Court: District Court, D. Arizona; February 19, 2014; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Edward Louis Dean, a Hawaiian inmate at Saguaro Correctional Center (SCC), filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was later amended. The case was transferred from the District Court of Hawaii to the Arizona District Court. Remaining defendants—including Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), SCC Warden Todd Thomas, and State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety Director Ted Sakai—filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court intends to grant, thereby terminating the action.
Dean alleges he was transferred to SCC on November 30, 2011, and has requested a diet aligning with his Essene faith, specifically consisting of raw fruits, vegetables, nuts, and unpasteurized cheese. Instead, he was offered alternative religious diets that include cooked items, forcing him to either eat against his beliefs or refrain from eating. The court previously dismissed certain claims but found that Dean's allegations could potentially violate his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment.
Defendants argue that Dean cannot demonstrate a substantial burden on his religious rights, that SCC has compelling interests in denying his dietary request, and that the denial relates to legitimate penological interests. They also assert that Hawaii officials are not liable for damages without evidence of a constitutional violation policy, that Sakai is not a necessary party, and that Dean cannot prove a CCA policy for liability.
Legal standards under RLUIPA indicate that the government must not impose substantial burdens on religious exercise unless it demonstrates a compelling interest and employs the least restrictive means. The burden of establishing a violation lies with the inmate initially, after which the government must justify its actions. RLUIPA applies to private prisons, and the court must interpret it broadly in favor of protecting an inmate's religious rights.
Inmates retain First Amendment protections, including the right to freely exercise their religion. To invoke the Free Exercise Clause, a prisoner must demonstrate that their belief is sincerely held and rooted in religious conviction. If successful, the burden shifts to the inmate to show that prison officials have substantially burdened their religious practice. Any regulation that limits this right must be reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, assessed through four factors: (1) a valid connection between the regulation and the governmental interest; (2) the availability of alternative means for inmates to exercise their rights; (3) the impact on prison staff, other inmates, and resource allocation; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives.
The background facts indicate that food services at SCC are contracted to Trinity Services Group, which manages meal preparation and supply procurement. Meal plans are developed by dieticians to meet caloric and nutritional standards compliant with dietary guidelines. SCC provides various meal options, including general, Kosher, vegan, and medical diets. There are allegations regarding the presence of pork in the non-pork diet and limitations on commissary food items for supplementation. SCC serves a daily average of 4,800 to 6,000 meals, accommodating a population of 1,600 to 1,900 inmates with over 300 staff members. Meals for segregated inmates are transported to their cells multiple times a day.
Defendants provide evidence estimating the weekly cost of meals outlined in Plaintiff's sample menu to be between $473.61 and $523.18, translating to an annual cost of $24,627.85 to $27,205.50. Plaintiff contests this evidence as undisclosed expert testimony. Trinity's Regional Vice President, Huffman, estimates daily food costs for the meals at approximately $22.50, totaling about $8,212.50 annually. In comparison, alternative diets show significantly lower costs: SCC's vegetarian diet at $2.48 per day ($905.20 annually), vegan at $2.54 per meal ($927.10 annually), and Kosher at $3.36 per day ($1,226.40 annually). Huffman states that food items necessary for the sample menu will be sourced from existing suppliers with no bulk purchases made, increasing costs since retail food prices are 5-30% higher than commercial vendors. Additionally, external food vendors have not been vetted for safety, which poses risks of foodborne illnesses. Labor costs for procuring these items are projected at $247.88 to $297.45 weekly, or $12,889.76 to $15,467.40 annually, based on a Food Service Director's salary with benefits. Due to Trinity's refusal to buy in bulk and logistical issues, the nearest supermarket is 20 miles away, requiring the Food Service Director to make multiple trips each week, spending 2 to 3 hours per trip for procurement and compliance activities.
The estimated weekly cost for the Food Service Director's vehicle, due to gasoline and wear and tear from a 40-mile round trip three times weekly, is approximately $67.80, totaling $3,525.60 annually, calculated at a reimbursement rate of $0.565 per mile. Operationally, Trinity's staff assists in maintaining custody and supervision of inmates in the kitchen. The sample menu items are categorized as specialty foods, necessitating enhanced security measures to prevent contraband issues. If the Food Service Director must leave the facility to procure food for the menu, it would compromise kitchen supervision, extend meal production times, and disrupt staff coverage during mandatory breaks. To mitigate these impacts, Trinity may need to adjust staffing schedules, causing inconvenience, or require after-hours shopping by the Director, increasing labor costs due to overtime pay requirements. The Plaintiff contests Huffman's statements, claiming they constitute undisclosed expert testimony.
The Court grants summary judgment to the Defendants, establishing that the denial of the specialized diet serves compelling government interests and is the least restrictive means of achieving that aim under RLUIPA. Regarding the First Amendment claim, the Court applies the Turner analysis and determines that the diet denial is reasonably related to legitimate penological goals. For the Plaintiff to demonstrate a substantial burden on a sincerely held religious belief under RLUIPA and the First Amendment, he must show that his practice of consuming a raw vegetarian diet is both sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. The Court notes that sincerity is a factual question and acknowledges that while the Defendants suggest a lack of sincerity based on the Plaintiff's admission process, the Plaintiff maintains he identified as Essene and received a mainline diet to barter for food aligning with his beliefs.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to find an expert supporting the claim that the Essene religion mandates a raw-food vegetarian diet, referencing Thomas's research indicating that such a diet is not required. However, the Court clarifies that Plaintiff only needs to demonstrate a sincere belief that a raw-food vegetarian diet aligns with his faith, as per Shakur. The Court emphasizes that it should not question an individual's interpretation of their religious beliefs and concludes that Defendants have raised factual questions regarding the sincerity of Plaintiff's beliefs, preventing them from obtaining judgment as a matter of law.
To establish a substantial burden on his religious practice, Plaintiff must show that Defendants significantly hinder his ability to eat according to his religious beliefs. A substantial burden occurs when the state pressures an individual to alter their behavior in violation of their beliefs, even if the pressure is indirect. Defendants argue that although Plaintiff cannot follow his preferred dietary practice, other religious practices remain accessible, such as communions and prayer. They also highlight that Thomas offered Plaintiff vegetarian and vegan meal options. However, Plaintiff disputes their adequacy and claims the commissary lacks raw vegetarian food items.
Defendants incorrectly incorporate the Turner test's second factor, related to alternative means of exercising religious rights, into the RLUIPA analysis, which should focus on whether the denial of specific religious exercise constitutes a burden. The Court references Greene v. Solano County Jail, which illustrates that the assessment should center on whether a specific aspect of religious practice is hindered, rather than the overall ability to practice religion. A complete denial of a particular religious exercise, such as the requested diet, constitutes a substantial burden. The Court concludes that there are triable issues of fact regarding whether the denial of Plaintiff's dietary request imposes a substantial burden on his religious practice, necessitating further evaluation under RLUIPA and the First Amendment.
RLUIPA imposes a heightened burden on prisons, prompting the Court to prioritize its analysis. Defendants assert that accommodating the requested diet would incur significant costs and administrative burdens, compromising food service efficiency and kitchen security, thereby establishing compelling governmental interests for denying the diet.
The Plaintiff contends that RLUIPA does not equate the interests of private prisons with those of the government when assessing compelling governmental interests. However, case law confirms that RLUIPA applies to private prisons, which are classified as "institutions" under the statute. The definition of "government" includes state government instrumentalities and entities acting under state law. The Hawaii Department of Corrections has delegated responsibilities to CCA Defendants, rendering them government actors under RLUIPA.
The Court examines whether the Defendants' actions serve a compelling governmental interest through the least restrictive means. The argument that accommodating the diet would suggest favoritism leading to security risks is rejected due to a lack of specific evidence supporting such claims; similarly, the existence of various diets already provided to inmates undermines this argument.
Defendants claim that running a simplified food service is a legitimate interest, as accommodating one inmate's dietary request would create substantial administrative challenges. They argue that catering to an individual would disrupt the efficient management of food services for a large inmate population, which requires serving thousands of meals daily.
Evidence was submitted regarding substantial financial costs tied to providing a specific diet. The plaintiff objected to testimony from Susan Hoffman, a witness for the defendants, on the grounds that she was an undisclosed expert without an expert report. The defendants countered that Hoffman was not being presented as an expert but rather as a fact witness regarding food service operations at Trinity, thus not requiring a report under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(A)(2)(b). If Hoffman or another witness were to be considered as offering expert testimony, the court indicated it would exclude such evidence due to lack of timely disclosure, referencing Wong v. Regents of Univ. of California. The document clarifies the distinction between lay and expert testimony as governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702. Rule 701 allows lay witnesses to provide opinion testimony if it is based on their perception and helpful for understanding or determining a fact, without needing specialized knowledge. The court noted precedents where business owners were allowed to testify about projected profits based on their experience. In this case, Hoffman, who has significant experience and knowledge in her role as Regional Vice President at Trinity, was deemed qualified to offer testimony regarding the costs associated with the requested diet and Trinity's operational role. The plaintiff did not contest Hoffman’s personal knowledge, leading to the overruling of the objection.
Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ assertion that certain food items, including bananas and tomatoes, are not served at SCC, citing his receipt of these items during holiday meals. He argues that other foods like seeds, nuts, and dried fruit could be procured in bulk rather than through grocery purchases. However, Plaintiff's testimony indicates that foods like tomatoes and bananas are considered specialty items at SCC, and he fails to provide evidence regarding the cost or feasibility of purchasing large quantities for a single diet. While he claims that his requested meals require no cooking and involve minimal preparation, Defendants’ witness notes the costs associated with sourcing these items from different suppliers.
Plaintiff also asserts that meals could be prepared by inmate kitchen workers, but his request includes whole fruits and vegetables along with prepared items like cabbage and lettuce wedges, which do not align with his claims of minimal preparation. Although he mentions other inmates' requests for an Essene diet, he provides no evidence that these requests match his dietary specifications. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to substantiate claims regarding the cost of his requested diet and notes Defendants' argument that such a diet may be nutritionally inadequate. The Court sustains Plaintiff's objection to the evidence regarding this inadequacy, distinguishing between lay and expert witness testimony. Ultimately, the Court recognizes a compelling interest in denying the costly specialized meal plan requested by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff did not establish a triable issue regarding Defendants’ claim that the annual cost of providing the requested meals ranges from $24,627.85 to $27,205.50. The cost for food alone is approximately $8,212.50 annually, significantly higher than the next most expensive option at $1,226.40. Additionally, the procurement of food incurs substantial costs, estimated at $12,889.76 to $15,467.40 annually, which is beyond the bulk purchasing costs for other diets. Offering the requested diet would disrupt an efficient food service model.
Citing various precedents, the document emphasizes the compelling interest in reducing costs and maintaining security. It references cases where courts found that limiting inmates to available diets was justified to manage expenses and security concerns. Specifically, the need for off-site procurement of specialized diets raises security risks, as it would divert staff away from their supervisory roles, increasing the potential for contraband.
Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants did not adequately consider the diet request is countered by Defendants' response to interrogatories regarding the exact costs, which were uncertain due to variables in the food service provided by a third party. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Defendants demonstrated that rejecting the raw vegetarian diet was the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling government interests of cost containment and security.
Defendants evaluated the feasibility of providing a specialized diet for Plaintiff but determined that the current vegetarian options sufficiently met his religious needs, citing logistical and financial challenges in accommodating his requests amidst serving 4,800 to 6,000 meals daily. Plaintiff failed to present evidence to counter these claims regarding the financial and security implications of his dietary requests. Additionally, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's argument that Defendants did not consider transferring him to another prison for dietary accommodation, noting he provided no legal authority supporting such a requirement and had not previously requested a transfer for this purpose.
In assessing Plaintiff's First Amendment claim, the Court applied the four Turner factors to evaluate the relationship between the denial of the requested diet and legitimate penological objectives. While Defendants did not explicitly reference Turner, their evidence indicated a valid interest in maintaining a simplified food service, minimizing costs, and ensuring personnel availability for inmate supervision. The Court found that limiting special dietary options aligns with legitimate governmental interests, favoring Defendants.
The second Turner factor examined whether Plaintiff had alternative means of religious expression. Defendants claimed that Plaintiff could still engage in various religious practices, such as fasting and prayer, despite his objections regarding the impact of dietary restrictions on his religious observance. The Court upheld Defendants' evidence, noting that Plaintiff had previously testified to his ability to practice these activities. The distinction between general religious practices and strict prohibitions was also highlighted, drawing comparisons to cases involving dietary restrictions for specific faiths, suggesting a nuanced consideration of religious obligations.
Plaintiff asserts that consuming a raw vegetarian diet is essential to his beliefs, claiming that cooked foods defile a believer. The Court accepts for analysis that cooked foods are prohibited, favoring Plaintiff in this aspect. However, accommodating this dietary request would negatively impact kitchen staff and security by requiring additional supervision for sourcing and preparing specialized meals, which contradicts the prison's bulk food service model. There is insufficient evidence regarding the financial implications of accommodating one inmate's dietary needs on the overall food budget, leading to a conclusion that this factor supports Defendants. Plaintiff has not proposed viable alternatives to meet his dietary needs at minimal cost to prison resources, further weighing against him. Evaluating the four Turner factors, the Court determines that Defendants' refusal of Plaintiff's raw-food vegetarian diet aligns with legitimate penological objectives, and thus, there is no violation of the First Amendment. Consequently, there are no triable issues regarding the RLUIPA claim or First Amendment claim, and the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing the claims with prejudice and terminating the action. The Court also notes that while the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue, Defendants do not contest their RLUIPA obligations. Additionally, a witness affidavit indicates that Plaintiff's proposed raw vegetarian menu fails to meet nutritional standards, lacking essential nutrients and exceeding fat and copper intake guidelines.
