Evans v. Gloucester Township

Citations: 124 F. Supp. 3d 340; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110752; 2015 WL 5012593Docket: Civil Action No. 14-7160 (JBS/JS)

Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; August 20, 2015; Federal District Court

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Crystal A. Evans, a former Gloucester Township Council member, claims that Gloucester Township, its Police Department, former Mayor David R. Mayer, and other municipal employees conspired to violate her constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments through a culture of political retribution. She alleges that following her election, she faced hostility and harassment during council meetings, was implicated in a voting fraud scheme, wrongfully arrested for stalking, and was the target of a sexually explicit defamation campaign. Evans argues these events were part of a broader conspiracy led by Mayer to suppress political dissent and were reflective of a municipal policy of retaliation.

The defendants, including Gloucester Township and Mayer, have filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Evans' claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are time-barred, her state tort claims fail to meet New Jersey Tort Claims Act requirements, and her allegations are inadequately pleaded. The court must evaluate whether the claims are barred by limitations or notice requirements and the sufficiency of Evans' allegations. The court has accepted the facts from Evans' Amended Complaint as true for the motion's purpose. Evans highlights that her political troubles began after she refused to engage in unethical practices and opposed certain proposals, leading to increased pressure and reprimands from party leadership, including Mayer.

Mayer and S. Daniel Hutchinson engaged in character attacks against the Plaintiff, which obstructed her official duties and led to her dismissal as a constituent caseworker in June 2008. Mayer reportedly directed subordinate officials to suppress political dissent through fines and investigations, and encouraged council members to publicly intimidate the Plaintiff. Although the Plaintiff completed her council term in January 2012, she chose not to seek reelection due to ongoing hostility. After leaving office, the Plaintiff experienced continued harassment from Gloucester Township officials, particularly related to her support of a referendum aimed at limiting campaign contributions from municipal contractors.

From March to July 2012, Mayer allegedly conspired with the Township Solicitor and a legal assistant to fabricate a voter fraud charge against the Plaintiff. Following the submission of petition signatures for the referendum on February 19, 2012, a legal assistant threatened a constituent who signed the petition, coercing her into signing an affidavit that falsely claimed the Plaintiff misled her. This affidavit was leaked to a reporter, prompting inquiries into voter fraud allegations. The Defendants also allegedly sought to use this affidavit in a public lawsuit against the Plaintiff.

Additionally, from July 2010 to November 2012, while managing the Turnersville branch of the New Jersey Motor Vehicles Commission (MVC), the Plaintiff received unusual automated calls from the Gloucester Township Police and Mayer’s office, which she found suspicious given her branch's location and her private extension. She suspected monitoring of her activities by MVC Director Robert Grill, who required her to share her computer credentials with a new hire, leading to concerns about privacy violations. The harassment prompted the Plaintiff to report to the Department of Justice in September 2012.

Lastly, on November 7, 2012, the Plaintiff was drawn into a domestic dispute involving her brother-in-law and Angela DeLucca, who reported damage to her property, leading to further complications.

Plaintiff claims that officers Benjamin Lewitt and Gregory A. Jackson exploited Ms. DeLucca's emotional distress to obtain statements regarding her relationship with Plaintiff, including allegations of harassment involving approximately 500 phone calls, twelve uninvited visits, property damage, and a life threat. Plaintiff asserts that Officer Lewitt misused these statements to escalate initial allegations into a Fourth Degree Felony Stalking charge, despite Ms. DeLucca never requesting police action. The Investigative Field Reports allegedly show a lack of good faith in evidence collection prior to issuing a Criminal Complaint-Summons on November 8, 2012, without contacting Plaintiff first. On that date, Ms. DeLucca and Mr. Evans attempted to clarify that Mr. Evans had contacted Plaintiff, but the police refused to reconsider the stalking complaint or take their statements. Plaintiff's attorney arranged for a voluntary appearance at the police station, yet the Gloucester Township police arrested Plaintiff at her workplace in a public manner, resulting in her termination from the MVC on November 14, 2012. The charges were eventually downgraded and dismissed, with an admission from a prosecutor that the charges should not have been pursued.

