United States v. Matusiewicz

Citations: 84 F. Supp. 3d 363; 43 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1640; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38304; 2015 WL 1409650Docket: CRIMINAL ACTION No.13-83

Court: District Court, D. Delaware; March 26, 2015; Federal District Court

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Amy Gonzalez is indicted for cyber-stalking and conspiracy related to the murder of her sister-in-law, Christine Belford. The indictment raises First Amendment concerns regarding the cyber-stalking statute, with Gonzalez arguing that it is overbroad and vague, violating her due process rights. The court denies her motion to dismiss. 

The indictment alleges that Gonzalez, along with co-conspirators David Thomas Matusiewicz and Lenore Matusiewicz, engaged in a campaign from 2009 to 2013 to surveil and harass Belford, following a contentious custody battle and accusations of abuse made by David Matusiewicz that were deemed not credible by the Family Court. Their actions included posting online accusations, contacting Belford's children's school and church, and soliciting assistance to monitor her home. 

The indictment does not charge the defendants with murder or conspiracy to commit murder; instead, they face charges for violations of federal interstate stalking and cyberstalking statutes, which could result in life imprisonment.

The Federal Cyberstalking Statute, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2), initially enacted in 1996 to prohibit physical stalking that instills reasonable fear of injury, has been amended to include cyberstalking. The statute criminalizes using electronic means to harass or intimidate someone, causing reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, or substantial emotional distress.

Defendant Gonzalez challenges the constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment, arguing it is overbroad. The overbreadth doctrine allows for the invalidation of laws that significantly infringe on protected speech. However, this remedy is applied sparingly, requiring the challenger to demonstrate that a substantial number of the statute's applications are unconstitutional relative to its legitimate purposes.

Gonzalez claims Section 2261A criminalizes speech based on its effects and punishes protected expression, pointing to her statements about Christine Belford, which she argues reflect her sincere beliefs regarding her nieces' well-being. However, the court notes that these examples do not demonstrate a significant intrusion into protected speech. Previous rulings, including those from four circuit courts, have upheld the statute, stating it encompasses many legitimate applications and rejecting similar overbreadth challenges. The First Circuit, for instance, dismissed a comparable argument, emphasizing the absence of a pattern of unconstitutional applications supporting Gonzalez's claim.

Most applications of the laws in question pertain to conduct not protected by the First Amendment, leading to a finding that Gonzalez has not sufficiently demonstrated that 18 U.S.C. 2261A is substantially overbroad. Gonzalez's reliance on her own claimed protected speech does not fulfill the burden necessary to prove that the statute as a whole is unconstitutional. If the indictment is indeed based on protected speech, an "as-applied" challenge would adequately safeguard her rights.

The key issue then becomes whether the Government's application of Section 2261A against Gonzalez is unconstitutional. Gonzalez contends that the Government is penalizing her for the content of her speech, while the Government argues that the speech referenced in the indictment is unprotected. This necessitates an assessment of whether the alleged speech is protected or falls into categories of unprotected speech, as outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Stevens. The Government asserts that Gonzalez's speech may be categorized as defamation or as integral to criminal conduct.

The defamation exception allows for legal remedies against false statements damaging to an individual's reputation. The second exception, concerning speech integral to criminal conduct, stems from Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., which held that speech tied directly to the commission of a crime is not protected. However, this exception has faced scrutiny, as reflected by the Third Circuit's caution against overly broad interpretations, asserting that communications serving professional purposes are still considered "speech" under the First Amendment.

Overall, careful interpretation of these exceptions is necessary to avoid the potential consequence that any criminalized speech could be deemed integral to the offense, thereby justifying punishment.

The Giboney exception's application to prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. 2261A has been examined through various circuit court decisions regarding the federal cyberstalking statute. Most courts, referencing Giboney, determined that the speech involved in as-applied challenges was not protected by the First Amendment. In *United States v. Petrovic*, the Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction for "revenge porn," ruling that the defendant's harassing communications were integral to his extortionate conduct. The First Circuit in *United States v. Sayer* similarly rejected a First Amendment challenge from a defendant who posted explicit images of his ex-partner online, concluding that the speech had no legitimate purpose. The Ninth Circuit followed suit in *United States v. Osinger*, where a defendant's creation of a fake Facebook page featuring explicit images of his ex-partner also led to a conviction for cyberstalking. The Sixth Circuit in *United States v. Bowker* further upheld a cyberstalking charge against a defendant who directly communicated with the victim. Conversely, *United States v. Cassidy* was the only case to dismiss a cyberstalking indictment on First Amendment grounds, with the court finding the defendant's speech protected due to its challenging nature regarding the target’s credibility as a religious leader. A consistent theme across the rejected challenges is the absence of a legitimate purpose for the speech in question, particularly when it involved private sexual information without consent. In the case at hand, the speech could potentially be defamation, as the indictment alleges the defendant posted false accusations against Christine Belford on YouTube. The defendant may argue a truth defense, and some of the speech could be integral to criminal conduct, as evidenced by soliciting friends to approach Belford’s residence.

If a request is part of a conspiracy to harass, it falls outside First Amendment protection as it encourages participation in an offense. The Defendant's public accusations against Belford do not align with Giboney's exception since they are not linked to extortion or a gratuitous invasion of privacy. The allegations suggest the Defendant caused significant emotional distress through speech that could otherwise be protected if true. In contrast to King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, here the speech itself is the alleged offense. The concurring opinion in Osinger indicated that combined conduct and speech can violate the law, particularly if the objective is to harass and inflict emotional distress. However, Gonzalez claims her motives included protecting her nieces, which is a legitimate concern. While protective speech is generally highly valued, not all of Gonzalez's speech falls under Giboney's exception, which necessitates a singular intent to cause harm under 18 U.S.C. 2261A. Due to First Amendment protections, courts should be cautious when prosecuting speech that could be construed as a crime, particularly considering Delaware's stance on child abuse reporting. Delaware protects individuals from liability when making good faith reports to authorities, yet Gonzalez did not report her allegations through appropriate channels, opting instead for public postings. This decision diminishes First Amendment protections, suggesting her true aim was to harass Belford rather than to safeguard the children. Additionally, the elements of the offense, including intent and a course of conduct causing intimidation, mitigate concerns about chilling protected speech.

The Indictment against Defendant Gonzalez does not infringe upon her First Amendment rights, as she will have the opportunity to contest the Government’s evidence regarding her alleged unlawful intent at trial. The defense argues that the Cyberstalking Statute (18 U.S.C. § 2261A) is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment, claiming it fails to provide clear notice of prohibited conduct and risks arbitrary enforcement based on others' emotional reactions. However, legal precedent states that a criminal statute is void for vagueness if it does not allow individuals of ordinary intelligence to understand what actions are prohibited or if it permits arbitrary enforcement. Stricter scrutiny applies to statutes with criminal penalties, especially those affecting protected rights like free speech. Nevertheless, a statute's lack of precision does not automatically render it vague. 

The court finds that the statutes in question are not unconstitutionally vague because they require proof of specific criminal intent to harm or harass, thereby reducing the likelihood of unknowing violations. Additionally, the statute employs an objective standard concerning the victim's emotional distress, which mitigates concerns about arbitrary enforcement based on individual reactions. The actions alleged in the Indictment, such as soliciting surveillance of a victim and disseminating accusatory letters, would likely be recognized by a reasonable person as violating the statute, thus affirming the clarity and applicability of the law in this case.

Co-defendants Lenore Matusiewicz and David Thomas Matusiewicz have joined Amy Gonzalez’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, but the court's reasoning applies equally to them, resulting in the denial of their motion. The Third Circuit's ruling in United States v. Lampley supports the imposition of criminal sanctions for interstate telephone harassment. However, contrasting views on the constitutionality of harassment statutes were noted, particularly regarding a statute that criminalizes communication intended to harass or alarm, which may be deemed overly broad. The court referenced an Eighth Circuit ruling allowing regulations on speech that are viewpoint neutral and involve highly private and offensive content. The court also indicated that the defendant's speech may not be protected if it concerns sexually explicit material involving a private individual. The decision distinguishes the context of speech for First Amendment considerations, recognizing tighter constraints on political speech compared to commercial speech. While the defendant may argue a lack of trust in Delaware authorities to protect her nieces, the court emphasized that the critical issue is whether Ms. Gonzalez had alternative means to express her concerns about the children, which she did. Additionally, the intent required under 18 U.S.C. 2261A(1) involves the purpose to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person.