Hellwege v. Tampa Family Health Centers

Citations: 103 F. Supp. 3d 1303; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47102; 126 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1613; 2015 WL 1608827Docket: Case No. 8:14-cv-1576-T-33AEP

Court: District Court, M.D. Florida; April 10, 2015; Federal District Court

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Defendant Chad L. Lindsey and Defendant Tampa Family Health Center (TFHC) filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint from Plaintiff Sara Hellwege. Hellwege, who was nearing graduation from Frontier Nursing University and seeking licensure as an advanced practice nurse in Florida, identifies as a Christian with strong beliefs against prescribing hormonal contraceptives due to potential effects on embryos. She is affiliated with the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG). 

In April 2014, TFHC advertised open positions for certified nurse-midwives, which Hellwege believed she was eligible for. After inquiring about these positions via email on April 28, 2014, Lindsey informed her on May 13, 2014, that her AAPLOG membership precluded her from moving forward in the hiring process due to TFHC's Title X organization status. Despite Hellwege's clarification that she would consider various positions consistent with her beliefs, Lindsey did not respond. Hellwege alleges she was denied the chance to continue the application process while TFHC sought additional applicants for the same positions. She filed the initial action on June 27, 2014, and subsequently submitted an amended complaint on February 4, 2015, with the defendants' consent. The court granted the motions to dismiss in part.

Hellwege claims that Lindsey and TFHC barred her from continuing the application process for certified nurse midwife positions due to her membership in AAPLOG and her religious and moral beliefs opposing certain hormonal contraceptives. She argues this refusal constitutes violations of both federal and state laws. The Amended Complaint outlines several claims: I) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7, II) Violation of Florida Statute § 381.0051(5), III) Violation of Florida Statute § 390.0111(8), IV) Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and V) Violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, specifically against TFHC. Motions to dismiss were filed by Lindsey and TFHC on February 18 and 19, 2015, respectively, and are currently under review by the Court.

In evaluating these motions, the Court will accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in a manner most favorable to Hellwege, while also adhering to the legal standard that requires more than mere labels or conclusions. The Court cites relevant case law, emphasizing that factual content must be sufficient to support a plausible claim for relief.

Count I of Hellwege's Amended Complaint specifically alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7, also known as the Church Amendments. Hellwege contends that TFHC and Lindsey discriminated against her based on her religious and moral objections to certain services, as well as her AAPLOG membership. The Church Amendments, established in the 1970s, clarify that federal funding recipients are not compelled to perform abortions or sterilizations. The Court must determine if the Church Amendments grant individuals like Hellwege a private right of action.

Discrimination prohibitions outlined in the relevant statutes assert that entities receiving grants or contracts under specified public health laws cannot discriminate against health care personnel based on their involvement in lawful sterilization procedures or abortions, whether for or against performing such procedures due to their religious beliefs or moral convictions. This prohibition extends to employment decisions and the granting of staff privileges. Additionally, individuals are not required to participate in health services or research activities that conflict with their religious beliefs or moral convictions if funded by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Regarding the Church Amendments, there is a dispute over whether they provide a private right of action. The defendants argue for dismissal of Count One of the Amended Complaint, indicating that the Amendments do not explicitly grant a private right of action. The Court references prior case law, specifically Cannon v. University of Chicago, emphasizing that Congress typically specifies private rights when intended. While recognizing that implied rights of action can exist under certain circumstances, the Court insists that such rights are rare and must clearly reflect Congressional intent to provide both a private right and remedy.

The Church Amendments, specifically section (c), do not confer a private right of action, as established in Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital, where a nurse was compelled to assist in a late-term abortion against her will. The court noted hints of intent to recognize individual rights in section (c) but found no evidence that Congress aimed to create a private right of action. This implies the possibility of individual rights existing without an accompanying remedy. The court concurs that section (c) protects health care workers from discrimination based on their abortion-related actions or moral beliefs, affirming an individual right against employment discrimination. Section (d) further emphasizes individual rights related to religious beliefs or moral convictions, stating individuals cannot be compelled to perform actions contrary to such beliefs. The court dismisses arguments that the title "Individual Rights" does not confer rights, affirming that the explicit language in section (d) suggests Congressional intent to create individual rights. Despite recognizing these rights, the court addresses the more complex issue of whether Congress intended to provide a private remedy for enforcing the Church Amendments. The Supreme Court’s criteria for implying a private right of action, articulated in cases like Cort v. Ash and Cannon, focus on Congressional intent, which remains central in determining if such a remedy exists.