Additionally, starting in March 2012, Plaintiff alleges that Mayer and/or the Gloucester Township Police Department directed various defendants to publish defamatory and explicit content about her and her family online. Examples include a blog post about Plaintiff's arrest, which referred to alleged reckless driving and civil charges related to a domestic dispute, and other derogatory comments on local media platforms.

Plaintiff alleges that online posts made by various individuals, including Defendant Mayer, demonstrate knowledge of allegations against her that were not publicly disclosed until November 13, 2012. On that date, Sean McCullen published an article detailing Plaintiff's arrest, sourced from Defendant David Harkins. The following day, an individual using the handle 'Best4GT' (believed to be Mayer) commented on Plaintiff's emotional state regarding her husband's infidelity. Another user, 'YMBDFA,' claimed Plaintiff had a prior criminal record for unauthorized use of a government computer. On November 15, 2012, gtrmc.com restricted public comments, and 'Best4GT' accused Plaintiff of confronting her husband at a residence. 

In early 2013, the user 'Sybil Evans' alleged that Plaintiff had a history of criminal behavior, including stalking and threats, and suggested an affair with her brother-in-law. 'YMBDFA' further alleged Plaintiff's involvement with a known sex offender and misuse of her modeling business. On March 4, 2013, 'Best4GT' reiterated claims of Plaintiff's past arrests and threats. At that time, gtrmc.com was operated by Defendant Frank Mellace, affiliated with the Gloucester Township Democratic Committee. 

Plaintiff contends that Mayer and/or the Gloucester Township Police Department urged Mellace and others to employ Search Engine Optimization to elevate damaging articles in search results related to her name. Additionally, since June 2014, Defendant James Dougherty and others allegedly created false profiles of Plaintiff on pornographic websites. From March 2015, there were further attempts to associate her name and information with inappropriate content on Frompo.com. Plaintiff claims that these actions have severely hindered her employment opportunities. She filed her lawsuit on November 14, 2014, and the Court dismissed Defendants' motion to dismiss as moot after she submitted an Amended Complaint on April 20, 2015.

The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint includes 12 claims against 17 defendants, including Gloucester Township and various individuals, alleging municipal liability; conspiracy to commit gender discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1985; violation of First Amendment rights; malicious prosecution; abuse of process; false arrest; violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights concerning reputation, false light, tortious interference with a business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress; and violations of substantive and procedural due process rights. Gloucester Township, Gloucester Township Police Department, and Mayor Mayer have moved to dismiss the complaint, following procedural actions including the striking of Plaintiff's initial opposition brief. 

The standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires that the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and determines if the Plaintiff has provided fair notice of the claims and their grounds. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to be plausible on its face, and legal conclusions or formulaic recitations do not suffice. 

Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's claims are time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in New Jersey, which the Plaintiff acknowledges applies but contends is subject to the continuing violation doctrine, discovery rule, and equitable tolling. The Court must analyze the timeliness of each claim based on the specific incidents alleged, noting that the burden of proving the statute of limitations defense lies with the Defendants.

The Third Circuit has clarified that when a pleading does not indicate when the statute of limitations began, it cannot warrant dismissal under Rule 12. The court dismisses the Plaintiff's claim that the continuing violation doctrine applies, noting that while both federal and New Jersey courts recognize this doctrine as an equitable exception to the statute of limitations, it primarily pertains to workplace discrimination cases. The doctrine acknowledges that claims under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination can arise from repeated incidents that cumulatively create an unreasonable work environment.

In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme Court articulated that hostile environment claims are distinct from discrete acts, as they involve ongoing conduct rather than isolated events, thus allowing for the continuing violation doctrine to apply. However, the doctrine cannot be used to include time-barred discrete acts. The New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that this theory is meant to aggregate acts that, when viewed collectively, demonstrate a pattern of discrimination.

