Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; September 22, 2015; Federal District Court
Pro se plaintiff Friedrich Lu asserts a civil rights action against George Hulme and the Trustees of the Boston Public Library under Section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. Lu, a homeless individual, claims violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was denied entry to the Copley branch of the Library due to a wire shopping cart containing his belongings, which was deemed to emit a strong foul odor. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, which Lu opposed, and also filed a motion for civil contempt against defense counsel for alleged evidence forgery.
The court granted the defendants' summary judgment, determining that Lu failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a violation of his federal rights. While acknowledging Lu's First Amendment right to access the Library, the court noted the defendants' legitimate interest in maintaining Library property and ensuring a pleasant environment for all patrons. Lu did not dispute the guard’s observation regarding the odor from his cart, justifying the Library's exclusion of the cart under its policy against foul-smelling items.
The court concluded that this restriction was a narrowly tailored measure serving the Library's interests, thus did not infringe upon Lu's First Amendment rights. Additional aspects of the Library's policy may raise constitutional questions, but they were not pertinent to this case. Lu's equal protection claim was dismissed due to the lack of evidence showing similarly situated individuals were treated differently. The procedural due process claim was also dismissed, as Lu received adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding his exclusion.
The court further dismissed Lu's Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim, as there was no evidence showing any violation of his rights. Lastly, Lu's motion for civil contempt was denied due to a lack of credible evidence regarding the alleged forgery by defense counsel.
On June 22, 2012, Lu filed a Verified Complaint and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the Trustees and Hulme, claiming the Library violated his constitutional rights by prohibiting his cart and its contents. The defendants sought dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the Library's Appropriate Library Use Policy was constitutionally valid. The court issued a Memorandum and Order on March 30, 2013, granting the defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lu's substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, citing a lack of egregious conduct that would "shock the conscience." However, the court found Lu had plausibly alleged violations of his First Amendment rights, and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, as well as the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA).
The court recognized Lu's First Amendment right to access the library, noting that the classification of the library as a "designated" or "limited" public forum was not necessary for decision-making at this stage, emphasizing that reasonableness of the Library's policy should be evaluated during summary judgment or trial. Regarding the equal protection claim, the court found Lu had plausibly stated that homeless individuals were selectively excluded from the Library, despite some lack of specific allegations against similarly situated individuals. The court also noted that the procedural due process claim required further examination of a protected liberty interest and therefore denied the motion to dismiss that claim without prejudice. Lu's claim for damages under the MCRA was also deemed plausible. The court denied the TRO due to insufficient likelihood of success on the merits and recognized the case's exceptional nature warranted appointing counsel for Lu, who later chose to continue representing himself.
Discovery disputes emerged primarily due to Lu's lack of legal training. In a March 3, 2014 Memorandum and Order, the court acknowledged Lu's commitment but warned that ongoing disputes would hinder case progress if he continued to represent himself. The court again inquired whether Lu would accept appointed counsel, which he declined. During an April 14, 2014 scheduling conference, Lu once more refused a court-appointed lawyer. Additional discovery disputes arose in the following months, with some referred to a magistrate judge. A February 26, 2015 scheduling conference revealed minimal discovery had occurred, though Lu's deposition was conducted. The court set deadlines for summary judgment motions. On April 3, 2015, defendants filed for summary judgment on both counts of Lu's complaint, asserting that Lu was excluded from the library due to his cart's foul-smelling contents, as per Library Policy. They also claimed qualified immunity for defendant Hulme, even if a constitutional violation occurred. Lu opposed the summary judgment, arguing that the Library Policy was falsified by defense counsel for litigation purposes, and he filed a motion for civil contempt proceedings against them, which the defendants opposed.
Lu, proceeding pro se, is entitled to have his pleadings interpreted liberally. Summary judgment is warranted when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine disputes regarding any material facts, as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A fact is considered "material" if it could influence the litigation's outcome based on applicable law. Genuine disputes exist only over facts that could affect the case's resolution under governing law. The court evaluates whether reasonable evidence could allow a jury to favor the nonmoving party, requiring the record to be viewed in the light most favorable to that party. The moving party's evidence can be accepted if the opposing party fails to present counter-evidence. Inadmissible evidence is only considered if it could be presented in an admissible form at trial. The moving party carries the initial burden to inform the court of the basis for their motion and identify relevant record portions that show no genuine material fact issues. This burden can be met by demonstrating a lack of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims. The court must examine the record as a whole rather than in isolated segments. The evidence for the summary judgment motion includes Lu’s Verified Complaint, his deposition, an affidavit from Hulme, and the Library Policy, with the exception that facts related to Lu's exclusion from the Library are largely undisputed.
