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Miller v. Davis
Citations: 123 F. Supp. 3d 924; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105822; 2015 WL 4866729Docket: Civil Action No. 15-44-DLB
Court: District Court, E.D. Kentucky; August 12, 2015; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs, comprising two same-sex couples and two opposite-sex couples, are seeking a preliminary injunction against Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis, who has ceased issuing marriage licenses following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which mandated state recognition of same-sex marriage. Davis, citing her religious beliefs as an Apostolic Christian, implemented a policy of not issuing any marriage licenses to avoid discrimination against same-sex couples. Plaintiffs argue this policy substantially interferes with their right to marry, as it prevents them from obtaining licenses in their home county. Davis contends her policy merely imposes an incidental burden on the right to marry, justified by her right to free exercise of religion. The Court held hearings regarding the motion for injunction, with representation from both sides, including attorneys from the ACLU and the Liberty Counsel. The proceedings were recorded, and the matter is now ready for review. Central to this case is the conflicting constitutional rights: the right to marry under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment versus the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. The Court must determine whether Davis's religious objections excuse her from issuing marriage licenses. Ultimately, the Court concludes that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt Davis from her obligation to issue licenses. Factual details reveal that Plaintiffs Miller and Roberts, along with Holloway and Fernandez, were denied marriage licenses after requesting them from the Rowan County Clerk’s Office, despite the Obergefell ruling. They approached County Judge Executive Walter Blevins for licenses, but he indicated he could not issue them while Davis remained in office. Other plaintiffs, Spartman and Skaggs, also sought to formalize their relationship post-Obergefell. Prior to visiting the Rowan County Clerk’s Office for a marriage license, the couple confirmed they had all necessary documentation by calling ahead. A deputy clerk informed them not to come, stating they would not be issued a license. Nearby counties, including Bath, Fleming, Lewis, Carter, Elliott, Morgan, and Menifee, are issuing marriage licenses and are less than an hour from Morehead, where the couple resides. Despite having the ability to travel to these counties, they prefer to obtain their license from Rowan County due to their strong community ties, including residence, work, social activities, voting, and tax obligations. Kim Davis, the Rowan County Clerk, described her office as a "pass through collection agency" for the state, managing various functions including tax collection and issuing licenses. Kentucky law mandates that county clerks issue marriage licenses, which involves the couple providing their information at the clerk’s office to generate a license form that must be presented to an officiant and returned for recording within thirty days. The form, prescribed by the Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives, consists of sections for the marriage license, certificate completed by the officiant, and a recording statement. Davis refuses to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, viewing the required authorization statement as a personal endorsement of same-sex marriage, contrary to her Apostolic Christian beliefs. Four deputy clerks share her objection, while another is undecided, and one is willing to issue the licenses but is barred from doing so by Davis. Following the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell, Governor Beshear mandated that Kentucky recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states and within Kentucky. All executive branch agencies are implementing necessary operational changes following a Supreme Court decision that grants same-sex couples the right to marriage licenses. The Department of Libraries and Archives is distributing a gender-neutral marriage license form and usage instructions. Addressing religious concerns from county clerks, it is emphasized that personal beliefs may coexist with the legal duty to issue marriage licenses; clerks unable to fulfill their duties due to personal convictions are encouraged to resign. Despite this guidance, Kim Davis, Rowan County Clerk, intends to maintain her 'no marriage licenses' policy for the remainder of her term. In the context of a civil rights action against Davis and Rowan County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to uphold their constitutional rights. This statute allows for the redress of rights violations but does not provide substantive rights itself. Official capacity suits against Davis are effectively actions against Rowan County, which can only be held liable if a policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. A single decision by an official with policymaking authority could constitute county policy. Determining whether an official is a final policymaker is a nuanced legal question dependent on state or local law, and courts should not classify officials as state or municipal actors in an overly broad manner, focusing instead on the specific area of authority. The Court is examining whether Davis, the elected Rowan County Clerk, acted as a final policymaker in the issuance of marriage licenses. Although Davis operates with minimal oversight from the Rowan County Fiscal Court, there is no evidence that she establishes marriage policy for the County, as the State of Kentucky exclusively regulates marriage. The State not only