Court: District Court, N.D. Georgia; September 11, 2015; Federal District Court
In this interpleader action, various motions were considered by the court, resulting in the following rulings: Ann J. Herrera's Motion to Enforce Settlement and/or for Partial Summary Judgment was denied, as was the Akpele Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment Against Herrera. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, while the Akpele Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment Against the Plaintiff and their Motion to Strike or Disregard Portions of an affidavit were both denied. Additionally, Herrera’s Motion to Disregard or Exclude Consideration of a declaration was also denied.
Dr. Ignatius Akpele established AIE Surgical Practice, LLC, in Georgia on September 5, 2000, and set up a Defined Benefit Plan on April 19, 2005, approved by the IRS as a tax-qualified pension plan. He was the sole trustee and applied for a whole life insurance policy totaling $5,148,206.00 with Travelers Life and Annuity Company, designating the Defined Benefit Plan as the owner and beneficiary. Initially, Uzo Akpele and their child were beneficiaries, but this was changed during underwriting, which the Akpele Defendants dispute despite acknowledging that the plan required it. The policy was issued on April 19, 2005, and later reissued by MetLife without changes. Premium payments were made from 2006 to 2008, but the 2009 premium was not paid by either Dr. Akpele or AIE Surgical Practice.
The policy in question converted to reduced paid-up insurance with a surrender value of $299,301.35 and a death claim value of $516,108.00. MetLife notified Dr. Akpele on January 5, 2010, of this conversion and his option to reinstate coverage. An inquiry from Andy Boyer on March 2, 2010, confirmed Dr. Akpele stopped premiums on April 18, 2009, and received a letter about the policy's status. Dr. Akpele authorized Bruce M. Meaner to communicate with MetLife, which provided policy values on March 19 and 24, 2010. Dr. Akpele was diagnosed with terminal cancer in early 2010 and died on December 30, 2010. Following his death, MetLife mistakenly sent a statement regarding imputed income in January 2011, and later, a claim packet to his family on February 1, 2011, requesting the trustee of the Defined Benefit Plan to process the claim. After the probate court appointed Ann J. Herrera as temporary administrator on July 1, 2011, Uzo Akpele sought policy benefits on November 29, 2012, indicating that the trustee would provide necessary documentation. On December 12, 2012, the Akpele Defendants filed a claim for the policy proceeds, which MetLife denied, arguing they were not listed beneficiaries. Subsequently, MetLife filed an interpleader complaint on November 22, 2013, and deposited the death benefits with interest, totaling $635,562.25, on December 16, 2013. All parties, including MetLife, Herrera, and the Akpele Defendants, are moving for summary judgment on various grounds. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, requiring the movant to identify such absence, with the burden shifting to the nonmovant to present affirmative evidence. Herrera seeks to enforce a settlement agreement with the Akpele Defendants or, alternatively, for partial summary judgment, which the Akpele Defendants contest as untimely. However, her motion adheres to local rules regarding timing.
The Court determined there is no prejudice to the Akpele Defendants regarding the early filing of the motion, leading to the overruling of their objection. The Court will not disregard the motion as it has granted permission for excess pages. Under Georgia law, settlement agreements that are "definite, certain, and unambiguous" are enforceable even without a signed final document, and a party is bound by their attorney's agreement if the attorney had apparent authority. The case involved a dispute over whether Akpele Defendants' counsel, Mr. Aniekwu, communicated his lack of authority to settle to Herrera's counsel, Mr. Wayne. While Mr. Wayne’s correspondence suggests no such communication was made, Mr. Aniekwu claimed he expressed his lack of authority in phone conversations, resulting in a genuine dispute of material fact that necessitates denying Herrera’s motion.
The Akpele Defendants filed a counter-motion for summary judgment, asserting that ERISA preempts any agreement and requires benefits from a life insurance policy to be paid to Uzo Akpele. This claim was rejected because ERISA does not govern life insurance policies, and the Akpele Defendants did not argue for direct payment to Uzo Akpele, but rather to the trustee of the Defined Benefit Plan. Consequently, their counter-motion for summary judgment was denied.
