Ellis v. San Francisco State University

Citations: 114 F. Supp. 3d 884; 32 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 171; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88817; 2015 WL 4111405Docket: Case No. 15-cv-02273-TEH

Court: District Court, N.D. California; July 7, 2015; Federal District Court

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The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss filed by San Francisco State University regarding the Complaint from Plaintiff Linda Ellis. The Court accepted the factual allegations as true for the purpose of this motion. Ellis was hired as a professor in 1987 and diagnosed with a brain tumor in June 2010, linked to radiation exposure from the Chernobyl disaster. Following her diagnosis, she received a letter in May 2014 from Bryan Kauffman, the Director of Faculty, Staff Relations, placing her on temporary suspension pending a Fitness for Duty Independent Medical Examination, citing disruption of university operations but providing no further justification. Ellis later discovered that the examination would be psychological and challenged the need for it, ultimately refusing to attend. Kauffman threatened disciplinary action for her refusal and insisted she attend the evaluation despite her objections. After rescheduling the examination twice, the university issued a Notice of Dismissal in August 2014, stating her refusal to undergo the examination constituted a failure to perform her duties, leading to her termination on December 2, 2014. Ellis filed claims with the EEOC and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing before initiating this lawsuit, alleging her termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Court noted that under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must present sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim for relief, requiring more than mere possibility of unlawful conduct.

A claim is considered facially plausible when the plaintiff presents sufficient factual content to allow the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all material factual allegations as true and interpret the complaint favorably for the non-moving party, though legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations are not accepted as true. Dismissal may occur if there is no valid legal theory or if the facts alleged are insufficient under a valid theory. Courts are limited to the pleadings' facts, and introducing external matters converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, unless excluded by the court.

In this case, the plaintiff asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The defendant contends that the plaintiff's ADA claims are barred by California’s sovereign immunity, a point the plaintiff concedes. However, the plaintiff argues that the defendant waived this immunity by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, which the defendant disputes, citing a divided authority regarding the ADA's procedural limitations and the Rehabilitation Act's incorporation of ADA standards. The court finds the defendant's arguments unpersuasive, emphasizing that leave to amend should be granted freely when justice requires, and noting that Congress intended for the Rehabilitation Act to incorporate the substantive prohibitions of the ADA. Consequently, the plaintiff is permitted to amend the complaint to state similar claims under the Rehabilitation Act while maintaining plausible claims under the ADA and FEHA.

Plaintiff's claims under the ADA are dismissed, but she is allowed to amend her complaint under the Rehabilitation Act, as substantive prohibitions of the ADA are applicable. Defendant does not contest that the ADA's procedural limitations bar these claims. Plaintiff's claims under the ADA and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) remain valid. The ADA prohibits requiring medical examinations unless they are job-related and consistent with business necessity, a standard that is strict and objective, placing the burden on the employer to demonstrate necessity. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant demanded her attendance at a “Fitness for Duty Independent Medical Examination” without sufficient justification, and that her refusal led to her termination. These allegations constitute plausible claims under the ADA and FEHA. Defendant's attempt to submit evidence from the letter demanding the examination is dismissed as it falls outside the pleadings. While Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no right to refuse a lawful examination, Plaintiff seems to concede that termination could result from non-compliance with a lawful demand.

Plaintiff has raised a plausible claim that Defendant's demand for a medical examination was unlawful, arguing that Defendant failed to demonstrate a legitimate business necessity or job-relatedness for the examination. It is suggested that an employer might improperly demand such an evaluation for reasons unrelated to work, such as personal disputes. While an employee can't refuse an examination solely based on personal belief about its necessity, the demand must be objectively reasonable. The determination of whether Defendant's demand was justified is a factual question that cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage, particularly as the burden of proof lies with Defendant. If Defendant proves the demand was job-related and necessary, termination after refusal may be lawful; otherwise, Plaintiff had the right to refuse, and termination would be unlawful. The Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA claims without prejudice, allowing for these claims to be realleged under the Rehabilitation Act, with an amended complaint due within two weeks or risk dismissal with prejudice. Other aspects of Defendant's motion were denied.