Leonard v. Tractor Supply Co.

Citations: 88 F. Supp. 3d 459; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9792; 2015 WL 401476Docket: Civil No. 14-399

Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; January 27, 2015; Federal District Court

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Melissa Leonard filed a complaint on February 18, 2014, in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, claiming injuries from a porch swing at a Tractor Supply Company store. The case was removed to federal court on March 25, 2014. Leonard's claims include Negligence, Strict Liability, Products Liability in Negligence, and Warranty. Tractor Supply Company moved to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 4, arguing it cannot be liable since it neither manufactured nor sold the defective product. The court agreed, granting the motion to dismiss these counts.

On March 1, 2012, Leonard was injured when the swing she used fell. The court emphasized that under Rule 12(b)(6), it must accept factual allegations as true and view the complaint favorably for the plaintiff. For a claim to survive, it must be plausible, providing enough facts to suggest the defendant's liability without requiring a probability at the pleading stage. The court noted that mere labels or conclusions are insufficient, and if dismissal occurs, a plaintiff should be allowed to amend unless it would be inequitable or futile.

Both parties concur that the Restatement (Third) of Torts governs the Plaintiff's claims. In the absence of a ruling from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a federal court must anticipate how that court would resolve the matter, as established in Covell v. Bell Sports, Inc. The Court of Appeals in Covell suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would likely adopt this Restatement. Tractor Supply Company contends it cannot be liable under strict liability, negligence in products liability, or warranty because it did not sell a defective product. The Plaintiff counters that Tractor Supply Company qualifies as one who "otherwise distributes a product" per section 20 of the Restatement, which defines this as providing a product for use or consumption, even if not sold. Although the Plaintiff acknowledges that Tractor Supply Company did not sell the swing to her, she argues that the Company assembled, displayed, and encouraged her to use the product, thereby promoting its consumption. The Plaintiff cites a lack of Pennsylvania case law interpreting the Third Restatement, relying instead on the Reporter’s Note, which suggests that liability can arise from harm caused by defective products even before an actual purchase is made, as exemplified by cases under the Uniform Commercial Code. This reasoning supports the notion that a seller may be held liable once the product enters the stream of commerce, applicable under strict products liability as well.

Once a product is classified as such, it must be determined whether it was 'sold' or 'otherwise distributed' by the defendant. Strict liability applies to giveaways and products distributed free of charge since title passes to the consumer. The analysis extends to the intention to contract for sale, even if title has not formally passed. In Barker, the court found a contract of sale was created when a customer took possession of a soft drink bottle with the intent to pay. Gillispie affirmed that it was a jury's role to decide if the plaintiff intended to purchase the bottles by taking them into possession. Both cases indicate that the only barrier to title passage was the inability to complete the sale due to a product defect causing damage. 

However, Ms. Leonard's case differs as there is no claim that she intended to purchase the porch swing. Other commercial distribution methods include demonstrator models, where possession is intentionally transferred to a specified customer, as illustrated by examples like a trial deep-fat fryer in a restaurant. 

In contrast, the Greenwood case involved an injury on a water slide where the court found no sale, lease, or bailment attributes, and thus no title transfer to the plaintiff. Following Pennsylvania law, the strict liability claim against the amusement park was rejected as it was not considered a seller. Although this finding was based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court referenced the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which supports distinguishing between a sale and service. The notes clarify that if a product is not consumed, it typically is treated as a service, as seen in cases regarding amusement rides and other similar services, leading to the conclusion that amusement ride operators are service providers and not subject to strict liability.

The court addressed the issue of strict liability in the context of the case Rivera-Emerling v. M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp., where a plaintiff was injured by a display chair in a store. The trial court initially ruled that the strict liability claim could not be submitted to the jury due to the plaintiff not having purchased the chair. However, the Appellate Court reversed this decision, stating that a cause of action for strict products liability could arise if a product held out for sale injures a prospective purchaser using it. The court noted that the plaintiff in Rivera-Emerling intended to buy the chair and was invited to sit on it by a salesman.

In contrast, the current case lacks evidence that the plaintiff, Ms. Leonard, had any intention to purchase the porch swing or was invited to sit on it by a Tractor Supply Company employee. Consequently, the court concluded that Pennsylvania courts would not extend strict liability to the circumstances of this case, determining that Tractor Supply Company was not a seller of the porch swing as defined by the Restatement (Third) of Torts. As such, the plaintiff's claims of strict liability and warranty against Tractor Supply Company could not stand. The court granted Tractor Supply Company's motion to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 4, but allowed the negligence claim in Count 1 to proceed against them and permitted claims against other defendants to continue. The court also stated that any amendment to reassert strict liability and warranty claims against Tractor Supply would be futile. The order on January 28, 2015, formally dismissed Counts 2, 3, and 4 against Tractor Supply Company.