Court: District Court, D. Puerto Rico; September 4, 2015; Federal District Court
Limary Sánchez-Estrada filed a lawsuit against MAPRE PRAI-CO Insurance Company and its affiliates, alleging discrimination based on gender, pregnancy, and pregnancy-related disabilities under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Pregnancy Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Puerto Rico law. The court partially granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, eliminating claims related to gender discrimination unrelated to pregnancy and a tort claim under Puerto Rico law. Remaining claims include allegations of a hostile work environment due to pregnancy and adverse employment actions, including negative evaluations and suspensions related to pregnancy-related absences.
Subsequently, the defendants sought summary judgment, to which the plaintiff opposed. The defendants also moved to strike a self-serving affidavit submitted by the plaintiff, arguing it was a sham intended to create disputes over material facts. The court agreed and struck the affidavit, ordering the plaintiff to revise her response to the summary judgment motion without referencing the stricken affidavit.
Despite this, the plaintiff's resubmitted documents still included arguments based on the stricken affidavit and violated local procedural rules by presenting additional facts improperly. Furthermore, the plaintiff's responses to the defendants' statements often lacked proper citations or included unsupported citations, contravening Local Rule 56(e).
Assertions of fact in statements of material facts must be accompanied by specific citations to record materials to support them; otherwise, the court may disregard those assertions. The court has no obligation to search the record for unreferenced materials, which would waste judicial resources. Consequently, unsupported statements and those referring to stricken affidavits will also be disregarded, as emphasized in Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. The court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, citing the standard that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The moving party has the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. If the moving party meets this burden, the onus shifts to the non-moving party to show at least one genuine and material fact issue exists. The non-moving party can do this by citing specific evidence or demonstrating that the moving party's evidence does not conclusively establish the absence of a dispute. If a genuine factual issue remains that could affect the case's outcome, summary judgment must be denied. The court views evidence favorably towards the non-moving party without making credibility determinations at this stage. However, if the non-moving party's claims are based on mere speculation or unsupported assertions, summary judgment may be granted.
The relevant background indicates that the Plaintiff began employment with Multiservicar as a receptionist in June 2011 and was promoted to Service Advisor in January 2012. A new receptionist was hired by Multiservicar shortly thereafter.
Plaintiff became a Service Advisor under the direct supervision of José Oyóla, with indirect oversight from shop manager Luis Crespo starting September 2012. At Crespo's request, she performed various tasks including repair estimates and communicating with clients and the parts department. In 2011, Oyóla had no performance complaints regarding Plaintiff. On September 25, 2012, she informed Multiservicar of her pregnancy, following the distribution of new uniforms to employees earlier that month. On October 23, 2012, she requested maternity uniforms, but Crespo advised that she could wear regular clothes instead, without specific guidelines. An inquiry to HR about additional uniforms revealed that the budget had been exhausted due to company financial losses. The employee handbook includes an Attendance and Punctuality Policy that mandates documentation for medical appointments, including maternity-related absences. The policy outlines how absences are categorized and points are accumulated for tardiness and absences, with disciplinary actions escalating from verbal warnings to termination based on point thresholds.
As of the specified date, the Plaintiff had 13.50 points under the Attendance and Punctuality Policy, with no absences related to her pregnancy. Following her pregnancy onset, she experienced complications including severe back spasms, leading to missed work starting in October 2012. On October 25, 2012, she fainted at work due to low blood pressure and was subsequently treated at the hospital, where her physician advised her to rest until October 27, 2012. Upon returning to work on October 29, 2012, she provided a medical certificate but was told by Oyóla, per Crespo's instructions, that she could not return until presenting another medical clearance.
In November 2012, the Plaintiff was hospitalized for back spasms from November 7-12 and was directed to remain on bed rest until November 14. She confirmed her return to work on November 15, 2012, but received a written reprimand dated November 8, 2012, regarding her absenteeism, although the reprimand did not specify the relevant period. The Plaintiff’s annual performance evaluation received on November 26, 2012, reflected penalties for her attendance, despite a total score of 2.87 indicating she met job requirements in most areas, with noted need for improvement in attendance and teamwork.