The Boston Public Library (BPL) has an Appropriate Library Use Policy, established on March 23, 2004, superseding the previous Appropriate Patron Behavior Policy from 2001. The Library Policy mandates that BPL facilities be clean, safe, and comfortable for various activities such as reading and studying. It outlines the Library's responsibility to enforce rules protecting patrons' rights and safety, and to safeguard Library property. Noncompliance with these rules may lead to removal, expulsion for up to one year, or legal action. Prohibited behaviors include violating laws or Library policies, bringing in foul-smelling items, using wheeled devices outside designated areas (with exceptions for assistive devices), and subjecting all bags to inspection.
In legal proceedings, Lu challenges the authenticity of the Library Policy, claiming it cannot be admitted as evidence in the summary judgment motion. He also alleges forgery, but provides no supporting evidence. The court, however, can consider evidence that could be admissible at trial, and the defendants may present an authenticated version of the policy. An affidavit confirms the policy was in effect when Lu was denied Library entry. Lu's claims of forgery are deemed insufficient to create a factual dispute regarding the policy’s validity as of June 13, 2012, allowing the court to consider the Library Policy in its decision-making process.
Friedrich Lu, a homeless man residing in Boston, frequently utilized the Library, visiting daily from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 or 5:00 p.m., and often returning in the evening. On June 13, 2012, Lu attempted to enter the Library carrying a loaded shopping cart and several grocery bags while it was raining. His shopping cart, approximately one-and-a-half feet long, one foot wide, and three feet tall, contained around ten plastic grocery bags, two brown paper bags (potentially holding legal documents), five bottles or cans, a piece of clothing, and a recently purchased package of ice cream. The items were wet due to the rain.
Upon entering, Lu was stopped by a male security guard who informed him that he could not enter the Library with the cart. The guard suggested leaving it outside, unguarded, and warned that the police would be called if Lu persisted. Lu requested to speak with the supervisor, Hulme, the Library’s Manager of Security, who arrived and also stated that Lu could not bring the cart inside. Hulme declared the cart's contents as “all trash” without inspecting it, despite Lu’s explanation that he needed to carry his belongings as a homeless individual. Lu offered to leave certain items outside, but Hulme maintained that everything in the cart was considered trash, further questioning Lu about the cart's contents.
Lu inquired about rearranging his belongings to enter the Library, but Hulme stated it was impossible as other homeless individuals were not allowed inside with their items. Hulme mentioned a prior instance where a homeless person was permitted entry only after placing belongings in suitcases, which Lu found unfeasible due to difficulty in obtaining suitcases. After approximately ten minutes in the Library and a five-minute conversation with Hulme, Lu was asked to leave and complied. Both Lu and Hulme characterized their interaction as friendly. Hulme noted that a security guard initially stopped Lu because of a perceived foul odor from Lu's cart, which Hulme confirmed, stating that there had been previous complaints about Lu's odor. Lu did not contest the odor claim, leaving it undisputed. Disagreement arose regarding the mention of Library Policy during their conversation; Hulme asserted he informed Lu that bringing his cart violated policy, while Lu claimed he was unaware of such a policy. At the summary judgment stage, the court must accept Lu’s version as true. Since June 13, 2012, Lu has not attempted to return to the Library but believes he can enter without his cart. Lu's Complaint includes two claims for relief: one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of federal rights and another under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA). He alleges violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when denied entry with his belongings. However, the court determined that the undisputed facts do not support a finding that the defendants violated Lu’s constitutional rights, leading to a summary judgment in favor of the defendants for both claims.
The First Amendment guarantees the right to receive information, which extends to public libraries as designated public forums. Access to libraries is considered essential for information dissemination, but such access is not unlimited. The Supreme Court's "forum" analysis categorizes government property into three types: traditional public forums, designated public forums, and limited or nonpublic forums.
Traditional public forums, like streets and parks, allow for content-based regulations only when they serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored. Designated public forums are properties the government intentionally opens for public expressive activities, and any restrictions on speech in these forums are subject to strict scrutiny, similar to traditional public forums.
In contrast, limited public forums restrict access to select groups or topics, allowing the government to impose reasonable and viewpoint-neutral barriers to preserve the property’s intended use. Many courts recognize public libraries as designated public forums, affirming the need for access while allowing for some regulatory frameworks.
