Court: District Court, D. Kansas; August 10, 2015; Federal District Court
The Court concludes that the Kansas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage are unconstitutional, violating the due process and equal protection clauses, following the precedent set by Obergefell v. Hodges. There is a dispute between the plaintiffs, who argue that Obergefell strengthens their case, and the defendants, who claim the case is moot. The Court determines it must rule on some claims rather than dismissing the case outright, as Obergefell did not directly address Kansas’ laws.
The plaintiffs seek two forms of relief: a declaration that the Kansas laws are void and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The Court grants the first request, affirming the unconstitutionality of the Kansas laws. However, the second request for a permanent injunction is more complex. The defendants have indicated compliance with Obergefell but the Court has concerns regarding the uniformity of this compliance, based on facts presented.
Balancing the need for federal judicial oversight with the opportunity for state officials to comply voluntarily with Supreme Court rulings, the Court ultimately decides to provide the plaintiffs with declaratory relief while carefully considering the necessity and implications of a permanent injunction. The specifics of the Court's declaratory judgment are detailed at the end of the order.
The Court has temporarily declined to grant the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction against Kansas officials regarding same-sex marriage laws. The decision is deferred pending further evidence on whether Kansas officials will voluntarily comply with the Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges. The Court allows parties to submit additional statements of facts by September 15, 2015, with a 21-day response period for each side. If evidence indicates non-compliance with Obergefell, the Court will reassess the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment based on established legal standards.
The procedural context includes the plaintiffs seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging Kansas laws that prohibit licensing and recognizing same-sex marriages. The Court previously issued a preliminary injunction based on Tenth Circuit precedent that deemed similar laws unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the Supreme Court's recent affirmation of this precedent in Obergefell, the Court must now consider motions including several motions to dismiss and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. While the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief is granted, their claim for injunctive relief is denied for now. The Order provides rationale for these decisions, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive record to guide the Court's remedial discretion.
Plaintiffs seek a court declaration that Kansas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment and request an injunction against enforcement by state officials. The challenged laws include Article 15, Section 16 of the Kansas Constitution and K.S.A. 23-2501 and 23-2508, which explicitly define marriage as a union between one man and one woman, rendering all other marriages void. K.S.A. 23-2508 further restricts recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages. Plaintiffs assert that these laws not only ban same-sex marriages but also impose unconstitutional restrictions on neutral statutes, such as K.S.A. 79-32,115, which governs tax filing status, preventing same-sex couples from filing jointly. Similar restrictions affect K.S.A. 8-246(a)(1), which governs name changes on driver’s licenses, and K.A.R. 108-1-1(g)(1), concerning health plan eligibility for spouses of state employees. Plaintiffs argue that the enforcement of these laws violates their constitutional rights by denying recognition and benefits afforded to heterosexual couples.
An "eligible dependent participant" is defined by regulation as a lawful spouse recognized by Kansas law. Two plaintiffs, Kail Marie and Michelle Brown, allege that their employers, Kansas universities, denied their requests to add their spouses to healthcare plans, citing that same-sex marriages are not recognized under Kansas law. The factual background reveals that the plaintiffs have lived in committed relationships for 20 years and meet all qualifications for marriage in Kansas, except for their same-sex status.
On October 8, 2012, Ms. Marie applied for a marriage license at the Douglas County District Court but was instructed to return after a three-day waiting period. The next day, District Judge Robert Fairchild issued an Administrative Order stating that the court must follow existing Kansas laws regarding marriage licenses. He noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had declined to review cases that challenged similar provisions in other states, indicating that without a justiciable case, the court could not determine the validity of Kansas' constitutional provision regarding marriage.
The plaintiffs did not clarify whether Ms. Marie submitted the application or if it was denied; however, Judge Fairchild's order implied that it would have been denied. Similarly, plaintiffs Kerry Wilks and Donna DiTrani, who have lived together for five years, experienced refusal from the Sedgwick County District Court clerks when they attempted to apply for a marriage license on multiple occasions in October 2014, eventually leading to a deputy clerk taking their information for an application on the fourth attempt.
Ms. Wilks and Ms. DiTrani completed a marriage license application, but it was denied by a deputy clerk who cited the Kansas Constitution's prohibition on same-sex marriage and stated that the Sedgwick County District Court would not issue licenses to same-sex couples.
James Peters and Gary Mohrman, who have been in a committed same-sex relationship for nearly 35 years and married in Iowa in 2010, joined the lawsuit after filing an Amended Complaint. Mr. Peters, employed by the University of Kansas, sought to add Mr. Mohrman as a dependent for health insurance coverage under the State Employee Health Plan (SEHP). However, the request was denied based on a directive stating that same-sex marriages are not recognized under Kansas law. Consequently, while they file their federal taxes jointly as a married couple, they must file separately as single individuals for state taxes due to Kansas's non-recognition of their marriage.
Carrie Fowler and Sarah Braun, who have been in a committed same-sex relationship for over two years and married in Illinois in 2014, also joined the lawsuit. Ms. Fowler changed her last name to Braun in accordance with Illinois law and attempted to obtain a driver's license under her married name in Kansas. However, the Kansas Division of Vehicles (KDV) refused to issue the license, citing the state's non-recognition of same-sex marriages. Even after the Douglas County district court began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, KDV representatives maintained that same-sex marriages were still not recognized under Kansas law.
Darci Jo Bóhnenblust and Joleen Hickman, plaintiffs in the lawsuit, have been in a committed same-sex relationship for over 19 years and reside in Riley, Kansas. They married in Riley County on November 13, 2014, following a preliminary injunction that allowed same-sex marriage licenses to be issued. After their marriage, they attempted to obtain new driver’s licenses reflecting their married last names—“Pottroff” for Ms. Bóhnenblust and “Spain” for Ms. Hickman—but were denied by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDV) due to the state’s non-recognition of same-sex marriages. Additionally, Ms. Bóhnenblust, employed at Kansas State University, sought to add Ms. Hickman as a dependent on her health insurance but was refused based on the same legal rationale.
The document outlines the roles of several defendants. Susan Mosier, M.D., Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), is responsible for vital records and ensuring compliance with Kansas laws that prohibit same-sex marriage. Douglas Hamilton, Clerk of the District Court for the Seventh Judicial District, has similar responsibilities regarding the issuance of marriage licenses while adhering to state laws against same-sex marriage. Bernie Lumbreras, Clerk of the District Court for the Eighteenth Judicial District, performs the same functions as Mr. Hamilton in Sedgwick County. Both Hamilton and Lumbreras are named in their official capacities and accused of acting under state law during the events relevant to the lawsuit.
Ms. Lumbreras is responsible for ensuring compliance with Kansas law, including its same-sex marriage ban, in her role as deputy clerk. Plaintiffs allege that the deputy clerk who denied the marriage license application of Ms. Wilks and Ms. DiTrani acted under Lumbreras’s direction, naming her in her official capacity and asserting she acted under state law at all relevant times.
Nick Jordan, the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR), supervises the KDOR, which includes the Division of Taxation. Kansas law, K.S.A. 79-32,115, governs tax filing statuses for married couples. KDOR issued Notice 13-18 clarifying that Kansas only recognizes marriages between one man and one woman, thus prohibiting same-sex couples from filing joint or married status income tax returns. Although this notice has been removed from the KDOR website, plaintiffs claim it continues to be enforced, and they have named Secretary Jordan in his official capacity, alleging he acted under state law.
Lisa Kaspar, the Director of the Kansas Department of Vehicles (KDV), oversees the issuance and reissuance of driver’s licenses. Plaintiffs allege that under Kaspar’s direction, the KDV has applied the same-sex marriage ban to deny same-sex couples the ability to obtain a new driver’s license using their marriage license as proof of identity, naming her in her official capacity and asserting she acted under state law.
Mike Michael, the Director of the Kansas State Employee Health Plan (SEHP), manages health benefits for state employees and their dependents. Plaintiffs contend that he has implemented the SEHP’s eligibility provisions in a way that excludes same-sex spouses from coverage, naming him in his official capacity and alleging he acted under state law.
