Court: District Court, E.D. New York; April 23, 2015; Federal District Court
Motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by all Defendants were presented under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The Plaintiff, Michael Peacock, opposed these motions. The Court granted the Defendants’ motions, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
The facts outline that Peacock was employed as a bus driver by Suffolk Bus Corporation (SBC) since December 2006, receiving positive performance evaluations. On December 1, 2011, he reported a safety violation involving a verbal argument between passengers but was informed by Richard Spevak that no investigation would occur. Shortly after, he faced a one-day suspension for a minor procedural infraction.
On June 1, 2012, Peacock encountered a threatening passenger and, following instructions from Rose Bedell, transported the passenger to their destination. He attempted to report this incident, which was acknowledged for investigation. Following a minor accident two weeks later, he was subjected to a drug test, which returned negative results. Afterward, he was suspended without explanation and informed that an investigation into the accident and his employment history would be conducted.
On July 10, 2012, Peacock learned of his termination during a hearing organized by the Transportation Workers Union Local 252 (Local 252) without prior notice. Despite requesting a grievance and subsequent hearings, Local 252 did not adequately respond, with a second level hearing held on July 12, 2012, without his participation. Peacock initiated legal action on July 25, 2014, later filing an Amended Complaint that included claims for civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, violation of 49 U.S.C. § 31105, and wrongful discharge.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present sufficient factual matter that, when accepted as true, demonstrates a plausible claim for relief. This standard requires that the plaintiff provides factual content allowing the court to infer the defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. While courts generally accept all allegations as true, mere threadbare recitals of legal elements and conclusory statements are not granted this presumption. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations, and complaints that lack factual enhancement are insufficient.
For a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a conspiracy; (2) aimed at depriving a person or class of equal protection or privileges; (3) an overt act in furtherance; and (4) an injury or deprivation of rights. The plaintiff claims to be a member of a political group as a whistleblower; however, whistleblowers are not recognized as a protected class under this statute. Previous cases have affirmed that retaliation against whistleblowers does not constitute a valid claim under § 1985. Additionally, a conspiracy claim must include specific factual allegations; general, vague allegations do not meet the pleading standard. The plaintiff's assertion that defendants conspired to retaliate against him for safety complaints was deemed insufficient, leading to the dismissal of the conspiracy claim.
Plaintiff's second cause of action alleges unlawful suspension and discharge by Defendants in retaliation for safety violation complaints, claiming a violation of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. 31105. The STAA prohibits discharging or discriminating against employees for filing complaints regarding commercial motor vehicle safety violations and provides a complaint process involving the Secretary of Labor. If the Secretary fails to issue a final decision within 210 days, the employee may sue in district court. However, Defendants argue that the STAA lacks a private right of action, a stance supported by various federal courts. The court agrees, emphasizing that the STAA outlines a comprehensive administrative procedure for handling such complaints, with judicial review limited to specific circumstances. Plaintiff's response does not address the private right of action issue and incorrectly asserts that alternative remedies exist without needing to seek administrative remedies first. Consequently, the court deems Plaintiff's claim improper and dismisses the second cause of action.
Plaintiff's claim titled 'relief under equity' is interpreted as a common law wrongful discharge claim; however, New York law does not recognize wrongful discharge claims. Additionally, Section 301 of the Labor Management and Relations Act (LMRA) preempts state law claims related to collective bargaining agreements, including wrongful discharge. Thus, even if New York law acknowledged such a claim, it would still be preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA, leading to the dismissal of this cause of action.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's assertion of a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation was raised for the first time in opposition to the Union's motion to dismiss and is not included in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs cannot amend their complaint in such a manner. Even if considered, this claim would be time-barred due to a six-month statute of limitations, which begins when a union member is aware of the breach. Here, Plaintiff was informed of his termination and the Union's inaction within a timeframe that exceeds the limitation period, rendering the claim untimely.
The Court concludes that allowing Plaintiff to amend the complaint would be futile, as the claims are either defective or time-barred. Consequently, the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, Plaintiff did not oppose the motion regarding the third cause of action, leading to its dismissal as abandoned.
