Court: District Court, C.D. California; April 27, 2015; Federal District Court
On September 8, 2014, Colette Carpenter, representing the estate of Clayton O. Carpenter, along with other plaintiffs, initiated a lawsuit following a helicopter crash in Georgia that resulted in one death and several serious injuries. The complaint alleges three causes of action: strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence, naming several defendants involved in the helicopter's manufacture, inspection, and maintenance, including Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Prototype Engineering and Manufacturing, and BAE Systems, among others.
Each of the named defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint, which the plaintiffs opposed. A hearing was held on March 9, 2015. The court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the BAE and Sikorsky defendants due to lack of personal jurisdiction. Prototype's motion was partially granted, allowing dismissal on grounds of failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) but without prejudice, permitting the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
The procedural history indicates that the case originated in the Los Angeles Superior Court before being removed to federal court by the BAE defendants, who cited federal subject matter jurisdiction based on the crash occurring on federal land. Following jurisdictional discovery requests and extensions, the plaintiffs submitted their oppositions to the motions, and the defendants subsequently replied.
On January 15, 2014, an MH-60M Blackhawk helicopter, operated by Clayton Carpenter, Jon Ternstrom, and Cameron Witzler, crashed while en route from St. Augustine, Florida, to Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. Ternstrom served as the pilot-in-command, Carpenter as co-pilot, and Witzler as crew chief. As the helicopter neared Hunter, it experienced a failure of the tail rotor pitch change shaft, leading to uncontrolled rotation and a crash. Carpenter died from severe injuries shortly after, while Ternstrom and Witzler also sustained severe injuries but survived. The plaintiffs allege that the crash resulted from defects in the tail rotor pitch change shaft and related systems. They further claim that the crew's injuries were exacerbated by the failure of their seats to adequately absorb the impact forces. Additionally, the complaint states that the Electronic Locator Transmitter (ELT) failed to notify Air Traffic Control of the crash, delaying emergency response and medical aid. The complaint attributes liability to the defendants collectively for their roles in the design, manufacturing, testing, inspection, assembly, maintenance, training, distribution, advertising, marketing, warranty, and sale of the helicopter and its components, without specifying individual conduct.
The Sikorsky and BAE Defendants argue against personal jurisdiction in the District. Specifically, regarding the BAE Defendants, the Plaintiffs allege that BAE Systems, Inc. is a Delaware corporation registered in California and does business in Ontario, California. BAE Systems Simula, Inc. is identified as an Arizona corporation also conducting business in California, while BAE Systems Aerospace Defense Group, Inc. is another Arizona corporation that operates in Arizona. The Plaintiffs assert that the BAE Defendants maintain physical plants in California with employees, payroll, contracts, and utilize California's privileges and benefits; however, they provide no supporting evidence for these claims.
In response, the BAE Defendants present a declaration from Frank Crispino, the General Manager of BAE Systems Aerospace Defense Group, Inc. Crispino states he is familiar with the locations and operations of the Aerospace Defense facilities. He asserts that the BAE Defendants' involvement in the case was limited to the installation of pilot seats for a helicopter, which were neither produced nor shipped to California. Instead, all work was conducted in Arizona according to government specifications, with final delivery to Connecticut. Crispino further claims that BAE Aerospace Defense Group, Inc. has no physical presence, employees, phone numbers, bank accounts, or real property in California, nor does it pay any state or local taxes there.
Crispino asserts that BAE Systems, Inc. and BAE Systems Simula, Inc. had no involvement with the helicopter seats implicated in the accident. BAE Systems Simula, Inc. is identified as the parent company of BAE Aerospace Defense Group, Inc., headquartered and incorporated in Arizona, while BAE Systems, Inc. serves as the "great-grandparent" of BAE Systems Simula, Inc., with its headquarters in Virginia and incorporation in Delaware.
The Complaint against the Sikorsky Defendants claims that Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation is a Delaware corporation based in Stratford, Connecticut, and that it conducts business in California. Sikorsky Support Services, Inc. is also described as a Delaware corporation registered to operate in California, specifically in Los Angeles. Plaintiffs argue that the Sikorsky Defendants sell Blackhawk helicopters and parts in California but have not provided information regarding the number of helicopters shipped to California, their gross sales, or profits derived from California operations. They claim that 3% of the Sikorsky Defendants' 2013 sales revenues, amounting to $114 million, were generated in California, although no evidence is provided for this assertion.