Plaintiffs have named Director Michael in his official capacity, claiming he acted under state law throughout the relevant period. Defendants have filed four motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction on various grounds. These include assertions of sovereign immunity, lack of an Article III case or controversy, mootness, and lack of standing due to insufficient traceability and redressability of injuries. The motions also argue that the claims do not present a federal question and are barred by the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity.
Defendants’ challenges include both facial and factual jurisdictional challenges under Rule 12(b)(1). For facial challenges, the Court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true, while for factual challenges, it may consider evidence outside the complaint. However, factual disputes must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendants have incorporated their dismissal arguments into their response to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Court opts to evaluate these jurisdictional challenges under the summary judgment standard, which is less burdensome for the defendants than the standard for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.
Despite this more favorable standard, the Court finds that defendants’ jurisdictional challenges do not justify dismissal and therefore denies all four motions to dismiss. Additionally, the plaintiffs seek summary judgment on all claims, prompting the Court to discuss and apply the standard governing motions for summary judgment.
To succeed in a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs must show there is no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). The court evaluates evidence and draws inferences in favor of the non-moving parties, which are the defendants in this case. A genuine issue of fact exists if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, while a material issue is essential to resolving the claim or defense. Plaintiffs carry the initial burden of production and must demonstrate that summary judgment is legally justified without needing to disprove the defendants' claims; they must only indicate a lack of evidence supporting the defendants' position. If this burden is met, defendants must present specific facts showing genuine issues for trial, using affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specified exhibits. Summary judgment is a valid procedural mechanism aimed at ensuring just and efficient resolutions of cases.
Regarding mootness, which stems from Article III's case or controversy requirement, the court recognizes two types: constitutional and prudential mootness. Defendants have consistently argued that plaintiffs' claims are moot across multiple motions and filings. The court will first assess if there remains a live controversy that meets Article III's requirements, followed by an examination of prudential concerns that may influence the decision to grant relief.
Constitutional mootness mandates that federal court cases present a definite, concrete controversy throughout litigation, allowing for specific relief. It stems from Article III’s case or controversy rule, stipulating that an actual controversy must exist at all review stages, not just at the complaint's filing. Courts view constitutional mootness as a temporal aspect of standing, with separate burdens of proof: plaintiffs must demonstrate standing, while defendants must prove mootness. The defendants’ mootness arguments are categorized into two groups: those from their initial motions to dismiss and responses, and those from a recent motion claiming plaintiffs’ claims are moot due to compliance with the Obergefell ruling. Defendants argued that their non-enforcement of bans on same-sex marriage licensing made the claims moot, citing specific instances of compliance with gender-neutral application forms and licensing practices. These mootness claims were reiterated under various labels, including sovereign immunity and lack of standing. However, the court found these arguments unpersuasive, noting that defendants had not previously indicated why they provided the relief sought, which was due to the preliminary injunction order in the case.
Administrative Orders from the Chief Judges of Kansas’ Seventh and Eighteenth Judicial Districts confirm compliance with a preliminary injunction from this Court, mandating that marriage licenses be issued to all qualified applicants regardless of gender. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision not to stay this preliminary injunction further instructs Kansas and the parties involved in the Kail Marie lawsuit to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
Mootness of a plaintiff's claims arises only if it is unequivocally clear that the wrongful behavior is not likely to recur in the absence of the injunction, as established in Vitek v. Jones. The defendants have not met this burden, particularly since the injunction is preliminary. Compliance with such an injunction does not moot the underlying claims; if dissolved without a decision on the merits, there would be nothing preventing the defendants from resuming enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban.
Defendants, after the Obergefell decision, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot due to their voluntary compliance with Obergefell. However, plaintiffs correctly point out that Obergefell did not invalidate the specific provisions of the Kansas Constitution and statutes that prohibit same-sex marriage. The defendants’ remaining mootness argument hinges on their voluntary compliance, which requires a stringent standard to establish mootness, as stated in Friends of the Earth. This standard demands clear evidence that the wrongful behavior is not expected to recur, placing the burden on the party claiming mootness.