Cort’s four-factor test was effectively overruled by the Supreme Court in Touche Ross and Transamerica when congressional intent became the sole determinative factor. The Court in Northwest Airlines clarified that without inferring congressional intent from statutory language or structure, a private remedy cannot be implied. Sandoval emphasized that the judicial role is to interpret statutes to discern if they intend to create both a private right and a private remedy, asserting that without the latter, no cause of action exists and courts cannot create one based on policy considerations. In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court ruled that statutes do not automatically confer enforceable rights merely by mentioning rights. Specifically, the Court found no implied right of action under FERPA, noting that enforcement mechanisms were administrative rather than judicial. The regulations specify that the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) handles complaints related to federal health care provider conscience protection statutes, coordinating with relevant funding components. The enforcement process involves assisting entities to comply; if compliance fails, the Department may consider legal actions, including funding termination. The Court concluded that these administrative procedures indicate a lack of congressional intent to create individually enforceable private rights, distinguishing the case from others without federal review mechanisms.

The Court rejects Hellwege's request to imply a private right of action based on congressional silence, adhering to the precedent set in Touche Ross & Co. and Cannon. The Court emphasizes that a violation of a federal statute does not inherently create a private cause of action unless there is clear congressional intent, which is absent in the Church Amendments. Other federal cases support this conclusion, indicating no private right of action exists under the Church Amendments despite their prohibition against discrimination based on religious or moral convictions. Consequently, Count I is dismissed, and Hellwege is not entitled to injunctive relief.

In Counts IV and V, Hellwege alleges religious discrimination against TFHC under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act, claiming that both statutes prohibit discrimination in hiring based on religion. TFHC contends that Hellwege has not demonstrated her qualifications or that she suffered an adverse employment action. However, Hellwege's claims are based on a failure-to-hire theory, requiring her to show that she was qualified for a position, applied for it, and was not hired while the position remained open or was filled by someone outside her protected class.

Hellwege claims to be a Christian and part of a protected class, asserting she was qualified for the certified nurse-midwife position at TFHC but was denied employment due to her religious beliefs. She alleges that TFHC continued to seek applicants after her denial. The Court accepts her allegations as true for the purpose of this stage in the proceedings, finding sufficient grounds for a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act, thus denying TFHC’s Motion to Dismiss regarding Counts IV and V.

In Counts II and III, Hellwege alleges violations of Florida statutes Fla. Stat. 381.0051(5) and 390.0111(8). The Court recognizes that her attempt to pursue a private cause of action under these statutes raises a novel issue of state law. Referring to the two-part test from Palmer v. Hospital Authority of Randolph County, the Court decides against exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these state claims due to their complexity and the potential for unnecessary decisions on state law. Consequently, Counts II and III are dismissed without prejudice, while Count I is dismissed with prejudice. The Court orders TFHC to respond to Counts IV and V by April 30, 2015.

TFHC's funding includes allocations from Title X of the Public Health Service Act. Florida Statute 381.0051(5) allows physicians to refuse to provide contraceptive or family planning services for medical or religious reasons without facing liability. Similarly, Fla. Stat. 390.0111(8) ensures that no hospital or individual is required to participate in abortion procedures, protecting those who object on moral or religious grounds from disciplinary actions. The plaintiff in the Cenzon-DeCarlo case focused solely on section (c) of the Church Amendments, omitting section (d). Title IX prohibits sex-based discrimination in federally funded education programs. The Florida Civil Rights Act aligns with Title VII, following Florida's principle that state laws modeled after federal statutes should be interpreted similarly. This principle is supported by case law, including O’Loughlin v. Pinchback and Greenfield v. City of Miami Beach, which affirm the congruity of state and federal interpretations.