creates marriage laws but also dictates the procedures county clerks must follow, indicating that Davis acts on behalf of the State rather than as an independent policymaker for Rowan County. This finding does not preclude the possibility of the Plaintiffs obtaining injunctive relief against Davis. Typically, the Eleventh Amendment prevents lawsuits against a state or its officials; however, actions for prospective relief against state officials are treated differently. This principle, derived from the Ex parte Young doctrine, allows federal courts to order state officials to comply with federal law without violating sovereign immunity. The Plaintiffs seek to prevent Davis from infringing on their federal constitutional rights, granting the Court authority to provide relief under Ex parte Young. The excerpt further discusses the fundamental right to marry as protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, which encompasses both procedural and substantive due process. While the Constitution does not explicitly mention marriage, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized it as a fundamental right, applicable to both different-sex and same-sex couples. Any state law or policy that significantly interferes with this right must be justified by compelling state interests and be narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. A state significantly infringes on the right to marry when some individuals are completely barred from marrying, while others face substantial burdens that effectively coerce them to abandon their marriage rights. The Wisconsin statute requiring court approval for individuals with child support obligations before marrying was invalidated on these grounds. However, not all state actions related to marriage require strict scrutiny; reasonable regulations that do not substantially hinder marriage decisions can be upheld if they are rationally connected to a legitimate government interest. In the case at hand, Defendant Davis' refusal to issue marriage licenses is contested by Plaintiffs, who argue that this policy severely obstructs their ability to marry in Rowan County. Davis counters that Plaintiffs can obtain licenses from neighboring counties or from Judge Walter Blevins, indicating that they are not entirely barred from marriage in Kentucky. While it is true that obtaining a license from other counties is an option, the Plaintiffs emphasize their strong community ties to Rowan County, making it preferable for them to marry there. Moreover, for some residents in this rural area, traveling to other counties may pose significant physical, financial, or logistical challenges. Davis’ argument also overlooks the potential for other county clerks to adopt similar policies, as 57 out of 120 clerks have expressed concerns about issuing marriage licenses in light of religious beliefs regarding same-sex marriage. If Davis' policy is deemed non-interfering, it sets a precedent that could lead to widespread refusal to issue licenses, amplifying the inconvenience from a few counties to potentially half of the state. Lastly, while Judge Blevins can issue marriage licenses in the county clerk's absence, his authority is limited and should not be seen as a complete alternative to the county clerk’s role. The statute does not define 'absence,' leading to the conclusion that a traditional interpretation is applicable. Davis argues for her designation as 'absent' due to her religious objections to issuing marriage licenses, but lacks legal precedent to support this interpretation. Allowing Judge Blevins to issue licenses while Davis performs her duties would exceed his authority, as KRS 402.240 only permits him to act when Davis is unable to do so. This could create conflicts between county officials and risk manipulation of defined duties. The Court finds that Davis' suggestion of future alternatives for obtaining licenses, like an online system proposed by county clerks, is currently impractical and does not affect the analysis of 'substantial interference.' The Court concludes that the only viable option for Plaintiffs is to seek marriage licenses in another county. Although travel is possible, the Court questions why Plaintiffs should have to do so, given their expectation for their elected official to fulfill her duties. Davis' refusal to issue licenses hinders many residents' ability to marry and warrants heightened scrutiny. When asked for a compelling state interest behind her 'no marriage licenses' policy, Davis cites the protection of her religious freedom. However, the State's obligations extend beyond this, including preventing Establishment Clause violations and upholding the rule of law, which must take precedence over individual religious beliefs in a governmental context. Davis must comply with the Court's opinion despite personal disagreement, as noncompliance could create a dangerous precedent. The Court finds that Davis' 'no marriage licenses' policy likely violates Plaintiffs’ rights without a compelling state interest, indicating a strong likelihood of success for the Plaintiffs in their claim, which supports their request for relief. In terms of potential irreparable harm, the Court notes that a plaintiff who shows a likelihood of success on a constitutional claim is likely to suffer irreparable injury without injunctive relief. Relevant case law indicates that violations of constitutional rights lead to irreparable harm, and while the Sixth Circuit has not explicitly addressed marriage rights in this context, the denial of such rights will likely result in irreparable harm similar to other recognized rights. Thus, this factor favors granting the Plaintiffs’ Motion. Regarding potential harm to Kim Davis, the First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion, encompassing both the freedom to believe and to act, although the latter is subject to regulation. Free exercise challenges typically invoke strict scrutiny, requiring laws to serve a compelling government interest. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has moderated this stance, allowing neutral and generally applicable laws to impose incidental burdens on religious practices without strict justification. A law is not deemed neutral if it specifically targets religious practices for restriction. The Court has not clearly defined the standard for evaluating whether a prohibition is of general application but noted that the Free Exercise Clause protects against unequal treatment based on religious motivation. It has been interpreted that Smith and Babalu imply a rational basis review for neutral laws of general applicability, which requires laws to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In response to these cases, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prevents substantial burdens on religious exercise from rules of general applicability unless a compelling state interest justifies it. Although RFRA was intended to apply to both federal and state governments, the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional as applied to states in City of Boerne v. Flores. Thus, federal free exercise challenges are governed by RFRA, while state challenges follow the Smith standard. In the context of Governor Beshear's directive post-Obergefell, which mandates county clerks to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, Davis contends that this directive significantly burdens her religious exercise and lacks a compelling state interest. She argues that an exemption could easily be granted without disrupting Kentucky’s marriage licensing system. Davis claims that the directive is not neutral or generally applicable, suggesting it requires strict scrutiny. However, the text indicates that Beshear’s directive aims to align state activities with Supreme Court decisions, and Davis has not sufficiently shown that it intends to suppress religious practice. Her evidence includes a single instance where Governor Beshear allegedly discriminated in granting conscience-based exemptions. Additionally, the Attorney General's decision not to appeal a ruling against Kentucky’s same-sex marriage bans further complicates her argument, as it reflects a lack of intent to pursue discriminatory practices. Davis has not been granted an exemption similar to that of Attorney General Conway regarding her religious objections to same-sex marriage. While both are elected officials with strong opinions on the matter, the comparison fails as Conway's situation involved prosecutorial discretion on an unsettled legal issue, whereas Davis is outright refusing to comply with Supreme Court rulings in her official capacity as Rowan County Clerk. Consequently, the Court finds that Governor Beshear's treatment of them cannot be seen as discriminatory based on religious beliefs. The Beshear directive is likely to be upheld as it serves a legitimate government purpose, specifically in maintaining the rule of law and promoting individual autonomy for same-sex couples, which includes access to marriage licenses and associated societal benefits. Additionally, the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause protects individuals' rights to speak and refrain from speaking, but it does not prevent the government from determining its own speech content. The government can promote policies on behalf of its citizens. Davis argues that the directive violates her free speech rights by compelling her to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, which she perceives as endorsing a message contrary to her religious beliefs. The Court examines whether issuing a marriage license is an act of speech, noting Davis' claim that it requires her to "authorize" same-sex marriage. However, the KDLA marriage licensing form does not necessitate endorsement of same-sex marriage; it only requires the clerk to verify the accuracy of the provided information and the couple's eligibility under Kentucky law. Davis' personal religious beliefs are irrelevant to this legal obligation. The Court also considers that any potential speech may be attributed to the government, as county clerks issue licenses on behalf of the State, which dictates the form without allowing alterations. The Court contemplates if compelling Davis to issue a license infringes on her free speech rights, but finds limited relevance in compelled speech precedents, which typically involve private individuals. As a public employee, Davis' speech rights differ from those of private citizens; the government has more authority to regulate employee speech. Public employees must accept certain limitations on their freedoms as a condition of employment. The analysis of constitutional protections for public employee speech is guided by two inquiries: whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a public concern, and whether the speech was made within the scope of official duties. If the speech is made in the course of official duties, it is not protected under the First Amendment. Restricting speech related to a public employee's professional duties does not violate the employee's rights as a private citizen. Courts must evaluate if the government entity had sufficient justification for treating the employee differently from the public. The government restrictions must target speech that could impact its operations. In the case of Davis, her refusal to issue marriage licenses as Rowan County Clerk does not constitute private speech since only her official capacity allows her to act in this role. Therefore, her refusal likely does not receive First Amendment protection, making her compelled speech claim unlikely to succeed. Article VI, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits religious tests