Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; July 9, 2015; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs Douglas Bader, Charles Doyle, and Ralph Rina filed a lawsuit against United Airlines, Inc. and United Continental Holdings, Inc. alleging age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), violations of state civil rights statutes, wrongful discharge, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interference with prospective economic advantage. United Airlines moved to dismiss these claims under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that the claims are precluded, preempted, or legally insufficient.
The plaintiffs, who were Pilot Instructor/Evaluators (I/Es) at Continental Airlines prior to its merger with United, argue that United's requirement for I/Es to be 'line-qualified'—a stipulation that necessitates being under the age of 65 due to FAA regulations—is arbitrary and discriminatory. Following the merger, United, in conjunction with the Airline Pilots Association, established the United Pilots Agreement (UPA), mandating that I/Es be line-qualified, which resulted in the termination of the plaintiffs after a grace period as they reached the FAA's age limit.
In assessing the motion to dismiss, the court applied federal notice-pleading standards, requiring the plaintiffs' complaint to provide a short, plain statement that gives fair notice of their claims, supported by sufficient factual content to suggest a plausible right to relief. The court's analysis also included considerations of preemption by the Fair Treatment of Experienced Pilots Act (FTE-PA), which mandates that line pilots, but not I/Es, be under 65 years old and calls for compliance with FAA-approved training programs for older pilots. The court's decision on the motion to dismiss is partially granted and partially denied, indicating that some claims may proceed while others may be dismissed based on the established legal standards.
The FTE-PA includes a preemption provision stating that actions compliant with its regulations cannot form the basis for liability under any employment law before U.S. courts or agencies (49 U.S.C. 44729(e)(2)). The FAA regulates commercial air operations and allows air carriers to create an Advanced Qualification Plan (AQP) for training and certifying crewmembers, subject to FAA approval (14 C.F.R. 121.909). United Airlines asserts that its AQP requires instructors and evaluators (I/Es) to be line-qualified, claiming this requirement preempts the plaintiffs’ claims under the FTE-PA. However, the court finds that United has not substantiated that its AQP mandates line-qualification, as it failed to identify any specific approved document reflecting such a requirement. Furthermore, the court can only consider the allegations in the complaint and specific referenced documents at the motion to dismiss stage, and United's AQP does not meet these criteria. Even if the AQP did require line-qualification, United has not adequately justified why the FTE-PA would preempt the plaintiffs' claims since they are I/Es and not pilots, and the FTE-PA specifically pertains to pilots over the age of 60 (49 U.S.C. 44729). The court finds that the cited case, Jones v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, does not support United’s position, as it involved a pilot and does not extend FTE-PA applicability to I/Es. Consequently, the court determines that the plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by the FTE-PA at this stage.
United asserts that its line-flying requirement for Instructors/Examiners (I/Es) constitutes a reasonable factor other than age (RFOA) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). However, at this procedural stage, United cannot invoke this defense, as it is an affirmative defense requiring both evidentiary support and persuasion of its merit. The court cannot dismiss the case based solely on allegations that do not sufficiently establish the defense. United has not proven that the line-qualification requirement is legally mandated or that it is reasonable simply because it was a longstanding practice before the merger, without further evidence obtained through discovery.
Additionally, United claims the line-qualification for I/Es is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). Similar to RFOA, BFOQ is also an affirmative defense that must be substantiated by the defendant, and it cannot typically be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. The necessity of line-qualification for I/Es, compared to pilots, remains unclear, and United has not shown that there is a legal requirement for I/Es to be under 65 or that line-qualification is essential to the airline's operations. Consequently, the court denies United's motion concerning the BFOQ defense.
Regarding the retaliation claim by plaintiff Bader, United contends it fails because the complaint does not indicate that Bader engaged in protected activity prior to the alleged retaliatory actions, which occurred in 2013, while Bader filed a discrimination charge in February 2014. Bader’s response cites an informal complaint made in spring 2013 after seeing a seniority list that improperly ranked plaintiffs. However, the complaint only vaguely mentions that "plaintiffs complained" about the list, lacking specific details to establish protected activity.
The complaint, particularly Count II, is criticized for being poorly drafted, yet it has enough allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss. United Airlines references Peters v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP to argue that a vague mention of the plaintiffs' complaints about a seniority list is insufficient, but this case is not directly applicable as it was decided at the summary judgment stage. The allegations related to plaintiff Bader are minimal but provide adequate notice of claims, leading to the denial of United’s motion regarding Bader’s retaliation claim.
Regarding the preemption of state law claims by the Airline Deregulation Act (FADA), United asserts that all state-law claims, including discrimination and common law claims, are preempted by FADA, which aims to enhance airline industry performance by limiting state regulations on prices, routes, and services. Citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, United argues that job requirements for instructor/examiners (I/Es) are related to airline services and fall under FADA's broad preemption. Congress prioritized safety in air commerce, retaining federal authority over airline services, which includes pilot training.
In opposition, the plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court has indicated that some state laws may only relate to prices or services in a tenuous manner, thus not warranting preemption. They note that most Circuit Courts have found that FADA does not preempt state employment law claims, while United counters with a few contrary lower court decisions.
The Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit have not specifically determined if the Federal Aviation Deregulation Act (FADA) preempts state employment law claims. The Seventh Circuit has defined 'service' in FADA broadly, encompassing all aspects of air carrier service, including transportation. In contrast, district courts within the Seventh Circuit are hesitant to extend this preemption to employment law claims, noting that such claims have a tenuous relationship with 'services' under FADA. Cases like Hamilton and Meyer illustrate that whistleblower and retaliatory discharge claims are not preempted, as they do not directly implicate safety concerns associated with airline services. United Airlines argues that the plaintiffs' age discrimination claims interfere with its safety obligations under FADA; however, the Court finds this justification insufficient for preemption since safety is an implicit expectation rather than a competitive service element. The plaintiffs' state law claims of age discrimination are deemed too loosely connected to airline services to warrant preemption by FADA.
Regarding state common law claims, United contends that claims of wrongful discharge, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interference with prospective economic advantage should be dismissed. The Court must apply the laws of the respective states (Colorado, Kentucky, Arizona) to these claims. The plaintiffs seem to concede that wrongful discharge claims must be dismissed, which the Court agrees with, as these claims are preempted by state civil rights statutes in all three states. Consequently, Count VI related to wrongful discharge is dismissed.
Plaintiffs allege breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an unspecified contract governing their employment relationship with United, which the court interprets as the UPA. However, such claims are preempted by federal labor law, as they depend on the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, leading to the dismissal of Count VII.
The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) fails as the alleged conduct does not meet the threshold of extreme or outrageous behavior required under the law of any of the plaintiffs' states, resulting in the dismissal of Count VIII.
Regarding the claim of interference with prospective economic advantage, it may also be preempted similarly to the breach of covenant claim, but it fails to state a valid claim since it does not involve a third party, as required by the law of the plaintiffs' states. Consequently, Count IX is dismissed.
In conclusion, the court grants United’s motion to dismiss partially—denying it for Counts I-V but granting it for Counts VI-IX, which are dismissed with prejudice. The court also notes a prior case regarding the FAA-mandated retirement age as potentially distinguishable, and clarifies the terminology used for the Airline Deregulation Act as 'FADA' to align with the parties' briefs and avoid confusion with the Americans with Disabilities Act.