The Plaintiffs maintain that the Sikorsky Defendants are wholly owned subsidiaries of United Technologies Corporation and that they have sold helicopters to the Los Angeles Fire Department, citing articles and advertisements from the website "helis.com." Additionally, they mention a scholarship awarded by the Sikorsky Defendants to a California teenager for a design related to unmanned helicopters, highlighted in a press release. They also reference a 2009 exposition in Anaheim, California, where the Sikorsky Defendants participated, and note that the Defendants have previously been involved in litigation in California.
The Sikorsky Defendants have submitted a declaration from James P. Antippas, a Legal Specialist at Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, asserting that both Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and Sikorsky Support Services are Delaware corporations based in Stratford, Connecticut. Antippas states that the Helicopter in question was manufactured in Connecticut for a U.S. procurement contract and sold to the U.S. military in 1991, with no service or maintenance performed by the Sikorsky Defendants. He further claims that Sikorsky Aircraft does not design, manufacture, or conduct business in California, while Sikorsky Support Services holds a certificate of qualification under California law and has California offices unrelated to the Helicopter at issue.
The document outlines the legal standards for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. To assert jurisdiction, it must be demonstrated that California’s long-arm statute applies and that exercising jurisdiction aligns with due process. California’s statute is consistent with federal due process, which requires that a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum. The discussion distinguishes between general and specific personal jurisdiction, noting that general jurisdiction applies only when a corporation's contacts with the state are substantial enough to consider it "at home" there. The excerpt references relevant case law, including Goodyear and Daimler, to clarify that mere ties do not justify general jurisdiction and emphasizes the necessity of "continuous and systematic" contacts for jurisdiction to be valid.
In the case involving Daimler, plaintiffs, including victims and their families, sued Daimler in California, alleging that a subsidiary collaborated with the Argentine government to perpetrate serious human rights violations against workers. The Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs, clarifying that general jurisdiction requires a corporation’s affiliations with a state to be so "continuous and systematic" that it is essentially "at home" there. Since neither Daimler nor its subsidiary was incorporated or had its principal place of business in California, the Court held that general jurisdiction did not align with due process. It established that general jurisdiction is only available in "exceptional cases" outside the state of incorporation or principal place of business.
For specific personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit requires that the defendant's activities must be related to the claim asserted, which involves a three-part test: (1) purposeful availment of the forum’s benefits, (2) the claim arising from those forum-related activities, and (3) the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction. The burden to satisfy the first two prongs lies with the party asserting jurisdiction, while the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate the unreasonableness of jurisdiction if the first two are met.
The burden of proof for establishing personal jurisdiction varies based on how the court determines the issue. If based solely on affidavits, a prima facie showing is sufficient. If credibility issues arise or if there are disputed facts, a preliminary hearing may be held, requiring the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Uncontroverted allegations in a complaint are assumed true for a prima facie showing, but courts cannot assume the truth of allegations contradicted by affidavits, with factual conflicts resolved in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.
A district court can transfer a case even if it lacks jurisdiction, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a), and 1631, provided that the transferee court would have had jurisdiction when the case was misfiled, the transferor court lacks jurisdiction, and the transfer serves the interest of justice. The court evaluates personal jurisdiction over the BAE Defendants, concluding neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction exists. The BAE Defendants are not California corporations, with principal places of business in Virginia or Arizona, and plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of exceptional circumstances for general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction also fails, as there are no relevant contacts with California related to the case. Consequently, the BAE Defendants' motion is granted. Regarding the Sikorsky Defendants, the plaintiffs similarly argue for general and specific jurisdiction, referencing limited evidence of contacts with California. However, no general personal jurisdiction is established, as the Sikorsky Defendants are not incorporated in California, with their principal place of business in Connecticut. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances for jurisdiction in California.
No specific personal jurisdiction exists over the Sikorsky Defendants, as evidence presented by Plaintiffs shows only limited contacts with California. The Sikorsky Defendants accounted for 3% of their total 2013 sales from California, sold three helicopters to the Los Angeles County Fire Department, awarded a scholarship to a California student, and participated in a 2009 trade exhibition. However, none of these contacts are connected to the Helicopter or its crash, which is central to the case, making the jurisdictional link insufficient. Consequently, the Motion of the Sikorsky Defendants is granted.
Regarding the potential transfer of the case to the Southern District of Georgia, the Plaintiffs improperly attempted to raise this motion in their opposition rather than filing it separately. They argue for the transfer based on the crash occurring in Georgia, implying the application of Georgia law under 16 U.S.C. 457. However, the mere applicability of Georgia law does not establish personal jurisdiction over the BAE and Sikorsky Defendants in Georgia. The Plaintiffs have not met their burden to demonstrate specific or personal jurisdiction in Georgia at the time of filing. Therefore, the request to transfer the claims to Georgia is denied.
The political question doctrine pertains to cases involving issues constitutionally assigned to the legislative or executive branches, meaning the judiciary is ill-equipped to make policy determinations. The Supreme Court identifies six categories that indicate a case is not justiciable: (1) clear constitutional commitment of the issue to another political branch; (2) absence of judicially manageable standards; (3) necessity for initial policy determinations unsuitable for judicial discretion; (4) inability to resolve the case without disrespecting other branches; (5) a strong need for adherence to a prior political decision; and (6) potential embarrassment from conflicting judgments by different branches. If any of these factors are integral to the case, it is deemed not justiciable; otherwise, it is justiciable. Determining the presence of a political question requires a careful analysis of the case's specific facts rather than a simplistic categorization. No political category is inherently immune from judicial review, and courts must assess claims as they would in trial to ascertain the emergence of a political question. Even unlawful military actions can be subject to judicial scrutiny in specific contexts. Private parties claiming the political question doctrine must prove that their case involves executive or legislative decisions and that those decisions are protected from judicial review. Ultimately, the political question doctrine serves as a constitutional jurisdictional limitation, allowing courts to examine the underlying facts of a case beyond the complaint's surface.
The government contractor defense protects entities from liability when they act within the authority granted by the government, as established in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co. To successfully invoke this defense, particularly for suppliers of military equipment, four criteria must be met: (1) the U.S. must be immune from liability for the claims, (2) the supplier must demonstrate that the U.S. provided or approved precise specifications for the equipment, (3) the equipment must have performed according to those specifications, and (4) the supplier must have warned the U.S. of any known dangers associated with the equipment that were not known to the U.S.
In McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., the Ninth Circuit remanded a case involving the deaths of two Navy pilots after an ejection from a Rockwell-manufactured aircraft, with the court emphasizing that the government contractor defense applies in contexts where military decisions about equipment design are not subject to judicial review due to separation of powers and national security concerns. The court required a determination of whether reasonable specifications for the ejection system had been set or approved by the military; without such specifications, Rockwell could face strict liability.
Similarly, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Supreme Court dealt with a case involving a military helicopter crash where the co-pilot died due to an escape hatch design flaw. The Court endorsed reasoning akin to that in McKay and asserted that whether the government contractor defense’s elements are met is a jury question.
Prototype contends that resolving this case necessitates assessing military decisions related to the helicopter's procurement, design, maintenance, operation, flight procedures, training, and emergency responses. In contrast, plaintiffs assert that the case is a straightforward matter of product defect, negligence, and warranty, insisting that it does not raise political questions merely due to military involvement. Prototype cites a military report from an AR 15-6 investigation into the helicopter crash, which determined that the accident was mainly caused by the failure of the tail rotor pitch change shaft. The report indicated that this incident would typically be recoverable, but noted that the failure stemmed from both human error—specifically, the absence of a cotter pin installation—and a system failure related to inadequate procedures for verifying component integrity during repairs.
The investigator determined that the Helicopter was operating at a "relatively low" altitude and an approach airspeed of 60-80 knots with a lower power setting when the tail rotor pitch change shaft failed, resulting in a loss of "anti-torque thrust." Several "present and noncontributing" factors were noted that did not affect the accident's outcome but could help prevent future incidents, including the absence of a quality assurance inspection beyond that performed by the installer/repairer. The investigator found no negligence or misconduct by military personnel.
Prototype cites various case law to support its argument regarding political questions, indicating that several plaintiffs’ claims were deemed nonjusticiable. Notable cases include Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y and Gilligan v. Morgan, where the courts ruled against justiciability concerning actions involving military or governmental procedures. The excerpt further references Baker v. Carr, emphasizing that identifying a political question cannot rely solely on "semantic cataloguing." Prototype argues that proceeding with the case would necessitate a fact-finder to second guess military decisions and procedures, risking a lack of deference to the executive branch.
Prototype’s motion was supported solely by the Military Report from the Plaintiffs, which failed to demonstrate that a political question is inherently linked to the resolution of the disputed facts. This aligns with the government contractor defense principles applicable to military product manufacturers. Though Prototype intends to invoke this defense, it does not reconcile its assertion that every military contractor case presents a political question, which is inconsistent since not all government contracts fall under this defense. Previous cases, McKay and Boyle, did not establish that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to a political question; instead, they involved plaintiffs representing military officers injured by allegedly defective products, which does not parallel the current situation. Prototype has not effectively distinguished these cases from the present one, particularly as it does not challenge military battlefield actions or foreign policy decisions. Consequently, Prototype's Motion is DENIED without prejudice, allowing for renewal post-discovery.
Regarding the Plaintiffs' claims against Prototype, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) mandates that a pleading must succinctly present a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, going beyond mere formulaic recitations. The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility of liability. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a complaint lacks a valid legal theory or sufficient facts, with the allegations assumed true and interpreted favorably toward the non-moving party. However, courts are not obliged to accept contradictory allegations or those lacking factual support. The Complaint outlines three causes of action: negligence, strict product liability, and breach of warranty, indicating that Georgia substantive law applies, although the parties have not conducted a choice of law analysis under Georgia law to ascertain the applicable substantive law for each claim.
Prototype’s motion and reply reference various jurisdictional case laws. The applicability of these cases hinges on the determination of substantive law relevant to the current case. The Complaint asserts multiple product liability theories against all defendants; however, these allegations lack sufficient specificity and are deemed implausible. Consequently, the Prototype Motion is granted for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), requiring plaintiffs to specify the wrongful conduct attributed to each defendant and align these allegations with the substantive law under Georgia's choice of law principles.
The BAE and Sikorsky Defendants’ motions are granted due to lack of personal jurisdiction, leading to their dismissal from the action without prejudice, allowing for future claims in a proper forum. The Prototype Motion is partially granted and partially denied; it is denied regarding the political question aspect but granted for the need to file an amended complaint that adequately states a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). An amended complaint is to be submitted by May 11, 2015, with a redlined version attached showing all changes.
Additionally, on January 9, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed application to substitute L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, L.P. for Doe 41, which was granted. The Act referenced applies to rights and duties that arose prior to its enactment. Prototype, identified as a California corporation, did not contest personal jurisdiction initially, thus waiving that defense. No evidence was presented regarding the source of revenue claimed from Sikorsky operations in California, leading to dismissal of that argument. Plaintiffs' reference to Sikorsky's financials, including net sales and operating profit, lacks clarity in the basis for their calculations concerning revenue. Compliance with Cal. Corp. Code § 2105 regarding foreign corporations conducting business in California is also noted, alongside the Supreme Court's assumption about imputing a subsidiary’s California contacts.
The subsidiary involved had significant connections to California, including physical offices and a notable share of total Mercedes Benz vehicle sales. The Court referenced Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. as an exceptional case where personal jurisdiction was established based on corporate activities in Ohio, despite the company not being incorporated or having its principal business there. The president's relocation to Ohio and management of the company from that state justified the jurisdiction under due process. Additionally, Section 457 indicates that if a person dies due to neglect or wrongful conduct in a U.S. jurisdiction, the right to action for the death exists as if it occurred within the jurisdiction of the relevant state. Following the dismissal of BAE and Sikorsky Defendants, the claims against Prototype remain, with the Complaint alleging various responsibilities of the named defendants related to the design, manufacture, testing, inspection, assembly, instruction, maintenance, training, distribution, advertising, marketing, warranty, and sale of the helicopter and its components.