for public office, which means state-imposed criteria based on religion are unconstitutional. This principle has been upheld in cases such as Torcaso v. Watkins and McDaniel v. Paty, which invalidated requirements based on religious beliefs for holding public office. Davis argues that being compelled to issue marriage licenses contradicts her religious beliefs, constituting an improper religious test. However, the act of issuing a marriage license only confirms legal compliance, not moral endorsement. The state does not force her to adopt specific religious beliefs as a condition of employment, nor does it infringe on her rights to freely exercise her religion. Despite her focus on the Religious Test Clause, the Court reminds Davis of her obligation to uphold the Constitution, which she swore to do upon taking office. Her refusal to follow established legal rulings suggests a potential violation of her constituents' constitutional rights. Sincere personal opposition that becomes law and public policy can lead to state-sanctioned exclusion, which demeans those whose liberties are denied, as noted in Obergefell. The Kentucky Religious Freedom Act aligns with the Kentucky Constitution, which asserts that all individuals are inherently free and equal, possessing inalienable rights, including the right to worship freely. Specifically, Kentucky Constitution § 5 prohibits legal preference for any religious sect or belief and protects individuals from being compelled to support any religious institution or education contrary to their conscience. Kentucky courts have determined that this constitutional provision does not offer greater protection than the First Amendment. However, the Kentucky Religious Freedom Act imposes heightened scrutiny on state actions that may substantially burden religious exercise. Under this act, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest and employ the least restrictive means to justify such burdens, which may include indirect consequences like withholding benefits or access to programs. In this context, Davis contends that the Beshear directive significantly burdens her religious freedom without a compelling state interest. The court finds that the burden is minimal, as Davis is merely required to confirm that couples meet legal marriage criteria, not to endorse same-sex unions. Davis retains her right to practice her faith and hold personal beliefs regarding marriage. Nonetheless, her religious beliefs do not exempt her from fulfilling her responsibilities as Rowan County Clerk, leading the court to conclude that she is unlikely to violate her free exercise rights under the Kentucky Constitution. Furthermore, safeguarding constitutional rights is deemed to be in the public interest. In G. V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, the court determined that Kim Davis's "no marriage licenses" policy likely infringes on Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry. The court found that Davis would not suffer a violation of her free speech or exercise rights if an injunction was issued, leading to a conclusion that all four factors for granting a preliminary injunction favored the Plaintiffs. The court granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, prohibiting Davis from enforcing her policy against future marriage license requests. The court noted that issuing marriage licenses required minimal resources in Rowan County, with Davis’s office having issued 212 licenses in 2014, generating approximately $4,500, or 0.1% of its annual budget, from these licenses. The process occupied only about one hour of a deputy clerk’s time weekly. Legal qualifications for marriage in Kentucky include being over eighteen, mentally competent, unrelated, and currently unmarried. The court acknowledged that while Plaintiffs argued against the need to classify Davis as a state actor or municipal policymaker for relief, this did not preclude further arguments on this issue. The court also referenced socioeconomic data, indicating that Rowan County's median household income is significantly lower than the state average, with a notable percentage of the population living below the poverty line. Additionally, it expressed concerns about the practicality of Davis's proposed interpretations regarding marriage license processing, particularly emphasizing the limited availability of Judge Blevins, the highest elected official in the county, for handling marriage requests. The Court expresses concerns about Judge Blevins' efficiency compared to Kim Davis and her six deputy clerks. Plaintiffs have made an Establishment Clause claim against Davis in her official capacity, which is referenced in a preliminary injunction motion Davis filed against Governor Beshear and KDLA Librarian Wayne Onkst, though that motion is not yet ready for review. Davis contends that if the Beshear directive is deemed neutral and generally applicable, strict scrutiny should still apply to her free exercise claim because it is paired with a free speech claim. However, the Court finds this argument lacks merit, as Davis' free speech rights are limited due to her public employment status, citing Draper v. Logan County Public Library. The Court will further explore this issue in the next section. Davis cites precedents from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, specifically Bourke v. Beshear and Love v. Beshear, which ruled that Kentucky's prohibitions on same-sex marriage violated equal protection rights. These cases were consolidated by the Sixth Circuit and reversed, later leading to the Supreme Court's review in Obergefell v. Hodges. The excerpt notes that free speech cases involving public employees typically address compelled silence rather than compelled speech, emphasizing that the First Amendment encompasses both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking.