Drake ex rel. J.D. v. Allergan, Inc.

Docket: Case No. 2:13-cv-234

Court: District Court, D. Vermont; May 22, 2015; Federal District Court

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J.D., a minor with cerebral palsy, was treated with Botox by Dr. Scott Benjamin to alleviate lower limb spasticity. His parents, Kevin and Lori Drake, brought claims against Allergan, Inc., the manufacturer of Botox, alleging that the injections caused J.D. to develop a seizure disorder. After a thirteen-day trial, the jury found Allergan negligent, leading to J.D.'s injuries, and awarded punitive damages. However, the jury did not find evidence that Allergan violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act.

Post-trial, the Plaintiffs requested judgment based on the jury's verdict, while Allergan sought judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. The court granted the Plaintiffs' motion and denied Allergan's, agreeing to enter judgment reflecting the jury's findings.

Background details include that Botox, containing botulinum toxin type A, is not FDA-approved for pediatric spasticity, making its use in J.D.'s case "off-label." Allergan had previously pleaded guilty to promoting Botox for off-label uses, including juvenile cerebral palsy. J.D. received his first Botox treatment in April 2010 at age three, but his parents noted limited improvement. In May 2012, after a higher dose was administered, J.D. experienced significant adverse effects, leading to a diagnosis of status epilepticus, a prolonged seizure condition. He eventually returned to normal after hospital treatment.

In August and September 2012, J.D. experienced episodes characterized by red ears and swollen cheeks. Following a vomiting incident in October 2012, J.D. was diagnosed with epilepsy after an EEG indicated significant seizure activity and subsequently prescribed anti-seizure medications. The doctor reported J.D.’s adverse reaction to a prescription drug, prompting the plaintiffs to file their Complaint on September 3, 2013, initially alleging multiple claims including strict liability failure to warn and negligence, but later dropping design defect and implied warranty claims before trial. The trial commenced on November 8, 2014, with the plaintiffs completing their case-in-chief by November 12, 2014. Allergan sought to strike the testimony of the plaintiffs’ medical causation expert and moved for judgment as a matter of law, both of which were denied by the court. The plaintiffs subsequently dropped their strict liability failure to warn claim during the charge conference, leading the jury to deliberate solely on claims of negligence and the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (VCFA). The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on the negligence claim, awarded $2,778,881.35 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000.00 in punitive damages, and ruled in favor of Allergan regarding the VCFA claim. Allergan renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, which requires a high burden of proof to overturn a jury verdict. The court must view evidence favorably toward the non-moving party and can only grant the motion if the jury's verdict lacks a legally sufficient evidentiary basis.

Allergan seeks judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiffs' negligence claim, asserting insufficient evidence for causation and the lack of culpability for punitive damages. The Court evaluates these claims, recognizing Allergan's significant burden. The jury was instructed to assess whether Allergan’s actions substantially contributed to J.D.’s injuries. To establish causation, Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that Botox caused J.D.'s seizure disorder and that Allergan's negligence led to the prescription by Dr. Benjamin.

Dr. Anna Hristova served as the Plaintiffs’ medical causation expert. Allergan's attempts to exclude her testimony based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert standard were denied. Although Allergan discredited the Albavera-Hernández study during cross-examination, the Court noted that this does not preclude a reasonable jury from concluding that Botox caused J.D.'s seizures or that Dr. Hristova's opinions were reliable. The Court emphasized that an expert's opinion does not need to be supported by unequivocal studies, referring to prior cases that allowed for the reliability of various types of evidence. The Court also rejected Allergan's argument that Dr. Hristova's reliance on the 'totality of circumstances' lacked reliability, noting that this approach raises factual questions regarding causation, despite Allergan's claims to the contrary based on the Hollander case.

Individual categories of evidence deemed unreliable by the district court cannot be combined to form a reliable theory, as it undermines the intellectual rigor expected of experts. In contrast to the Hollander case, the current court did not find the evidence unreliable nor did it identify an analytical gap between the data and the expert opinion. Some evidence might be insufficient on its own but can support a causation inference when considered collectively. The First Circuit previously reversed a trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony that inferred causality from multiple acceptable scientific inferences across different types of evidence. In this case, plaintiffs provided substantial evidence, including Dr. Hristova’s testimony, allowing reasonable jurors to conclude that Botox likely caused J.D.’s seizures. Key evidence included seizure rates from Allergan’s clinical trials, findings from the Graham study, adverse event reports, biological plausibility, FDA guidance, and the timing of J.D.’s seizures without alternative explanations. 

