Councill v. Damascus Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.

Citations: 109 F. Supp. 3d 907; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70210; 2015 WL 3459204Docket: Case No. 1:15CV00005

Court: District Court, W.D. Virginia; June 1, 2015; Federal District Court

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The Damascus Volunteer Fire Department, a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt non-profit, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming charitable immunity under Virginia law in a personal injury case involving plaintiff Wanda Councill. The court found that Councill was not a beneficiary of the Fire Department's charitable purposes at the time of her injury, thus denying the motion. The Fire Department provides services to the community regardless of ability to pay and operates a bingo hall to fund its charitable activities. On July 13, 2012, Councill traveled from North Carolina to participate in a bingo game, paying a $50 entry fee and winning $500. She later injured herself outside the venue, alleging negligence by the Fire Department. Charitable immunity in Virginia requires the entity to prove it operates for a charitable purpose and that the plaintiff was a beneficiary at the time of injury. The court confirmed that the Fire Department meets the first requirement but struggled with the second, which defines a beneficiary as having a "beneficial relationship" with the organization. A person does not need to receive financial assistance to be considered a beneficiary, as long as the charity's ability to provide services is reliant on charitable contributions.

An individual qualifies as a "beneficiary of [charitable] bounty" if their interaction with the charitable organization is linked to its charitable purpose. The Fire Department asserts that its bingo hall operations are aimed at funding its firefighting and rescue services, claiming that participation in bingo constitutes a benefit to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's entry fee, game participation, and prize winnings are cited as evidence of this benefit. The Fire Department argues that under Virginia law, mere presence on the premises qualifies an individual as a beneficiary, referencing cases where visitors were deemed beneficiaries despite not being members of the institutions.

However, the Virginia Supreme Court has clarified that the definition of "beneficiary" is narrower than the Fire Department suggests. In *Thrasher v. Winand*, the court held that while charitable institutions are immune from negligence claims by beneficiaries, this immunity does not apply to those without a beneficial relationship, such as vendors at a festival who were there to sell goods rather than receive charitable benefits. The court emphasized that mere potential future benefits do not constitute a beneficiary status, determining that the true beneficiaries were those receiving direct donations from the institution's activities.

In a similar vein, *Straley v. Urbanna Chamber of Commerce* concluded that an attendee injured during a festival could not be classified as a beneficiary since she did not receive any financial benefits from the event and had an indirect, attenuated relationship with the organizers. The cases of *Thrasher* and *Straley* are analogous to the current situation, as the plaintiff similarly did not receive direct charitable benefits from the Fire Department's operations.

Councill paid a fee for participation in the Fire Department's bingo games but was not a beneficiary of its charitable services, thus not qualifying as a "vicarious beneficiary." She was also not a resident of Damascus during the incident, making any potential future benefits from the Fire Department too speculative to be considered. As Councill was merely an invitee owed reasonable care by the defendant, the defense's claim for charitable immunity was rejected. Consequently, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. The document highlights a broader trend against charitable immunity, indicating it is increasingly seen as outdated. Additionally, the cases cited by the Fire Department were distinguishable, as they involved organizations that served the public broadly, unlike the Fire Department, which provides specific services to the Damascus community. The Fire Department's references to Virginia trial court opinions were also noted to be factually different from the present case.