Court: District Court, N.D. California; March 31, 2015; Federal District Court
The Court issued an order partially granting and partially denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Stationary Engineers, Local 39, PTF, LLC, in response to Plaintiff Charles Loft's claims. The Court determined that the matter could be resolved without oral argument, canceling the scheduled hearing but maintaining the case management conference.
The factual background reveals that Loft is a member of the Defendant union and an assistant chief engineer at Sequoia Hospital. After the collective bargaining agreement expired on October 1, 2013, members, including Loft, went on strike. While on leave, Loft participated in striking on October 3, 2013. Allegations arose from fellow union members that Loft worked during the strike, with claims he aided hospital operations by communicating with management.
Defendant notified Loft of these charges on November 15, 2013, allowing him to respond by December 13, 2013. Loft denied the charges in a letter. A pre-trial hearing on January 24, 2014, led to the decision to escalate the matter to a membership trial, which took place on February 25, 2014. Loft claims he was denied the opportunity to present a witness and documents during the trial. Ultimately, he was found guilty of violating the strike and fined $25. Following the trial, Loft was informed he could appeal the decision within 30 days.
Loft initiated this lawsuit on February 24, 2014, the day before his union trial, and also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the trial, which was denied by the Court.
On June 12, 2014, Loft filed a Second Amended Complaint, consisting of four causes of action. First, Loft accused the Defendant of violating the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) under 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(5), citing failure to notify Loft of specific charges, inadequate notice for a pre-trial hearing, and insufficient time to prepare a defense. Second, Loft claimed breach of contract under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), asserting that he was a third-party beneficiary of the union constitution and that the Defendant's actions violated this constitution. Third, Loft alleged a breach of duty of fair representation under the LMRDA. Finally, Loft claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the Defendant's conduct. Loft sought various damages and attorney's fees.
On January 14, 2015, the Defendant moved for summary judgment, submitting a statement of uncontroverted facts and supporting declarations. In response, Loft filed an opposition with additional declarations and exhibits, along with an objection to the Defendant’s statement. The Defendant replied on February 3, 2015. The legal standard for summary judgment requires the court to view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, determining if there are genuine issues of material fact. The moving party must initially identify evidence showing no genuine issues exist, while the opposing party must present specific facts indicating a genuine dispute for trial.
Defendant seeks summary judgment on three grounds regarding Loft's lawsuit. First, Defendant contends Loft's failure to exhaust internal union remedies bars his civil suit, thus entitling Defendant to judgment on all four claims. Second, Defendant argues that Loft’s claim for breach of the duty of fair representation is legally precluded, as this duty pertains only to collective bargaining obligations and not individual grievances against the union. Third, Defendant asserts that Loft's request for punitive and emotional distress damages in his breach of contract claim is inappropriate, as such damages are not available for breach of contract.
In response, Loft acknowledges his failure to exhaust union grievance procedures but argues this should be excused because the internal process would not provide the monetary relief he seeks, rendering it inadequate. Loft also defends his claim for breach of duty of fair representation but does not address Defendant's argument concerning the recovery of punitive and emotional distress damages.
The Court will evaluate Defendant’s arguments sequentially. Regarding the failure to exhaust internal union remedies, the court has discretion to mandate exhaustion under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The Supreme Court has identified three factors to consider: hostility from union officials, inadequacy of internal procedures to fully remedy the grievance, and potential delays in judicial hearings. If any of these factors are not met, internal remedies are presumed inadequate, and requiring exhaustion may constitute an abuse of discretion. The burden to demonstrate the adequacy of internal remedies lies with the moving party.
The second Clayton factor examines whether internal union appeal procedures can adequately address an employee’s grievance and provide full relief, including monetary damages. The Ninth Circuit ruled that if these internal remedies do not offer the full relief sought, they are deemed inadequate, as illustrated in *Casumpang*, where the court reversed a district order requiring exhaustion of union procedures due to uncertainty about potential monetary recovery. Additionally, in cases where a plaintiff has missed an internal grievance deadline, a district court cannot mandate exhaustion of internal remedies unless the union can provide evidence that these procedures would allow for the reactivation of the grievance.
In the current case involving Loft, he has sought compensatory, special, and exemplary damages. The Defendant failed to present evidence that Loft could obtain such damages through its internal grievance process, and the documentation Loft provided did not clarify the available remedies. Furthermore, Loft missed the thirty-day deadline to appeal his conviction, which further complicates the situation. Since the Defendant did not demonstrate that its internal procedures could allow Loft to reactivate his grievance, the Court determined that the Defendant could not prove the availability of adequate internal union remedies. Consequently, the Court denied the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on Loft’s alleged failure to exhaust internal grievance procedures.