Defendants must demonstrate not only current compliance with the Constitution but also eliminate any reasonable risk of future noncompliance. The burden of proof lies heavily on them, particularly when weighed against the public interest in resolving the case definitively, which tends to favor plaintiffs. In assessing the mootness claims of the original defendants, the Clerk defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims are moot due to their ongoing issuance of same-sex marriage licenses for over seven months. Secretary Mosier claims to continue distributing marriage forms and managing records in accordance with same-sex marriage, similar to her predecessor's actions post-preliminary injunction. However, the original defendants have not provided new evidence to substantiate their claims of voluntary compliance, relying instead on outdated declarations and orders. The court previously clarified that such compliance does not moot the plaintiffs' underlying claims, indicating that the defendants must provide evidence of independent compliance to establish mootness.
Regarding Secretary Jordan, he claims the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) has withdrawn a guidance document that disallowed same-sex couples from filing joint tax returns and asserts that they will now process returns for same-sex couples equally. However, the only supporting evidence is an affidavit from KDOR's Director of Policy and Research, which only confirms the removal of the document without verifying equitable treatment of tax filings between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. In contrast, plaintiffs provided evidence through a declaration from a tax preparer who has assisted same-sex couples with tax filings, indicating ongoing concerns regarding equal treatment in practice.
Mr. Christensen inquired via email to the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) regarding the status of his clients' 2014 Kansas income tax returns. Bob Clelland from the KDOR responded that the returns were under review due to a recent Supreme Court ruling and would not be accepted at that time. After a follow-up email eight days later, Clelland indicated that joint returns were not yet being accepted and that he would need to change the filing to separate. In a subsequent email, Mr. Christensen referenced an affidavit from Mr. Cram, which stated that the Attorney General’s office had retracted Notice 13-18, which denied recognition of same-sex marriages for state tax purposes, but was awaiting clarification from the Governor's legal staff on the implications for tax returns. The court concluded that the affidavit did not confirm that the KDOR was processing married-status tax returns for same-sex couples equally, indicating an ongoing controversy with Secretary Jordan.
Director Kaspar claimed the plaintiffs' claims against her were moot as the Kansas Division of Vehicles (KDV) now issues driver’s licenses reflecting married names for same-sex spouses, compliant with the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision. However, her affidavit did not address the specific relief sought by the plaintiffs—namely, the ability for same-sex spouses who changed their names upon marriage to obtain driver’s licenses under those new names. Evidence provided by plaintiff Matt Lara indicated that on July 10, 2015, he was denied a name change on his driver’s license at the KDV due to outdated policies. After further inquiry, Lara was later informed that the KDV would allow the name change.
The Court finds uncertainty regarding the KDV's current policy on same-sex spouses obtaining updated driver’s licenses under their married names, despite Director Kaspar's sworn statement asserting equal treatment for same-sex spouses. A violation occurred shortly after her declaration, leading the Court to reject the motion to dismiss claims against her based on mootness. Director Michael argues that claims against him are moot because Kansas law allows same-sex spouses eligibility for dependent coverage under the SEHP. However, the regulation cited does not definitively confirm this eligibility, and his reliance on an affidavit from Mike Randol, which states that applications will be accepted, does not guarantee equal approval for same-sex spouses. The Court determines that the evidence does not support a finding of no risk of recurring violations, thus maintaining the claims against Director Michael. Overall, the record indicates uncertainty about compliance with the Obergefell decision, and while some steps have been taken by the defendants, mere promises of reform do not suffice to render the case moot.
The Court examines prudential considerations related to the plaintiffs' requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, focusing on the doctrine of prudential mootness. This doctrine allows a court to dismiss a case not only for lack of constitutional grounds but also when prudence and respect for governmental branches suggest that the court should refrain from granting relief, even if it has the authority to do so. The Court emphasizes that prudential mootness is particularly relevant in cases seeking injunctions against government actions. Claims for equitable relief invoke the court's remedial discretion, which is essential for addressing the specific needs of each case.
A permanent injunction is characterized as an extraordinary remedy, and federalism principles advise caution when federal courts consider enjoining state governments. Although the plaintiffs' request does not violate any abstention doctrines, the Court must still weigh the implications of issuing a permanent injunction against Kansas officials. Prudential mootness often arises when a defendant, like the Kansas officials in this case, indicates a willingness to provide the relief the plaintiff seeks, and the Court must evaluate the credibility of such assurances. Government commitments carry significant weight, as an injunction could lead to unnecessary conflict and waste of public resources. The Court notes that evidence in the summary judgment record indicates that the defendants have begun to comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell.
Measures taken by defendants to comply with Obergefell are deemed insufficient to resolve plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, although they indicate a sincere, albeit incomplete, effort to align with the ruling. The Court chooses to defer the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief while allowing defendants time to finalize their policy updates. Should future developments suggest defendants are not complying, plaintiffs may amend their motion for injunctive relief. However, this decision does not affect the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief, which remain viable and must be adjudicated independently of the injunctive relief request. The Court emphasizes that a declaratory judgment is crucial to resolving disputes that influence defendants' actions toward plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief are therefore appropriate, as they can provide a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of Kansas laws and establish the constitutional standards to which defendants must adhere. This approach respects principles of comity and federalism, offering an alternative to injunctive relief for assessing state statutes' constitutionality. Hence, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief are not moot and are set for adjudication.
Secretary Mosier, Dr. Robert Moser, and the Clerk defendants argue against being proper defendants for the relief sought by plaintiffs. Dr. Moser's motion to dismiss claims relies on his resignation as Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE). The Court previously ruled that Dr. Moser was a proper defendant due to his official duties related to marriage registration. Following his resignation in November 2011, Susan Mosier became the Interim Secretary, and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), she is automatically substituted as a party in the case, allowing claims against Dr. Moser to continue as if directed at her.
Secretary Mosier remains a proper party as her office supervises marriage registration and maintains marriage records, which are essential for the plaintiffs' sought relief. The Clerk defendants argue that since judges, not clerks, decide on marriage licenses, the plaintiffs failed to join Chief Judges, making their claims against the clerks invalid under judicial immunity principles. However, the Court notes that the Clerk defendants incorrectly label their argument, as it pertains to standing rather than indispensable parties. Kansas law empowers both clerks and judges to issue marriage licenses, contradicting the clerks' assertion that only judges have this authority.
Defendants argue that the conduct affecting same-sex marriage applicants may involve non-party actors, but plaintiffs Marie, Brown, Wilks, and DiTrani experienced constitutional injuries directly from the Clerks, not judges. The Court's preliminary injunction order stated that these injuries resulted when the Clerks, under state law, denied marriage licenses. This injury is traceable to Kansas laws, as detailed in Chief Judge Fairchild’s Administrative Order 14-13 for plaintiffs Marie and Brown, and a Sedgwick County deputy clerk's statement clarifying that Kansas’ ban was the sole reason for denying licenses to Wilks and DiTrani. The relief sought by plaintiffs aims to address these injuries by enjoining the enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban, thus removing the barriers to license issuance. Defendants fail to present a compelling reason to deviate from this conclusion, affirming that the Clerks are proper defendants for the licensing claims.
Regarding Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, while it generally prohibits suits against state officials in their official capacities, the Ex parte Young doctrine allows for lawsuits if ongoing violations of federal law are alleged and prospective relief is sought. Director Michael contends that the relief against the SEHP plan implicates sovereign immunity due to potential monetary implications for the state. However, the possibility of requiring state funds does not automatically bar a claim. The Supreme Court's ruling in Edelman v. Jordan illustrates that federal courts can order prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, even if it incurs state costs. In Edelman, the Court differentiated between permissible future compliance injunctions and impermissible monetary restitution claims, reinforcing that only the latter violates Ex parte Young.