Crespo reviewed and suggested changes to the evaluation, which negatively affected her score, though Defendants claimed other employees' evaluations were similarly impacted. The Plaintiff has not seen the evaluations of other employees. On December 4, 2012, she received a memorandum dated November 28, 2012, stating her suspension without pay until December 10, 2012, due to exceeding 20 points for attendance, following two prior written warnings.
On December 5, 2012, Plaintiff lodged a pregnancy discrimination charge against Defendants with the Antidiscrimination Unit. Up to that date, she accumulated 22.50 points due to tardiness and absenteeism, though some absences related to her pregnancy were not counted against her. She provided medical certificates for several pregnancy-related appointments on October 25-26, December 4, and January 9, and these absences were excluded from her point tally. Despite visiting her obstetrician on October 16, November 13, and December 4, she only submitted a medical certificate for the December 4 visit.
On December 13, 2012, Plaintiff left work early due to back spasms, but did not submit a medical certificate to justify this absence despite being given a deadline of January 4, 2013, to do so. When returning to work on December 10, she was reminded that medical certificates were needed for pregnancy-related appointments to avoid point accumulation.
On December 17, 2012, MAPFRE’s Vice President noted that Plaintiff was frequently using her personal phone at work. Subsequently, on December 27, Crespo issued a written reprimand for her failure to promptly complete tasks. At this point, she was around twenty weeks pregnant. On January 9, 2013, her obstetrician recommended she apply for non-occupational disability due to pregnancy complications, leading to a disability leave from January 9 to May 13, 2013.
Plaintiff claims to have started receiving maternity leave benefits on April 15, 2013, and gave birth on April 29, 2013, although the record lacks clarity on these assertions. After exhausting her pregnancy leave, she resigned from Multiservicar on June 10, 2013. Oyóla attested that Plaintiff had been a good employee but noted a decline in her performance due to her pregnancy. Crespo had previously raised concerns about her frequent illnesses.
Oyóla experienced a health issue necessitating nearly thirty days off work without reprimand or suspension. Defendants attributed this lack of discipline to Oyóla not accumulating enough points under their policy. On September 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants, claiming gender and pregnancy discrimination, as well as discrimination due to pregnancy-related disabilities. The court partially granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, eliminating the gender discrimination claim unrelated to pregnancy and a Puerto Rico Article 1802 tort claim. The remaining allegations included creating a hostile work environment due to pregnancy and adverse employment actions through negative evaluations and reprimands related to pregnancy-related absences.
Currently, Plaintiff asserts three claims: disparate treatment under Title VII for pregnancy, hostile work environment under Title VII for pregnancy, and disparate treatment under the ADA for pregnancy-related disabilities. In seeking summary judgment, Defendants argue that the suspension was a legitimate business decision, that Plaintiff did not demonstrate differential treatment or that their actions were pretextual, and that her hostile work environment claim lacked severity and pervasiveness. Additionally, they contend that her disabilities did not constitute major life impairments under the ADA and that failure to prove federal claims also negates Puerto Rico law claims.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ acknowledgment of her work quality, combined with selective points accumulation for pregnancy-related absences, indicates discrimination. She also asserts that Defendants improperly counted her medical visits against her points, that the written reprimands and negative evaluations constituted severe harassment, and that her pregnancy-related disabilities qualify as disabilities under the ADA. The court will examine each claim individually. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sex, which includes pregnancy as clarified by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, establishing that discrimination due to pregnancy is unlawful.
Liability in a disparate-treatment case hinges on whether a protected trait, such as pregnancy, motivated the employer's decision. A plaintiff can establish disparate treatment through direct evidence of discrimination or by employing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. In this case, the court found insufficient direct evidence of discrimination, leading to the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Direct evidence must consist of statements from decision-makers indicating bias against the protected trait. The plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, which includes proving that she was pregnant, her job performance was satisfactory, an adverse employment action occurred, and non-pregnant employees were treated differently.
The court determined that the plaintiff met the first three elements of the prima facie case: it was undisputed that she was pregnant during the relevant period, her job performance was satisfactory aside from attendance, and adverse actions included a negative evaluation regarding attendance and teamwork, a suspension without pay, and the failure to provide maternity uniforms. This establishes a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, which the defendants can counter by providing a non-discriminatory reason for their actions. If they do so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendants' stated reasons are a pretext for discrimination.
The fourth element regarding the differential treatment of non-pregnant employees requires clarification. Plaintiff lacks knowledge about how other employees were evaluated during the November 26, 2012 evaluation, and Oyóla’s testimony indicates that some employees' scores also decreased after reviews. Consequently, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants treated non-pregnant employees differently in this instance. Regarding Plaintiff's suspension, she contends that Defendants selectively did not classify certain absences as pregnancy-related, which contributed to her points under the Attendance and Punctuality Policy. However, records show Plaintiff failed to provide medical certificates for some appointments and that many certificates did not indicate pregnancy-related issues. Evidence submitted by Defendants reveals that Oyóla's absences did not exceed the threshold for suspension, countering Plaintiff's claim of disparate treatment.
Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts she was denied maternity fit uniforms, which resulted in her wearing regular clothing while non-pregnant employees wore uniforms. Despite this claim, the court acknowledges that Plaintiff fulfills the prima facie case for only one of the three alleged adverse employment actions but will assume she has for all three for the purposes of this motion. This assumption shifts the burden to Defendants to present legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions.
The court reviews the November 2012 evaluation and December 2012 suspension collectively, as both relate to Plaintiff's point accumulation. The evidence confirms that Defendants provided valid non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's point accumulation, which exceeded twenty due to tardiness and absences. Absences reported with medical certificates for pregnancy-related reasons did not contribute to her points, while those without such documentation were counted as sick time. Additionally, Defendants justified the non-provision of maternity uniforms by presenting evidence that their 2012 uniform budget was depleted by October due to significant financial losses.
The court addressed the legitimacy of Defendants' non-discriminatory reasons for their actions concerning Plaintiff's employment during her pregnancy. It stated that Defendants' financial limitations, coupled with allowing Plaintiff to wear her regular clothing, did not indicate a refusal to accommodate due to cost concerns. Plaintiff failed to present evidence of similarly situated employees receiving different treatment regarding accommodations. Consequently, her prima facie case was undermined, shifting the burden to her to prove that Defendants' reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination.
Regarding her November evaluation and December suspension, Plaintiff did not demonstrate any inconsistencies or contradictions in Defendants' stated reasons that would suggest discriminatory motives. She neglected to inform her employer that her absences were pregnancy-related, which was essential for them not to count against her attendance record. Even if those absences were pregnancy-related, the critical issue was whether Defendants were aware of this when making their decisions.
The court emphasized that the true test of discrimination was whether Defendants' actions were improperly motivated, noting that "pretext for discrimination" involves deceit, not simple errors. Despite evidence of complaints about Plaintiff's frequent absences, this alone did not indicate selective discrimination based on her pregnancy. The court found that Plaintiff did not follow the employee handbook requirements regarding notification of pregnancy-related absences, and when she did inform Defendants, no penalties were applied.
Lastly, Plaintiff did not provide any justification for why the decision not to supply maternity uniforms constituted pregnancy discrimination. As a result, the court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's claim of pregnancy disparate treatment.
To establish a hostile work environment claim based on pregnancy discrimination, a plaintiff must prove six elements: 1) membership in a protected class, 2) unwelcome sexual harassment, 3) harassment based on sex, 4) harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions, 5) conduct that is both objectively and subjectively offensive, and 6) a basis for employer liability. Evidence of nonsexual behaviors, such as work sabotage or humiliation, can contribute to a hostile environment. The court's inquiry at summary judgment focuses on whether a reasonable person would find the conduct hostile or abusive, considering the totality of circumstances, including the frequency and severity of incidents. In the present case, however, the court determined that the evidence did not support a finding of a hostile work environment. The plaintiff’s attendance issues, though likely pregnancy-related, did not justify legal fault against the defendants, who provided legitimate nondiscriminatory explanations for their actions, including inquiries about medical certificates and performance expectations. Overall, there was no evidence to indicate that the defendants acted with discriminatory intent regarding the plaintiff's pregnancy.