Specifically, plaintiffs noted that seizure rates in Allergan’s clinical trials were higher in Botox groups (0.61%) compared to placebo groups (0.37%), with concerns that Allergan selectively reported data to obscure this disparity. Allergan's 2012 FDA report suggested similar rates (0.7% for Botox and 0.6% for placebo) but did not use raw adverse event frequencies for comparisons. Furthermore, the jury might infer that Allergan altered its data reporting methods to hide the number of positive rechallenges, which indicated seizures ceased when Botox was withheld but recurred upon reintroduction. The absence of positive rechallenge data in the 2012 report compared to the 2004 report could suggest intentional obfuscation.

Dr. Hristova's reliance on the Graham study highlighted significant findings relevant to the case. Participants receiving Botox in the study were administered an average dose of 13.9 u/kg, exceeding the highest dose of 8 u/kg tested by Allergan in clinical trials and aligning closely with the dose received by J.D. The study reported two deaths in the Botox group attributed to 'asphyxiation related to epilepsy,' with authors asserting the deaths were not injection-related but lacking detailed analysis. Dr. Hristova deemed these deaths statistically significant and noted the study was sponsored by Allergan, suggesting potential bias in the findings due to common issues in manufacturer-sponsored research.

Additionally, Dr. Hristova evaluated adverse event reports submitted to the FDA, indicating that such reports often arise when there is perceived causation between a drug and an event. Many analyzed reports were medically confirmed, enhancing her confidence in linking Botox to adverse outcomes, including seizure cases where patients were diagnosed with epilepsy after Botox administration. Concerns raised by Dr. Mark Gormley, a Botox injector, regarding the connection between Botox and seizures were mentioned, highlighting that Allergan may have been hesitant to investigate these reports further.

The jury could infer that medically confirmed reports and instances of positive rechallenge—where a patient's reaction is compared to prior responses—warranted greater weight than standard anecdotal reports, as supported by legal precedent. While caution is advised in attributing causation based solely on such reports, they remain relevant for jury consideration.

Lastly, evidence suggesting biological plausibility for Botox causing seizures was presented, with theories explaining potential mechanisms of action, particularly significant in the absence of conclusive epidemiological data.

Dr. Roger Aoki, former Vice President of Neurotoxin Research at Allergan with extensive experience in Botox, was initially queried by Dr. Brin in 2001 regarding a mechanism by which Botox could induce seizures. In a later deposition, Dr. Aoki acknowledged the plausibility of seizures resulting from peripheral Botox injections, but at trial, he retracted this position, asserting that such injections would not trigger seizures. The jury could have favored his deposition statement over his trial testimony. Additional support for the biological plausibility of Botox causing seizures came from Dr. Hristova, who referenced research suggesting that Botox might spread to the brain through retrograde axonal transport, and Dr. Brin's earlier publication indicating that botulinum toxin could enter the central nervous system post-peripheral administration. Although Dr. Brin later recanted this view, Dr. Aoki admitted the possibility of retrograde transport as a valid theory. 

Furthermore, the FDA's guidance indicates a relationship between Botox and seizures, as Allergan included a seizure warning in the Botox label in 2010 due to reports of new or recurrent seizures, particularly in predisposed patients. While the exact causal relationship remains unestablished, the inclusion of adverse reactions on drug labels requires some basis for a potential link. Lastly, the timing of J.D.'s seizures, as testified by Dr. Benjamin, along with the absence of alternative explanations, reinforced the inference that Botox injections could have caused the seizures. Dr. Benjamin indicated he believed Botox was responsible for J.D.’s seizures and would not recommend further Botox treatment.

The Second Circuit upheld an expert's opinion that connected the progression and timing of a disease's development to causality. The court noted that a temporal relationship between exposure to a substance and the onset or worsening of a disease can serve as compelling evidence for causation. In the case at hand, the defense argued that J.D.’s seizures were coincidental due to his cerebral palsy; however, Dr. Hristova testified that the likelihood of developing seizures after age five in someone with a milder form of cerebral palsy is very low. She indicated that only 21% of individuals with spastic diplegia develop seizures and highlighted that most seizures occur before age two. Dr. Hristova also described J.D.’s seizures as autonomic and atypical, suggesting they were likely caused by Botox rather than being a natural occurrence. The jury was instructed that pre-existing conditions do not negate causation, and they could conclude that Botox either caused the seizures or lowered J.D.’s seizure threshold enough to trigger them.