Plaintiffs are seeking a court order for Director Michael and the SEHP to recognize valid same-sex marriages entered into in Kansas and other jurisdictions, explicitly stating they do not request any monetary damages related to past tax overpayments or unpaid health insurance claims, but rather seek prospective relief. The court will not dismiss claims against Director Michael because the requested injunction aligns with permissible remedies under Edelman.
Secretary Jordan argues that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28 U.S.C. 1341, restricts the court's jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' request for equal recognition of same-sex marriages under Kansas tax laws, as the TIA prohibits federal court interference with state tax systems when an adequate state remedy exists. This act applies to both injunctive and declaratory relief. Jordan contends that the plaintiffs' claims would require the court to enjoin state tax assessments, which is barred by the TIA.
The court must determine whether the injunction pertains to the "assessment, levy or collection" of a state tax. Under the TIA, "tax" refers to laws aimed at raising revenue, not regulatory measures. The plaintiffs are not challenging a tax or fee but rather the administration processes of Kansas income tax filings, which are found to be regulatory rather than revenue-raising in nature. Thus, the challenge does not fall under the TIA's jurisdictional bar.
The Kansas Supreme Court evaluated an equal protection challenge against the Kansas Department of Revenue's (KDOR) policy that treats single and married taxpayers differently. The State articulated four non-revenue-based interests for this preferential treatment: encouraging marriage, alleviating the financial burden on married taxpayers, reducing the federal income tax 'marriage penalty,' and promoting the filing of joint tax returns. The Court determined that the policy in question does not qualify as a "tax" under the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) and that the TIA does not preclude federal court jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims, including those related to state tax administration.
Subsequently, the Court addressed the merits of the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief. Citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell, which invalidated state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage as violations of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court ruled that same-sex couples have the fundamental right to marry. Consequently, it declared that Kansas laws restricting marriage licenses for same-sex couples are unconstitutional. The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, denying various motions to dismiss filed by the defendants and affirming the plaintiffs' right to relief.
The Court grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment regarding claims for declaratory relief while postponing its decision on claims for injunctive relief. It declares that provisions of the Kansas Constitution, along with relevant statutes and policies that restrict marriage licenses and recognition of same-sex marriages, are void as they violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the Court identifies multiple discriminatory practices by various state officials:
1. The Clerk's refusal to license same-sex marriages on equal terms as opposite-sex marriages.
2. The Secretary of State’s refusal to distribute marriage-related forms and manage records for valid same-sex marriages.
3. The refusal of tax-related officials to allow same-sex couples to file tax returns as married or to process their filings comparably to opposite-sex couples.
4. The refusal to issue driver’s licenses to same-sex spouses under the same procedures available to opposite-sex spouses.
5. The refusal to approve applications for dependent health care benefits for same-sex spouses on the same terms as those for opposite-sex spouses.
The Court also sets a deadline of September 15, 2015, for the parties to submit any undisputed facts relevant to the injunctive relief claims, allowing 21 days for responses. It emphasizes that submissions must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and local rules, focusing on events post-July 21, 2015, and clarifies that no additional legal arguments are invited. Lastly, it specifies that once a motion to dismiss is turned into a factual motion, the opposing party must provide evidence to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
Federal courts are advised to abstain from cases involving unresolved state law questions, as established in Younger v. Harris and Burford v. Sun Oil Co., reflecting a longstanding policy against federal interference in state proceedings. The Anti-Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. 2283) prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions to halt state court actions, while the Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. 1341) prevents federal interference with state tax matters. In the current litigation, Directors Kaspar and Jordan contend they are not appropriate parties, but the court dismisses their claim due to a lack of supporting legal or factual evidence. The court also addresses arguments related to sovereign immunity and finds that these do not substantively impact the case, focusing instead on the argument from Director Michael. The court concludes that the plaintiffs' claims do not involve state tax issues, countering Secretary Jordan's assertion related to comity. It cites precedents from federal courts, including the Tenth Circuit, affirming that such claims fall within federal jurisdiction, particularly in the context of same-sex marriage recognition cases, which have established standing for similar tax-related disputes.