A designated public forum is defined as public property made available by the State for expressive activities, as established by the Tenth Circuit. Public libraries serve specific expressive functions, such as reading, writing, and contemplation, but are not designated for activities like speeches or debates. The court has determined that the Library in question qualifies as a designated public forum, as it is publicly funded and intended for activities like selecting materials and attending programs. The City of Boston has thus created a designated public forum by allowing access for specific First Amendment activities. However, the Library's designation does not encompass all forms of First Amendment expression; it is limited to activities aligned with its purpose. Consequently, the Library is only required to permit activities that are consistent with its nature and the government's intent in designating it as a public forum.
Heightened scrutiny applies to the restrictions imposed by the government in designated public forums, which must be (1) narrowly tailored, (2) serve a substantial governmental interest, and (3) leave open adequate alternative channels of communication. Restrictions that do not limit specifically permitted First Amendment activities need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The government bears the burden of proving that regulations are not efforts to suppress expression based on opposition to the speaker’s views.
In the context of public libraries, a distinction is made between hygiene or appearance rules and conduct rules. Hygiene rules deny access based on personal characteristics and are analyzed under heightened scrutiny, as they limit First Amendment activities like reading and writing. An example is a rule that allows removal of patrons due to body odor. In contrast, conduct rules permit removal for misuse of facilities and do not implicate First Amendment rights as they regulate behavior beyond the library's intended purpose.
The library's rules justifying the exclusion of a patron's cart are considered content-neutral but restrict the manner of exercising First Amendment rights. The rules prohibit bringing items with foul odors and the use of wheeled devices. While these could be seen as hygiene restrictions, they do not necessarily prevent library use if items are left outside. Thus, the rules should be subjected to heightened scrutiny as they impact patrons' access to First Amendment activities.
The Library's policies prohibit the entry of garbage, foul-smelling items, and any articles that may impede other users. Lu was excluded primarily due to the foul odor of items in his cart, as determined by library staff. The Library aims to maintain a clean and safe environment for all patrons, and the court must assess whether the policies are narrowly tailored to this interest while offering alternative access for excluded individuals. The court concludes that the foul odor prohibition is constitutional, as it effectively serves the Library’s interest in ensuring a functional space for all patrons. The rule permits exclusion only when a library employee identifies items causing a significant odor that disrupts library use. While requiring Lu to leave his cart outside is burdensome, it does not infringe upon his access, as he can enter other facilities without his cart. Furthermore, the court finds the foul odor prohibition is not unconstitutionally vague, as it provides clear standards that prevent arbitrary enforcement and preserves First Amendment rights. A law is only considered vague if it is so unclear that average individuals cannot understand its meaning or application.
Library employees have discretion regarding the removal of garbage and foul-smelling articles, but the Library Policy limits this discretion by permitting removal only if such items impede Library use. This standard provides clarity and notice, making the restriction sufficiently definite. The court finds the Library's policy constitutional and applicable in preventing Lu from entering with his cart, which was deemed to contain "rubbish" and emit a strong odor. Security guard Hulme reported the cart's contents as "stinky" and "pungent," and Lu admitted that his cart had been stored outside for two months and contained wet items. Although Lu proposed rearranging his belongings to gain access, this would not have rendered the cart compliant with Library Policy. Lu did not present evidence disputing the foul odor, affirming the cart's exclusion. The court acknowledges that such policies may disproportionately impact homeless individuals but asserts that the First Amendment guarantees equal access for all patrons. Lu's rights cannot override the rights of other patrons to enjoy the Library. Consequently, the defendants had a legitimate constitutional basis for excluding Lu's cart, and summary judgment is granted on his First Amendment claim. The main reason for Lu's exclusion was the security guard's assessment of the cart's unsuitability due to its contents.
The court confirmed a constitutional basis for excluding Lu's cart under the foul-smelling articles prohibition, making it impossible to assess whether Lu could enter the Library with the cart absent such articles. This case does not serve as an appropriate forum to evaluate the constitutional validity of the Library's wheeled device ban, adhering to the principle of judicial restraint that courts should avoid constitutional questions unless necessary. This case is notably the first in the First Circuit to address First Amendment issues related to library access restrictions, particularly policies prohibiting patrons from bringing certain items.
The Library's substantial interest lies in preventing interference among patrons and maintaining a clean environment. However, the defendants contend that the wheeled cart prohibition may not be constitutionally valid because it lacks specificity regarding its aim to limit disruptions. Unlike the foul-smelling articles ban, the wheeled-device prohibition is overly broad, applying to all carts regardless of their potential disruption. Should this prohibition exclude more individuals than necessary to fulfill the Library's interests, it would fail to be "narrowly tailored."
Additionally, allowing exceptions, such as permitting strollers while banning shopping carts, could undermine the Library’s justification for the prohibition. The comparative sizes of the wheeled devices suggest an inconsistency in the policy's application. Finally, while the policy does not require the least restrictive means, there may exist less restrictive alternatives to a complete ban on wheeled devices, such as permitting them in designated areas.