Regarding negligent promotion and proximate cause, the jury needed to determine if Allergan's promotional activities were a proximate cause of J.D.’s injuries. Allergan contended that it must be shown that they substantially influenced Dr. Benjamin's decision to treat J.D. with Botox at a high dose. The court clarified that proximate cause can have multiple contributors and that juries typically determine proximate cause unless exceptional circumstances arise. The evidence presented allowed the jury to reasonably find the proximate cause necessary to rule in favor of the Plaintiffs.

Allergan contends that Dr. Benjamin's use of high doses of Botox for treating juvenile cerebral palsy patients is based solely on his training and clinical experience, independent of Allergan’s influence. However, the jury could reasonably conclude otherwise based on various evidence presented. 

The Plaintiffs highlighted direct interactions between Allergan representatives and Dr. Benjamin. Between 2000 and 2002, Allergan sales representative Larry Jackson made nineteen visits while Dr. Benjamin was in training, during which he may have promoted off-label Botox use. In 2005, another representative, Scott Traub, renewed Dr. Benjamin's interest in Botox for pediatric patients and discussed high dosing, although Dr. Benjamin did not recall the specifics of these discussions. 

Further, the jury could infer that pharmaceutical promotions influence doctors' decisions, often without their conscious awareness. Dr. Benjamin acknowledged that many physicians believe promotional efforts affect others but not themselves. Testimony from Dr. David Kessler referenced a WHO study indicating that promotional influences often exceed doctors' self-awareness. 

Additionally, the Plaintiffs presented evidence suggesting Dr. Benjamin may have been swayed by medical literature that Allergan had a role in shaping or ghostwriting. While Dr. Benjamin could not confirm having read specific articles, he acknowledged some familiarity with them, suggesting potential influence.

Dr. Benjamin admitted that Allergan's activities had affected his practice, even if he could not quantify the extent of this influence. He noted that Allergan was part of his educational and training experiences, which collectively impacted his practice. The jury might also infer that Allergan's marketing activities influenced his dosing decisions, particularly since he noted that discussions at professional conferences, where Allergan was present, shaped his understanding of dosing ranges.

Dr. Benjamin testified about using a slide set from WE MOVE, a non-profit organization founded by Dr. Mitchell Brin, who previously ran it before joining Allergan. Allergan pled guilty to controlling and funding WE MOVE, which influenced the content of its dosing guidelines. The 2005 guidelines state a maximum dose of 16 u/kg or 400 units, an increase from the previous maximum of 12 u/kg. Dr. Benjamin acknowledged using WE MOVE as a resource and noted that its high dosing guidelines may have impacted his dosing choices, specifically recalling an increase in dosing around eight to ten years ago, likely around the time he discussed high-dose Botox in 2005. His current maximum dose is 15 u/kg, suggesting Allergan's influence may have contributed to his shift from doses above 10-12 u/kg to 15 u/kg, including the dose administered to a patient, J.D. The jury could reasonably conclude that Allergan's promotional efforts significantly affected Dr. Benjamin's practice decisions.

Regarding punitive damages, Allergan contends the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, but the court disagrees. Vermont’s standards for punitive damages require evidence of "outrageously reprehensible" conduct and malice, which includes bad motive or reckless disregard. The plaintiffs did not claim that Allergan acted with ill will towards them but needed to demonstrate that Allergan's actions met the standard for recklessness necessary for malice. The definition of reckless disregard sufficient for malice remains ambiguous in Vermont law.

To qualify for punitive damages, conduct must exceed mere wrongdoing or unlawful behavior; it requires evidence of bad motive in addition to reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights. Courts have determined that mere reckless disregard is insufficient for punitive awards, which necessitate proof of conscious, deliberate disregard of a known risk of substantial harm. Malice can be inferred in egregious cases, such as intentional misappropriation of funds, where the defendant's motive for financial gain demonstrates bad intent, even without a direct intention to cause harm. Punitive damages may be applicable to companies that knowingly introduce hazardous products to the market, reflecting an awareness of potential risk for profit. Other examples of demonstrable malice include fraud and acts motivated by bias or extortion. Additionally, the Due Process Clause limits jury consideration to conduct with a direct connection to the specific harm experienced by the plaintiff.