Regarding Herrera's motion to disregard the Wilson Declaration, the Court denied it based on Herrera's lack of standing to object to evidence in a summary judgment motion where she is not a party, but noted it would not consider legal conclusions in affidavits. The Akpele Defendants sought to disregard the McCarthy Affidavit, citing hearsay and lack of personal knowledge. However, the Court clarified that a motion to strike is not appropriate for challenging summary judgment evidence and will review the evidence directly. The Court found McCarthy’s affidavit based on personal knowledge and determined the authenticity of the documents was sufficiently established under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(1), allowing the Court to consider the affidavit in its entirety.
The Court determines that the attached documents are admissible as they were created and maintained in the ordinary course of business, thus exempting them from hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). Consequently, the Akpele Defendants’ Motion to Strike or Disregard is denied.
MetLife's Motion for Summary Judgment targets the Akpele Defendants' counterclaims, which consist of three key claims.
1. **Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment and Reformation**: The Akpele Defendants assert that a mutual mistake regarding the policy's beneficiary and rider warrants reformation. However, evidence, including prior communications from MetLife, confirms that the Defined Benefit Plan is the designated beneficiary, a point the Akpele Defendants have conceded. Therefore, the Court declines to reform the contract. Regarding the Premium Waiver Rider, the application indicates that Dr. Akpele selected a Lapse Protection Guarantee applicable only to variable universal life policies, not the whole life policy he obtained. The Court finds no mutual mistake and will not add a rider that cannot apply.
2. **Counterclaim for Breach of Contract**: The Akpele Defendants claim MetLife failed to pay the full policy benefit. However, evidence shows Dr. Akpele did not make premium payments post-April 2008 and intended to stop. Thus, MetLife acted within the contract’s provisions by converting the policy to reduced paid-up status, leading the Court to grant MetLife’s motion regarding this counterclaim.
3. **Counterclaim for Negligence and Related Claims**: The Akpele Defendants allege negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. The Court notes that tort claims must derive from a breach of statutory or fiduciary duties, not merely from contractual breaches. There is no evidence of a fiduciary relationship between MetLife and the Akpele Defendants, as the insured was Dr. Akpele. Consequently, the Court grants MetLife’s motion for summary judgment on this counterclaim as well.
MetLife’s motion for summary judgment on the Akpele Defendants’ sixth counterclaim for conversion is warranted due to the absence of a tort claim in this matter. Regarding the fourth counterclaim for bad faith, the Akpele Defendants allege damages under O.C.G.A. 13-6-11 and O.C.G.A. 33-4-6, asserting that MetLife's refusal to pay benefits was frivolous. However, evidence indicates Dr. Akpele intended to cease payments, negating any claim of bad faith against MetLife, thus the motion for summary judgment should be granted. The fifth counterclaim for fraud and deceit is based on opinions about the insurance coverage related to a Premium Waiver Rider, which cannot support a fraud claim under Georgia law. Additionally, there is no evidence of fraud regarding the beneficiary designation; the Akpele Defendants acknowledge that the Defined Benefit Plan was correctly designated as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy. Consequently, the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on this counterclaim should also be granted. MetLife seeks dismissal from the action, a permanent injunction against all defendants, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. In an interpleader suit, once the stakeholder fulfills its obligations, it is discharged from further claims. However, attorneys’ fees are discretionary and not warranted if the interpleader arises from ordinary business. Since MetLife has met all obligations and the court grants its motion for summary judgment on all counterclaims, MetLife should be dismissed from the case. All defendants are permanently enjoined from suing MetLife regarding the life insurance policy, and MetLife is awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees for defending against the counterclaims due to the resources expended.
The court has made several rulings regarding various motions in this case:
1. Ann J. Herrera’s Motion to Enforce Settlement or for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.
2. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
3. The Akpele Defendants’ Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment against the Akpele Estate and Ann J. Herrera is denied.
4. The Akpele Defendants’ Motion to Strike or Disregard Portions of James McCarthy's Affidavit is denied.
5. The Akpele Defendants’ Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff is denied.
6. Ann J. Herrera’s Motion to Disregard or Exclude Consideration of the Declaration of Brent L. Wilson is denied.
Additionally, references to various statements of material facts and legal precedents are noted throughout the document, indicating the reliance on established case law and procedural rules in reaching these conclusions. Specific citations from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant case law underscore the decisions made regarding the motions.
