Trout v. Village of Westmont

Citations: 68 F. Supp. 3d 961; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134219; 2014 WL 4770555Docket: No. 12 C 3504

Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; September 23, 2014; Federal District Court

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Frank Trout, former Fire Chief of Westmont, was terminated for misconduct on January 17, 2012, and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Village claiming unpaid compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), related state laws, and his employment contract. The court previously granted judgment on the pleadings favoring the individual Village officials named as defendants. The Village has now moved for summary judgment, which the court grants, determining that Trout was exempt from FLSA protections and that his contract claim fails because he terminated the agreement himself.

The Village's motion is supported by a Statement of Uncontested Facts in accordance with Local Rule 56.1, which requires the non-moving party to respond with record citations. While Trout's counsel submitted a responsive statement, it lacked complete citations. Key undisputed facts include Trout's employment history, starting as a "paid on call" firefighter in 1989, advancing to Deputy Chief and Administrative Officer, and eventually serving as Fire Chief from January 5, 1993, until his termination.

During Trout's tenure, a "Duty Officer" program was established, requiring an officer to be on call, which Trout, alongside other senior officials, participated in. The Village classifies the Fire Chief as an exempt employee ineligible for extra compensation as Duty Officer, while Deputy Chiefs and Captains are classified as non-exempt and do receive such compensation. Trout disputes this classification but fails to provide supporting evidence. As Fire Chief, Trout held significant management responsibilities, including overseeing fire services, enforcing regulations, and directing department activities.

Responsibilities included inspecting buildings for code compliance, attending meetings with three fire districts, and representing both the Fire Department and Village at various boards. The individual supervised approximately 110 employees, including key directors and the Deputy Chief of Administration. Duties extended to conducting interviews for hiring and promotions, recommending employment decisions, scheduling work hours and leave, ensuring employee safety, and implementing performance evaluations and training. Oversight also included managing the Fire Department's inventory, equipment inspections, and budget preparation.

The Village manager reportedly "rarely if ever visited" fire stations to evaluate management activities, and while the individual claimed some supervisory responsibilities were limited, evidence did not substantiate this. A memorandum from Village Manager Searl indicated a disciplinary suspension for the individual due to public comments made at a parade, which did not permanently revoke disciplinary authority but temporarily restricted command decisions for five days, with the suspension being paid due to the individual's exempt status.

The individual argued difficulty in independently authorizing small purchases, but a memo from Searl regarding budget constraints clarified the prohibition on using village funds for holiday cards, not a restriction on purchasing authority. Serving as Duty Officer was a significant responsibility outlined in the Fire Chief job description, which the individual confirmed was accurate. The individual filled in for this role when necessary and remained in charge of the Fire Department. Initially classified as a salaried, exempt employee, the individual did not receive additional Duty Officer compensation until 2001 when a request for extra pay was approved by the Village Manager and the Public Safety Committee, stipulating payment of one hour for every three hours worked beyond the normal shift.

Craig Skala, the Fire Department's Administrative Officer, confirmed in a February 25, 2003 letter to Ronald Searl that the Plaintiff would receive additional compensation starting March 2003. Under the Village of Westmont’s Municipal Code, Fire Department members' compensation is determined by the village board and included in the annual budget. The Village Manager has the authority to hire and set compensation for employees, but there is no record of a Board meeting that approved the additional compensation that Plaintiff received, which he claims is binding due to Botch’s agreement. By January 2012, when Plaintiff's employment ended, he was the highest-paid employee in the Fire Department with a salary of $125,289.84, significantly higher than others in similar roles.

In September 2005, with Ronald Searl as Acting Village Manager, budget concerns prompted discussions about reducing expenses, and the Plaintiff voluntarily decided to relinquish his Duty Officer pay, fearing termination if he continued to accept it. This decision was not prompted by any directive from Searl or any Village official, and the Plaintiff explicitly stated in a September 22, 2005 letter his willingness to forgo the additional pay as a contribution to the Village's financial stability. While the Defendant claims that Plaintiff stopped submitting payroll requests for additional compensation on December 26, 2005, the Plaintiff asserts he continued to submit timesheets until his departure. However, it is agreed that starting January 8, 2006, the Village stopped compensating him for Duty Officer shifts when he was not scheduled as Chief.