Defendant seeks summary judgment to dismiss Loft’s claim for breach of fair duty of representation, asserting that such a claim is legally precluded since it does not pertain to the union's conduct with Loft’s employer. The defendant contends that the duty of fair representation is specific to collective bargaining obligations and, therefore, Loft’s claim fails. However, it is established that a union member can sue a union for breach of this duty, as confirmed in Carter v. Smith Food King and Moore v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Worker, Local 6. The court agrees, emphasizing that the duty of fair representation protects individual members from adverse treatment by the majority. Consequently, Loft is permitted to pursue his claim against the defendant for this breach, leading to the denial of the defendant’s summary judgment motion.
Additionally, the defendant challenges Loft's requested remedies for breach of contract, claiming that punitive and emotional distress damages are not permissible under contract law. Loft asserts that the International Union’s constitution serves as a contract, with himself as a third-party beneficiary, and alleges its breach. The court notes that while the defendant seeks to preclude Loft's remedies, Loft fails to counter this argument in his opposition. The court clarifies that the summary judgment motion addresses Loft's claim rather than the specific remedies sought.
The Ninth Circuit has not definitively ruled on whether a party can seek summary judgment regarding the availability of a remedy; however, most district courts that have considered the issue permit such motions. Rule 56 allows courts to address parts of a claim when a party lacks evidence to support those portions. Both the right to relief and the remedy are encompassed within a "claim" as articulated in Rule 56. Courts have affirmed that certain remedies can be subject to summary judgment.
In the case at hand, the Court evaluates Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Loft's entitlement to punitive and emotional distress damages related to his breach of contract claim under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). It is established under federal labor law that punitive damages are generally not permissible for LMRA breach of contract claims, leading the Court to grant Defendant’s motion regarding punitive damages.
Regarding emotional distress damages, the Defendant claims such damages are not available for breach of contract, but fails to provide legal support for this assertion. Although the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed the recoverability of emotional distress damages for LMRA breach of contract claims, some precedents suggest they can be awarded. A relevant case, Bloom v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 168, involved union members seeking emotional distress damages, which were ultimately reversed by the Ninth Circuit due to insufficient supporting facts. The Court will further consider whether Loft is entitled to emotional distress damages for his claim.
The Ninth Circuit determined that claims of emotional distress by individual union members were insufficient, as most provided minimal evidence of distress, such as feelings of disappointment or being treated poorly. The court found that the union's conduct did not constitute "outrageous conduct" necessary to support a direct claim for emotional distress. However, while the court did not decide if emotional distress damages could be awarded for a breach of the duty of fair representation, it referenced an Eighth Circuit case allowing such damages in similar situations involving particularly abusive union conduct. The Ninth Circuit noted that extreme actions, like those in the Richardson case, justified emotional distress damages due to a pattern of malicious treatment. Consequently, the court indicated that Loft could potentially recover emotional distress damages based on the union's conduct. The Defendant's claim that Loft was legally barred from recovering such damages was deemed incorrect. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the Defendant did not challenge the evidence supporting Loft's emotional distress claim, focusing solely on the legal permissibility of such damages under the LMRA. The court denied the Defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding Loft's emotional distress claim but granted it concerning Loft's request for punitive damages. Additionally, Loft's objection to the Defendant’s failure to comply with Civil Local Rule 56-2 was upheld, and the court disregarded the Defendant’s statement of uncontroverted facts.
The Ninth Circuit employs the Clayton three-factor test for claims under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). This test, initially articulated in the context of LMRA actions, is applicable to LMRDA claims and serves as a guideline for determining whether exhaustion of remedies should be required under Title I of the LMRDA. The only case where a district court prohibited a defendant from contesting a plaintiff's entitlement to certain remedies in a summary judgment motion is In re Methyl Tertiaiy Butyl Ether Products Liability Litigation. The court clarified that Federal Rules 56 and 54 focus on claims rather than the specific relief sought, rendering the concept of partial summary judgment on remedies outside the scope of the rules. However, the court treated the motion as one in limine, deciding on it accordingly.
In Bloom, while the Ninth Circuit did not elaborate on the union's conduct, the main issue involved the union president's promise to the plaintiffs regarding a preferential hiring agreement, which was not fulfilled, leading to a lawsuit for specific performance. Additionally, Loft's declaration indicated he experienced significant emotional distress due to the union's conduct, including anxiety about expulsion and deterioration of familial relations, and described physical symptoms linked to his mental anguish. Testimony from a union official during Loft's trial suggested threats against him, which were witnessed by others.