In this case, the continuing violation doctrine is found inapplicable because the Plaintiff's claims stem from a series of separate acts that she was aware of or should have recognized as actionable at the time they occurred, including alleged discrimination from 2008 to 2012, a false voter fraud allegation in 2012, harassment from July 2010 to November 2012, a false arrest beginning in November 2008, and defamatory statements made about her online.

The continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable to the Plaintiff's claims because she was aware of her injuries at the time they occurred, as established in Montanez v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. Additionally, the Plaintiff's allegations do not reflect a pattern of discrimination, instead involving isolated incidents of political discrimination, retaliation, false arrest, defamation, and gender discrimination, distinguishing them from the workplace harassment in Morgan. The claims include an overarching conspiracy but rely on these isolated events rather than a recurring pattern. The court also notes that the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Roa prevents the Plaintiff from using ongoing acts to revive untimely claims. Consequently, the court will evaluate whether the discovery rule or equitable tolling applies to the Plaintiff's claims, particularly her 1983 and 1985 claims arising from her November 8, 2012, arrest. A false arrest claim accrues at the time of arrest, while a malicious prosecution claim accrues upon favorable termination. The court finds that the Plaintiff's false arrest claim is time-barred since it was filed over two years after her arrest. The Plaintiff's argument that her claim did not accrue until she learned of the lack of probable cause or suffered damages is rejected; the statute of limitations begins at the time of detention. As the Plaintiff was aware of her arrest and the circumstances surrounding it at that time, her claim is untimely.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are time-barred due to her arrest on November 8, 2012, which occurred over two years before she filed her original complaint. Consequently, her due process claim is dismissed as untimely, supported by case law indicating that similar claims based on improper arrest are subject to a statute of limitations. While First Amendment retaliation claims are individually actionable, the Court finds this claim also barred by the statute of limitations as it relates to the arrest. 

However, the Court cannot determine if Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim is time-barred since the Amended Complaint does not specify when the charges against her were dismissed, and such claims accrue only upon dismissal of charges. Therefore, any constitutional claims based on alleged improper prosecution may not be time-barred.

With respect to claims related to political retaliation, false voter fraud allegations, workplace harassment, and internet defamation, these appear to be barred as well. The political retaliation claims stem from events that concluded in January 2012, over two years prior to the complaint. The voter fraud allegations occurred between March and July 2012, while workplace harassment claims involve conduct prior to November 14, 2012. Additionally, internet defamation claims include statements made before this date, rendering them untimely.

Plaintiff's attempt to invoke equitable tolling is rejected as she relies on facts not included in the Amended Complaint. Specifically, her assertion about learning of coercion in the voter fraud case in July 2012 and the alleged concealment of identities by internet bloggers are not pleaded in the complaint, and thus cannot be used to justify tolling the statute of limitations.

The Court determines that Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 from 1983 and 1985 are time-barred, except for those related to an alleged improper prosecution following her November 8, 2012 arrest and claims regarding internet statements published after November 14, 2012. Regarding the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (NJTCA), the Court finds that Plaintiff's state tort claims for false light, tortious interference, and intentional infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed due to her failure to provide the required notice within ninety days of the injury. Plaintiff argues that the NJTCA does not apply to her claims against Defendant Mayer, asserting that his actions were outside his official duties; however, the Court rejects this argument, citing the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Velez, which affirms that the NJTCA's notice provisions apply to intentional tort claims against public employees. Because the Amended Complaint does not demonstrate compliance with NJTCA notice requirements, Plaintiff's claims against Mayer are barred and must be dismissed. For the § 1985 conspiracy claim, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged the necessary elements of conspiracy, including the existence of a conspiracy, the intent to deprive individuals of equal protection, an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and resulting injury or deprivation of rights, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

The plaintiff must demonstrate that the conspiracy was driven by discriminatory motives related to race, gender, or class-based animus, as established in Griffin v. Breckenridge. In this case, the plaintiff has not alleged any violation of federally protected rights. The claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against Defendant Mayer is based on allegations of an internet defamation campaign that included derogatory comments, manipulation of search results, and the creation of fake profiles using the plaintiff's identity. However, while these allegations may support a state tort claim, defamation is not actionable under § 1985(3); courts have consistently held that there is no constitutional protection against defamation. The plaintiff's claimed reputational injury, though possibly actionable under state law, does not constitute a constitutional violation. Consequently, the court intends to dismiss the § 1985(3) claim against Mayer.