The Village Board did not take any official action regarding the Plaintiff's decision to forgo additional compensation for his Duty Officer hours. The Plaintiff was terminated in January 2012 due to a DUI charge, statements made during a Memorial Day parade, and inappropriate use of his official vehicle while off-duty. He seeks compensation for up to 1,900 hours worked as Duty Officer outside his regular Fire Chief shifts, claiming the position is hourly under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). However, he provides no supporting evidence for this assertion. Evidence cited indicates the Village did not compensate all hours worked, contrary to FLSA requirements, and the Duty Officer role was not a distinct position but a supervisory assignment for eligible officers.

The court identifies two main legal issues: whether the Plaintiff was entitled to compensation for Duty Officer shifts under the FLSA and state law, and if the Village had a contractual obligation to pay him for those shifts. It concludes both answers are "No." The Plaintiff concedes he is not seeking overtime pay and has received his full salary, which likely compensates for his full-time role. The Village argues he is exempt from FLSA protections, as the Act exempts employees in bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacities. The burden of proof for exemption lies with the employer, and if undisputed facts support the exemption, the employer is entitled to summary judgment. To qualify for the executive exemption, the employee must earn at least $455 per week, primarily manage, direct the work of two or more employees, and possess hiring or disciplinary authority.

The established facts demonstrate that the plaintiff meets all criteria for exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). His salary exceeded $455 per week, he supervised over 100 employees, participated in hiring and disciplinary decisions, and primarily engaged in exempt managerial activities as outlined in 29 C.F.R. 541.100(a)(2). Management duties included interviewing, training, pay adjustments, employee supervision, and budget management. The plaintiff's role as the Fire Chief confirmed that management was his primary duty, supported by his significant salary and the discretionary authority he exercised. 

The five-day disciplinary suspension did not permanently hinder his supervisory role, and the budget constraints regarding holiday gifts further indicate his involvement in financial management. Even when acting as Duty Officer, which was a minor portion of his overall hours, he remained in a managerial position. The plaintiff's assertion of dedicating “up to 1900 hours” to this role lacks substantiation, while his full-time duties accounted for approximately 12,000 hours from 2006 until termination in 2012. As a result, the plaintiff is exempt from FLSA protections, and the same standards apply under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, leading to the dismissal of Counts II and III of the Second Amended Complaint.

Additionally, the plaintiff claims a contractual right to compensation for Duty Officer shifts based on an alleged agreement with the former Village Manager. He cites the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, which mandates timely payment of owed wages upon employment termination.

The Village contests the Plaintiff's claim for Duty Officer shift pay based on two main arguments: the non-existence of an enforceable agreement and the Plaintiff's waiver of any right to enforce it. The Village cites the Illinois Municipal Code, its own ordinances, and the Illinois Open Meetings Act to assert that former Village Manager Raymond Botch's commitment to pay the Plaintiff was invalid due to lack of proper procedural adherence. Botch claims he hired the Plaintiff to the Duty Officer position with consent from the Public Safety Committee and the Board of Trustees, but fails to provide specific dates or details of this approval or how the Village complied with the Open Meetings Act. The court identifies a factual dispute regarding the enforceability of Botch's 2003 commitment.

However, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff voluntarily ended the arrangement when Ronald Searl became Village Manager in 2005, amid tight financial conditions. The Plaintiff was concerned that he was perceived as overpaid and willingly agreed to forgo additional pay, stating in a letter that he would do so during the Village's financial difficulties. Although he claims to have continued submitting timesheets for his Duty Officer work, he received no payment post-2006 and did not revive the agreement until after his termination in 2012.

The Village argues, and the court concurs, that the Plaintiff waived his right to enforce Botch’s commitment through both explicit renunciation and conduct that contradicts any intent to claim that right. This waiver is supported by legal precedents indicating that waiver can occur through actions, words, or conduct that are inconsistent with the intention to enforce a claim.

Plaintiff served as a Duty Officer for several years without compensation, as outlined in his job description, and took no action regarding unpaid wages until after his termination. His behavior indicates a lack of belief in the enforceability of an agreement for additional pay beyond his substantial salary. The Village is granted summary judgment on Count I due to the absence of claims against the individual Defendants, leading to their dismissal from the case. Although Plaintiff disputes having disciplinary authority, this claim is supported by his deposition testimony, which he fails to effectively rebut with record evidence. He acknowledges submitting time sheets marked "no pay at this time" to preserve his right to compensation, but his references do not substantiate this claim regarding time sheets in his responses. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the Village, granting summary judgment and concluding the matter against the individual Defendants.