Allergan pled guilty in 2010 to a federal charge for promoting Botox for off-label uses, particularly in pediatric spasticity, between 2000 and 2005. Evidence presented by the Plaintiffs indicated that Allergan's marketing targeted pediatric specialists and that sales for off-label use in this area significantly increased from 2002 to 2007. The Plaintiffs cited testimony from Dr. Brin, who confirmed that 8 u/kg is the maximum pediatric dose studied and recognized as safe, and that doses above this threshold were associated with increased risks, including the potential for distant spread of the toxin. Allergan's internal definitions categorized doses exceeding 8 u/kg as an "overdose," and their toxicology data indicated adverse effects at and above this dosage. 

Moreover, Allergan was aware of the dangers associated with higher doses, as indicated by a refusal to provide Botox for a clinical trial involving higher doses in 2005 due to safety concerns. A scatterplot presented in court illustrated that the majority of pediatric cases occurred at doses above the maximum recommended dose of 8 u/kg. The jury could reasonably infer that Allergan possessed significant evidence suggesting that higher doses were more dangerous and that the company actively promoted these doses to increase sales. Marketing documents highlighted a strategic intent to raise dosing limits and encouraged higher injections, with communications from Allergan executives indicating a push toward significant increases in dosages administered to patients. The WE MOVE initiative also showed a recommendation for higher dosing, further reflecting Allergan's promotion of increased use beyond the established safety limits.

Allergan indirectly funded the publication and distribution of pediatric dosing charts, as testified by Mr. Barborka. Mr. Traub confirmed that he shared WE MOVE dosing guidelines at various medical events. Allergan's CEO, David Pyott, indicated that pediatric dose reductions due to FDA safety concerns could slow Botox sales growth. Evidence suggested that Allergan's promotional efforts likely reached Dr. Benjamin, who was contacted by Larry Jackson, who discussed a dosing trend shift from 4-6 u/kg to 10-20 u/kg, supported by marketing materials. Scott Traub also interacted with Dr. Benjamin around the time he circulated a slide deck stating 20 u/kg as an acceptable maximum dose, which may have influenced Dr. Benjamin to raise his maximum dose to 15. Dr. Benjamin acknowledged using the WE MOVE website and its dosing schedule in his practice. The jury could infer that Allergan's promotional activities were reprehensible, particularly given the evidence of promoting higher doses. Allergan's conduct was seen as deserving outrage, especially since the company had previously pled guilty to a crime. While Allergan cited the United States v. Caronia case, arguing its promotional activities were legal under federal law, the jury could reasonably view the actions as outrageously reprehensible. The court noted that malice could arise from deliberate, outrageous conduct aimed at financial gain, even without the intention to harm others. The jury could reasonably conclude that Allergan prioritized profits over the health and safety of children.

The court acknowledged the unique concerns of attorney fraud and the fiduciary relationship with clients while indicating, in dicta, that punitive damages could be warranted for companies that knowingly market dangerous products. Evidence suggested that Allergan was motivated by profit and recklessly promoted high doses of a toxin, which posed a substantial risk of harm to children. The court found that the jury could reasonably infer malice or, at the very least, conclude that Allergan acted with conscious disregard for the known risks associated with doses above 8 u/kg, where most child injuries occurred.

Allergan's request for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 was addressed, noting that a new trial can be granted if the jury's verdict is seriously erroneous or a miscarriage of justice. The court highlighted that trial judges have the discretion to weigh evidence without favoring the verdict winner, but must exercise caution regarding witness credibility. Conflicting evidence presented at trial meant the jury's determination of credibility would not be disturbed lightly. Ultimately, the court found no basis to conclude that the jury reached an erroneous verdict or that justice was miscarried, thereby granting the Plaintiffs' motion and denying Allergan's motions, leading to judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs based on the jury’s verdict.

The jury awarded compensatory damages totaling $2,500,000 to J.D., while Lori and Kevin Drake received $28,881.35 in compensatory damages and an additional $250,000 for mental anguish. The document references several peer-reviewed studies concerning the safety and effects of Botulinum Toxin Type A in children with cerebral palsy. One study by Cidronio Albavera-Hernández discusses the safety of the toxin, while another by H. Kerr Graham examines its efficacy in preventing hip displacement in at-risk children. A further study by Anna H. Hristova details severe nervous system complications following the therapy, proposing theories on how Botox may spread beyond the injection site, potentially affecting the brain and causing seizures. These theories are significant as they suggest a plausible mechanism for Botox-related seizures, despite the limited understanding of seizure mechanisms. Additional studies cited include research on the long-distance effects of Botulinum Neurotoxin A and a reappraisal of its central effects.