Court: District Court, E.D. Wisconsin; September 23, 2015; Federal District Court
James Hefti alleges that Brunk Industries retaliated against him by firing him for exercising his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Brunk, a Wisconsin corporation specializing in medical device components, filed for summary judgment, which was denied by District Judge Rudolph T. Randa. Hefti worked as a Tool and Die Designer from December 2011 until his termination on March 25, 2013. He was responsible for designing stamping dies and reported to department manager Rick Eisel.
In early March 2013, Hefti requested FMLA leave to care for his son with mental health issues, expecting to use it a few times a week. Despite this, Eisel expressed frustration upon learning of Hefti's FMLA paperwork. Human Resources confirmed the validity of Hefti's leave request. Hefti submitted the completed FMLA form three days before his termination.
Brunk cited Hefti's unprofessional communications with co-workers as the reason for his firing, a concern that had been raised by multiple employees over several months. Specific incidents included complaints about Hefti's tone and aggressive behavior, leading to warnings from Eisel about his conduct. In his performance review, Eisel noted concerns regarding Hefti's offensiveness and urged him to be more approachable. The company's history included granting numerous FMLA requests without prior lawsuits, indicating a lack of previous FMLA-related issues.
Hefti's co-workers described him as “difficult and unapproachable.” On December 5, he sent an inappropriate email to Dykstra, calling him “you’re my bitch,” which Dykstra reported to Eisel. Hefti later acknowledged this comment was inappropriate. On January 4, he expressed concern about negative feedback from Shull, asserting he defended himself professionally and did not want “nonsense” in his review. By February, Dykstra communicated his frustration regarding Hefti's behavior to Eisel, stating he was unsure how to handle the situation. Hefti repeated the derogatory term when introducing his wife to Dykstra. Roth informed Eisel that Hefti was increasingly difficult to work with, citing manipulation and argumentative behavior.
During Hefti's performance review on March 7, 2013, he received a rating of “3.5” out of “5,” despite being told his sarcasm was problematic. Hefti sent derogatory emails to Dykstra on March 22, prompting Dykstra to forward these to Eisel, who found them unacceptable. Eisel communicated concerns to Brunk's president, who suggested termination if there was consensus. Eisel, fearing Dykstra might quit, recommended Hefti's termination on March 25 to Human Resources. After the termination meeting, Hefti reacted aggressively, demanding protection from what he called “bullshit allegations,” and threatened to take his belongings without interference. Police were called, and Hefti warned Eisel that he had not heard the last of him.
The legal standard for summary judgment requires proving there is no genuine dispute over material facts, allowing for judgment as a matter of law against a party who does not establish an essential element of their case.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) allows eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for serious health conditions, including those of family members, and prohibits employers from interfering with or retaliating against employees exercising their FMLA rights. Claims under the FMLA can be based on discrimination/retaliation or interference/entitlement theories. The former requires proof of discriminatory intent, while the latter requires only evidence that the employer denied the employee entitlements under the Act.
To establish a retaliation claim, the employee must show a protected activity, a materially adverse action by the employer, and a causal connection between them. Evidence supporting a retaliation claim can include suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, differential treatment of similarly situated employees, and pretextual reasons for employment actions.
Hefti's termination occurred shortly after he requested FMLA leave, which Hefti argues indicates suspicious timing. However, the claim is further substantiated by his manager, Rick Eisel's, comments and demeanor, which suggest discriminatory intent. Eisel expressed disappointment about Hefti taking leave and made statements implying that Hefti should not expect to maintain health benefits while on leave, indicating a potential causal link between Hefti's FMLA request and his termination. This context raises questions about Eisel's attitude towards Hefti’s FMLA leave, which could imply that Hefti was treated unfairly as a result of his protected activity.
The termination of Hefti is inferred to be a pretext for discrimination, as Brunk claims Hefti was fired for unprofessional interactions with co-workers. Brunk had previously been accommodating towards FMLA leave requests and had not faced FMLA lawsuits prior to this case. The court is required to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Hefti, particularly regarding the timing of his termination relative to his FMLA request, which raises questions about the legitimacy of the firing. Hefti had been warned about his behavior prior to requesting FMLA leave, suggesting that the timing of his dismissal might be coincidental. However, Hefti received positive performance reviews shortly before his termination, indicating that Brunk has not provided conclusive evidence that Hefti would have been fired regardless of any discriminatory motive.
Hefti's interference claim under the FMLA survives summary judgment, requiring proof that he was eligible for FMLA protections, that Brunk was covered under the FMLA, that Hefti was entitled to take leave, that he provided adequate notice of his intent to take leave, and that Brunk denied him FMLA benefits. The key disputed issue is whether Brunk would have terminated Hefti if he had not requested FMLA leave. An employer can only avoid liability for interfering with FMLA rights by demonstrating that the same decision would have been made regardless of the FMLA request, which is a matter to be decided by a trier of fact. Consequently, Brunk's motion for summary judgment is denied, and motions in limine are due by October 30, 2015, with responses due by November 6.
