Abdo v. Reyes

Citations: 91 F. Supp. 3d 1225; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18212; 2015 WL 632075Docket: Case No. 2:14-cv-620 CW

Court: District Court, D. Utah; February 12, 2015; Federal District Court

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Michael Abdo and SUWA have filed a lawsuit in state court seeking a declaration that the State and Tooele County's action against the United States, aimed at quieting title to certain roads, violates Utah law and the state constitution. SUWA requests an injunction to prevent the Attorney General, Tooele County, and the County Commissioners from pursuing this action using state funds, effectively seeking to dismiss the pending Tooele County case and over twenty similar R.S. 2477 road cases in federal court. The State Defendants removed the state case to federal court in August 2014, and SUWA's motion to remand was filed in September 2014, with the court hearing arguments in February 2015.

The background details that Tooele County and the State of Utah filed the Tooele County case against the United States in May 2012 to assert rights-of-way over roads allegedly established before the repeal of R.S. 2477 in 1976. This repeal ended the federal statute that granted rights-of-way over public lands but allowed rights acquired before the repeal to remain vested. The action is brought under the Quiet Title Act, which allows for civil actions to resolve title disputes involving the U.S.

The Tooele County case is part of a larger group of approximately twenty-six similar cases, which are managed under a detailed plan to avoid overwhelming resources. Currently, the Tooele County case is stayed, although preservation depositions of key witnesses are occurring to safeguard historical testimony. SUWA was granted permissive intervention in the Tooele County case and most other road cases, but is limited from making new claims or defenses since it does not hold title to the properties involved. SUWA can, however, consult with the United States regarding defenses and contribute to legal briefs in support of the U.S. position.

In Garfield County Consolidated Cases 2:11-cv-1045 and 2:12-cv-478, SUWA obtained permission to file a memorandum supporting the United States’ motion to dismiss, arguing that these cases are barred by Utah's statute of limitations, which restricts actions concerning real property rights to those initiated within seven years of the right accruing (Utah Code 78B-2-201). SUWA contends all R.S. 2477 cases arose prior to 1976, when the statute was repealed, thus rendering any state or county action to quiet title time-barred. Additionally, SUWA claims that actions taken by the Attorney General violate the Utah Constitution, particularly Article 7, Section 16, as these actions were filed more than seven years post-repeal, indicating the Attorney General was not fulfilling his legal responsibilities. Consequently, SUWA sought a state court injunction against the Attorney General and Tooele County officials to prevent them from pursuing R.S. 2477 claims. The State Defendants removed SUWA’s case to federal court, arguing this was justified by complete preemption or the Supreme Court's criteria in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. SUWA then moved to remand the case back to state court, claiming the State Defendants' removal notice lacked a short and plain statement justifying removal. The court determined that the removal notice was not procedurally defective, as disputes regarding complete preemption pertain to substantive, rather than procedural, issues. The Tooele County case seeks to quiet title against the United States under 28 U.S.C. 2409a, with exclusive federal jurisdiction established by 28 U.S.C. 1346(f) for such actions.

Complete preemption exists in cases involving quiet title actions against the United States, allowing for removal to federal court. Federal-question jurisdiction is determined by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which states that federal jurisdiction arises only if a federal question is present in the plaintiff's complaint. A plaintiff can avoid federal jurisdiction by relying solely on state law. However, if a federal statute is extraordinarily powerful, it can transform a state claim into a federal claim, thus permitting removal. 

The Tenth Circuit employs a two-prong test for complete preemption: first, whether the federal regulation preempts the state law; and second, whether Congress intended to allow removal by providing a federal cause of action. Complete preemption is rare, and courts generally start with the second prong. In quiet title cases against the U.S., federal courts hold exclusive jurisdiction, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f).

While SUWA's complaint against the State Defendants relates to state law violations, it may invoke federal remedies that address similar rights or interests. SUWA's claims hinge on a statute of limitations, and while Congress may provide a federal remedy, the federal statute of limitations differs from the state one. The first prong of the preemption test may not be satisfied, as the Quiet Title Act addresses real property interests claimed by the U.S. and allows conditions that could limit a state or county's ability to quiet U.S. title, which does not violate the Act.

The Quiet Title Act establishes a 12-year statute of limitations for counties to sue the United States regarding title disputes, which cannot be extended by counties. While the Act does not intend to completely preempt state law on limitations periods, it does not allow counties to impose longer periods than 12 years. The court leans toward concluding that complete preemption does not support the removal of the action in question, favoring remand based on strict construction of removal statutes. 

In cases lacking complete preemption, the Supreme Court allows federal courts to hear state law claims that hinge on substantial federal questions, as outlined in Grable & Sons. The criteria for proper removal require that a state claim must (1) raise a federal issue, (2) be actually disputed, (3) be substantial, and (4) be resolvable in federal court without upsetting federal-state judicial balance. SUWA's claims, which reference Utah's 7-year statute of limitations, rely on actions taken to quiet title, and cannot independently support a claim without such actions. The claims invoke federal laws, R.S. 2477 and FLPMA, which set the framework for title claims by the State and County. Although SUWA’s claims engage substantial federal issues, the requirement for an actual dispute is not met, as it is established that any title acquisition by the State must have occurred before 1976, contrasting with the broader "disputed title" provision of the Quiet Title Act.

Section 78B-2-201 indicates that title must have accrued by 1976, and it is uncontested that over seven years have passed since the potential acquisition of title by the State Defendants. Consequently, the court finds that removal based on Grable & Sons' alternative test is not applicable. Regarding the Anti-Injunction Act, while SUWA's motion to remand seems valid, it does not address the court's jurisdiction over the Tooele County case and related R.S. 2477 road cases. SUWA's complaint seeks to enjoin the State Defendants from advancing the Tooele County case, and if successful, would undermine the court’s jurisdiction over the matter. The court notes that the R.S. 2477 cases involve significant federal law and are under exclusive jurisdiction due to the federal R.S. 2477 statute and the waiver of sovereign immunity. SUWA's state court action appears to circumvent previous court orders and effectively seeks to dismiss the Tooele County case, which could also affect other ongoing R.S. 2477 cases. The Anti-Injunction Act restricts federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings unless explicitly authorized or necessary to preserve jurisdiction. The court asserts that the current actions are in rem, meaning state court jurisdiction over the same res could impair federal jurisdiction. The precedent indicates that federal courts may enjoin state actions that threaten their jurisdiction, especially regarding specific property or objects.

Kline remains applicable law for the current court's proceedings on R.S. 2477 road cases, which are in rem and grant the court exclusive jurisdiction prior to any state court actions. Should the state court proceed without an injunction, it could undermine the federal court's jurisdiction. The court acknowledges that the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is relevant. Under the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. 1651), the court can issue necessary writs to third parties affecting its jurisdiction. However, the appropriateness of enjoining SUWA’s state court action has not been fully briefed, so the court will delay any injunction until the parties submit their briefs according to the outlined schedule. The court grants SUWA’s motion to remand and directs the parties to brief the issue of a writ to prevent SUWA from continuing its state court action, with all related filings to occur in the Tooele County case.

The State Defendants include multiple officials from Utah and Tooele County. Abdo was not included in the motion to intervene; thus, only SUWA was granted permissive intervention. The court notes that while a twelve-year statute of limitations applies to counties, the Quiet Title Act's limitations differ regarding states. The court references Utah Code 78B-2-102, which prescribes time limits for civil actions but can be overridden by more specific statutes, indicating a need to analyze the relationship between 28 U.S.C. 2409a and Utah’s statutes regarding limitations.