Libraries could alleviate the burden on individuals using wheeled devices by providing designated storage areas for carts, potentially addressing concerns that existing laws are overly broad. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government must treat similarly situated individuals alike. To establish an Equal Protection violation, an individual must show selective treatment based on impermissible factors like race or intent to suppress constitutional rights. Determining whether individuals are “similarly situated” involves a factual analysis of relevant circumstances.
In this case, Lu claims his exclusion from the Library violated his equal protection rights but fails to identify specific instances where similarly situated individuals were treated differently, which is necessary to demonstrate unlawful oppression. The only cited example involves a homeless person who was allowed entry after transferring items from a shopping cart to a suitcase, yet Lu does not substantiate how these situations compare. Lu was excluded due to the foul odor from his cart's contents, and he has not shown any other individuals in similar circumstances were admitted.
Additionally, Lu alleges a broader claim that the Library discriminates against the homeless as a class, referencing public concerns about their use of Library facilities. However, he lacks evidence of disproportionate exclusion of homeless individuals or discriminatory intent in the Library's policies. Therefore, his disparate impact claim fails as it requires proof of both discriminatory purpose and effect. Summary judgment is appropriate on Lu's equal protection claim.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Lu's equal protection claims. To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must identify a protected liberty or property interest and demonstrate that state actors deprived him of that interest without adequate constitutional process. The fundamental requirement of procedural due process is that the individual receives notice of the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. The court emphasized that there is no rigid standard for assessing the adequacy of state procedures, as due process requirements are flexible depending on the circumstances.
Regarding Lu's First Amendment claim, the defendants' refusal to allow him into the Library with his cart was found to substantially burden his rights. However, the defendants provided sufficient procedural protections: a security guard informed Lu he could not enter with his cart, and after Lu requested to speak to the supervisor, Hulme listened to him and reiterated the policy, offering alternatives for entry. Lu was not suspended or banned from the Library, and he was afforded the opportunity to appeal any severe sanctions under Library Policy.
Lastly, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) allows individuals to seek injunctive and equitable relief if their constitutional rights are interfered with. The MCRA's remedies align with those available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, providing a state-level avenue for claims similar to federal civil rights actions.
The Act allows individuals to take legal action if their rights, as guaranteed by federal or state constitutions or laws, are violated through threats, intimidation, or coercion. Under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) interference with the exercise of their constitutional rights, (2) that such interference occurred or was attempted, and (3) that it was executed through threats, intimidation, or coercion. The MCRA operates on a two-part framework where the defendant threatens or coerces the plaintiff to abandon a constitutional right. The plaintiff, Lu, failed to prove that his constitutional rights were violated when denied access to the Library, leading the court to grant summary judgment against his MCRA claim.
In a separate matter, Lu accused defense counsel of forging the Library Policy for litigation purposes and sought an evidentiary hearing to address possible civil contempt. The defendants countered that the Library Policy had been in place since March 2004. An evidentiary hearing is warranted only when genuine material facts are in dispute, but Lu's forgery claims lacked substantiating factual evidence, resulting in the denial of his contempt motion without a hearing.
The court ordered the following: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and (2) Plaintiff's Motion for a Civil Contempt Proceeding is denied. The document also notes that verified complaints serve as affidavits in summary judgment and mentions that although Lu’s deposition was not sworn due to lack of identification, it would be treated as such by the defendants. The Library Policy can be accessed online.
Lu's complaint references a 2008 Boston Globe article discussing Library Policy and highlights the court's observation of conflicting views among courts regarding libraries as limited versus designated public forums. The Tenth Circuit clarified that courts labeling libraries as limited public forums meant they were subcategories of designated public forums, applying that standard to regulations on expressive activities within libraries. The First Circuit has historically used the term "limited public forum" interchangeably with "designated public forum" and "nonpublic forum," ultimately adopting a definition equating it with nonpublic forums. The Supreme Court, however, clarified in 2010 that limited public forums are distinct from designated public forums. The defendants assumed the Library to be a designated public forum but conflated the scrutiny standards applied to designated public forums with those for limited public forums. The Library does not restrict admission or First Amendment activities based on content, thus it is not classified as a limited public forum. Some courts have attempted to create a "limited designated public forum" category, which the First Circuit does not recognize, as it complicates existing classifications without adding clarity. The court suggests that the distinction between "conduct" and "hygiene" regulations serves a similar analytical function as the proposed category. The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Neinast examined a shoe-wearing policy under reasonableness, and the defendants agreed that the library regulations are content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, yet they incorrectly applied the reasonableness standard.
