to it. The Plaintiff's suspension on April 5, 2013, immediately after her complaint, and her termination on April 12, 2013, were deemed to show a close temporal proximity that supports a causal connection. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s behavior during an April 5 meeting and her failure to provide a satisfactory follow-up letter constituted intervening acts that severed this connection. However, the Court determined that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Plaintiff's attitude could be considered an intervening act.

Testimony indicated that after the Plaintiff's complaint, an investigation into her lack of merit increases began, and Cawthon described the intent of the April 5 meeting as constructive. Contrarily, the Defendant claimed the Plaintiff's conduct during the meeting was problematic, leading to her suspension. The Plaintiff countered that she was simply trying to listen and was not disrespectful. Ultimately, the Court recognized these conflicting accounts and noted that the Defendant's reliance on the Plaintiff's "attitude" as justification for the suspension might not suffice to break the causal chain linking her complaint to the adverse employment actions taken against her.

The Court determined that the term "attitude" is too subjective to warrant credibility assessments, which are beyond its purview. A reasonable jury might interpret the Plaintiff's demeanor during a meeting as a reasonable reaction to a potentially threatening situation, especially since the meeting was related to her complaint of unequal pay and was followed by a suspension within twenty-four hours. The Court concluded that the alleged attitude did not sever the causal link established by the close timing of the events.

The Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff's inadequate response to a request for a written commitment constituted an intervening act that disrupted the causal chain. However, the timeline indicated that the Plaintiff received a letter from Cawthon on Monday, responded on Tuesday, and Cawthon sent a second letter the same day, which the Plaintiff received on Wednesday. This sequence showed that Cawthon could not have acted on the Plaintiff's response before issuing the second letter. The Court noted that despite Cawthon's assertion that the Plaintiff's response was unacceptable, the temporal proximity of her complaint and subsequent suspension and termination indicated that the Plaintiff's failure to respond to the second letter did not disrupt the causal link.

The Court acknowledged that the Defendant's reasons for the Plaintiff's suspension and termination—her attitude in the meeting and her failure to provide a written commitment—were legitimate, non-discriminatory justifications. Consequently, the burden shifted back to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that these reasons were pretextual. To do so, the Plaintiff must either prove that discriminatory motives more likely drove the employer's actions or show that the employer's explanations were not credible due to inconsistencies or contradictions. The Plaintiff argued that her suspension and termination were directly linked to her complaint about unequal pay.

Plaintiff's suspension one day after filing a complaint regarding unequal pay, followed by termination a week later, raises a significant question of pretext in retaliation claims, satisfying the "but for" standard. There is a factual dispute concerning whether Plaintiff's actions, such as her attitude and an unsatisfactory letter, interrupted the causal chain of events leading to her suspension and termination. Additionally, there are unresolved questions about the existence of any longstanding performance and attitude issues that were cited as reasons for the management meeting. Given these uncertainties, a reasonable jury could find Defendant's stated reasons for the adverse actions questionable, thus precluding summary judgment.

Defendant also seeks partial summary judgment regarding the availability of liquidated damages for alleged violations of the Equal Pay Act (EPA). Under the EPA, liquidated damages may equal unpaid wages unless the employer demonstrates good faith and reasonable grounds for believing their actions were not violations. Willfulness requires that the employer acted with knowledge or reckless disregard of the law. Defendant claims that their response to Plaintiff's complaint was in good faith, while Plaintiff contests the adequacy of the investigation and notes a lack of audits under EEO policies. The Court concludes that too many material facts remain unresolved to grant summary judgment on this issue, resulting in the denial of both parties' motions for summary judgment.

The defendant argues that the Centrifuge Operator position is the highest level without managerial duties, while the relief foreman/flock and leach operator holds the highest position with some managerial responsibilities. The plaintiff disputes the criteria for merit increases, claiming that the defendant has not conducted a compensation audit and that its EEO Policy, which addresses discriminatory pay practices, is communicated to all employees. Merit increases are stated to be for exceptional employees, but the plaintiff challenges this rationale as an "after-the-fact" justification for her lower pay, asserting she performed her duties well despite needing assistance for specific tasks. The court has considered additional evidence from both parties after reopening discovery on this issue. The excerpt references various legal precedents and regulations regarding wage discrimination under 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1), noting that the Eleventh Circuit has indicated the burden of proof may not necessarily revert to the plaintiff following an affirmative defense.

In Mulhall, the court determined that none of the defendants successfully demonstrated any affirmative defenses, rendering the issue of pretext unnecessary for consideration. Subsequent cases have continued to explore pretext, requiring plaintiffs to present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding defendants' affirmative defenses. For instance, in Steger, the court found insufficient evidence to counter the defendant's defense, while in Irby, the plaintiff's argument against the defense was deemed too subjective. Similarly, in Seldon, the plaintiff failed to provide probative evidence to establish pretext or justify the defendant's affirmative defense. The Duncan case noted that even after defendants established their defense, the plaintiff lacked evidence to suggest that a pay disparity was gender-based. The analytical framework established in these cases serves as a guide for the current case. Additional precedents, such as Glenn and Price, emphasize the need for legitimate business reasons to be connected to the circumstances of the case. The court also addressed claims regarding merit increases, with the plaintiff arguing that some were disguised promotional increases rather than merit-based. The defendants countered with documentation of the plaintiff's performance issues, asserting this evidence undermined her perception of her job performance. The court found the Seldon case to be distinguishable from the current situation.

Seldon established three criteria for evaluating claims: experience, job knowledge, and performance. The court determined that the plaintiff’s beliefs about her performance did not create a genuine factual dispute, given the defendant provided affidavits indicating the plaintiff's lack of job skills and documented evaluations showing her comparators had superior experience. Promotional increases were noted for Brantley (1997, 1998, 2001, 2010), Caneega (2001, 2004, 2012), and Smith (1999, 2000, 2007, 2013). Lord acknowledged a significant pay disparity in 2012, attributing the plaintiff's ineligibility for a merit increase to her performance. Various case law references highlight that the credibility of explanations regarding pay differences should be considered by fact finders. The plaintiff contended that "but for" causation should be assessed at the pretext stage rather than the prima facie stage, but the court found this distinction irrelevant for its ruling, as the plaintiff could establish "but for" causation at the prima facie stage. The Eleventh Circuit has not clearly defined the application of "but for" causation in these contexts.

Mere temporal proximity in retaliation claims must be very close, as indicated in Redd v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., where a seven-week gap between protected activity and adverse employment action was deemed sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. A "close temporal proximity" can satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proving but-for causation in FLSA retaliation claims, as seen in Raspanti v. Four Amigos Travel, Inc. However, in Hankins v. AirTran Airways, Inc., a failure to meet performance standards severed the causal link despite close timing. Whatley v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority illustrates that termination can stem from overall job performance issues rather than retaliation. The context of actions and speaker demeanor can influence the jury's assessment of insubordination and discrimination, as noted in Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Technologies, Inc. Good faith on the employer's part can mitigate liquidated damages under the Equal Pay Act if reasonable grounds for actions are shown. The defendant highlights that the plaintiff’s pay disparity was acknowledged in 2012, yet the plaintiff claims to have communicated her lack of a raise over the past decade prior to her complaint.