Regarding the § 1983 claim against Mayer, the defendants assert that the plaintiff has not adequately stated this claim in counts four through eight. The plaintiff contends that they have sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim based on political retaliation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and deprivation of liberty and property interests, among other rights. To establish a valid § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show a violation of a constitutional right and that the violation was perpetrated by someone acting under state law.

Claims against Mayer in his official capacity have been conceded for dismissal, leading the Court to focus solely on the claims against him individually. Government officials cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional actions of subordinates under respondeat superior; liability arises only from their own unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiffs seeking to hold Mayer liable under Section 1983 must establish either that he was a policymaker who acted with deliberate indifference to policies causing constitutional harm or that he directly participated in violating plaintiff's rights or had knowledge of and acquiesced to subordinate violations. 

Despite the Court's earlier conclusion that many claims against Mayer are time-barred, the plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated Mayer's personal involvement in the alleged wrongs necessary for a Section 1983 claim. The claims, including political retaliation and malicious prosecution, primarily stem from the plaintiff's alleged false arrest on November 8, 2012, with the plaintiff asserting that Mayer and Deputy Chief Harkins tacitly approved the actions of the police officers involved. However, these assertions lack the necessary factual basis for supervisory liability. The allegations do not indicate Mayer's involvement or awareness of the arrest or the investigation leading to the charges against the plaintiff. 

The plaintiff's claims regarding Mayer's online comments and cyber harassment are also deemed insufficient for a Section 1983 claim, as defamation alone does not constitute a constitutional violation unless it results in a change in the plaintiff's rights or status. The plaintiff's assertion that her employment opportunities have been adversely affected by the alleged defamation does not meet the threshold required for a constitutional claim.

The Third Circuit in Clark determined that the potential loss of future employment does not alter or extinguish any right or interest, emphasizing that a liberty interest requires more than mere reputational injury. In this case, the Plaintiff's allegations regarding Mayer’s involvement in an internet defamation campaign were deemed insufficient to establish a 1983 claim, as there were no claims of employment application rejections.

Regarding municipal liability, the Defendants contended that the Plaintiff failed to substantiate a claim. The Plaintiff argued that the alleged misconduct resulted from an unconstitutional municipal custom, policy, or practice. Under § 1983, municipal liability cannot be established through respondeat superior but must show that the municipality itself supported a constitutional rights violation. A municipality can be held liable if its policy or custom, enacted by officials representing official policy, caused the injury. For a claim to succeed, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality was the 'moving force' behind the alleged harm through deliberate conduct.

The Plaintiff's allegations about municipal liability were deemed conclusory and insufficient. She claimed that Mayer and others fostered a political culture of fear and intimidation to settle political scores and inhibit political speech. The Amended Complaint asserted that Gloucester Township and its Police Department maintained an unconstitutional custom of harassment and intimidation against political opponents through various means, including fines, audits, and smear campaigns. The Plaintiff further alleged that she directly witnessed Mayer and his administration directing officials to engage in such misconduct, linking these actions to Gloucester Township’s unconstitutional policies and practices.

Plaintiff's allegations against the Township and Police Department lack factual support to establish municipal liability, as they primarily stem from individual decisions rather than a municipal policy or custom. The Amended Complaint alleges that Officer Lewitt made a unilateral decision during Plaintiff’s arrest on November 8, 2012, and that Defendants Carlamere, Coyle, and Long elicited false statements from an elderly constituent. Additionally, unidentified Camden County prosecutors and Gloucester Township police officers allegedly attempted to arrest Plaintiff at her workplace, while various individuals posted offensive comments online. However, the Court finds that these incidents cannot form the basis of a municipal liability claim merely through conclusory statements. The claims framed as a conspiracy against Plaintiff for her political views lack factual support linking them to municipal policy or final decision-maker actions. Consequently, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the municipal liability claim.

