Court: District Court, D. Arizona; November 6, 2014; Federal District Court
The United States seeks partial judgment on the pleadings regarding A.R.S. 13-2319, which criminalizes the smuggling of human beings for profit. The court heard arguments on November 3, 2014, and has previously detailed the case's background in earlier orders. A.R.S. 13-2319 defines "smuggling" as the transportation of individuals who are not legally in the U.S. The U.S. aims to permanently enjoin this statute, claiming it is the last unresolved issue in the case.
Defendants contend that the U.S. only challenged a specific section of the statute, arguing that federal law does not preempt A.R.S. 13-2319. They assert that the U.S. did not explicitly plead a challenge to the entire statute in its complaint. In response, the U.S. argues that the court has previously recognized its challenge to the complete statute, invoking the law of the case doctrine, which prevents reconsideration of previously decided issues. The standard for judgment on the pleadings applies, requiring that all pleadings be viewed as true, and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if they meet that standard.
The Court affirms that the Defendants' argument is precluded by the December 10, 2010 Order and lacks a reasonable basis within the Complaint. During the Motion to Dismiss consideration, the Court acknowledged that the Complaint contests A.R.S. 13-2319, which was modified by Section 4 of S.B. 1070. The United States successfully claimed that A.R.S. 13-2319's smuggling definition constitutes an impermissible regulation of immigration, asserting that the entire statute is preempted by federal law. Although specific sections of the Complaint do not mention A.R.S. 13-2319 directly, earlier references indicate a challenge to the entire statute. The United States alleges that Arizona's smuggling prohibition conflicts with federal law under 8 U.S.C. 1324, claiming it obstructs Congressional objectives regarding penalties for unlawful presence. The definition of smuggling cited by the United States predates S.B. 1070 and remains relevant, as the amendment only added a subsection without altering the definition itself. Thus, the Court dismisses the Defendants' assertion that not all sections of A.R.S. 13-2319 were challenged. Additionally, the Court references the Ninth Circuit's decision in Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, which established that federal law preempts A.R.S. 13-2319 based on field and conflict preemption principles, emphasizing federal authority over immigration matters.
The Ninth Circuit evaluated A.R.S. 13-2929 in relation to the federal statute 8 U.S.C. 1324, which addresses the transportation and harboring of unauthorized aliens as part of a comprehensive federal immigration enforcement scheme. The court identified that while Congress allowed state and local officers to arrest for violations of 8 U.S.C. 1324, it did not authorize state prosecutions, reserving that authority for federal officials. The court concluded that A.R.S. 13-2929 was field preempted, agreeing with other circuits that the federal government holds a dominant interest in regulating alien entry and movement.
The Ninth Circuit's conflict preemption analysis highlighted three reasons for its conclusion: 1) A.R.S. 13-2929 imposed different penalties that disrupted the federal legislative balance; 2) it undermined federal authority by allowing state prosecutions for these offenses; and 3) it criminalized actions not addressed under the federal harboring statute. The defendants failed to distinguish A.R.S. 13-2319 from the statute in Valle del Sol or refute the Ninth Circuit's precedent, relying instead on non-binding state court decisions that predated significant federal rulings. Consequently, A.R.S. 13-2319 was also found to be field preempted, as it sought to regulate transportation of unauthorized aliens in a manner overlapping with 8 U.S.C. 1324.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of A.R.S. 13-2319 aligns with its prior ruling in Valle del Sol, establishing that A.R.S. 13-2319 is conflict preempted due to an overwhelming federal interest in the field, particularly in relation to 8 U.S.C. 1324 concerning the harboring of unauthorized aliens. A.R.S. 13-2319 imposes different state penalties, undermines federal authority to prosecute smuggling crimes, and lacks a safe harbor for religious activities, which is present in the federal statute. Consequently, the court granted the United States' Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, declaring A.R.S. 13-2319, including amendments from Section 4 of S.B. 1070, as preempted by federal law and permanently enjoined. The defendants' argument that the United States' prior ruling only targeted Section 4 is unsupported, as the court indicated that the challenge extended beyond mere amendments to the existing human smuggling statute. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found A.R.S. 13-2929 to be void for vagueness, noting that the phrase 'in violation of a criminal offense' is not clear to an ordinary person.
