Greiman v. Hodges

Citations: 79 F. Supp. 3d 933; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5263; 2015 WL 220965Docket: No. 4:13-cv-510

Court: District Court, S.D. Iowa; January 14, 2015; Federal District Court

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A Motion to Dismiss has been filed by the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) and associated defendants in response to a lawsuit from Plaintiff Blair J. Greiman regarding his parole eligibility. Greiman was convicted of first-degree kidnapping in 1982 at age sixteen, resulting in a life sentence without parole, which was mandatory for Class A felonies under Iowa law at that time. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot be sentenced to life without parole, necessitating a "meaningful opportunity for release." Following this, Greiman filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, leading to a 2012 ruling that vacated his life sentence and resentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years, making him eligible for parole immediately.

However, the IBOP denied Greiman's parole twice, citing the seriousness of his crime, without adequately considering his youth, maturity, and rehabilitation. Greiman argues that this denial did not provide the meaningful opportunity for parole mandated by law. Additionally, he contends that the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) requires him to complete sex offender treatment before parole, yet he cannot enroll in these classes due to policy restrictions, further hindering his path to parole.

Mr. Greiman, sentenced to life with parole eligibility, argues his exclusion from sex offender classes places him in a situation akin to that of juvenile offenders serving life without parole. He filed a Petition in the Iowa District Court on November 22, 2013, claiming violations of due process and cruel and unusual punishment under both Federal and Iowa Constitutions. The Petition requests the Court to: 1) declare that the Defendants' actions are unconstitutional; 2) mandate the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) to allow him access to sex offender classes for parole eligibility; 3) require the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) to factor in his youth at the offense time and his rehabilitation in parole decisions; 4) instruct the IBOP to develop policies that consider youth and rehabilitation in parole determinations; 5) recognize legal distinctions between juveniles and adults in parole decisions; 6) maintain jurisdiction until unconstitutional practices are resolved; 7) award costs and fees to the Plaintiff; and 8) provide any additional relief deemed appropriate by the Court. The Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa on December 23, 2013. 

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must present a clear statement of the claim demonstrating entitlement to relief, with factual allegations accepted as true and all reasonable inferences made in favor of the Plaintiff. The complaint must contain sufficient factual content to establish a plausible claim. While detailed factual allegations are not required, the Plaintiff must provide adequate grounds for the claim rather than mere labels. The plausibility standard demands more than a possibility of success on the merits, but does not require a probability. The Supreme Court established a two-pronged approach for evaluating such complaints: distinguishing between factual and legal allegations, accepting the former as true, and assessing the factual allegations for plausibility. A claim is plausible if it permits a reasonable inference of the defendant's liability, while mere consistency with liability does not meet the threshold for entitlement to relief.

The "parsing" process involves a thorough examination of the plaintiff's allegations, emphasizing that the complaint must be interpreted as a cohesive whole rather than assessing each allegation in isolation. Courts are cautioned against requiring plaintiffs to eliminate every lawful explanation for the defendant's conduct, as this contradicts the principle of favoring the nonmoving party and imposes an improper probability standard at the pleading stage, as established in Iqbal and Twombly. Courts should apply their judicial experience and common sense to evaluate the plausibility of claims, considering alternative explanations while recognizing that a well-pleaded complaint can advance even if actual proof seems unlikely.

To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a constitutional right violation and demonstrate that the deprivation was perpetrated by someone acting under state law. More than a mere assertion of wrongful conduct is required; factual allegations must suggest that the defendant's actions caused the constitutional breach. The plaintiff claims that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, along with corresponding state rights under the Iowa Constitution, have been violated due to a lack of consideration for his youth and rehabilitation in the parole review process, as well as being denied access to mandatory sex offender treatment, which effectively denies him a meaningful opportunity for parole.

Federal case law recognizes the significant distinctions between juveniles and adults, noting that youth often entails less maturity and responsibility, leading to impulsive decisions. This understanding underpins the argument that age should influence legal considerations regarding treatment and opportunities for rehabilitation.

Juveniles often lack the experience and judgment necessary to make responsible decisions, making it inappropriate to equate them with adults regarding legal consequences. The Supreme Court has recognized that special care must be used when assessing the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession, particularly given the instability of adolescence. Over recent decades, the Court has limited harsh sentencing for juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that individuals under sixteen cannot receive the death penalty, and in Roper v. Simmons, this was expanded to those under eighteen. The Roper decision highlighted fundamental differences between juveniles and adults: juveniles exhibit a lack of maturity, are more susceptible to negative influences, and their character is less developed and more changeable. These factors reduce the moral culpability of juveniles compared to adults and suggest that their behavior is less indicative of irretrievably depraved character. The Court also emphasized that youth should be viewed as a mitigating factor because juveniles can mature and reform. In Graham v. Florida, the Court further prohibited life sentences without parole for nonhomicide offenses committed by juveniles, reinforcing the principle that their developmental stage necessitates different legal treatment.

The Court reaffirmed that life without parole is an excessively severe punishment for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, as established in Roper. It concluded that the legitimate goals of penal sanctions—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—do not justify such a sentence for juveniles. While states are not required to guarantee eventual freedom for juvenile offenders, they must offer a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. This means that a life without parole sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide offender violates the Eighth Amendment, as it precludes the possibility of reentry into society.