The court acknowledges that while the severity and pervasiveness of alleged harassment are typically questions for a jury, summary judgment is appropriate for evaluating hostile environment claims. Citing First Circuit precedents, the court finds that the defendants did not create a workplace characterized by discriminatory intimidation or insult sufficient to alter the plaintiff's employment conditions. Consequently, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.
Regarding the plaintiff's allegations related to safety shoes, although initially claimed in her complaint, these allegations appear to have been abandoned, leading to the dismissal of this claim as well.
In addressing the plaintiff's disability discrimination claim under the ADA, the court outlines the necessary elements for establishing such a claim. It highlights that the plaintiff must prove she is disabled under the ADA, can perform essential job functions with or without accommodation, and suffered adverse employment action due to her disability. The court finds that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case, particularly noting that her pregnancy-related complications do not qualify as disabilities under the ADA. The evidence indicates that the defendants' actions were based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons and not on any discriminatory motives. As a result, the court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff’s ADA claim as well.
All federal claims brought by the plaintiffs have been dismissed, leading to the dismissal of their Puerto Rico law claims as well. Law 44, which parallels the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), prohibits discrimination against individuals with physical, mental, or sensory disabilities in Puerto Rico and aims to align with federal ADA provisions. The elements for proving a claim under Law 44 are similar to those under the ADA. Additionally, Law 100 provides for doubled damages for violations of Law 44, while discrimination claims under Law 3 are analyzed similarly to Title VII claims, particularly regarding gender and pregnancy discrimination. The absence of genuine issues of material fact in the federal claims compels a similar conclusion for the Puerto Rico claims. Therefore, claims under Law 44, Law 100, and Law 3 are dismissed.
The court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' case entirely. The judgment is to be entered accordingly. The court notes several instances where the plaintiff's factual assertions lack support in the record. For example, the plaintiff claimed no performance-related complaints in 2011, but evidence contradicts this assertion. Moreover, the plaintiff previously alleged unequal treatment regarding safety shoe requirements but has since abandoned this claim. In responding to the defendants’ statements of material fact, the plaintiff initially denied that her absences before September 25, 2012, were unrelated to her pregnancy, although the record indicates otherwise.
Plaintiff submitted a medical certificate for absences from September 18-20, 2012, but the certificate does not specify that these absences were related to pregnancy. The Plaintiff also admitted that none of her absences prior to September 25, 2012, were pregnancy-related. While she disputes certain absence dates, the Defendants acknowledge two corrections that only result in a cumulative difference of less than one point (21.50 points total). This difference is irrelevant to her discrimination claims and would not have affected her suspension. The Plaintiff's additional claims regarding absences either reference a stricken affidavit or medical certificates that lack indications of pregnancy-related visits.
Regarding her absence from November 7-9, 2012, the Plaintiff asserted that the attendance record was forged because she did not sign it; however, the evidence supporting her forgery claim relies on the previously stricken affidavit. The Plaintiff admitted during her deposition to being absent from November 7-14, 2012, which includes the disputed dates.
For her October 23, 2012, obstetrician visit, the certificate provided merely states she is under the doctor's care and lists her due date, not justifying an absence. The obstetrician confirmed seeing her only on the dates indicated. The Plaintiff also claimed a medical certificate for her December 13, 2012, absence based on a leave form from January, but she acknowledged in her deposition that she did not obtain such a certificate.
Defendants objected to the admissibility of an email cited by the Plaintiff as hearsay, but the court noted that statements made by an agent within their employment scope can be considered party admissions under Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, the email was deemed admissible as it contained statements made by Barreiro, the Vice President of MAPFRE, within the scope of his employment.