The Court further concludes that Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against Defendants Mayer, Gloucester Township, and the Police Department are time-barred, except for those related to alleged wrongful prosecution post-arrest and defamatory online posts after November 14, 2012. Additionally, Plaintiff's state law claims are barred by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (NJTCA) notice requirements. The 1985 claim is dismissed for failing to allege a deprivation of a federally protected right or a plausible conspiracy. Dismissal will be without prejudice for potential amendment within 21 days, limited to addressing identified deficiencies, not rehashing previously decided matters. The Court also notes inconsistencies in the spelling of names within the Amended Complaint, adopting the first instance of each. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that an alleged recorded statement has not been provided to her or her legal representatives.

The Amended Complaint incorrectly lists the dates of November 8, 2014, and November 14, 2014, but context indicates the correct dates are November 8, 2012, and November 14, 2012, respectively. The individual named "McCullen" is also referred to as "Sean McMullen." The Plaintiff has asserted claims against several fictitious defendants, including various John and Jane Does. Other defendants have not responded to the Amended Complaint. According to legal precedent, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) accrue when the plaintiff is aware of the alleged conspiracy, with the statute of limitations beginning with each overt act causing damage. The Court’s analysis regarding the statute of limitations applies equally to both the Plaintiff’s § 1983 and § 1985 claims. The Plaintiff did not address alleged misconduct in her opposition brief, leaving her position on the timeliness of her claims unclear. 

The Plaintiff claims the discovery rule applies to her false arrest claim, arguing she lacked constructive notice of the absence of probable cause until criminal discovery was provided to her attorney on or around February 1, 2013. However, this fact is not included in the Amended Complaint, preventing the Court from considering it. The same applies to her claim regarding her arraignment on January 9, 2013. The Court thus rejects the invocation of the discovery rule based on these unpleaded facts. The Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the discovery rule pertain only to her November 8, 2012 arrest and alleged internet defamation. 

For false imprisonment claims, the accrual occurs when an arrestee first appears before a magistrate, but the Plaintiff's claim is for false arrest, making her arguments related to false imprisonment irrelevant. The Court also dismisses the Plaintiff's assertion that fear of retaliation has prevented legal representatives from preserving her claims, as these allegations appear only in her brief and are absent from the Amended Complaint. Additionally, failure to meet notice requirements under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (NJTCA) bars recovery against public employees and entities. Lastly, the Court does not take into account actions attributed to Mayer upon becoming Mayor in 2010, as they fall outside the relevant limitations period.

Plaintiff's allegations of gender-based discrimination are supported only by a reference to being called "that woman" at Gloucester Township Council meetings, which lacks substantive evidence. Claims of conspiracy among defendants are deemed conclusory and insufficient, as the Amended Complaint fails to demonstrate a coordinated effort, presenting merely a series of unrelated acts. Plaintiff's attempt to introduce a claim under 18 U.S.C. 241 in her opposition brief is considered improper. She concedes that claims against Defendant Mayer in his official capacity are duplicative of those against the Township, thus they will be treated as claims against the Township and dismissed. 

In discussing her First Amendment political retaliation claim, Plaintiff focuses primarily on her November 8, 2012 arrest and fails to connect Mayer to any alleged wrongful actions during that incident, undermining her claims. Allegations regarding events outside the statute of limitations, such as voter fraud accusations and workplace harassment, are deemed irrelevant and also fail to establish Mayer's personal involvement. While Plaintiff claims losses stemming from alleged internet defamation, she admits her termination from MVC was due to criminal charges, not defamation, and provides no evidence of loss related to her modeling business, Role Models, Inc. Consequently, the Court does not need to assess the defendants' qualified immunity argument. 

Count two of the complaint, which alleges municipal liability against Defendant Mayer and Defendant David Harkins, mirrors count one but lacks additional factual support, making it implausible. Much of the conduct cited occurred outside the statute of limitations, and even if considered, it would not suffice to support a municipal liability claim against the Township or the Police Department.