In Terrance Graham's case, the imposition of life without parole deprived him of any chance to prove he could reintegrate into society, despite the potential for personal growth and rehabilitation. While the Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, it does not prevent lifelong incarceration for those who commit serious crimes; however, states cannot initially determine that these offenders will never be rehabilitated.

The 2012 Supreme Court case Miller v. Alabama further restricted life without parole for juveniles by ruling that mandatory life sentences in homicide cases are unconstitutional, as they do not allow for consideration of the offender's age and associated characteristics. States may impose life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide, but only after evaluating mitigating factors, including the offender's age. The Court emphasized that sentences of this severity for juveniles should be rare, given the challenges in distinguishing between transient immaturity and irreparable corruption in young offenders.

In 2013, the Iowa Supreme Court enhanced protections for juvenile offenders by requiring individualized sentencing evaluations in cases involving de facto life sentences or lengthy terms that effectively negate meaningful parole opportunities. Key rulings established that: 1) juveniles are constitutionally distinct from adults regarding culpability; 2) they are more capable of change; and 3) lengthy sentences without parole should be rare. This was affirmed in cases such as State v. Null, State v. Pearson, and State v. Ragland, where the court applied Miller-type protections to various lengthy sentences. In 2014, the court further declared all mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution.

In relation to parole, Iowa Code 906.4(1) stipulates that parole must serve the best interests of both society and the offender, with the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) responsible for determining the likelihood of release without community detriment. A person is not considered a detriment if they can fulfill law-abiding obligations. The IBOP is mandated to systematically review the status of all individuals committed to the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) for potential parole or work release. The Iowa Administrative Code permits parole reviews based on inmate case files rather than requiring in-person reviews. Factors influencing parole decisions include the criminal record, details of the offense, recidivism, behavior, participation in programming, mental health, time served, and relevant risk assessments.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under either the Federal or State Constitution. They assert that Plaintiff seeks an enhanced parole review beyond what Iowa law provides for parole-eligible inmates. Defendants contend that the ruling in Graham pertains solely to sentencing procedures and does not extend to parole considerations, asserting that the only guarantee for Plaintiff under Graham is the avoidance of a life sentence without the possibility of parole.

The Court disagrees, noting that Graham requires that juvenile nonhomicide offenders be afforded a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, which can only occur post-sentencing. In Iowa's indeterminate sentencing system, this opportunity manifests during parole reviews. Although the initial sentencing judge was mandated to impose a life sentence without parole due to the Class A felony conviction, this was modified to allow for parole following the Graham decision.

The Court highlights that the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) holds the authority to determine the length of Plaintiff's prison sentence and is responsible for ensuring that he receives the constitutionally required opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation. Defendants also assert that the IBOP's procedures for reviewing Plaintiff's parole eligibility are constitutionally sufficient, implying that the IBOP considers relevant factors, including Plaintiff's age at the time of the offense and his subsequent maturation and rehabilitation, in its assessments.

Defendants assert that the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) acted within its discretion to deny Plaintiff parole, determining that his release was not in society's best interests. The Court, at this preliminary stage, cannot definitively conclude whether the IBOP's parole review procedures comply with constitutional mandates regarding juveniles. It must accept as true all factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, which include: the IBOP's failure to consider Plaintiff's youth, maturity, and rehabilitation; the denial of parole based solely on the seriousness of the offense without considering other factors; and the IBOP’s policies not accounting for youth and development at the time of the offense. These allegations form a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, suggesting that Defendants have deprived Plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity for release, thus potentially violating his rights against cruel and unusual punishment.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot base his claim of cruel and unusual punishment on the IDOC’s policy excluding him from sex offender treatment classes, as inmates lack a constitutional right to specific treatment. However, Plaintiff contends that this policy effectively denies him a meaningful opportunity for parole, as he cannot participate in required treatment without a defined discharge date, thereby leading to a de facto life sentence without parole, contrary to Graham v. Florida.

The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff’s due process claims arise from the same allegations as his cruel and unusual punishment claims, asserting that the parole review process and treatment policies deny him a meaningful opportunity for release. Defendants counter that these claims fail because Plaintiff lacks a constitutional right to parole or work release. Nonetheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established a plausible claim, denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss regarding both the Eighth Amendment and due process violations.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff lacks a protected liberty interest in parole, arguing that due process only requires adherence to specific statutory procedures for parole decisions. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot challenge the parole system's overall validity but may only contest the failure to follow established protocols. While Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s desire for parole is limited, Plaintiff's claims are broader, arguing that he is entitled to a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation," as mandated by the Graham decision. Unlike previous cases where a mere hope of parole was deemed insufficient for due process protection, Graham establishes a categorical entitlement for juvenile offenders to prove their readiness for reintegration into society. The court finds that Plaintiff's allegations, if true, indicate a denial of due process regarding this entitlement, thus rejecting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The court also recognizes the novelty of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, emphasizing the importance of allowing these theories to be explored in light of actual facts rather than dismissing them prematurely. Therefore, the court deems that further discovery and consideration of the case on its merits are necessary.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied. The Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 9 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, Section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. Courts assess punishments by looking at evolving societal standards, as established in cases like Graham and Roper, which emphasize that punishment should align with the severity of the offense and consider factors such as a juvenile's home life and likelihood of rehabilitation. The Iowa Constitution may offer stronger protections for due process claims than the Federal Constitution, as indicated by prior Iowa Supreme Court rulings.